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ABSTRACT 
 
In the belief that the disappointing rate of growth of Argentina since the 1930s was the 
consequence of excessive government meddling in the economy, in the mid-1970s the 
military government took the decision to attempt a radical change in the development 
strategy: the model of industrialisation based on import substitution was replaced by 
one based on the conviction that faster economic growth would result if market forces 
were given free rein, with the State taking a back seat. The de-regulation of the 
repressed financial system and the opening up of the economy to the world capital 
markets following the neo-classical principles in vogue at that time was the cornerstone 
of the new model of accumulation. It was believed that this would lead to higher rates 
of savings and investment coupled with a more efficient allocation of resources. This 
study uses the new information economics approach to explain why this experiment 
culminated in a dramatic financial collapse and generated a severe economic downturn 
with long-term consequences for the country. 
 
     4 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Like most worthwhile things in life, the completion of this thesis would not have been 
possible without the help and involvement of numerous people. Although I won’t be 
able to mention everybody, I would like to express my gratitude to those who made the 
greatest contribution, both inside and outside the LSE. First and foremost, I would like 
to thank my supervisor Dr. Colin Lewis, who has supported me throughout my studies 
with his patience, motivation, enthusiasm and knowledge, whilst allowing me the 
freedom to work in my own way. His guidance was of great help in the identification of 
the fundamental nature of my research. I could simply not have imagined having a 
better supervisor for my PhD. study.  
 
It is difficult to overstate my appreciation of those who have contributed to my research 
formation in economics at CEDES in Buenos Aires, where I spent four fruitful years. 
This dissertation has been positively influenced by much of what I learnt from Mario 
Damill, José María Fanelli, Roberto Frenkel and Guillermo Rozcenwurcel. The same 
words of gratitude are extended to Prof. Victor Bulmer-Thomas and José Miguel 
Albala-Bertrand of the Institute of Latin American Studies and Queen Mary and 
Westfield College of the University of London, and Prof. Juan Carlos Benítez, who first 
brought me into the world of monetary economics.  
 
I would like to thank Roberto Alemann, Adolfo Díz, José Luis Machinea and Ricardo 
López-Murphy, four participants in or witnesses to the economic policies under study, 
for taking the time to provide me with important information in personal interviews.  
 
In this incomplete list of acknowledgments, I cannot fail to include the names of Sergio 
Luna, Olli Haltia, Ernesto Piedras, Sara Gross, Leonardo Campos-Filho and Humberto 
Panuco for the stimulating discussions on economics and for all the fun we had during 
my time in London.  
 
Anita Freeman deserves a very special thank you for her advice on many aspects of 
the way in which my ideas were presented.  
 
I cannot close without saying how grateful I am to my wife and children for their endless 
patience, support and encouragement.  
 
 
 
 
5
 
 
THESIS OUTLINE 
 
           Page 
   ABSTRACT               3 
 
   ACKNOWLEDGMENTS             4 
 
   TABLE OF CONTENTS             5 
 
   LIST OF GRAPHS AND TABLES                      
   List of Graphs              7 
   List of Tables             8 
 
   LIST OF SYMBOLS             9 
 
   CHAPTER   I      GENERAL INTRODUCTION       11 
 
   CHAPTER   II      FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY    18 
                       II.1    INTRODUCTION         19 
              II.2     FINANCIAL FACTORS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH     21 
          II.2.1  Informational Problems in Market Efficiency     34 
     II.2.2  The Role of Financial Intermediaries      38 
     II.3     A GENERAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 44 
     II.3.1  Setting-up the Aggregation Procedure      48 
     II.4     A MACRO-FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FOR ARGENTINA    51 
     II.4.1  Matrix of Assets and Liabilities for the Financial System    53 
     II.4.2  Supply-Demand Stocks and Flows of Financial Assets    55 
     II.5     REAL AND FINANCIAL INTERACTIONS      58 
     II.6     CONCLUSIONS         60 
    
   CHAPTER   III       CHANGING THE MODEL OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION   63 
           III.1    INTRODUCTION         64 
                        III.2    THE MODEL OF INDUSTRIALISATION BY IMPORT SUBSTITUTION             66 
           III.2.1  First Phase 1946-63          79 
                        III.2.2  Second Phase 1964-75            86 
                        III.2.3  Financial Policy 1945-75            94 
                        III.3     IN SEARCH OF A NEW MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT                 98 
                        III.3.1  First Phase 1976-78          102 
           III.3.2  Second Phase 1979-81                  115 
                        III.4     POLICY REFORMS AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION      135 
                        III.5     CONCLUSIONS           147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
 
           Page 
     CHAPTER   IV     INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND BANKING SYSTEM 149  
             IV.1  INTRODUCTION         150 
                         IV.2   A STATE OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION      152 
            IV.3   INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THE FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION OF 1977  159 
            IV.4   POLICY REFORM AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE    165 
            IV.4.1 Market Competition and Financial Deepening     166 
            IV.4.2 Supply and Demand for Financial Assets      171 
            IV.4.3 Term-structure of Financial Assets      180 
            IV.4.4 Currency Denomination of Financial Assets     183 
            IV.4.5 Pitfalls in the Institutional Framework      188 
            IV.5    FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK     196 
            IV.6    CONCLUSIONS         206 
  
    CHAPTER   V       BANKING BEHAVIOUR, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND INFLATION 208 
           V.1     INTRODUCTION         209 
           V.2     ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, INFLATION AND FINANCIAL MARKETS  211 
           V.3     INTEREST RATES AND FINANCIAL SPREAD IN ARGENTINA 1977-81  216 
                   V.4     INTEREST RATE DECISIONS IN A HIGHLY INFLATIONARY ECONOMY 229 
                   V.4.1  A Model of Interest Rate Decision with Imperfect Information               231 
           V.4.2  Testing the Model: A Case-Study of Interest Rate Decisions under Uncertainty 242 
           V.5     MANAGEMENT OF LIQUIDITY RISK                  250 
           V.5.1  Net Defensive Position                    251 
           V.6     SPECULATION AND EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 259 
           V.7     CONCLUSIONS                     271 
 
     CHAPTER   VI     ECONOMIC CYCLE, BORROWER FRAGILITY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY  274 
            VI.1   INTRODUCTION         275           
            VI.2   FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC CYCLE    278 
            VI.3   ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 290 
            VI.4   BORROWER FRAGILITY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY                302 
            VI.5   CONCLUSIONS         310 
 
     CHAPTER   VII    GENERAL CONCLUSIONS                   312 
 
      APPENDICES                       319 
     Chapter III: Appendices A and B                 320-21 
     Chapter IV: Appendix                  323-37 
     Chapter V: Appendices A and B                338-40 
     Chapter VI: Appendices A and B                344-48 
 
      SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY                351-71 
 
 7
LIST OF GRAPHS AND TABLES 
 
 
Page 
List of Graphs           
 
Graph I.1 Total and Per Capita GDP Growth, 1930-90            13 
Graph II.1 Market of Credit               30 
Graph III.1 Domestic and External Demand, GDP, Industrial             
and Agricultural Outputs, 1945-75             75 
Graph III.2 Evolution of the Industrial Structure, 1945-75            77 
Graph III.3        Rate of Growth and Foreign Reserves, 1945-63         83 
Graph III.4        Growth and Inflation, 1964-74       88 
Graph III.5 Monetary Aggregates and Real Interest Rate, 1945-75            94 
Graph III.6 Quarterly Inflation Rates, 1976-78            109 
Graph III.7        Current Account and Private Capital Movements, 1976-78   110 
Graph III.8        Economic Growth and Cost of Bank Loans, 1976-78    112 
Graph III.9 Quarterly Inflation Rates, 1979-81            120 
Graph III.10      Financial Spread Between the Domestic and Foreign,          
Interest Rates, 1979-81              124 
Graph III.11      Changes in Private and Public Foreign Debt, 1978-81    130 
Graph III.12      Economic Growth and Private Capital Movements, 1978-81   132 
Graph III.13      Evolution of the Country’s Level of Solvency, 1976-81   145 
Graph IV.1 Stock of Financial Assets Held By The Private Sector, 1976-81         169 
Graph IV.2 Maturity and Term-Structure of Assets of the Private Sector, 1977-81        181 
Graph IV.3 Exchange Rate Risk of Financial Agents and  
Net International Reserves of the Central Bank, 1977-81                186 
Graph V.1 Inflation, Deposit and Lending Rates in Nominal Terms, 1977-81        216 
Graph V.2  Actual and Projected Rates of Financial Spread, 1977-81         227 
Graph V.3 The Loss/Gain Risk Function.             238 
Graph V.4 The Loss/Gain Risk Function of Argentina, 1977-81          243 
Graph V.5 Net Defensive Position per Unit of Deposit of the Aggregate  
Financial System, 1977-81             255   
Graph V.6 Net Def. Position per Unit of Deposit of the Bco Internacional, 1977-81          255 
Graph V.7 Net Def. Position per Unit of Deposit of the Bco de Los Andes, 1977-81         255 
Graph V.8 Net Def. Position per Unit of Deposit of the Bco de Intercambio 
Regional, 1977-81              256 
Graph V.9 The Loss/Gain Risk Function, Speculation and Excessive Risk,  
Taking in the Financial Market, 1977-81            260 
 8
 
Page 
 
Graph VI.1 Total Output and Stock of Banking Credits, 1977-81           279 
Graph VI.2 Net Worth and Net Financial Wealth of the Business Sector, 1977-81             281 
Graph VI.3 Virtuous Circle in the Real-Financial Interaction, Jul.1977– Jul.1979          288 
Graph VI.4 Return on Equity of the Sample of Firms (%), 1977-81           296 
Graph VI.5 Firms’ Assets in Default and/or in Bankruptcy, 1977-81           302 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table II.1 Stock Matrix of Assets and Liabilities for Argentina             54 
Table III.1 Aggregate Supply and Demand, GDP, Industrial and  
Agricultural Outputs, 1945-75                75 
Table III.2         Sequence of the Stabilisation Policies and Structural Reforms, 1976-81    100 
Table III.3         Key Macroeconomic Variables, 1975-78      105 
Table III.4         Key Macroeconomic Variables, 1978-81      119 
Table III.5 Fiscal Deficit and Its Monetary Financing, 1978-81           122 
Table III.6         Commercial and Capital Accounts of the Balance of Payments, 1978-81   127 
Table III.7         Stock of Private and Public External Debt, 1978-81      131 
Table III.8 Output Growth and Supply-Demand Des-aggregation, 1970-81          136  
Table III.9         Composition and Evolution of the Industrial Structure, 1970-81          138 
Table III.10       Saving, Investment and Financing, 1970-81      141 
Table IV.1 Stock Matrix of Assets and Liabilities, May 1977           155 
Table IV.2 Financial System: Number and Type of Institutions, May 1977-July 1979        167 
Table IV.3 Changes in Net Financial Wealth, Jul.1977 - Mar.1980            172 
Table IV.4 Changes in Net Financial Wealth, Mar.1980 – Mar.1980           177 
Table IV.5 Stock of Assets and Liabilities Nominated in Dollars, Jul.1977- Mar.1981        184 
Table  V.1 Financial Spread in Nominal and Real Terms, 1976-81           219 
Table  V.2 Determinants of the Financial Spread, 1977-81            225 
Table  V.3  Spread and Premium Paid over the Rate of Deposits in Real Terms on 
Average: Jul.1977 – Mar.1980               263 
Table VI.1 Estimation of the Net Financial Wealth of the Business Sector, 1977-82         286 
Table VI.2 Estimation of the Net Worth of the Business Sector, 1977-82             287 
Table VI.3 Profitability, Liquidity and Solvency of the Sample of Firms, 1977-81         292 
Table VI.4 Breakdown of the Return on Equity, 1977-81            296 
Table VI.5 Evolution of the Return on Equity: Real and Simulated Cases, 1977-81          300 
Table VI.6 Assets Under Judicial Supervision or in Bankruptcy, 1977-81          305 
 
  9
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
Note:  
- the variables in nominal terms are in CAPITAL letters; those in real terms are in small letters 
- the superscripts "s" and "d" mean ‘supply’ of and ‘demand’ for assets respectively 
- the superscript "i" means agent/sector and; the subscripts "t" and "t-1" mean a point in 
time. 
- (+) means assets and; (-) means liabilities. 
 
NWt  net worth      FWt net financial wealth   
At  stock of total assets     Lt stock of liabilities   
Ft  stock of financial assets    Kt stock of physical assets 
NFWt  net financial worth    SUPit financial surplus/deficit 
Yd        total disposable income                                      C       current consumption 
PI        physical investment of the private sector           Si       total saving 
X         exports of goods and services                            Ii        total investment 
Z         net financial payments received from abroad     T       government revenues 
G         public expenditures in current consumption       ΔX     change in the variable ‘X’ 
GI        public expenditures in capital goods             PS      surplus/deficit of the private sector 
M         imports of goods and services                     RWS   surplus/deficit of the foreign sector 
GS      surplus/deficit of the government sector         
 
Net Financial Wealth: 
fwp     private sector                                                 fwf      financial sector            
fwg     government                                                 fwrw    foreign sector       
fwcb   Central Bank   
 
Financial Assets (stock variables): 
mon currency in circulation                                
res banking reserves in the Central Bank          
ccbg credits granted by the Central Bank to the government 
dgcb deposits in local currency of the government in the Central Bank 
red credits granted by the Central Bank to the financial system 
sad saving deposits in local currency 
tip time deposits in local currency 
cred banking credit in local currency 
bon public bond in local currency  
jinv international reserves in the Central Bank 
jdep deposits nominated in dollar 
jcred credits nominated in dollar 
jbon public bond nominated in dollar    
totass total assets and;  totliab  total liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 10
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     (Shakespeare, Polonius, Hamlet, Act I, Scene III) 
 
 
 
 
            ‘’No people in the world like monetary experiments 
        more than the people of Argentina’’ 
        
                                                                          (Banker’s Magazine, London, 1899) 
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I.  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Argentina is widely considered to be a prime example of a nation which has never fulfilled 
its economic potential. Nobel Laureate Simon Kuznets once said that there were four 
categories of countries: developed, underdeveloped, Japan and Argentina1. In 1930, 
Japan ranked twenty-third among world economies and Argentina - with a GDP per capita 
2.3 times greater than the Japanese - was tenth and was generally regarded as a country 
with a bright future. In the early 1940s, another Nobel Prize winner, Paul Samuelson 
predicted that based on the abundance of natural resources, benign climate and its rich 
human capital, Argentina was a country destined to become an economic superpower2. 
However, by the mid-1970s, the country’s position in the world rankings had dropped to 
twentieth and Japan, despite its extremely limited natural resources, had jumped to tenth 
place. In the same period, Australia and Canada, those countries most similar to 
Argentina in terms of geography, population density, natural resources and with a 
comparable level of development in the 1930s, had achieved an increase in their levels 
of GDP per capita which was 44% and 74% respectively higher than that of Argentina. 
A similar pattern is observed when looking at the evolution of total output: GDP had 
increased in Australia by 39% and in Canada by 71% more than in Argentina3.  
 
This international comparison shows why Argentina is considered a ‘rara avis’ in terms of 
growth record. In most previous studies of development, the common view that explains 
the poor economic performance of this country is that it was due to excessive and flawed 
State intervention in the economy - direct State participation and badly designed macro-
economic policies and regulations - applied to encourage the process of industrialisation 
combined with repeated political upheavals. This may well be the case, between 1930 
and 1975 Argentina achieved a low rate of aggregate and per capita growth (2.9% and 
                     
1 Quoted by Iván Petrella, ‘’El fin de los errores groseros’’, La Nación, 24 July 2009.  
www. lanacion. com.ar/nota.asp/nota_id=1154185 
2 Quoted by Javier Millet ‘’Argentina y su Pasado’’, Digital Article. www. espahoy.com/ ensayos/ argentina 
y  su_ pasado, 2008 
3 Own estimation based on data obtained from A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992, 
OECD, 1995, pp. 180-81; 188-89; 194-95 and 202-03  
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1.09% per annum on average respectively) with repeated cycles of expansion and 
recession. Nonetheless, during this period, despite the general lack of dynamism of the 
economy - a fact which has attracted the attention of many academics worldwide - the 
overall rate of growth was positive, albeit modest, as can be observed in the graph below.  
 
Graph I.1 
Total and Per Capita GDP Growth, 1930 - 1990  
 (Index 1930=100)   
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 Source: own construction based on data obtained from Angus Maddison, Op. Cit., 1995, pp. 188-89 and 
202-03 4. 
 
 
However, when one looks at the evolution of the growth trend of Argentina what is most 
striking is that, between 1976 and 1990, the country was not even able to sustain the 
disappointing pace of growth of the previous forty-five years; that is, the average rate of 
growth of the period 1930-75. This can be seen in the graph above which depicts the 
                     
4 Updated data of these statistic series up to 2003 can be found in: www.ggdc.net/ maddison/ 
Historical.../horizontal-file_03-2007.xls 
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evolution of the level of aggregate output (index 1930=100) between 1930 and 1990, 
divided into four sub-periods of fifteen years each. In the first three sub-periods, (1931-
45), (1946-60) and (1961-75), Argentina managed to grow at a rate of 2.2%, 2.5% and 
3.9% per annum on average respectively. However, right at the beginning of the last 
sub-period (1976-90), the growth pattern of the previous years came to an abrupt end 
and the country entered into what later turned out to be its longest ever period of 
economic stagnation: total output dropped by 0.16% (0.01% per annum on average) 
and GDP per capita fell by 19% from US$ 8,132 in 1975 to US$ 6,581 in 1990; that is, 
to the level of 1968, twenty two years earlier. 
 
In a period of fifteen years (1976-90) in which Argentina did not grow at all, the rest of 
world experienced an important economic expansion (around 45% of their GDP) and 
countries like Australia and Canada registered growth of 60% and 61% respectively. As 
a result, Argentina dropped from twentieth to twenty-sixth position in the world ranking, 
whereas Japan - with a GDP per capita 2.8 times greater than the Argentine - reached 
third place5. A counterfactual analysis of this long period of recession is no less striking: 
if Argentina had continued growing at the average rate of the sub-period 1961-75 
(3.9% per annum), by 1990, the level of GDP would have been 58% higher - as shown 
by the dotted line of the graph above - and the GDP per capita would have been 84% 
higher (US$ 12,100)6. It should be stressed that the problems afflicting Argentina 
during these years cannot be attributed primarily to external factors since the major 
Latin American countries did not experience such a dramatic economic downturn. On 
the contrary, Brazil grew by 63%, Chile 90% and Mexico 62%.  
 
The natural question which arises is, therefore, what were the economic factors which 
brought about this sudden change in the growth pattern of Argentina in the mid-1970s 
and generated the longest period of economic stagnation in the country’s history?. In 
                     
5 Data obtained from A. Maddison, Op. Cit., 1995, pp.  
6 A counterfactual analysis which shows that Argentina could have experienced a similar growth rates to 
Australia and Canada over the period 1913-84 had different domestic economic policies been applied is 
presented in D. Cavallo, R. Domenech and Y. Mundlak, ‘’La Argentina que pudo ser. Los costos de la 
repression económica’’, Ed. Manantial, 1989.   
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other words, what was at the root of a period of recession which would surprise even 
those accustomed to the economic under-performance for which Argentina is widely-
known? The aim of this study is to address these questions and, in this way, fill a gap 
which is also surprising: the lack of thorough analyses of this subject in the literature.  
 
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the financial de-regulation experiment of the 
late 1970s, based on a narrow theory of financial markets, which failed to take into 
account the effects of high inflation and asymmetric information, was the fundamental 
cause of what can be called the ‘Great Stagnation’ of Argentina. The badly designed 
liberalisation of the financial system combined with the opening-up of the economy to 
world markets were key factors in the generation of a new type of macro-economic 
disadjustment, which caused a severe economic downturn and later restricted the 
country’s ability to resume growth for a lengthy period of time.  
 
In order to test this hypothesis, it was necessary to undertake an in-depth analysis of 
both the macro-financial structure and the borrower-lender relationship during the period 
of financial liberalisation (1977-81). This is the first time that this kind of analysis has 
been carried out to study the roots of the Argentine financial collapse of 1980-81. 
Previous works have looked at the banking sector in isolation and have not examined 
the full extent of the macro- and micro- economic interactions between the financial 
structure and the real side of the economy. These analyses also failed to take into 
account the problems of imperfect and asymmetric information exacerbated by high 
inflation and their consequences for the liberalised financial system. This dissertation is 
original for both the theoretical and the analytical approach used. With regard to the 
former, for the first time the Argentine experiment in financial liberalisation, based on 
neo-classical principles, has been examined in the light of the new theory of economic 
information. What also makes this study ground-breaking is the analytical framework 
applied, a matrix of assets and liabilities, which allows both a quantitative and 
qualitative evaluation of the financial structure of Argentina over the period 1976-81. 
This matrix incorporates the effects of the interactions of the real with the financial side 
 16
 
of the economy, stock with flow variables and the impact of high inflation on the 
behaviour of micro-economic units (borrowers and lenders) as well as that of the new 
institutional framework.  
 
One major obstacle which had to be overcome was the lack of quantitative information 
about the portfolio composition of the economic sectors and the financial relationships 
between them (Tables of Flow of Funds and Financial Wealth by Economic Sectors). In 
other countries, including some in Europe and the United States of America, this data 
forms part of the financial statistics officially issued by the monetary authority. In 
Argentina, however, this information is not in the public domain, although the raw 
statistics (balance sheets of the Central Bank and of the financial system as a whole) 
necessary to build up a picture of the macro-financial structure can be obtained. From 
this basic information and using a macro-financial framework, it was possible to 
produce new data to calculate the composition, distribution and evolution - stocks and 
flows - of the financial wealth of the economic sectors of Argentina, an essential 
component of an empirical study of this nature. Another factor which made it difficult to 
evaluate the extent and seriousness of the financial crisis of 1980 was the lack of 
information about the proportion of non-performing loans in banks. This was due to a 
defective regulation based on the philosophy prevailing at that time of the ‘free 
functioning’ of the financial markets, which did not require banks to inform the Central 
Bank about the state of their loan portfolios. This problem was overcome by using the 
financial data produced (Financial Wealth Tables) and the balance sheets of a sample 
of firms to estimate the extent of the problems of financial fragility and the gravity of 
distress borrowing on the part of bank debtors.    
 
After this brief general introduction, the dissertation is organised as follows: Chapter II 
explains the theoretical and methodological approaches to be used for the study of the 
Argentine financial structure and its interaction with the real side of the economy over 
the period 1977-81. Chapter III provides the historical background for the new model of 
economic development adopted after the military coup of March 1976 and gives details 
 17
 
of the policy-reforms, the short-term macro-economic dynamic as well as the structural 
transformation which ensued. The rest of the work focuses on the financial side of the 
economy, looking at the borrower-lender relationship from both a macro- and a micro-
economic point of view. In Chapter IV, there is a macro-economic examination of the 
effects of the financial liberation of mid-1977 on the country’s financial structure. It 
includes an assessment of the policy, economic and institutional factors responsible for 
the rapid process of financial deepening (credit boom), which culminated in a far-
reaching banking crisis at the beginning of 1980. From a micro-economic or sectoral 
perspective, Chapter V deals with the banks’ behaviour during the period of financial 
liberalisation and tries to understand why they charged very high real lending rates and 
financial spreads; and what effects these had on the credit risk positions of the financial 
intermediaries. The model of interest rate decision developed in this chapter is used to 
identify cases of excessive risk taking and speculative behaviour by some banking 
institutions and their effects on the aggregate financial system over the years 1977-81. 
In Chapter VI, the sectoral assessment of the debtor-creditor relationship is 
complemented by looking at the evolution of the financial health of the non-financial 
private sector (bank borrowers) and its consequences for both the financial system and 
for the country as a whole. Finally, the general conclusions are summarised in Chapter 
VII.  
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II.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter presents the theoretical and methodological approaches which will be used 
throughout the dissertation for the study of financial markets and their interaction with the 
real side of the economy in Argentina over the years 1977-81. It begins by reviewing the 
main schools of thought in connection with financial factors in the process of capital 
accumulation. This helps to identify the evolution of the ‘state of the art’ in understanding 
the full dimension of the nature and hence, the roles that the financial markets play in the 
economy. In addition, the theoretical foundations of the banking reform implemented by 
Argentina in mid-1977 are considered in depth. These include financial repression and the 
policy of financial liberalisation as a way of boosting the saving and investment rates and 
improving resource allocation in order to speed up the rate of growth.  
  
The Chapter aims at demarcating the theoretical approach to be used in the evaluation of 
the liberalisation experiment of the country under study. In this regard, the advances in 
both the ‘new economy of information and ‘new institutional economics’ are considered in 
order to explain the type of market failures which are widespread in the economy, and 
which have been overlooked by the neo-classicals. This evaluation is three-fold: one, to 
examine the cornerstones of the theory of imperfect information and its main contribution 
to a better understanding of capital markets; two, to contest the theory that freeing 
financial markets will encourage economic growth and; three, to establish the bases and 
concepts which will be applied thereafter in the analysis.  
 
The second half of the Chapter is devoted to the methodology for the empirical study. A 
macro-financial framework has been constructed taking into consideration the main 
features of the financial structure of Argentina and the availability of data. In order to have 
a practical tool, this financial structure is presented in one single table representing all the 
assets and liabilities held by the different categories of economic agents into which the 
Argentine economy was divided. 
 20
The Chapter is organised as follows: section two focuses on the main theories with regard 
to financial factors in economic growth. The rest of the work sets out the methodology. 
The building blocks of a consistent macro-financial framework and of the dis-aggregation 
procedure over assets, time and agents needed for the empirical assessment is shown in 
section three. A matrix of assets and liabilities for Argentina is developed in section four. It 
presents the methodology for the analysis of the composition, distribution and changes of 
portfolio and of the net worth of the selected economic units. This is completed with the 
‘supply of‘ and ‘demand for’ the whole spectrum of financial assets in order to evaluate the 
interdependency between individuals’ decisions in connection with portfolio allocation. 
Section five expands on the financial and output interactions by considering the necessary 
and the sufficient conditions for spill over effects in real and financial markets derived from 
a disequilibrium initiated in one of the two sides of the economy. Finally, conclusions are 
summarised in section six. 
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II.2 FINANCIAL FACTORS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
The central issues in economic growth are the generation and mobilisation of savings and 
the efficient allocation of these funds to productive activities (physical capital), to research 
and development (technological innovation) and to education and training of the labour 
force (human capital)1. Financial markets are at the hub of this process. This was 
recognised long ago by both admirers and detractors of capitalism yet, the nature and, 
therefore, the function of capital markets in the economy has been less well understood2. 
This helps to explain the different approaches which exist in connection with the role of 
financial markets in output determination. An evaluation of the main schools of thought will 
be instrumental in appreciating the progress of knowledge - state of the art - made in 
relation to the interaction between real and financial markets in the process of capital 
accumulation. In addition, this will be helpful for examining the hypothesis of financial 
liberalisation as a way of promoting growth which Argentina applied in 1977-81 as well as, 
for defining the approach and selecting the key literature to be used throughout the study. 
 
For the ‘classics’, financial markets perform the function of transferring resources from the 
units who save to those who invest. For this school, the rate of saving is the central factor 
determining the pace and level of overall activity. Thus, high rates of saving generate an 
ample supply of loanable funds in the market for credits and this, in turn, provides the 
means for the growth of investment. In the same vein, low rates of saving give rise to a 
limited amount of loans and high interest rates which ultimately discourage investment. 
                     
1 The importance of both ‘technological innovation’ and ‘human capital’ for economic growth has now been 
widely accepted. See R. R. Nelson and S. G. Winter An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 1982; 
R. R. Nelson, ‘’Why do Firms Differ, and How does Matter?’’, Strategic Journal of Management, vol. 12, 
1991 and; N. Stokey, ‘’Human Capital, Product Quality and Growth’’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 56, 
2, May 1991, pp. 587-616. 
2 John Locke, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and Joseph Schumpeter among other writers stressed the 
importance of sound money and unfettered financial intermediation. Karl Marx and Rudolf Hilferding are 
those who claimed that the financial system has pernicious effects on capitalism. J. Bentham, Defense of 
Usury., 1787; A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776; J. A. 
Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and 
Business Cycle, 1934; R. Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development, 
1910. 
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This indicates that the supply of, and demand for, funds in the credit markets coincide at a 
certain interest rate and, therefore, the macro-economic equilibrium is guaranteed. 
Accordingly, for this approach, financial factors play a passive role in the determination of 
output: changes in the rate of growth are only the result of an alteration in the country’s 
rate of saving, or as Adam Smith stated, the ‘thrift’ of the nation. James Meade has 
characterised this view neatly as: “a dog called saving wagged its tail labelled 
investment’’3.  
 
With the advent of Keynes’ General Theory, attention turned to understanding the 
mechanisms of market adjustment to a macro-economic disequilibrium and, to how the 
system could return to a position of full employment. One fundamental contribution of this 
author was the rejection of the idea that the rate of investment is determined by the rate of 
saving in the market for credits. That is, a firm’s investment decisions are decided on the 
basis of their profit expectations and the rate of interest at which the money can be 
borrowed, is only one and not necessarily the main variable in determining the investor’s 
decisions. More importantly, Keynes showed that any growth in activity caused by higher 
investment spending and propagated through the multiplier effect, will increase total 
income and thus the amount of saving4. This is contrary to the pre-Keynesian mainstream 
analysis with regard to the cause-effect relationship in the process of capital 
accumulation. Indeed, now saving is a passive variable which depends on total income 
and this in turn, fluctuates according to the level of investment. As mentioned before, the 
investors’ view of the prospects for the economy in general, or what Keynes called ‘animal 
spirits’ ultimately, shape the aggregate rate of investment and the level of activity5. This 
                     
3 Quoted in P. Bridel, Cambridge Monetary Thoughts: Development of Saving-Investment Analysis from 
Marshall to Keynes, 1987, p. 161.     
4 The multiplier effect arises because the propensity to consume and to save are both greater than zero 
and add up to one. Thus, the amounts of consumption and saving increase with the level of income and 
then, the expansion in consumption and saving leads to further increase in output. See Chapter 10 of the 
General Theory. J. M. Keynes The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936, pp. 107-
120.  
5 The driving forces behind the investment decisions - the marginal efficiency of capital - are the central 
factors which explain the fluctuation in the level of activity. J. M. Keynes, Op. Cit., Chapters 11 and 12 pp. 
123-143. 
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was stated by Joan Robinson as: “the central thesis of the General Theory that firms are 
free, within wide limits, to accumulate as they please, and that the rate of saving of the 
economy as a whole accommodates itself to the rate of investment that they decree“6. If 
one goes back to Meade: “a dog called investment wagged its tail labelled saving”7.  
 
This argument is consistent as increases in investment do generate, via the multiplier, the 
amount of saving needed to finance a given expansion in aggregate expenditure. The 
issue to be explained though is: how the increase in investment in the interregnum period 
is financed before the multiplier generates the necessary amount of saving. The response 
of Keynes was that the financial system as a whole - banking institutions and the central 
bank - should provide the means for financing the growth in investment regardless of the 
preceding pattern of saving flows: “the banks hold the key position in the transition from a 
lower to a higher scale of activity“8. They are responsible for temporarily reducing the level 
of liquidity, and for encouraging credit growth to match the increase in the demand for 
funds from borrowers. The rationale behind this is that it is in the interest of banks to do 
more business and, that the banks’ liquidity will be restored after the multiplier process 
has produced an increase in saving compatible with the new investment level.  
 
Nevertheless, the fundamental contribution of Keynes with regard to the interaction of real 
and financial markets in the process of capital accumulation is essentially the problem of 
coordinating saving and investment decisions9. This is explained by the liquidity 
preference theory proposed, which shows that in a world with only two assets (money and 
securities), the rate of interest is determined by the supply of, and demand for, money and 
not in the credit market, as indicated by the prevailing paradigm10. Thus, the supply of, 
                     
6 J. Robinson, Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, 1962, pp. 82-83.  
7 P. Bridel, Op. Cit., p. 161. 
8 J. M. Keynes, “The ’Ex-Ante’ Theory of the Rate of Interest“, (1938), in The Collected Writings of John 
Maynard Keynes, 1973, vol 14., pp. 222. 
9 A superb interpretation of this contribution is found in A. Leijonhuvud  On the Keynesian Economics and 
the Economics of Keynes: A Study of Monetary Theory, 1967.  
10 By taking into account the Walras’ law, when the money market is in equilibrium, the security market must 
also be in equilibrium. Accordingly, the security market can be dropped out from the analysis.  
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and demand for, loanable funds, are no longer essential for explaining the level of output. 
Instead, Keynes asserted that the reason for a macro-economic disadjustment lies in the 
inconsistency between the rate of interest obtained in the money market and the marginal 
efficiency of capital due to changes in individuals’ preferences for liquidity11. That is to say, 
the action of speculators, those who have incentives for holding money according to their 
expectations about future changes in bond prices - the inverse of the rate of interest, may 
end up setting a ’floor’ for the interest rate: the well known phenomenon of liquidity trap. In 
this situation, there is a strong probability that the price of bonds will drop and, therefore, 
the demand for money for speculative motives becomes highly interest-elastic, and an 
increased money supply will not produce a decline in the rate of interest12. If this rate is 
higher than the expected return on investment - the marginal efficiency of capital - then, 
the amount of investment will decline and this, in turn, will reduce the level of income as 
well as the rate of planned saving. In this way, Keynes showed that an economy can 
reach a new position of ’equilibrium’ without attaining full employment.  
 
The Keynesian revolution produced an explosion of research in the field of macrofinance 
during the post-second world war years. Most of this was concerned with the transmission 
mechanism of policy measures, and how the government could encourage and sustain a 
high level of economic activity. All this work made it clear that the financial markets 
perform another function in a capitalist economy: the transmission of monetary policy.  
 
There is a vast amount of literature on the topic which can be broadly classified in two 
different schools: the money-view and the credit-view13. Starting with the money-view, the 
                     
11 The idea of disequilibrium in the money market with consequences in output fluctuations was suggested 
earlier by other authors. R. G. Hawtrey Currency and Credit, Longman, 1919.; R. G. Hawtrey, Trade and 
Credit, Longman, 1928 and K. Wicksell Lectures on Political Economy, 2nd. vol, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1935.  
12 The liquidity trap is therefore, the result of an absolute preference for liquidity. The reasons of the 
demand for money because of speculative motives is explained by Keynes in Chapter 15, Op. Cit., pp. 
169-179.  
13 It reedits the debate of the 19th century in England between the ‘’Currency School’’ and the ‘’Banking 
School’’. A. J. Schwartz, “Banking School, Currency School and Free Banking School’, Money: The New 
Palgrave: A  Dictionary of Economics, 1987, pp. 41-49.    
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interpretation of the Keynesian theory made by Hicks in his famous IS-LM model came to 
reinforce the idea that with two financial assets (money and loans), the credit markets can 
be omitted from the analysis using the Walras law14. For this reason, it became generally 
accepted that currency was regarded as the only relevant monetary aggregate in the 
financial-output interaction for the writers who subscribed to the General Theory. This was 
strengthened later on, with the resurgence of the quantity theory of money first developed 
by the ‘classics’ in the 18th century15. Much of the revival of this approach is owed to 
Milton Friedman and Ana Schwartz for their studies of business cycles taking into account 
both the velocity of monetary circulation and the correlation between money, output and 
prices16. They argued that the Great Depression of the 1930s was due to a sharp and 
unusual monetary contraction applied by the Federal Reserve System when, the demand 
for money was growing and the velocity of circulation was declining. Thus, for the so-
called monetarists, the main variable affecting the level of activity in the short term, and 
the level of prices in the long term, is the rate of growth of the money supply. No other 
aspects of the financial markets play any role in output determination.  
 
The credit-view takes into account the whole process of financial intermediation and thus, 
the way in which the supply of credits is generated. It began with the contribution made by 
John Gurley and Edward Shaw, who challenged the previous studies that included money 
as part of the wealth of the society (wealth-view)17. In contrast, these authors claimed that 
money as well as all other financial assets have their corresponding ‘debt’ counterpart and 
this, in turn, implies a relationship between debtors and creditors (debt-intermediation 
view). By taking into account a spectrum of financial assets wider than just currency, new 
financial issues were considered in the study of the financial-output interaction such as: 
                     
14 J. R. Hicks ‘’Mr. Keynes and the Classics: A Suggested Interpretation’’, Econometrica, April 1937. 
15 A survey of the different versions of the quantity theory is provided by Milton Friedman. M. Friedman, 
“Quantity Theory of Money”, Money: The New Palgrave: A  Dictionary of Economics, 1987, pp. 1-40.    
16 M. Friedman and A. Schwartz  A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1963.  
17 J. Gurley and E. Shaw "Financial Aspects of Economic Development", American Economic Review, 
September 1955, 45, pp. 515-538. 
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(a) the substitutability of assets and the chain of interdependency of financial markets; (b) 
the stability/instability of the financial system and; (c) the depth of the financial structure 
and the importance of financial institutions in economic development. To begin with, 
individuals make decisions about how to allocate resources based on their personal 
preferences as well as on an analysis of the risk and return associated with the different 
real and financial assets. They consider simultaneously the whole set of assets as well as 
the interdependencies between the decisions that other individuals make. The portfolio 
approach suggested by James Tobin demonstrates that, for instance, an increase in 
money supply can cause a change in the return on money and so, in turn, can trigger a 
reallocation of individuals’ portfolios. In theory, and assuming no market restrictions as 
well as perfect substitutability among assets, a new portfolio equilibrium is achieved when 
the marginal return on allocating one dollar to each different asset coincides18. This 
means that the effect of an increase in money supply in the economy is not independent 
of the variables affecting the supply of, and demand for, the rest of the assets and of 
institutional or market restrictions including, for example, the fiscal deficit, the degree of 
substitutability of assets and of market segmentation, the individuals’ preferences for 
liquidity and so on. An important conclusion to be drawn from this approach is that by 
controlling the supply of one monetary aggregate (e.g. currency), the relative return on the 
whole spectrum of real and financial assets can be modified.  
 
The issue of instability of the financial markets and its effects on the economy was studied 
in depth by Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger19. In accordance with Fisher’s debt-
deflation theory, Minsky maintained that the over-indebtedness of firms during periods of 
economic boom causes the financial system to become more fragile finally, culminating in 
                     
18 This is the well-known theorem developed by J. Tobin, “Money and Economic Growth”, Econometrica, 
1965, 33, pp. 671-84. 
19 H. P. Minsky, ‘’Theory of Systematic Financial Instability’’, in Financial Crises: Institutions and Markets in 
a Fragile Enviroment, E. I. Altman and A. W. Sametz (eds.), 1977; H. P. Minsky ‘’Can it happen again?, 
Essays on Instability of Finance, 1982 and; C. P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes, 1978. 
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a process of debt liquidation with detrimental consequences for economic activity20. In a 
period of economic expansion, the confidence of banks and borrowers rises, resulting in a 
cycle of speculative investment boom which brings about an increase in lending well 
beyond safe margins. With firms in a position of being highly dependent on market 
finance, problems begin when the prospects for the economy change in the investors’ 
eyes, originating a period of business downturn which leads to a wave of bankruptcies 
with distress selling and asset liquidation. The deterioration in the cash-flows and net 
worth of borrowers reduces their levels of expenditure and this, in turn, causes a further 
decline in output and a deepening of the economic and financial decline. Thus, 
government action is needed to prevent the destabilising effects of financial markets on 
the economy in line with the Keynesian position.  
 
The importance of the financial structure and financial intermediaries in the economy was 
recognised long ago by Gurley and Shaw21. They claim that the significance of the stock 
of money in the economy declines when the financial development is higher. Hence, what 
is relevant for the economy is not dependent on the stock of money per se but rather on 
the overall ‘financial capacity’. This measures the borrowers’ capacity to absorb debt 
without having to moderate current spending and future demand commitments. Financial 
capacity is thereby, an important determinant of aggregate demand which, in turn, has an 
effect on business performance and the structure of the debtors’ balance sheets. In their 
view, financial intermediaries help to expand borrowers’ financial capacity by making it 
easier for investors to obtain greater amounts of funds and better credit terms than they 
could have otherwise achieved from directly issuing securities to lenders22.   
                     
20 The debt-deflation theory was the first meaningful explanation of the origin of the Great Depression. It 
appeared in the first issue of Econometrica in 1933, when the economic crisis was still in progress. I. 
Fisher ‘’The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”, Econometrica, October 1933, 1, pp. 337-357.  
21 J. Gurley and E. Shaw, Op. Cit.,  pp. 15-38 and; J. Gurley and E. Shaw, Money in a theory of Finance, 
1960. 
22 In this line of research, Raymond Goldsmith, Alexander Gerschenkron and Rondo Cameron - among other 
writers - followed a historical analysis to show the relevance of the financial structure and of banking institutions 
in economic development. R. Goldsmith, The Financial Develoment of India: 1870-1977, 1969; A. 
Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness in theoretical perspectives, 1962 and R. Cameron, Banking and 
Economic Development: Some Lessons of History, 1972. 
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In short, the credit-view school is comprised of those who believe that financial factors 
matter and that the financial intermediaries play a crucial role in the performance of the 
economy. The so-called ‘’neo-Keynesians’’ argued that the transformation of savings into 
investment is neither smooth nor automatic and, therefore, all the factors which intervene 
in the process of channelling resources become relevant for capital accumulation. They 
considered that the policy of the government should be to try to keep interest rates low in 
order to encourage the private sector to undertake investment projects, as well as to have 
better control over the effects of financial factors on the economic cycle. Moreover, for 
some of these economists, State intervention is needed to avoid the destabilising effects 
of financial markets on the economy. This approach helped to show the non-passiveness 
of the financial markets in the process of capital accumulation in accordance with Keynes’ 
belief that, for the economic activity, what actually matters is the rate of investment. 
 
However, it should be borne in mind that not only does economic growth depend on the 
amount but also on the efficiency of the resources which are invested23. The ground-
breaking studies of the efficiency of financial markets in economic development were 
carried out by Ronald McKinnon and Edward Shaw at the beginning of the 1970s24. 
These authors stressed the problems of financial intermediation in developing countries 
as a result of growing State intervention which implied, among other things, selective or 
sectoral credits, high reserve requirements, foreign exchange controls and interest rate 
ceilings on deposits and on loans combined with high inflation rates. All these 
mechanisms were used by governments to obtain different goals such as: the transfer of 
resources from the financial system to the public sector, a reduction in the costs of 
                     
23 During the 1960s and 1970s, the dominant theory in developed countries regarding allocative market 
efficiency of capital was the famous Modigliani-Miller theorem which states that: if the firm’s value could be 
changed by altering the financial mix (equity and debt), this would imply a pure arbitrage opportunity. 
Therefore, in a scenario of perfect capital markets, real economic decisions are independent of the 
financial structure. This theorem is the theoretical base of the neoclassical arguments in which, financial 
considerations are ignored in the study of the economic cycle. F. Modigliani and M. H. Miller “The Cost of 
Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment”, American Economic Review, June 1958, pp. 
261-97.  
24 R. I. McKinnon Money and Capital in Economic Development: Brookings Institution, Washington D.C 
1973; and E. Shaw Financial Deepening in Economic Development, 1973. 
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financing fiscal deficits, the encouragement of private investment in areas regarded as 
priority by the authorities, as well as the maintenance of a high level of economic activity. 
McKinnon and Shaw stressed that these practices lead to a state of ‘financial repression’ 
which seriously affects the quantity and the efficiency of the funds channelled throughout 
the financial system. This conclusion was reached following different but complementary 
elements of the process of financial intermediation. Whereas McKinnon’s model 
emphasises a direct relationship between the demand for money and physical investment 
in a world of self-financed agents (outside money), Shaw used the debt-intermediation 
view to show the whole process of financial intermediation, departing from the deposit 
accumulation and culminating in the expansion of the lending capacity of the banking 
institutions (inside money). It is acknowledged however that these analyses are 
complementary rather than rival theories, since most projects require financing from both 
their own funds and outside loans25.  
 
The essential common elements of the McKinnon and Shaw approaches can be 
summarised as follows: the larger the money stock in relation to the level of activity, the 
greater the extent of financial intermediation between savers and investors through the 
banking system. Graph II.1 presents the main features of this neo-classical hypothesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
25 L. E. Molho, “Interest Rates, Saving and Investment in developing Countries: A Re-examination of the 
McKinnon-Shaw Hypothesis”, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 33, 1 March, p. 111. 
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Usually, financial institutions mediate between savers and investors. At a given rate of 
economic growth (σ0), the supply of credit (S0) is a positive function of the interest rate in 
real terms. As mentioned earlier, a common practice in developing countries was the 
setting of interest rate ceilings which resulted in a chronic excess demand for loanable 
funds. The Graph above shows that, at the interest rate (r1), the supply of credits appears 
as the binding constraint in the credit markets and, therefore, the actual physical 
investment is limited to the available amount of saving (i0). McKinnon and Shaw highlight 
the fact that the allocation of funds which exceeds the demand for credits at the prevailing 
interest rate (i1 - i0) is made based on criteria other than market prescriptions. 
Alternatively, if the interest rate ceiling is applied only to depositors, the borrower will pay 
the rate (r0); that is, the rate which clears the market with a restricted supply of credits 
(savings). In this case, the resulting high spread of financial intermediation (r0 - r1) 
evidences the inefficiency of a banking system which operates with a deposit rate 
ceiling26.  
                     
26 M. J. Fry, Money, Interest, and Banking in Economic Development,  2nd  ed. 1995, p. 26.  
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In practice, the repression of the financial system usually includes not only ceilings on 
deposit rates but also on lending rates. This means that loans are allocated not according 
to the expected productivity of the investment but, according to the ‘influence of the 
borrower’ on the bank, provided that the financial conditions (borrowing costs and 
collaterals) are met. Among others, borrower’s influence can mean political pressure, type 
of collateral, loan size, friendships or even hidden benefits offered to loans officers (e.g. 
bribes and kickbacks). This policy has damaging effects on the average efficiency of 
investment since the selected projects are required to yield a return slightly above the 
lending rate ceiling. A direct consequence of this is the great dispersion in the rate of 
return on projects, which characterises the financially repressed economies, as shown by 
the dots in Graph II.1. 
 
All this led McKinnon to conclude that “in the face of great discrepancies in rates of return, 
it is a serious mistake to consider development as simply the accumulation of 
homogeneous capital of uniform productivity” and, that economic development should be 
seen “as the reduction of the great dispersion in social rates of return on existing and new 
investments under domestic entrepreneurial control’’27. Hence, the strategy of keeping low 
and negative rates of return on financial assets, thereby sustaining an excessive demand 
for loans, has strong negative effects on economic development for several reasons. It 
fosters current consumption instead of future consumption (savings) and potential lenders 
may decide to invest directly and not to borrow from the financial market. Interest rate 
ceilings may also create a bias which could favour credit allocation to low-yielding-
projects. The inability of borrowers to obtain credits in formal markets and the 
unwillingness of lenders to lend at the prevailing - formal - market rates result in 
segmentation in capital markets. Finally, the long-term consequence of a disincentive 
policy for accumulating domestic assets is a shallow financial structure.  
 
                     
27 R. I. McKinnon, Op. Cit., 1973, p. 9. 
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To deal with these flaws, McKinnon and Shaw recommended a policy of interest rate 
liberalisation28. It was believed this measure would have a beneficial effect on the overall 
economy by raising both the saving and the investment rates. In effect, an increase in the 
interest rate, from (r1) to (r*), would cause an expansion in the rate of saving/investment, 
from (i1) to (i*)29. In addition, free market determination of interest rates would improve the 
quality of resource allocation by preventing the financing of low-yielding projects as 
illustrated by the dots below the equilibrium rate in Graph II.1. By the same token, an 
improvement in the efficiency of capital investment generates an increment in the rate of 
economic growth (σ1) which, in turn, shifts the saving function to (S1). Thus, a new lower 
equilibrium rate (r**) is achieved with the corresponding levels of saving and investment 
(i**)  
 
To summarise, the McKinnon-Shaw study asserts that economic growth is a positive 
function of a country's financial depth30. For them, the liberalisation of the financial 
system is fundamental for achieving that goal31. Indeed, by accelerating the 
transference of funds from saving to investment units and improving allocation, 
financial deregulation will have a positive impact on the rate of growth and this, in turn, 
will contribute to the deepening of the financial system. The opening-up of the capital 
account to international capital movements is another key measure for the financial 
liberalisation school. Market competition will be fostered and this will reduce the 
interest rate differentials as well as market segmentation Thus, financial deepening is 
both a consequence and an essential element for economic development. 
 
                     
28 Following this advice, a far-reaching programme of financial liberalisation was implemented in Argentina 
between 1977 and 1981.  
29 E. Shaw, Op. Cit., 1973, pp. 81-83.  
30 Financial deepening is defined as the increment in the ratio of a country's total financial assets to its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).  
31 R. I. McKinnon "Financial Liberalization in Retrospect: Interest Rate Policies, in LDCs, in The State of 
Development Economics, Ed. by Gustav Ranis and Paul Schultz, 1988, pp. 388 97.  
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Although nearly two hundred years have passed between Adam Smith (1776) and Ronald 
McKinnon (1973), the main concern in the study of economic growth remains the same: 
how to generate sufficient amounts of saving and, how to make efficient use of these 
funds. Throughout this period, different views have been put forward to deal with the main 
problems identified in the process of capital accumulation. Each of these visions contains 
an explicit or implicit consideration of financial markets which, in turn, evidences a belief 
about the role that the financial intermediaries play in the market economy.  
 
The ‘classics’ believed that financial agents perform passively and smoothly the function 
of transferring resources from savers to investors, so as to make the needs of those who 
have funds coincide with those who can make use of them. However, it is necessary to 
ensure that the resources which are not consumed are invested in productive activities 
because one cannot count on savings being automatically converted into investment. This 
is so, as investors’ decisions depend on their expectations about the future evolution of 
the economy (animal spirits). Furthermore, the allocation of a given flow of saving 
depends on the relative return between real and financial assets which means, that the 
composition of individuals’ portfolios may heavily influence the degree of capital 
deepening and hence, the long-term rate of growth. Thus, coordination failures between 
savers and investors are central to the Keynesian approach. This author believed that 
market failures occur in both the money and credit markets and that, this is what ultimately 
accounts for macro-economic disequilibria.  
 
Finally, the allocative efficiency of funds is the main concern for the neoclassicals. With 
this conviction, McKinnon and Shaw argued that financial markets perform a vital function 
in economic development and that, the troubles in the developing world are due to State 
intervention in these markets. Therefore, only ‘government failures’ are to blame for the 
problems of efficiency in capital markets throughout the saving-investment process. 
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II.2.1 Informational Problems in Market Efficiency 
 
The foremost evolution of economic theory over the last thirty years or so has been to 
demonstrate that allocative efficiency in a market economy is a much wider issue than 
believed by the neo-classicals. They asserted that competitive markets produce an 
optimal allocation - “Pareto efficient” - and, therefore, all that is needed is to ensure a free 
market operation32. This theoretical approach, however, does not encompass the full 
dimension of informational problems which include, asymmetric information between 
individuals as a result of the division and specialisation of labour and of knowledge. When 
information is imperfect, the actions of agents have externality-like effects on others - 
adverse selection, incentive effects, moral hazard, co-ordination failures - which can have 
negative effects on the allocative efficiency of competitive markets.  
 
The first appraisal of market inefficiencies due to asymmetric information is based on the 
‘lemon’ idea suggested by George Akerlof33. This author studied the relationship between 
the quality of products and prices in the used car market34. The market price reflects the 
average quality of the traded product and, therefore, sellers of comparatively high-quality-
goods will be paying a premium to sellers of comparatively low-quality-goods (lemons). In 
this situation, sellers of high-quality-goods may wish to stay out of the market so as not to 
sell their products at the market price. This, in turn, causes a reduction in the average 
quality of the remaining goods that are offered in the market and thus, other agents with 
products of relatively high quality, may also decide not to exchange them at the market 
price; originating - once again - the problem commented on above. In an extreme 
scenario, no transaction is made and this causes a market collapse35.  
                     
32 A situation is called ‘Pareto efficient’ when it is impossible to increase the welfare of any party without 
decreasing that of some other party.  
33 G. Akerlof  “The Market for Lemons”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1970, 84, pp. 488-500. 
34 An excellent survey on the informational problems in economics is given by J. E. Stiglitz, “The causes 
and consequences of the dependence of quality on price”, Journal of Economic Literature, 25, pp. 1-48. 
35 The same idea was modelled by Gregory Mankiw for the financial market. N. G. Mankiw ‘’The Allocation 
of Credits and Market Collapse’’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, August 1985, pp. 455-70.  
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The consequences of informational problems for the efficiency of competitive markets was 
generalised later by Bruce Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz with the re-formulation of the 
Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics36. They showed that when information is 
not fixed - and in particular is influenced by the action taken by one or more individuals - 
or markets are incomplete, an economy is not constraint Pareto-efficient37. This indicates 
that the price mechanism does not provide all the relevant economic information and 
hence, government interventions, which include the costs of information and of 
establishing markets, can be welfare improving.  
 
Besides the restrictions on the allocative efficiency of markets, informational problems 
also explain the establishment of institutions needed for the running of the market 
economy. Indeed, it was first posed by Ronald Coase that the neo-classical model holds 
only under severely restrictive assumptions of zero transaction costs; when the 
transaction costs are positive, institutions matter38. As defined by Harries, institutions are 
“the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are the human devised constraints 
that structure human interaction. They are composed of formal rules (statutes, laws, 
common law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour, and self 
imposed codes of conduct) and the enforcement characteristics of both”39. With perfect 
and costless information, there would be no transaction costs since each party involved in 
a market transaction would know all the attributes of the goods or services traded as well 
as the attitude and behaviour of the other agent. In this case, the enforcement of a certain 
agreement would be unnecessary as the parties would know the exact result of the 
transaction well in advance.  
                     
36 A general methodology for the analysis of the welfare consequences of imperfect information and 
limited markets is found in B. Greenwald and J. E. Stiglitz, ‘Externalities in economies with imperfect 
information’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986, 101, pp. 229-264. 
37 These authors added the term constraint with the aim of indicating that the costs of information as well 
as of establishing markets were taken into account. 
38 R. H. Coase ‘On the problem of social cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, October 1960, pp. 1-44. 
39 J. Harris, J. Hunter and C. M. Lewis, “The new institutional economics and third world development” in J. 
Harris, J. Hunter and C. M. Lewis (eds.), The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, 
1995, p. 23. 
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In the real world, however, information is neither perfect nor freely accessible and, 
therefore, the market exchange is not without cost. Transaction costs are the costs of 
negotiating and carrying out transactions including: bargaining, planning and deciding 
what needs to be done, the costs of writing and enforcing contracts, the provision of 
incentives as well as the costs of enforcing agreements so as to ensure that people follow 
instructions, honour commitments and keep agreements. In other words, these are the 
costs of running the ‘exchange’ in the economy, and the size of these costs depends on 
the nature and on the way in which the transactions are made40. Kenneth Arrow defined it 
as the ‘cost of managing the economic system’41. This explains why transactions usually 
occur in the market when doing so is most efficient, or they are brought within hierarchical 
organisations when doing so minimises the transaction costs42.  
 
The economic performance of markets is therefore, subject to the design and functioning 
of the institutions. Paralleling the Greenwald and Stiglitz’ theorem cited above, it can be 
stated that the overall efficiency of the process of capital accumulation is under constraint 
to institutional factors as well. Alternatively, the economic institutions can be seen as one 
kind of ‘intervention’ in the purity of the neoclassical world of competitive markets, which 
can be welfare improving. Needless to say, the outcome will certainly depend on both the 
institutional arrangements and the way in which the non-market organisations are run. 
 
Briefly, informational problems can affect market efficiency from two different sides: when 
the standard operation of markets is altered by the effect of asymmetric information 
among agents (market failures) and, when there is a deficient arrangement, establishment 
                     
40 For a study of transaction costs and their economic effects see, O. E. Williamson, The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism, 1985, Chapters I and II and D. North ‘’Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic 
Growth’’, Economic Inquiry, 25, July 1987, pp. 419-428.  
41 K. J. Arrow ‘’The organisation of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of market versus non-
market allocation’’, in The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure. The PPB System, Vol 1, Joint 
Economic Council of the United States. 91 Congress, 1st Session, 1969, p. 48.   
42 These include all kind of non-market organisations such as private and public enterprises, civil service, 
government, non-governmental bodies, etc. A study of ‘markets’ and other ‘hierarchical organisations’ is 
found in O. E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications, 1975 
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and enforcement of the property rights and other economic incentives, which give rise to 
high transaction costs (institutional failures)43. Whereas the former is a modification in the 
structure of market information caused by the action of one or more economic agents; the 
latter is the outcome of the structure of incentives in which the economic agents operate. 
Additionally, these ‘two flaws’ may be closely interrelated since the individuals who are 
trading in one market are influenced by the ‘rules of the game’ - the formal and informal 
institutional settings - of the economy and at the same time, the institutional framework 
can be affected by the actions taken by these economic actors. This is very important 
because “the dynamics of the interplay between the rules and the players - the causality - 
is the critical factor for a society’s capacity to obtain the ‘right’ or the ‘wrong’ institutions”44. 
In this regard, one way in which the market-players may have an impact on the 
institutional framework is when their actions cause externality-like effects on other agents 
(incentive effects, moral hazard, adverse selection and coordination failures). For 
example, if there is an acceleration in the rate of inflation, the banks will shorten their 
lending. By doing this, the liquidity risk of the firms rises and consequently, the economy 
as a whole is adversely affected. In this way, the action taken by the banks to 
accommodate to a new institutional arrangement, causes a further change in the financial 
structure of the economy45.   
  
                     
43 ‘Institutional failure’ is a much broader concept than that of ‘government failure’. While the latter refers 
exclusively to State intervention in markets and/or its regulation, the former encompasses the design and 
the enforcement of all human devised constraints which structure human interaction. Within this set of 
constraints, government action is one among many other components of the institutional framework of the 
economy. 
44 E. Wiesner, “Transaction Cost Economics and Public Sector Rent-Seeking in Developing Countries: 
Toward a Theory of Government Failure”, Evaluation & Development: The Institutional Dimension, R. 
Picciotto and E. Wiesner (Eds.), Transaction Publishers, The World Bank, pp. 15-16.  
45 The other way in which the ‘rules of the game’ of a society are modified is when the individuals exert 
‘exogenous’ pressure on the government as a result of lobbying and of rent-seeking actions by pressure 
groups. This is commonly utilised in studies of the economic effects of institutional change in the long-run. 
In a short-term study like that of the financial reform in Argentina (1977-81), it is sometimes more fruitful to 
examine the ‘endogenous’ interaction between the market-players and the institutional framework in the 
way suggested above. This does not mean that institutional change in capital markets as a result of either 
the action of pressure groups or of a policy reform will not be taken into account in this analysis when 
appropriate.  
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This change means that the allocative efficiency, the cornerstone stone of the 
neoclassical theory of market economy will be affected. The free operation of markets is a 
necessary, but by no means a sufficient condition for attaining an efficient allocation of 
resources46. This is so because all markets operate within an institutional framework and, 
therefore, their performance is inevitably influenced by institutional factors. Market 
performance may be also affected by the uneven distribution of information and 
knowledge among individuals47. Thus, both the institutional settings and the distribution of 
knowledge and information among agents are crucial elements for an efficient operation 
of markets and should be added to the factors affecting economic growth identified by the 
Smithian, Keynesian and neoclassical schools.  
 
Although these factors affect all types of markets, the present analysis focuses on the 
problems of information in connection with financial markets only. The role of financial 
intermediaries will be examined in the light of the new informational and institutional 
approaches. 
 
II.2.2 The Role of Financial Intermediaries 
 
Traditionally, the roles of financial intermediaries (banks) were confined to the mobilisation 
of savings, agglomeration of capital, asset transformation and the transference of funds 
from those who have saved them (savers) to those who can make use of them 
(investors), plus the responsibility for running the medium of exchange. Thus, banks were 
perceived merely as providing the missing link between the financial products that firms 
wanted to issue and the ones desired by investors48. Today, thanks to the progress in the 
study of imperfect information, it is known that the process of intermediation between 
                     
46 The importance of market mechanisms in solving the issues of coordination and motivation of economic 
resources - the two central problems of any economy - is fully explained by J. E. Stiglitz, Whither 
Socialism?,1994, Chapters 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12.  
47 It should be pointed out that the macro-economic disequilibrium highlighted by Keynes, the coordination 
failure between saving and investment units, arises because of asymmetric information between savers 
and investors. This shows the relevance of informational problems in the determination of output.  
48 J. Gurley and E. Shaw, Money in the theory of finance, 1960  
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borrowers and lenders entails special information-gathering activity and this explains 
some other functions of banks which are fundamental for the overall efficiency of the 
economy. These functions include:49  
 
a. Screening and selecting projects and borrowers: out of the whole distribution of projects 
and borrowers, the banks have to distinguish and to choose: (i) which projects are likely to 
yield the highest return, which will enable the borrower to repay the loan; and (ii) who are 
the most trustworthy borrowers to whom the banks can allocate their credits.   
b. Monitoring the use of funds: by understanding that borrowers and lenders have rival 
interests, it is necessary to ensure that the funds borrowed will be used as promised.  
c. Enforcing contracts: making sure that the funds borrowed will be repaid or, that the 
lender’s rights over the borrower will be exercised.   
d. Managing risks: the asset transformation of banks gives rise to three kinds of risk: 
liquidity, interest rate and credit risks. It is the aim of the intermediaries to reduce or to 
eliminate these risks by: (i) ‘transferring and sharing’ them with other economic agents, (ii) 
‘diversifying’ both their assets and liabilities as well as their debtors and creditors and; (iii) 
‘pooling’ a large number of investment projects. 
 
What follows is devoted to showing the importance of banks in the determination of output 
in line with the theoretical approach adopted and to developing the rationale which will be 
used in the analysis later on. The study of asymmetric information in credit markets 
encompasses the quality of borrowers and projects and its effects on the maximisation 
process of banking institutions50. In a seminal paper, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss 
pointed out that a bank, like any other firm, tries to maximise the net expected return per 
                     
49 The management of risks of the financial intermediaries is analysed later in Chapter V. Chapter VI deals 
with the consequences of screening and selecting projects and borrowers, as well as of enforcing 
contracts and monitoring the use of funds which the banks made in Argentina over the period 1977-81.  
50 The consequence of asymmetric information in credit markets was first studied by Jaffee and Russell in 
the 1976. D. Jaffee and T. Russell “Imperfect Information and Credit Rationing”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, November 1976, 90, pp. 651-66. 
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dollar lent51. Interest rate increases, however, may have an impact on the quality of loan 
allocation because, one, a higher proportion of riskier borrowers will take up the loan offer, 
whereas risk averse borrowers, those who are unlikely to default, will drop out of the 
applicant' list, and two, all borrowers will tend to change the nature of their projects so as 
to make them more profitable and accordingly, riskier. The former is called the ‘adverse 
selection’ effect and, it refers to the economic consequences of changes in the interest 
rates on the borrowers’ quality. The latter is known as the ‘incentive effect’ and entails the 
changes in the project’s quality as well as its negative effect on loan repayment 
afterwards.  
 
In capital markets where investment projects contain different levels of risk, a competitive 
equilibrium may entail credit rationing52. This occurs because the expected returns on 
loans decrease as a larger share of these loans are allocated to riskier projects. When 
there is asymmetric information between borrower and lender, the interest rate which 
maximises the bank's return may not be that which clears the market. Accordingly, credit 
rationing can be an optimal solution when the information costs of distinguishing the risk 
characteristics of different borrowers/projects are extremely high. In this situation, the loan 
supply curve bends backwards and after a certain point, a higher interest rate will only 
make the supply of credits decrease, worsening the excess demand for loans. At that 
point, the lender will find it profitable not to increase the loan rate but to ration credits.  
 
Adverse selection and incentive effects are ex-ante problems of asymmetric information. 
These effects are seen in a situation in which an agent has more information about the 
quality of the investment project, and the uninformed party can either act to influence the 
mix of borrowers or to induce them to reveal, through their actions, their creditworthiness. 
The ex-post consequence of having differential information between borrowers and 
                     
51 J. E. Stiglitz and A. Weiss "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information", American Economic 
Review, June 1981, 71 (3), pp. 393-410.  
52 J. E. Stiglitz and A. Weiss (1981), Op. Cit., p. 397. 
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lenders is connected with the borrower’s incentives to engage in activities which can 
benefit himself at the expense of the lender. These are the so-called moral hazard or the 
‘hidden action’ and ‘hidden knowledge’ problems of asymmetric information. Here, lender 
and borrower have the same information about the feature and quality of the loan 
allocation, yet the outcome of an investment project depends on uncertain variables (e.g. 
behaviour of the debtors, state of the world, etc.), which are not freely observable by all 
parties. Since the amount owed to lenders is usually subject to the realisation of random 
variables, debtors will always have the incentive to misbehave and to misrepresent the 
project’s result so as to lower the payments to the creditors. From the lender’s point of 
view, this is the reason for incurring costs in order to monitor the allocation, use and yield 
of the funds lent. 
 
The costs of monitoring loans subject to the probability distribution of a project’s yield - 
state of the world -  is the central argument of the ‘costly state verification approach’ put 
forward by Robert Townsend53. It should be emphasised that these costs are not only the 
costs of auditing and verification of the true value of the project’s outcome or a firm but 
also the costs of realisation of assets if borrowers go bankrupt including, the division of 
assets among creditors with different rights, and the differential value which the assets 
may have for creditors and debtors. This approach provides a framework for the 
incorporation of incentive problems into the cost of the lending process, as well as for 
understanding the nature and features of other topics such as debt contracts, the financial 
intermediation process, the allocative consequences of asymmetric information, and the 
effect of financial factors on output fluctuations.  
  
Based on this approach, Ben Bernanke made a significant contribution in relation to the 
transmission mechanisms of financial disruption on economic activity54. With asymmetric 
                     
53 R. M. Townsend “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification”, Journal of 
Economic Theory, October 1979, 21, pp. 265-93. 
54 B. Bernanke “Non Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression”, 
American Economic Review, June 1983, 73, pp. 257-276.   
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information, banks need to develop special information processing skills. In this regard, 
the cost of obtaining information associated with the borrowers’ creditworthiness and the 
project’s quality makes the market for credit a ‘customer market’55. Consequently, an 
important economic shock can destroy this ‘customer relationship’ which, in turn, restricts 
the effectiveness of the financial system as a whole in collecting and processing 
information as to the creditworthiness of borrowers.  
 
By the same token, the endogenous interaction between financial structure and aggregate 
economic activity was also evaluated in a scenario of debt contracts with costly default. 
Within these studies, the most convincing are those which show the relationship between 
the level of investment and the borrower balance sheet position56. The argument runs as 
follows: the strong balance sheet position of the borrower implies that he has assets to 
offer as collateral for obtaining external funds. This helps to reduce the informational risk 
that outside lenders, face resulting in lower borrowing costs which, in turn, stimulate the 
rate of investment. As Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler stressed: “the market equilibrium 
level of investment depends positively on the borrower balance sheet position, defined as 
the ratio of net worth to liabilities”57. The same idea was considered in the evaluation of 
the high sensitivity of the positive relationship between cash-flows and the investment 
rate. With no informational problems, it is likely that an improvement in cash-flows will 
generate further internal funds to finance an increase in investment. However, an 
additional effect may occur with imperfect information because an increase in cash-flows 
will strengthen the balance sheet position of companies, lowering the probability of default 
and increasing their chances of financing their investments from external sources. The 
                     
55 This theory has been used to explain the length and depth of the recession during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. 
56 See, for instance, B. Bernanke and M. Gertler, “Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluctuations, 
American Economic Review, March 1989, 79, 1, pp.14-31; C. W. Calomaris and R. G. Hubbard “Firm 
Heterogeneity, Internal Finance and Credit Rationing”, The Economic Journal, March 1990, 100, 90-104; 
and M. Gertler “Financial Capacity and Output Fluctuations in an Economy with Multi-Period Financial 
Relationships”, Review of Economics Studies, 1992, 59, pp. 455-472.   
57 B. Bernanke and M. Gertler, “Financial Fragility and Economic Performance”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1990, p. 573. 
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importance of this income-accelerator effect has been confirmed by several empirical 
studies58. 
 
In brief, with asymmetric information, a substantial increase in the market rate of interest 
due to market disajustments, macro-economic shocks, or policy mistakes might worsen 
the economic problems of adverse selection, incentive effect, moral hazard and 
coordination failures. This may lead to a significant drop in lending which, in turn, may 
cause a decline in investment and in the level of activity. It should be noted that this 
interaction between real and financial variables is an endogenous outcome as a result of 
changes in the structure of information of borrowers and lenders. Moreover, if the 
structure of incentives - the rules of the game - of the economy is negatively influenced by 
the action taken by some market-players, cases of opportunistic behaviour, cheating and 
fraud may came to be regarded as acceptable behaviour and ‘rewarded’. In this scenario, 
the rate of growth could be affected by institutional and informational weakness even if the 
financial markets are operating freely in line with the prescription put forward by the 
neoclassicals59. 
 
This thesis will use the theory of imperfect and asymmetric information to re-examine the 
Argentine financial liberalisation experiment, carried out in the late 1970s in accordance 
with the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. While other authors have studied this financial 
reform, this is the first time that it has been done applying the new information economics 
approach. 
                     
58 See for instance, O. Eckstein and A. Sinai “The Mechanism of the Business Cycle in the Post-War Era”, 
in The American Business Cycle: Continuity and Change, R. Gordon (Ed.), 1986; S. Fazzari, R. Hubbard 
and B. Petersen “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment”, Broking Papers on Economic Activity, 
1988, 1, pp.141-206; M. Devereux and F. Schiantarelli, “Investment, Financial Factors and Cash-Flows: 
Evidence from U. K. Panel Data”, Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989, No. 
3116; T. Hoshi, A. Kashyap and D. Scharfstein, “The Role of Banks in reducing the Costs of Financial 
Distress in Japan”, Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990, No. 3435. 
59 A study of the micro-macro interaction between the market-players and the institutional framework in the 
financial system of Argentina between 1977 and 1981 is presented later in Chapter VII. 
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II.3 A GENERAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
This section is devoted to the building up of a consistent macro-framework for the study of 
the Argentine financial structure. The theoretical foundation of this analytical framework is 
the credit-view advanced by Gurley and Shaw60. The starting points are the wealth and 
income identities of individuals61. There are several advantages to the notion of building 
this framework on accounting principles. First, it assures macro-consistency, as it is based 
on the income and wealth restrictions faced by all economic agents. Secondly, the 
distinction between stock and flow variables arises naturally from the balance sheets and 
from the economic statements. Thirdly, the notion of net financial wealth shows the 
monetary character of one economy, as well as the connection between real and financial 
variables. Finally, by following the procedure in which the information is actually collected, 
the empirical running of this analytical tool is guaranteed. 
 
This section begins by presenting a general outline defining the basic concepts of the 
financial framework. First of all, it is essential to define the notion of net worth (thereafter 
NW) in nominal terms for the individual (i) at time (t) as the difference between his stocks 
of total assets (At) and liabilities (Lt)62. That is63,  
 
(1)  NWt = At - Lt = Ft + Kt - Lt   with At = Ft + Kt 
 
where Ft = stock of financial assets 
 Kt = stock of physical assets 
                     
60 See above Chapter II, Section 2 
61 The theoretical grounds of this financial framework can be found in: J. Tobin “A general equilibrium 
approach to monetary theory”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1969 no. 1. J. Tobin “Money and finance 
in the macroeconomic process”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, May 1982, vol.68, no.2. J. Drabicki and 
A. Takayama "The General Equilibrium Framework of Economic Analysis: stock and flows with special 
application to macroeconomic model", in Green y Scheykman (Eds.) General Equilibrium Growth and Trade. 
Essays in Honour of L. Mc. Kenzie, 1979; S. Turnovsky  Macroeconomic Analysis and Stabilization Policy, 
1981; and J. M. Fanelli "Topicos de Teoría y Politíca Monetaria", Serie Docente, CIEPLAN, Santiago, August 
1991, No. 5   
62 From now, unless specified otherwise, the terms individual, agent or economic sector are considered 
synonymous. 
63 The subindex (i) is eliminated to simplify. 
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As shown in the identity (1), an individual's net wealth is likely to contain both financial and 
physical assets. In order to focus the analysis on the financial side only, the concept of net 
financial wealth (FWt) needs to be introduced. FW is defined as the difference between 
the stocks of total financial assets and liabilities. FW can also be expressed as the net 
total worth minus the stock of physical assets. Hence, the net financial worth of an 
individual in nominal terms at time (t) can be written as follows: 
 
(2)  FWt = NWt - Kt = Ft - Lt       
 
It is a basic financial principle that each creditor has one or more debtors, and financial 
assets held by an individual are the liabilities of other(s) agent(s). This means that in an 
aggregation over individuals/sectors, assets/liabilities within the same group cancels itself 
out. Therefore, the financial wealth of one economic sector consists of its net claims on 
agents outside its group. Extending this argument to society as a whole, all financial 
relationships cancel each other out and thus, the stock of financial assets for the economy 
as a whole is zero. That is to say, the total wealth of a society becomes merely its stock of 
physical capital. Formally, this can be stated as: 
 
(3)  ∑ NWit - ∑ Kit =  ∑ FWit = 0  with i = 1,...,n   
 
So far, the analysis has dealt with stock variables at a point in time. Over a period of time, 
the stocks of productive - financial and capital - assets generate a flow of income, which 
individuals can consume and/or save. It is known that the stock of capital increases with 
flows of net physical investment and the stock of financial wealth rises with positive net 
financial-savings or surplus (SUP), the part of the total disposable income that is allocated 
to increasing individuals' net financial wealth. 
 
Taking the above-stated financial principle, when an agent is buying financial instruments, 
there must be one or more agents who are selling those assets so as to obtain financing 
for their deficits. In other words, the net change in an individual's financial wealth must be 
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equal to an opposite variation in the net financial wealth of one or more other agents. 
Accordingly, for the overall economy, changes in financial wealth are always zero. 
 
 (4)  SUPit  =  Δ FWit = 0     with = 1,...,n   
 
Now, the real side of the economy is considered. The surplus (SUPi) of an individual (i) at 
period (t) can be defined as the difference between his flows of income-savings (Si) and of 
physical investment (Ii). It should be emphasised that an individual’s savings are made up 
of the difference between disposable income and consumption. This means that the 
surplus of an economic unit is equal to the flow of savings net of its investments in 
physical assets64.  
 
(5)  SUPi = Si - Ii 
 
As Fanelli pointed out, a surplus exists only in a monetary economy, since this is the part 
of disposable income which is neither consumed in capital nor in consumer goods65. 
Indeed, in a barter economy ‘goods are exchanged for goods’ and therefore, there is no 
way of keeping income in other stores of value except in goods. In this type of economy, 
every agent has a surplus which is identical to zero. This implies that for each individual - 
and hence for the whole society - the planned rate of saving is equal to the planned rate 
of investment and consequently, the macro-economic equilibrium is always secured. 
However, in a monetary economy, the existence of ‘surpluses’ and ‘deficits’ means 
financial relationships between borrowers and lenders. Since savings units can differ from 
investment units, the ex-ante total savings may not be equal to the aggregate physical 
investment. This is the Keynesian-problem mentioned above of co-ordinating ex-ante 
global saving and investment rates in order to obtain macro-economic equilibrium. 
 
The aggregated budget constraint of the economy shows that total expenditure must be 
                     
64 In order to simplify, the subindex [t] is omitted. 
65 J. M. Fanelli (1991), Op. Cit., p. 27. 
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equal to the global income. Thus, 
 
(6)  Yd + M + Z + T - (C + PI + G + GI + X) = 0 
 
Where these symbols mean: total disposable income (Yd); current consumption (C) and 
physical investment (PI) of the private sector. Imports (M) and exports (X) of goods and 
services; and net financial payments received from abroad (Z). Government revenues (T); 
and public expenditures in current consumption (G) and in capital goods (GI).  
 
The above identity can also be written as follows: 
 
(7)  (PS - PI) + (GS - GI) + (RWS) = 0 
 
where:  PS = Yd  – C = private sector saving;  
  GS = T – G = government saving and; 
  RWS  = foreign sector saving.  
 
The global budget restriction (expression 7) implies that - ex-post - the sum of the 
sectorial surplus in the economy must be equal to zero [ ∑SUPit = 0; with (i) = the private, 
government and foreign sectors]. This macro-economic condition of consistency can also 
be attained by considering the financial side of the economy (see above expression 4). 
This is so because the connection between the real and financial variables is implicit in 
the definition of surplus. Therefore, changes in the financial wealth of an agent in one 
period can be written as the difference between the stocks at the beginning and at the end 
of the period plus/minus the capital gains/losses on its portfolio due to changes in relative 
prices66. Formally, this is as follows: 
                     
66 Although it is beyond the scope of this study, capital gains/losses on financial portfolios caused by 
changes in relative prices and inflation can be easily incorporated into this framework. It should be pointed 
out that the surplus of an individual may not coincide with changes in his stock of financial wealth, if there 
is wealth re-distribution due to capital gains/losses (wealth-effect). This point is discussed in J. M. Fanelli 
Desequilibrio macroeconómico, restricciones financieras y políticas de estabilización, 1988. 
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(8)  SUPit + δ  = ΔFWit = FWit - FWit-1           where δ = capital gains/losses 
 
The expression (8) shows the main properties of the selected financial framework which 
include: one, the natural integration of stock-flow variables; and two, the interaction of the 
real and financial markets in a consistent macro-economic framework. This macrofinancial 
analysis can be applied to different levels of des-aggregation over assets, agents/sectors 
and periods. In general, the availability of information is the only restriction on the 
achievement of higher levels of dis-aggregation. 
 
II.3.1 Setting up the Aggregation Procedure 
 
Aggregation implies simplification. Simplification should be carried out by considering 
what is relevant and what is of secondary importance in a specific analysis. Axel 
Leijonhufvud rightly stressed: "the choice of a specific aggregation will depend on the 
limits of tolerable approximation that this context imposes"67. Since this is a general rule 
for ‘making abstractions’ in social sciences, two fundamental elements were taken into 
consideration in the building of the macro-financial framework presented below: one, the 
main features of the Argentine financial structure; and two, the availability of information 
on both the degree of dis-aggregation and the periodicity of the data. These are the 
criteria taken into account in the dis-aggregation over agents, assets and periods shown 
below.  
 
Aggregation over agents: the distribution effect is the most important assumption which 
has to be made when aggregating over individuals. It is implicitly assumed that the wealth 
and the income effect of price changes are cancelled out within the aggregate. That is to 
say, the matrix of the financial relationships among agents of one sector (aggregate) is 
                     
67 A. Leijonhuvud On the Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes: A Study of Monetary Theory, 
1967, p. 112 
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omitted. The purpose of this study is the evaluation of the financial relationships of the 
banking institutions with the other sectors. The financial structure of Argentina is therefore, 
divided into the following sectors: 
• Financial Sector: this is made up of two types of financial intermediaries: (a) private 
and public banking institutions (commercial and saving-investment banks). (b) non-
banking financial institutions, the so-called financieras.  
• Government Sector: this includes the central administration, the provinces and the 
public enterprises. 
• Private Sector: the non-financial private sector aggregates the sub-sectors of family 
and private enterprises. As mentioned above, no information is available to evaluate 
the financial relationships between these two sub-sectors. 
• The Central Bank: this deals with the financial relationship between the monetary 
authority with the National Treasury as well as with the financial system. The Central 
Bank is responsible for monetary policy and for the control and supervision of the 
financial intermediaries. 
• Foreign Sector: this is comprised of the financial relationships between the domestic 
economic units and the international capital market. 
 
Aggregation over assets: it should be noticed that the implicit assumption in aggregating 
over assets is that the assets of one group, become perfect substitutes. This was pointed 
out by John Hicks: “if the prices of a group of goods (assets) change in the same 
proportion, that group of goods (assets) behaves as if it were a single commodity 
(asset)”68. By applying this ‘theorem’, the aggregation of financial assets into one single 
asset implies that changes in return/risk of assets inside the group are of no importance 
for the analysis.  
 
The type of risk associated with each asset is the criterion used for aggregation in this 
                     
68 J. R. Hicks Value and Capital: an inquiry into some fundamental principles of economic theory, 2dn ed. 
1946, Mathematical Appendix, 10, pp. 312-13.  
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study. This requires the identification of the event that has the greatest influence on the 
expected return on assets in real terms69. As the thesis will demonstrate, in Argentina, the 
most important risk factors are: changes in the nominal level of price (inflation risk), 
changes in the nominal exchange rate (devaluation risk) and, changes in the nominal 
return on domestic assets (interest rate risk). This indicates that an analytical tool suitable 
for the study of the financial relationships of that country must contain - at least - the 
following categories of assets: currency; domestic assets and foreign assets.  
 
Aggregation over periods: this refers to the aggregation of time-decision-making of 
agents regarding their portfolio allocation. In practice, these decisions are taken 
continuously. Therefore, the shortest possible period of analysis is needed in order to 
simulate the dynamic process of a portfolio allocation by taking a comparative static 
method. In this evaluation, the series of snapshots will be taken on a monthly base, 
which is the shortest period of time in which the empirical information needed is 
available. This means that this assessment considers only portfolio decisions which are 
re-viewed at the end of each month. A monthly-period analysis is regarded as a good 
approximation of reality in relation to the financial decisions taken in Argentina over the 
period 1977-81.  
 
                     
69 For the difference between "type" and "degree" of risk, see A. Leijonhufvud, Op. Cit., 1968, pp. 122-30. 
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II.4 A MACROFINANCIAL STRUCTURE FOR ARGENTINA 
 
The macro-financial framework developed for Argentina is based on the dis-aggregation 
criteria defined above and on the wealth restriction faced by all economic units (exp. 2). 
To begin with, the wealth constraint has been dis-aggregated: (a) by assets, into twelve 
(12) kinds of assets that are specified below and; (b) by sectors, into five (5) economic 
units (financial and private sectors, Central Bank, government and foreign sectors)70. 
As stated earlier, the month is the period-analysis which will be used in the empirical 
case-study (see Chapter IV).  
 
The net financial wealth of the private sector [fwp] is made up of money [mcp]; deposits 
in local currency - saving [sadp] and time deposits [tidp]; and assets nominated in 
foreign currency - deposits [jdepp] and public bonds [jbonp] in dollars. The liability side 
includes credits in local [credp] and in foreign currencies [jcredp]. Formally, 
 
(9)  fwp = mcp + sadp + tidp + jdepp + jbonp - credp - jcredp   
 
The financial wealth of the government sector [fwg] includes money [mcg], time deposits 
in local [tidg] and in foreign currencies [jdepg]. Its liabilities are dis-aggregated into public 
bonds in domestic [bon] and in foreign currencies [jbon], credits given by the Central Bank 
[credg], and by the banks in domestic [credg] and in foreign currencies [jcredg].  
 
(10)  fwg = mcg + tidg + jdepg - ccbg - credg - jcredg - bon - jbon 
   
The financial wealth restriction of the financial sector [fwf] is dis-aggregated into money in 
circulation [mcf], public bonds in local currency [bonf], banking reserves in the Central 
Bank [res], credits granted to the private and government sectors in local [cred] and in 
foreign currencies [jcred]. The liabilities are loans owed to the Central Bank [red], deposits 
                     
70 The different financial instruments are defined according to the asset holder. 
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held by the government and by the private sector in local currency [tip], and private sector 
deposits nominated in foreign currency [jdep].  
 
(11)  fwf = mcf + res + cred + jinrf + jcred + bonf – sad - tip - red - jdep 
 
The financial wealth restriction of the Central Bank [fwcb] is defined as:  
 
(12)  fwcb = jinvcb + ccbg + red + boncb + jboncb - mc - res 
 
The financial portfolio of the monetary authority consists of international reserves [jinvcb] 
and credits nominated in local currency given to the government [ccbg] and to the banks 
[red]. In addition, public bonds in local [boncb] and in foreign currencies [jboncb] are 
assets held by the Central Bank. Its liabilities are dis-aggregated into money [mc] and into 
banking reserves [res].  
 
Finally, the net financial wealth of the foreign sector [fwrw] in relation to the economy is 
comprised of government bonds nominated in foreign currency [jbonrw] and the stock of 
international reserves in the Central Bank [jinv]. 
 
(13)   fwrw = jbonrw - jinv 
 
The amount of physical assets held by the different economic sectors should be taken into 
account so as to obtain the global wealth constraint of the economy. That is,  
 
(14)  Σ ki = k     
 
where [k] means the stock of physical assets and supra-index [i] means the five economic 
units: the financial and non-financial private sectors, the Central Bank, the government 
and foreign sectors. 
 
In short, expressions (9) to (13) make up a three-dimensional financial framework 
composed of assets, sectors and time, which will be used for the study of the allocation 
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and distribution (stock-variables), and changes (flow variables) in the portfolio of five 
economic units in Argentina per month during the period of financial liberalisation, 
1977-81. What follows will show the importance of this apparatus for the empirical 
examination of the macro-financial structure.  
 
II.4.1 Matrix of Assets and Liabilities for the Financial System 
 
The macro-financial framework outlined earlier can be structured in a double-entry matrix 
by gathering the financial wealth restrictions of the five economic units [expressions (13-
17)]. In this matrix, the rows contain stock of assets (liabilities with negative signs), and 
the columns show the sectors into which the economy has been dis-aggregated71. In 
order to have in one single table the total wealth restriction of the economy, the stocks of 
physical assets held by the different economic sectors are added up at the bottom of the 
table. 
                     
71 The third dimension of this financial matrix is obtained by developing the same structure for different periods 
(months). 
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Table II.1 
Stock Matrix of Assets and Liabilities for Argentina. 
 
Sectors 
Assets 
Central 
 Bank  
 Financial 
 Sector  
Private 
Sector  
Government 
Sector  
 Foreign 
Sector  
     
     ∑ 
  
 1.  mon 
 2.  res  
 3.  ccbg  
 4.  dgcb 
 5.  red  
 6.  sad   
 7.  tip  
8.  cred 
9.  bon 
10. jinv  
11. jdep 
12. jcred 
13. jbon 
 
  (-) 
  (-) 
  (+) 
  (-) 
  (+) 
 
 
 
  (+) 
  (+/-) 
 
  (+) 
  (+) 
 
 
  (-) 
  (-) 
  (-) 
  (+) 
  (+) 
  (+/-) 
  (-) 
  (+) 
  (+) 
 
  (+) 
 
 
 
 
  (+) 
  (+)   
  (-) 
  (+) 
  
  (+) 
  (-) 
 (+) 
 
  
 
  (-) 
  (+) 
 
  (+) 
   (+)   
  (-) 
  (-) 
   
  (+) 
  (-) 
  (-) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (-/+) 
 
 (+) 
 (+) 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
totassi 
totliabi 
totassc 
totliabc 
totassf 
totliabf 
totassp 
totliabp 
totassg 
totliabg 
totassw 
totliabw 
 
nfwI  nfwc nfwf   nfwp  nfwg   nfww  0 
k kc kf kp kg kw k 
nwi nwc nwf nwp nwg nww nw 
 
 
The empirical information for building the matrix of assets and liabilities is obtained from 
the balance sheets of the different economic units. The following accounting rules must be 
observed in order to attain macro-economic consistency: 
 
• The sum total across each row of financial assets must be equal to zero (the last 
column of the matrix). This guarantees the fulfilment of a basic financial principle 
which says that ‘every creditor must have their corresponding debtor’.  
• Based on the same principle, the net financial wealth of all economic sectors must be 
equal to zero (see the expression [∑ nfw] in the third last row of the matrix). 
• The sum total across each column must be equal to the sum of the stock of physical 
capital and net financial wealth of each economic sector (last row of the matrix).  
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• The sum total of the net worth [nw] across all economic sectors must be equal to the 
total stock of capital in the economy (last row and last column of the matrix). As stated 
above, the financial relationships between debtors and creditors cancel each other out 
and, therefore, for the society as a whole, the total wealth [nw] is only its stock of 
physical assets [k].  
 
It should be stressed that the macro-financial matrix presented above is a fundamental 
tool for the assessment of a country’s financial structure. In effect, at a point in time, the 
‘matrix of stocks’ displays the distribution and the composition of financial wealth of the 
different sectors, as well as the distribution of debts and credits among different economic 
units. Over a period of time, the ‘matrix of flows’ shows the sectors with deficits which are 
reducing their net financial wealth, and those which are demanding assets in order to 
allocate their surplus. Finally, this tool is useful for the analysis of the stock-flow relation of 
each instrument as well as the deepening and the degree of risk of the financial system. 
  
II.4.2 Supply-Demand ‘Stocks’ and ‘Flows’ of Financial Assets 
 
So far, the study has dealt with the ex-post accounting variables of the ‘wealth’ (stock) and 
‘budget’ (flow) constraints which are faced by the decision makers in the economy. Now, 
the ‘supply’ of and the ‘demand’ for financial assets will be identified in this framework so 
as to obtain a correct ex-ante specification of the markets for assets and of the 
interdependence of individuals’ decisions in connection with portfolio allocation. In effect, 
at the beginning of a certain period, economic agents display the size and the structure of 
portfolios that they want to hold at the end of the period, subject to their ‘planned’ wealth 
restrictions. Accordingly, the supply of and demand for stocks of financial instruments can 
be seen as the ex-ante version of expressions (9) to (13). They are identified by the 
superscripts "s" and "d" respectively. Furthermore, the equilibrium condition for the stocks 
of physical assets (capital) should be considered, if the ex-ante wealth constraint of the 
economy as a whole is to be attained. That is, 
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(15)  kd - ks = 0 
 
where: (kd) is the total demand for physical assets, and the supply function is obtained by 
adding up the stock of capital held by each economic sector [Σ ki = ks; (i= 1,...,n)].  
 
The ex-ante wealth constraint of the economy comprises the supply of and demand for 
stocks of financial and physical assets of all economic units. Expression (16) shown below 
is derived from the ex-ante specification of equation (3) after applying the dis-aggregation 
criteria of assets and sectors defined previously in Section II.3.1. Formally, 
 
(16)  0 =  (mcpd+ mcfd+ mcgd- mcs) + (sadd- sads) + (reds- redd) + (jdeppd+ jdepgd- jdeps) 
+ (jcreds- jcredpd- jcredgd) +(resd- ress) + (tidpd + tidgd - tips)+ (ccbgs- ccbgd) + 
+ (creds- credpd- credgd) + (boncbd+ bonfd+ bonpd- bons) + (jboncbd+ jbonfd     
    jbonpd+ jbonrwd - jbons) +  (jinrs- inrcbd- jinrfd) + (kd- ks) 
 
In this expression, each bracket represents one single market and there is one market for 
each financial asset. By taking into consideration that a zero excess demand identifies a 
situation of market equilibrium, this equation helps to derive the Walras law for stocks: if a 
stock equilibrium exists in (n-1) markets, the (n-th) market must also be in equilibrium. In 
addition, the ‘planned’ wealth restrictions of all economic units can also be arranged in a 
double-entry matrix, in which the rows show the market conditions for stock-equilibrium of 
the different types of assets, and the columns show the equilibrium conditions of portfolio 
of the different economic sectors considered in the analysis. 
 
Next, the market conditions for a ‘flow equilibrium’ of assets are taken into consideration. 
Bearing in mind the interdependence between stock and flow variables, the developments 
made by the ‘stocks’ are also valid for ‘changes in stocks’ of assets. Indeed, the demand-
supply flow of financial instruments in one period is identical to the difference between the 
stocks of the net asset position of this sector at the beginning and at the end of the period 
in real terms (Δfwt). This change, in turn, is equivalent to the financial surplus [sup] in real 
terms of that sector plus/minus the expected capital gains/losses [δe] on its portfolio due to 
changes in relative prices. By following the same logic, the ex-ante flow budget constraint 
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of the economy as a whole, can be obtained by making the first order difference on the 
aggregate wealth constraint (equation 16).  
 
 (17)   0 = (Δmcpd+ Δmcfd+ Δmcgd- Δmcs) + (Δsadd- Δsads) + (Δreds- Δredd) + (Δjdeppd+  
                Δjdepgd- Δjdeps) + (Δjcreds- Δjcredpd- Δjcredgd) + (Δresd- Δress) + (Δtidpd+  
                Δtidgd- Δtips) + (Δccbgs- Δccbgd) + (Δceds - Δcredpd- Δcredgd)+ (Δboncbd+  
    Δbonfd+ jbonpd- bons) + (Δjboncbd+ Δjbonfd+ Δjbonpd+ Δjbonrwd-Δjbons) +  
    (Δjinrs-    Δinrcbd  - Δjinrfd) + (Δkd- Δks) 
 
Equation (17) shows that the sum of the excess demand-flow of the total economy must 
be equal to zero. Accordingly, the so-called Walras law for flows can be defined as 
follows: if (n-1) markets are in equilibrium of flows in one period, the (n-th) market must 
also be in equilibrium. It should be stressed that a ‘matrix of flows’ (e.g. Δmon) can be 
obtained as the difference between the ‘matrices of stocks’ of two points in time: at the 
beginning and at the end of one period (e.g. mt - mt-1).  
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II.5 REAL AND FINANCIAL INTERACTIONS 
 
The developments described with regard to the ex-ante ‘wealth’ and ‘budget’ constraints 
for the economy as a whole are of great importance for the study of the interaction 
between real and financial markets. It can be observed that any market imbalance in the 
real side of the economy - markets of goods and services - will automatically imply an 
imbalance in one or more financial markets. That is to say, for instance, an excess-
demand for cars will generate an excess-supply in the market of one or more financial 
instruments (i.e. money, credits, etc.). This is derived from the macro-economic 
consistency shown by the Walras laws which dictate that all disequilibria in real markets 
will have financial effects. On the contrary, one cannot be sure whether a disequilibrium in 
financial markets will have a direct impact on the markets of goods and services or not. 
This is so, because an excess-demand for financial instruments can be counterbalanced 
by an excess-supply of other(s) financial asset(s). Following the example mentioned 
above, an excess-demand for money may be the result of an excess-supply of foreign 
currency without having any effect on the market for cars or, in general, on the real side of 
the economy (see equations 16 and 17). 
 
It should be stressed that the difference does not lie in the criteria used for making a dis-
aggregation of the real and the financial markets. In effect, if the financial side were 
aggregated into one single asset (e.g. money), a monetary disequilibrium would have an 
opposite impact on the real side, according to the macro-economic consistency shown 
previously, in which the result of adding up the excess-demand of all markets must be 
equal to zero. In a similar vein, by dis-aggregating the real side into more than one 
market, the Walras law could be met with an excess-demand in a market of goods and by 
an excess-supply in another market of goods, with no consequences for the financial side. 
Although this is true from an analytical viewpoint, it makes no economic sense 
whatsoever. Indeed, in a monetary economy any transaction always involves - at least - 
one financial instrument. Therefore, the possibilities for trading in a monetary economy 
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are only: 
 
   Goods/services    <--- by ---> Financial assets 
   Financial assets   <--- by ---> Financial assets  
 
This can be summarised as follows: a disequilibrium in the real side of the economy is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for generating an opposite imbalance in one or in more 
financial markets. That is to say, all disequilibria initiated in a real market will have a spill 
over effect on financial markets. The same cannot be guaranteed in the case of a financial 
maladjustment: it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an imbalance in the real 
side - the markets of goods and services. These elements will be taken into consideration 
in the study of the financial and output interactions throughout the years of free banking 
operation in Argentina, 1977-81. 
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II.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main concern in the study of economic growth is how to generate a sufficient amount 
of savings, and how to make an efficient use of these funds. In both cases, financial 
markets perform an essential task. This has been recognised by the principal schools of 
thought, although they have different views regarding the nature and thus, the functions of 
capital markets in the market economy. These differences lie primarily in the way in which 
the issue of information is taken into account. ‘Classical’ and ‘neoclassical’ economists 
believe that financial markets provide all the relevant information for an optimal decision at 
no cost and, that this information is fixed and cannot be modified by the actions of the 
market-players. For this approach, to ensure a high rate of growth, all that is needed 
therefore, is to obtain a high rate of saving and channel these funds freely - without state 
intervention - to the real side of the economy.  
Within this school of thought, the most thorough analysis of the financial factors in 
economic development was presented by Ronald McKinnon and Edward Shaw at the 
beginning of the 1970s. They concluded that government interference in capital 
markets is to blame for the economic backwardness of developing countries 
(government failures). Interest rate ceilings and quantitative restriction in credit markets 
among other things, give rise to disincentives for saving in domestic financial assets 
and a misallocation of resources. To correct this situation, a policy of financial 
liberalisation is recommended so as to increase the rate of saving by raising the real 
return on assets. According to McKinnon-Shaw, with enough savings and ‘free market’ 
allocation of resources, a high rate of growth will result.  
Those who believe that informational problems are pervasive in the economy, and that 
the market exchange and hence, the overall level of activity depends critically on them are 
supporters of the “new information economics”. They believe that macro and micro-
economic effects are a result of imperfect and asymmetric information among agents, 
which gives rise to coordination failures, transaction costs, adverse selection, incentive 
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effects and moral hazard. In other words, from different perspectives, these theorists 
challenge the neo-classical idea that the search for the self-interest of individuals will 
always produce a smooth and an efficient operation of markets. This is so because, if 
there are informational asymmetries, the structure of economic information can be 
altered by the action of one or more individuals which, in turn, will affect the ‘normal’ 
functioning of markets (market failures). In addition, with positive transaction costs, the 
efficiency of the market-system depends on the existence, the type, and the quality of 
the institutional framework responsible for the arrangement, or the establishment and 
enforcement of property rights and or other economic incentives. Accordingly, a free 
operation of the market mechanism is a necessary, but by no means a sufficient 
condition for attaining a high rate of growth. All this is even more significant in the case 
of developing countries where market failures as a result of informational and 
institutional weaknesses are far more serious than in the developed world.  
The re-consideration of assumptions of perfect and costless information has changed 
many of the standard results expected by the neo-classicals including the McKinnon-
Shaw hypothesis. The main effects of asymmetric information in capital markets can be 
summarised as follows: (i) interest rate increases may affect the quality of loans due to the 
adverse selection and incentive effects; (ii) financial deepening is generally associated 
with a greater leverage in the balance sheet of the borrowers and this, implies a greater 
divergence of the interests of borrowers and of lenders. Accordingly, the cost of financial 
intermediation - the agency cost - will rise as the borrower leverage increases, in contrast 
to McKinnon-Shaw’s predictions; (iii) since the cost of information about borrowers makes 
the market for credits a customer market, macro-economic shocks or mistakes in the 
design and implementation of policy reform can destroy the ‘customer relationship’, 
lowering the efficiency of the financial intermediaries; (iv) the performance of the financial 
sector is not independent of the economic cycle because the balance sheet position, the 
cash-flows and the expected value of the collateral offered by the borrower are non-price 
factors taken into consideration by the banks in their decisions about lending and; (v) the 
weakening of the balance sheet position can affect the borrower’s ability to repay loans 
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which, in turn, may have a knock on effect on the performance of the financial institutions. 
Finally, all these market failures could become more severe if there is an institutional 
framework which gives incentives to opportunistic behaviour, and if this is not punished 
appropriately (high costs of transaction).  
 
These new advances in the theory of imperfect information will be used throughout this 
dissertation in the analysis of the financial liberalisation experiment in Argentina between 
1977 and 1981. With regard to the methodology for the empirical study, a macro-financial 
framework was built to undertake a consistent examination of the financial relationships 
between different economic sectors. A wide range of financial assets  - stocks and flows - 
was incorporated with the aim of dealing with the entire process of financial intermediation 
and not just with the money-supply process. In order to have an operational tool, this 
financial structure has been arranged in a matrix of assets and liabilities of the different 
economic sectors into which the Argentine economy was divided. Looking at the rows in 
the matrix, it is possible to identify the stock-flow relationships in connection with each 
financial instrument, while the columns show the sectors - with deficits - which are 
reducing their net financial wealth and those which are demanding financial assets in 
order to allocate their surplus. For a point in time, the matrix displays the distribution of the 
financial wealth as well as the structure of debts and credits among the different economic 
sectors. Finally, an ex-ante specification of the matrix make possible a market-analysis of 
the supply of and demand for each financial asset as well as, of the equilibrium or 
disequilibrium position of the different economic units regarding the allocation of their 
portfolios. 
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III.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 1976, the armed forces seized power with the aim of re-establishing political 
and economic order. From the outset, the decision was to abandon the model of capital 
accumulation which Argentina had been following since the Second World War for one 
based on the prescriptions of economic liberalism. The intention was to break with the 
State-directed model of industrialisation by import substitution (ISI) and to move to an 
outward-looking, market-oriented growth strategy1. The aim of this Chapter is to give a 
description of the reforms, an analysis of the short-term macro-economic dynamic and 
the long-term structural consequences for the economy of the policies applied over the 
years 1976-81. The re-establishment of the political order was attempted by means of 
the so called ‘’dirty war’’ against subversion by left wing organisations. The human 
rights abuses during this period have been well-documented and it is not the intention 
to discuss them further in this dissertation, except when restrictions on civil liberties 
had direct economic implications2. 
 
The organisation of this Chapter is as follows: section two presents a description of the 
formation and performance of the model of capital accumulation followed by Argentina 
between 1945 and 1975. The emphasis is on providing a historical context for the new 
model of development rather than on giving an in-depth analysis of the ISI model itself. 
Section three describes the new economic plan announced at the beginning of 1976. 
Taking into account the nature and the consequences of the policy reforms, the period 
1976-81 has been divided into two phases: the first until the end of 1978 covers the 
years in which orthodox stabilisation tools - price deregulation and monetary and fiscal 
                                                 
1 This policy is usually referred to by the Spanish acronym ISI, which stands for industrialisación por 
substitución de importaciones. This is the practice that will be followed hereafter. 
2 The National Comission to investigate the human rights abuses (‘desapeared’) – CONADEP, Comisión 
Nacional de Desaparición de Personas – published a report in 1984 entitled Nunca Más (Never Again) 
documenting almost 10,000 cases of desapearences of opposition activists during the military government 
1976-81. www.desaparecidos.org/arg/conadep/nuncamas/nuncamas.html 
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policies - were used along with some trade and financial reforms. The second phase 
begins with a new stabilisation plan announced in December 1978, in which inflationary 
expectations were addressed by pre-announcing a sliding schedule of exchange rate 
devaluation and the economy was opened up to international trade and financial flows. 
Section four presents an evaluation of the structural consequences for the real sector 
of this stabilisation cum liberalisation experiment. The financial consequences - the 
main theme of this dissertation - are discussed at length in other chapters. Finally, the 
main findings of this study are summarised and further analysed in section five. 
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III.2   THE MODEL OF INDUSTRIALISATION BY IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 
 
The Great Depression brought about a disarticulation of the international flows of trade 
and capital, which led the developed countries to abandon the ‘gold standard’, devalue 
their currencies and apply protectionist policies. For Argentina, this world economic 
crisis resulted in a notable decline in the amount and value of exports and in the supply 
of foreign capital, severely affecting the country’s capacity to pay for its imports3. Since 
nearly 60% of the total public revenues came from the external sector, the collapse of 
foreign trade also caused a deterioration in the fiscal accounts4. The policy reaction to 
this was the application of restrictive fiscal measures, which included the introduction of 
an income tax and the reduction of the wages of state employees as well as other 
public spending cuts in 1932. This was complemented with an increase in import tariffs, 
a devaluation of the domestic currency and the establishment of an exchange control, 
by which imports required a previous government authorisation. Thereafter, the 
exchange control was reinforced and the exchange system was split into an ‘official’ 
rate and a ‘free floating’ one. In November 1933, imports and manufacturing exports 
started to be traded at the higher ‘free’ rate of exchange, while agricultural products 
were sold at the lower ‘official’ rate5.  
 
Additionally, the government tried to help the primary sector by using different 
commercial instruments. In the case of meat producers, the country signed the ‘Roca-
Runciman Pact’ with the United Kingdom in which, special preferences were conceded 
to British imports in exchange for maintaining the share of the British market for beef, 
which had been threatened at the Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa6. In the 
                                                 
3 The value of exports dropped from about US$ 1,000 million in 1928 to a US$ 335 million in 1932. If the 
generalised decrease in import prices is taken into consideration, it is estimated that the import capacity of 
Argentina measured by the resources obtained with its exports, dropped by one third over this period.  
4 In 1930 public revenues financed only 60% of government expenditure.  
5 A well documented analysis of the protectionist policies pursued by Argentina in this period is presented 
in R. Cortés Conde, La Economía Política de Argentina en el Siglo XX, 2005 
6 At this Conference, a quota system for a progressive reduction in imports of beef from Argentina had 
been agreed. An analysis of the ‘Roca-Runciman Pact’ and its economic and political consequences for 
Argentina is given by D. Drosdoff, El gobierno de las vascas (1933-56). Tratado Roca-Runciman, (1972); 
and P. Gerchunoff and L. Llach, El Ciclo de la Ilusión y el Desencanto. Un siglo de políticas económicas 
argentinas, 2003, pp. 124-130 
 67
 
case of grain producers, the ‘Junta Nacional de Granos’ was created to shield local 
producers by buying the excess supply at a minimum fixed price7. This measure was 
financed by the spread existing in the dual exchange rate system.  
 
After two years of economic decline, these policy reforms and an improvement in the 
international commodity markets contributed to a recovery of the external accounts and 
a period of economic growth occurred between 1934 and 1937. In this period, the 
country passed from ‘famine to feast’ in relation to foreign funds. The problems now 
were associated with the surplus in the balance of payments and its consequences for 
the management of the supply of money and credits and the foreign exchange market. 
In an attempt to improve control of the monetary aggregates and of the financial 
system, the National Congress passed laws, in 1935, which created the Central Bank 
of the Republic of Argentina (Banco Central de la República Argentina) and laid down 
the rules governing banking operations. Throughout this period, the monetary policy 
was very conservative, in line with the prevailing view of what the role of the State 
should be in the management of the financial system; that is to say, adjusting the 
quantity of money in circulation in accordance with the ‘true’ level of activity. This view 
did not change fundamentally until the advent of the first Peronist government. 
 
The belief that the worst had passed and that the country was again on the right road 
to development was proved wrong when a new negative external shock hit in 1937. 
The combination of the recession which affected the United States, poor harvests in 
Argentina and a fall in grain prices on the world market caused a decline in the value of 
exports, generating a depreciation of the domestic currency. At the same time, it was 
becoming clear that a new war in Europe was imminent, which would inevitably affect 
Argentine exports and, therefore, the economic difficulties experienced at the beginning 
                                                 
7 It should be stressed that this was one of more than 20 regulatory bodies which were established in the 
1930s to shield the local producers from deep market fluctuations. Among others, the most important are: 
the Comisión Nacional de Fibras Textiles (1931), de Aceite (1934), del Algodón (1935), de Fruticultura 
(1935); Junta Nacional de la Yerba Mate (1933) and Junta Reguladora de Vinos (1934). Berensztein and 
Spector provide a detailed analysis of the regulatory policy applied in these years, S. Berensztein and H. 
Spector, ‘’Business, Government and Law’’, in G. Della Paolera and A. Taylor, A New Economic History of 
Argentina, 2003, pp. 324-368 
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of the decade would re-occur. However, the institutional infrastructure of regulatory 
bodies and the know-how acquired in the previous years was used to further protect 
local business from the expected closure of overseas markets.  
 
The reaction of the government was to maintain the level of activity by making credits 
more easily available to the agricultural sector via the Banco de la Nación, the State-
owned clearing bank and dominant player in the credit market, after the approval of the 
‘Ley de Crédito Agrario’ in 1937. However, maintaining a high level of activity did not 
help to reduce imports and the country went from a surplus of US$ 287 million in 1937 
to a deficit of US$ 37.2 million in 1938. This led the economic authorities to adopt 
protectionist measures similar to those taken at the beginning of the decade: 
devaluation and restrictions on imports, which included a new increase in import tariffs 
and a tightening of exchange controls. 
 
Although all the measures undertaken during the 1930s were designed to stabilise the 
economy and protect it from the effects of external shocks, one unintentional outcome 
was the significant impetus given to the process of import replacement and to the 
development of local industry8. Indeed, total imports dropped from 24.8% of GDP on 
average in the period 1925-29 to 18.5% in the period 1935-39. This occurred mainly in 
the sector of finished consumer goods, where the proportion of imported goods fell 
from 13.3% to 7.8% in that period. By 1939, the industrial sector as a whole had grown 
by 35% since the beginning of the decade, representing 23% of the total production of 
the country.  
 
The decade of 1930s represents a turning point in a number of ways in the economic 
strategy which Argentina had been pursuing since the late nineteenth century. For the 
                                                 
8 For some authors, the process of industrialisation based on import substitutions had begun in the 1920s. 
A. Petrecolla, ‘’Sustitución de importaciones y formación del capital (la industria textil, 1920-1940); 
Documento del Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, Torcuato Di Tella, Sep. 1968; C. F. Díaz 
Alejandro, ‘’Etapas de la industrialización argentina’’ in M. Brodersohn (ed.), Estrategia de industrialización 
para la Argentina, 1970; and J. Villanueva, ‘’El orígen de la industrialización argentina’’, Desarrollo 
Económico, 1972, vol.12, pp. 471-76 
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first time, the government took on an active role in the regulation of economic activity 
and in the control of both the commercial and financial relationships with the rest of the 
world. Furthermore, at the end of this decade, there was a growing consensus that the 
strategy of economic development based on the export of primary agricultural products 
left the country too vulnerable to external shocks and that the new international order 
made this model no longer appropriate for Argentina9. At the same time, the increased 
industrialisation obtained in these years showed that a more integrated and complex 
economy was possible. Gerchunoff and Llach summarise it neatly, in the 1930s, ‘‘there 
was a change not only in economic thought and in the way in which the policy was 
carried out but also, in the foundations on which the Argentine economy was based’’10.  
 
Evidence of a new development strategy began to appear in the early 1940s. The first 
example was the economic plan drawn up by the then-Minister of Economy, Federico 
Pinedo, which was submitted to National Congress in 194011. The ‘’Pinedo Plan’’ was 
an attempt to cushion the economy against the expected disruption in the global 
markets which would occur as a result of the Second World War. Although it contained 
several of the protectionist measures which had been applied before - import quotas, 
increased tariffs, foreign exchange control - the difference in this case was that an 
extensive public works programme was proposed as a means of raising domestic 
consumption. In line with Keynesian ideas, the State would not only regulate the 
markets, but would also play a direct role in the economy by providing employment and 
thus, stimulating aggregate demand.  
 
The plan contained an important financial reform aimed at solving the lack of medium 
                                                 
9 For a deeper analysis of the model of development which Argentina had been following until 1930 see, 
for instance, R. Cortés Conde, La economía argentina en el largo plazo, 1996; G. Di Tella and D.C.M. 
Platt (eds.) The Political Economy of Argentina 1880-1946, 1986; C. F. Díaz Alejandro, Essays on the 
economic history of the Argentine Republic, 1970. 
10 P. Gerchunoff and L. Llach, Op. Cit., p. 141 (author’s own translation from Spanish).  
11 According to Juan José Llach, the Pinedo Plan was the basis of the economic policy applied thereafter 
by Juan Perón, ‘‘El Plan Pinedo de 1940, Su Significado Histórico y Los Orígenes de la Economía Política 
del Peronismo’’, Desarrollo Económico, vol. 23, Nro.92, pp. 515-558.   
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and long-term credits12. The intention was to create a financial body within the Central 
Bank, which would be able to transform the short-term deposits in banks into long-term 
loans of fifteen and twenty five years for the industrial and construction sectors 
respectively. This would be financed via a reduction in the reserve requirements of the 
Central Bank. The sectors and economic activities to which these credits would be 
allocated were fixed and predetermined by the government. They included industries 
which processed national raw materials, the construction of public housing and the 
acquisition of surplus harvests which could not be sold in the external markets. The 
financing body to be created would provide the funds, while the banks, financieras and 
other authorised institutions would be in charge of granting the loans. However, the 
risks assumed by the private sector were limited since all the obligations assumed by 
the financing body were considered to be obligations of the Argentine Nation. Likewise, 
it was proposed that the government had the right to guarantee the credits of export 
promotion and to receive public bonds of the national debt or shares in the public utility 
enterprises in payment or as collateral for exports. 
  
Even though the Pinedo Plan was not approved and the gloomy predictions on which it 
was based were not fulfilled, the notion that the economic independence of the country 
lay in the continuation of the process of industrialisation and substitution of imports had 
taken root.  
 
By 1945, the world economy, the economic structure of Argentina and the prevailing 
ideas on the role of the State in the economy had experienced fundamental changes 
compared with those existing in the pre-Great Depression period. On the one hand, the 
free trade order in the foreign markets had been definitively replaced by generalised 
protectionism and bilateral trade. On the other hand, Argentina had gone some way to 
reducing its dependence on the imports of finished consumer goods. Additionally, a 
belief in the use of expansionist fiscal and monetary policies as a means of sustaining 
                                                 
12 From the early 1930s, the financing of long-term loans with short-term deposits was restricted in order to 
avoid liquidity problems in banks.  
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full employment and high rates of growth was beginning to be seen as an important 
duty of the State in Argentina and in other parts of the world (Welfare State).  
 
The main economic goals of the first Peronist government proclaimed in the declaration 
of Economic Independence on 9th July, 1947 were to press on with the process of 
industrialisation by import substitution and to bring about a change in the distribution of 
income in order to expand the local market. In the words of Perón ‘‘… we must double 
production; multiply this by four by means of an appropriate industrialisation, that is to 
say, industrialisation will increase the added valued of our production, distribute this 
wealth in an egalitarian way and raise the living standards of our hungry population …. 
and with this, we will have solved one of the most important problems: social 
stability’’13.  
 
To these ends, Perón continued and extended further some policies of the previous 
government and introduced radical measures designed to plan, coordinate, control and 
participate in the process of development at all levels. These included the protection 
and promotion of industrial activities considered to be in the ‘national interest’. During 
this period, 40 industrial sectors were selected such as those which processed 
domestic raw materials, machinery and equipment and industries producing for 
national defence. Tariffs on competing imports were raised by up to 50%, and direct 
subsidies and easy loans were granted to encourage these sectors (Law 14630). The 
protectionist commercial policy of the previous years was reinforced by establishing a 
complex structure with different import duties, licences, quotas, prohibitions and implicit 
subsidies for different activities. Tariffs for consumer goods were higher than for capital 
goods14. Furthermore, local industry was helped by the system of State purchases by 
which, goods produced domestically were preferred to foreign ones. 
 
                                                 
13 Statement quoted by P.Gerchunoff and L. Llach, Op. Cit., 2003, p. 185.  
14 The tariff system of imports was organised considering: (a) the amount of domestic added value, (b) a 
classification into consumer, intermediate and capital goods and (c) the existence of national supply. 
 
 72
 
The management of the exchange rate was a fundamental policy for the redistribution 
of resources between the agricultural sectors and the new emerging industry. This was 
done by tightly controlling the foreign exchange market and establishing multiple 
exchange rates. In 1946, the ‘Instituto Argentino de Promoción del Intercambio’ (IAPI) 
was created to regulate foreign trade. Its role was to buy crops from producers and sell 
these on the international market. The government received foreign currency, but the 
agricultural producers were paid in pesos at an official (lower) exchange rate. This 
provided the government with extra fiscal resources, which were used to subsidise key 
industries by giving preferential exchange rates for the import of capital and 
intermediate goods. The agricultural sector did not receive this benefit for importing 
machinery and other farm inputs.  
 
As part of the policy of direct participation of the Sate in industrial activities, the level of 
public investment was raised sharply and oriented towards the areas of heavy industry, 
infrastructure and public utilities. This was aimed at managing areas considered critical 
and at solving the structural rigidities which existed in the supply of essential items for 
industry, which were regarded as obstacles to the progress of development. In this 
period, several State-run companies were established including Altos Hornos Zapla 
and SOMISA (steel production), ATANOR (petro-chemical), Yacimientos Carboníferos 
Fiscales (coal mining) and Merchant Marine (shipping). Moreover, services and utilities 
such as electricity, gas, railways, urban transport, telecommunications and water, all of 
which were foreign-owned, were nationalised. In connection with social and productive 
infrastructure, ambitious plans of construction of public housing, schools, hospitals, 
roads, ports and airports were undertaken by the State.  
 
Important reforms were introduced in the area of labour legislation and wage policy: the 
pension fund system, organised through the unions, was greatly extended15. This was  
a system of pay as you earn by which workers paid contributions to a State fund 
                                                 
15 A limited system of pension funds ‘Cajas’ had existed since the beginning of the century: Some 
examples of these ‘cajas’ are: public employees (1904), railway workers (1915), bank employees (1923) 
and merchant seamen and journalists (1939). However, it was only under Perón as Secretary of Labour 
and later as President that pension funds were set up for shop workers (1944) and factory workers (1946).  
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(‘cajas’) during their working life and drew their pensions on retirement. At the same 
time, the legislation was changed to improve working conditions by setting minimum 
wages, limiting working hours and giving protection to workers against unfair dismissal. 
The intention was to organise the workers into strong trade unions, which would then 
be in a better negotiating position with the capitalists. 
 
In an attempt to have control over the financial flows and the destination of domestic 
savings, the Peronist government nationalised bank deposits in 194616. This reform 
radically changed the functioning of the banking system, decisions as to fund allocation 
were now made exclusively by the Central Bank. Under the new regime, the financial 
intermediaries merely received deposits but did not have the power to decide how and 
to whom the credits should be granted. In this way, the government was able to set the 
interest rate and to direct the resources towards the economic sectors considered to 
have priority, in line with the idea of pushing on with the process of industrialisation by 
import substitution. During the period 1946-55, the institution used for channelling loans 
to industry was the ‘Banco de Crédito Industrial Argentino’ created in April 1944 and 
the Central Bank17.  
 
These policies contributed to the consolidation of a new model of capital accumulation 
around the manufacturing sector. The new development strategy relied heavily on the 
expansion of the domestic market as the driving force of the process of industrialisation 
by import substitution18. The main features of this model are19: (a) the State playing a 
                                                 
16 Previously, a sound banking system had existed, but most of the credits were allocated to mortgages. 
17 An in-depth study of the role played by the ‘Banco de Crédito Industrial Argentino’ (which later, in 1971, 
was re-named Banco Nacional de Desarrollo BANADE) is presented in M. Rougier, ‘’El financiamiento 
bancario a las empresas industriales argentinas. Antecedentes y orígenes del Banco de Crédito Industrial 
Argentino’’, Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina, 1999, 10, 2, Julio-Septiembre.  
18 In the literature this was known as the model of unbalanced growth. For a theoretical analysis of this 
type of development see A. O. Hirschman, Strategy of Economic Development, 1958, pp. 62-75. and A. O. 
Hirschman, “The Case Against One Thing At A Time”, in S. Teitel (ed.), Towards a New Development 
Strategy For Latin America,1992, pp. 13-19 
19 A formal economic model for this period of Argentina can be found in O. Braum and L. Joy, “A model of 
Economic Stagnation: A Case Study of the Argentine Economy”, The Economic Journal,1968, vol. 78, 
Dec. A. Porto, 1975 “Un Modelo Simple sobre el Comportamiento Macroeconómico Argentino en el Corto 
Plazo”, Desarrollo Económico, No. 59, vol. 15. A. Canitrot, “La Experiencia Populista de Redistribucion de 
Ingresos”, Desarrollo Económico, 1975, No. 59, vol. 15. A. Canitrot, “El Salario Real y la Restricción 
Externa de la Economía”, Desarrollo Económico,1983, No. 91 
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key role in the investment, financing, allocation and redistribution of resources; (b) the 
primary sector producing for both the local and external markets; and (c) a highly 
protected industrial sector, supplying capital and finished consumer goods exclusively 
to a reserved and restricted domestic market. In connection with the saving-investment 
process, the agricultural sector generated a surplus of foreign exchange which, in turn, 
was transferred to the public sector. This re-distribution of resources was carried out by 
means of export taxes and relative export prices, given that agricultural products were 
systematically discriminated against in the foreign exchange market20. These funds 
were used to finance the increased government expenditure on current and capital 
goods as well as to grant direct and indirect subsidises to the manufacturing sector. 
The public sector also financed its activities with funds obtained from subsidised 
credits, inflationary taxation and transfers from the pension fund system. In the 
industrial sector, a large source of investment finance came from the retained profits of 
the firms21.  
 
Although adjustments were made to this model of development, it remained essentially 
unchanged until the mid-1970s. In other words, there were differences in the emphasis 
of the measures and the type of instruments used by subsequent governments, but not 
in the ultimate goal: the achievement of a more sophisticated economy with a broad-
based industrial sector. The remainder of this section is dedicated to the analysis of the 
performance of the ISI model over the period 1945-75 and its long-term consequences 
for the Argentine economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The supply of agricultural exports was monopolised by the State at the IAPI - Instituto Argentino para la 
Promoción del Intercambio (Argentine Institute for Exchange Promotion).  
21 A thorough analysis of the different tools used for industrial promotion is provided by O. Altimir and J. V. 
Sourrouille, ‘’Los instrumentos de promoción industrial en la postguerra’’, Desarrollo Económico, 1966, vol. 
6 y 7. 
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Table III.1  
Aggregate Supply and Demand, GDP, Industrial and Agricultural Outputs, 1945-75 
(Index 1945=100) 
Period 1945-75 Total                 Consumption                Investment
Demand Total Private Public Total Private Public Exports
Total growth 195.8 217.4 221.1 189.2 484.8 457.7 522.1 140.1
Average growth 3.7 4.1 3.5 3.6 3.0 9.0 8.5 2.1
Contribut. to growth 110.3 49.4 45.6 3.8 49.7 19.4 30.3 0.9
Output-share
1945 107.1 80.5 71.4 9.2 10.3 6.0 4.3 16.3
1975 108.9 80.5 73.9 6.6 21.1 10.7 10.3 7.3
Period 1945-75 Total Imports GDP Agric.,Cattle Mininng Industry Construc. Services
Supply and Fishing
Total growth 195.8 305.8 188.8 103.0 527.2 381.2 345.4 135.8
Average growth 3.7 7.3 3.5 2.7 7.0 5.5 6.2 3.2
Contribut. to growth 110.3 10.3 100.0 7.4 3.7 51.7 7.4 29.9
Output-share
1945 107.1 7.1 100.0 20.3 1.4 22.5 3.5 52.4
1975 108.9 8.9 100.0 13.1 2.8 38.0 4.6 41.5  
Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales, The Central Bank of 
Argentina (BCRA), several annual issues, 1945-75, and Estudios, Estadísticas de la Evolución 
Económica de Argentina, 1913-1984, Instituto de Estudios Económicos sobre la Realidad Argentina y 
Latinoamericana, Fundación Mediterránea, Jul.-Sep. Año IX, No. 39, 1986 
 
Graph III.1  
Domestic and External Demand, GDP, Industrial and Agricultural Outputs, 1945-75 
(Index 1945=100) 
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To begin with, there is a description of the main structural changes in the economy, 
with the aim of identifying the stylised facts to be explained later, which characterised 
the performance of the ISI model. The graph and table above present the evolution of 
the main components of aggregate supply and demand between 1945 and 1975. In 
this period, gross domestic product (GDP) had grown by 189%, which means an 
annual compound rate of 3.5% on average. In dollar terms, a rate of growth of 3.9% 
per annum was estimated, after correcting the distortions caused by local prices22. On 
the demand side, the most dynamic factors were total consumption and investment 
(domestic absorption) which grew by 217% and 485% respectively (3.9% and 6.1% on 
average). While the former explains more than 49.4% of the economic growth, the 
latter accounts for 49.7%. In contrast, the export sector (external demand) performed 
poorly - in absolute and relative terms - with an increase of 140% (2.9% per year on 
average), far below the performance of the internal demand. It should be stressed that 
the magnitude of these changes was so important that they ended up re-shaping the 
total demand structure: the proportion of domestic absorption (consumption plus 
investment) to aggregate output increased from 91% in 1945 to 102% in 1975, with the 
corresponding decline in output-share of the external demand from 16% to 7% (Table 
III.1 and Graph III.1).  
 
Most of the new demand generated in these years was satisfied by local production. 
Mining, manufacturing and construction were the sectors which experienced the largest 
growth (527%, 381% and 345% respectively). However, the manufacturing sector 
explains most of the contribution to total growth (more than 52%), because of its weight 
in total output. The manufacturing expansion caused a modification of the sectoral 
composition of the production structure: the industrial sector increased its share in GDP 
from 22.5% in 1945 to 38% in 1975. At the other extreme, the lowest rate of growth 
occurred in the sector of agriculture, cattle and fishing (103%), which lagged behind 
                                                 
22 Own calculation based on the estimation of the GDP levels of Argentina in dollars terms made by Angus 
Maddison, who used the Geary-Khamis approach for converting national currencies into a common unit. 
The Geary-Khamis approach takes into account the criteria of purchasing power parity of currencies and 
international average prices of commodities (terms of trade). For extra information, see A. Maddison, 
Monitoring The World Economy 1820-1992, OECD, 1995, pp. 162-69  
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and consequently, its output-share declined from 20.3% to 13.1% in the period under 
study (Table III.1).  
 
The process of industrialisation by import substitution not only resulted in a progressive 
rise of the manufacturing sector in the generation of GDP, but also in the development 
of new and more complex industrial activities. Evidence of this is the rate of expansion 
of the production of capital and intermediate goods which more than doubled that of 
finished consumer goods (434% versus 126%). Most of this expansion (around 85%) is 
explained by the development of the industries of Chemicals, Rubber, Petroleum and 
Other Derivatives and Plastics as well as of Metal Products, Machinery and Motor 
Vehicles, which grew 485% and 584% respectively.  
 
Graph III.2 
Evolution of the Industrial Structure, 1945-75  
(Percentage points) 
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As can be seen in the graph above, during the post-war years, the ISI polices brought 
about a profound transformation of the industrial structure: in 1945, the production of 
finished consumer goods accounted for 57% of total manufacturing output and that of 
capital and intermediate goods for 35.1% and, by 1975, these percentages had 
changed to 32% and 62% respectively.  
 
In addition to local production, the expansion of the domestic demand was supplied by 
imported goods which grew by 306% (4.7% per year on average). However, in relative 
terms, due to the process of import replacement by local products, the proportion of 
imports in GDP declined by more than half, from 18.3% in 1944-46 to 8.5% in 1971-74. 
What is more, the reduction in the dependence on imported goods occurred together 
with a change in the demand structure of imports: in the mid-1940s, the proportion of 
finished consumer goods in total imports was 55% and of capital and intermediate 
goods was 45%, by the mid-1970s, these percentages stood at 25% and 75% 
respectively (Graph III.2).  
 
The general impression that emerges from these figures is that the stated objectives of 
the ISI strategy were on their way to being achieved: increased industrialisation, import 
substitution and expansion of the internal market. However, for a developing economy 
with the resources of Argentina, the rate of growth of these years on average was very 
low by international standards, due to the fact that it was extremely uneven23: periods 
of growth were followed by periods of recession or economic decline. An explanation of 
why these cycles occurred is, therefore, crucial for understanding the poor economic 
performance of Argentina over the period 1945-7524 25.  
                                                 
23 In the same period, Australia grew by 4.3% per annum, Spain 5.6%, Brazil 6.7%, México 6.3% and 
Canada 4.6%. Own calculation based on Maddison estimations. A. Maddison, 1995 Op. Cit., pp. 180-203 
24 There are several studies of the economic cycles of Argentina during these years, including: G. Di Tella 
and M. Zymelman, Los ciclos económicos argentinos, 1967; D. Heyman, ‘’Las fluctuaciones de la industria 
manufacturera argentina, 1950-78’’, Documentos de Trabajo, CEPAL, No.4, 1980; J. Katz, ‘’Una 
interpretación del largo plazo del crecimiento industrial argentino’’, Desarrollo Económico, (1969), 8, No. 
32, pp. 511-42; R. Mallon and J. V. Sourrouille, La polítical económica en una sociedad conflictiva, 1975; 
A. Dorfman, Cincuenta años de industrialización en la Argentina, 1930-80, 1983.  
25 A chronology of the main political and economic events of Argentina during the period 1945-75 is 
presented in Appendix A to Chapter III. 
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Based on the nature of the prevailing economic dynamic, the period under analysis has 
been divided into two phases. The first goes from 1946 to 1963, during which the first 
stage of the process of industrialisation (replacement of imported finished consumer 
goods) was completed and the second stage (the establishment of heavy industry) was 
set in motion. The second phase covers the period 1964-75, when the industrial base 
was being consolidated. The analysis begins with a description of the economic and 
political factors which caused the main macro-economic imbalances and their effects 
on the level of activity, followed by an explanation of the short-term economic 
dynamic26.  
 
III.2.1   First Phase 1946-63 
 
This phase encompasses the administrations of Juan Domingo Perón (1946-55), the 
Armed Forces (1955-58) and the democratically elected Arturo Frondizi (1959-62). 
These were the years of the ascent of the ISI policy with active government presence. 
In this phase, total output grew by 60%; an annual compound rate of 2.7% on average. 
Manufacturing and construction were the sectors which experienced the largest growth 
(94% and 91% respectively). However, most of the contribution to growth (about 48%) 
is explained by industry, because of its weight in total output. The lowest expansion 
occurred in the sector of agriculture, cattle and fishing, which grew by 19% and thus, its 
output-share declined from 22.3% to 16.5%; even so this sector was still largely 
responsible for generating foreign exchange (Table III.1). 
 
As part of a policy of income re-distribution and expansion of the internal market, in the 
first three years of the Five-year Plan - Primer Plan Quinquenal (1947-51), the Peronist 
government increased real wages by 56% and public expenditures on consumption 
and investment by 42%. This caused a marked increase in the internal demand, which 
led to rapid growth: total and manufacturing outputs grew by 25% and 29% respectively 
                                                 
26 The main political and economic events of the period 1945-75 are summarized in Appendix A to 
Chapter III. 
 
 80
 
(7.7% and 8.9% per annum on average). The expansion in domestic absorption also 
resulted in an increase in imports of both intermediate and finished consumer goods 
while the value of exports - affected by the discriminatory trade and exchange rate 
policies - grew at a much slower pace, despite the high terms of trade for Argentina. 
This, in turn, generated an accumulated disequilibrium in the balance of trade of US$ 
1,488 million. Given that in these years the country was closed to foreign capital, the 
external gap was financed by the reserves built up during the Second World War 
(about US$ 1,700 million). However, by the end of 1948, the international reserves in 
the Central Bank had fallen to less than US$ 150 million, while there were outstanding 
import permits for around US$ 1,500 million. On the internal front, the lax fiscal policy 
of these years tripled the public deficit, which rose from 5.4% of GDP in 1947 to 15.6% 
in 1948. In the same period, the amount of money in circulation (M1) in nominal terms 
increased by 87%. In this scenario, the lack of foreign exchange forced a nominal 
devaluation of 67%, which caused a dramatic economic contraction in 1949 (GDP fell 
by 4.9%) and, in the same year, inflation jumped from 13% to 31%.  
 
The next three years were characterised by economic turbulence, high inflation (25-
30%) and problems with foreign exchange, exacerbated by droughts in 1949/50 and 
1951/52 which significantly reduced the supply of agricultural products for export27. In 
the labour market, several unions went on strike, discontented with the reduction in real 
wages which occurred in the early 1950s. All this made the government realise that 
major changes in the economic policy were needed to deal with inflation as well as to 
move ahead with the process of industrialisation. In 1952, after the re-election of 
Perón, an austerity plan which included price and wage controls as well as monetary 
and fiscal restrictions was applied. In the Second Five-year Plan - Segundo Plan 
Quinquenal (1952-57), the IAPI abandoned its discriminatory practices and began to 
encourage the export of agricultural products and the legislation which had previously 
restricted or discouraged foreign investment was amended in order to promote it. 
                                                 
27 Total output grew by 1.5% and 3.9% in 1950 and 1951 and fell by 5.1% in 1953. 
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These policies proved effective in increasing foreign investment, reducing inflation and 
improving the external sector, which generated a new round of economic growth during 
the last three years of Perón’s mandate. In September 1955, Perón was deposed by a 
coup d’etat led by General Eduardo Lonardi (Revolución Libertadora) and, thereafter, 
the Peronist Party was banned from participating in elections28. 
 
In the mid-1950s, the main economic concern was how to become self-sufficient in oil 
so as to sustain the rapid growth. However, in this year, the political cycle changed and 
with it, most of the mechanisms of market intervention including price controls, system 
of multiple exchange rates, quotas and prohibitions on imports, IAPI, nationalisation of 
the bank deposits and so on, were dismantled29. However, industrialisation by import 
substitution continued to be the objective of economic policy-makers in the second half 
of the decade. Over these years, the agricultural sector received further incentives to 
produce and export. However, as world prices in agricultural commodities had fallen by 
35% since 1948, the resulting increase in export revenues was insufficient to redress 
the recurrent deficit in the external accounts. The other macro-economic disadjustment 
that was becoming endemic was the fiscal disequilibrium, which amounted to 5.5% of 
GDP on average in the period 1955-57 and, in the next year, increased to 9.6%.  
 
As had happened ten years earlier, but this time more severely, the expansionist fiscal 
and monetary policies combined with the lack of foreign exchange culminated in a far-
reaching economic crisis in 1959: total output fell by 6.4%, inflation jumped to 114% 
and real wages declined by 26%. This obliged the government of Arturo Frondizi 
(1958-62) to apply a stabilisation programme which included fiscal and monetary 
restrictions, limitations on wage increases and de-regulation of the foreign exchange 
market.  At the same time, over these years, there was a serious attempt to undertake 
the final push in the process of industrialisation by expanding the development of basic 
                                                 
28 The proscription of the Peronist Party was an important factor which latter undermined the legitimacy of 
the elected governments of Frondizi (1959-62) and Illia (1963-66) and wakened their ability to govern.  
29 On the political front, the National Constitution of 1853 reformed by Perón in 1949 was re-established. 
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capital intensive industries with important forward linkages - those supplying inputs for 
other industrial sectors. Priority was given to the extraction of oil and natural gas as 
well as to the expansion of the chemical and petro-chemical sectors and, particularly, 
to the automobile industry. With this aim, a new regulation related to foreign investment 
was passed (Law 14780). Important incentives were now offered to attract overseas 
investors in an attempt to ease the foreign exchange restriction. As a result, between 
1960 and 1962, foreign direct investment grew sharply; which explains around one-
third of the increase in the ratio of total investment to GDP from 15.7% in 1959 to 22% 
in 1962. The resulting rise in the internal supply combined with policies aimed at 
moderating the expansion of domestic absorption were successful in stimulating growth 
and reducing inflation: total output grew by 7.8% in 1960 and by 7.1% in 1961, while 
inflation slowed to 27.1% and 13.5% respectively. 
 
Although this attraction of foreign capital contributed to a rapid increase in production 
capacity and in per capita productivity across the manufacturing sector, it did not 
modify the previous anti-export bias of the industry: in 1960, non-agricultural exports 
amounted to US$ 43 million, or just 4.1% of total exports. In a period in which foreign 
capital inflows had started to dry up, this lack of dynamism of industrial exports 
combined with the poor harvests of 1960 and 1961 created a severe problem in the 
external sector. Once again, lack of foreign exchange put an end to a period of rapid 
growth and the economy fell into recession in the years 1962 and 1963 (GDP dropped 
by 1.2% and 2.4%) and inflation began to rise (28% and 26% per annum respectively). 
The economic downturn was aggravated by a political crisis which culminated in a coup 
d’etat and the removal of President Arturo Frondizi in 1962.  
 
From the examination of the macro-economic performance during the first phase 
(1946-63), it can be concluded that there is a clear relationship between the instability 
in the rate of growth and the evolution of the country’s external accounts, as can be 
seen in the graph below.  
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Graph III. 3 
Rate of Growth and Foreign Reserves, 1945-63    
(Percentage of GDP) 
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It is striking how close the correlation was between the rate of growth and the evolution 
of the stock of foreign reserves in the Central Bank plus (minus) the balance in the 
current account as a percentage of GDP. This can be rationalised as follows: periods of 
expansion in domestic demand - commonly the outcome of loose fiscal and monetary 
policy - led to output increases which, in turn, caused an increase in the demand for 
imports. Upswings in the level of activity continued up to the point where the growing 
import expenditures were no longer covered by export revenues. The decline in the 
amount of foreign reserves in the Central Bank resulted in a balance of payments crisis 
which, in turn, put an end to the original output increase. That is to say, the availability 
of foreign reserves marked the upper limit at which the country could remain in an 
expansionist phase. Thereafter, a down-cycle began with a nominal devaluation of the 
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peso, which caused an increase in the price of agricultural products and imported 
goods. This, in turn, generated a reduction in real wages which led to a reduction in 
domestic demand and an improvement in the external accounts. The re-establishment 
of a trade surplus eased the external constraint and helped the country to come out of 
the contraction phase and to start another cycle of prosperity30. This ‘’stop-and-go’’ 
dynamic in the level of activity was a distinguishing feature of the Argentine economy in 
the period 1946-6331.  
 
It should be stressed that, over these years, problems in the foreign sector recurred as 
an inevitable result of previous periods of over-expansion in domestic absorption along 
with two features of the country’s external accounts: (a) the characteristic of the export 
supply based on agricultural products; and (b) the high income-elasticity of the demand 
for imports. The former refers to the fact that the agricultural sector was unable to 
respond quickly to increased demand and consequently, higher internal consumption 
resulted in a lower amount of exportable goods. The latter is a natural outcome of the 
strategy of industrialisation by import substitution in which, import replacement of 
finished consumer goods requires extra imports of items - intermediate and capital 
goods - necessary for their manufacture. Furthermore, the economic growth leads to 
an increase in the level of national income, which creates a demand for all types of 
imports. As a result, the income-elasticity of the demand for imports may become 
greater than one and consequently, periods of negative import substitution are likely to 
occur. Diaz-Alejandro has confirmed this thesis for Argentina: in the period 1947-65, 
this income-elasticity reached 2.6% on average32. This means that the rise in imports 
was more than two and a half times that of the increase in total output.  
 
Far from being smooth, the transition between periods of ups and downs in the level of 
                                                 
30 An analysis of the role played by the foreign assistance in less developed countries can be found in H.B. 
Chenery and A. M. Strout, “Foreign Assistance and Economic Development”, The American Economic 
Review , 1966, vol. LVI, Sept., pp. 679-733 
31 The term ‘’stop and go’’ was coined by Díaz-Alejandro for Argentina. C.F. Díaz-Alejandro, Op. Cit. ,1970 
32 This refers to the “apparent” income elasticity of demand for imports which does not consider changes 
in relative prices, tastes, income distribution and availability of other durable goods. C.F. Diaz Alejandro, 
Op. Cit., 1970, pp. 226-8. 
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activity were characterised by price increases and significant forced re-distributions of 
wealth and income between sectors and economic groups. Distributive conflicts were 
the result of the way that the country adjusted to its external imbalance33. Commonly, a 
nominal devaluation, monetary tightening and an increase in the price of public utilities 
were the typical measures used to deal with a foreign exchange crisis from the late 
1940s on. The adjustment to an external imbalance began with a nominal devaluation 
of the peso, which generated an increase in the cost of the agricultural products and 
imported goods. This, in turn, caused a re-distribution of income from wage earners to 
capitalists and from the manufacturing to the agricultural sector, generating a reduction 
in real income of the sectors with the highest propensity to consume (urban workers). 
With the reduction in the domestic absorption, the balance of trade began to improve34.  
 
However, the external adjustment was not attained instantaneously after the exchange 
rate adjustment. The re-distribution of income was fiercely resisted by capitalists and 
wage earners in the industrial sector. While the former passed on the higher import 
costs of industrial inputs by including them in the retail prices, the latter demanded 
nominal wage increases in order to sustain their level of consumption. In this ‘game’, 
capitalists accepted their worker’s demands for increased nominal wages, as their 
industries supplied exclusively to the ‘protected’ domestic market. In effect, the high 
level of import tariffs allowed the industry to pass the higher cost of wages on to output 
prices without being threatened by foreign competition. During these years, an informal 
coalition made up of the ‘losers’ of a nominal devaluation (capitalists and wage 
earners) was being consolidated in the manufacturing sector so as to prevent a smooth 
re-distribution of income which would have benefited the agricultural sector35.  
                                                 
33 It should be stressed that the internal counterpart of a country’s foreign disadjustment is as an ex-ante 
excess in domestic absorption. Consequently, given a level of total production, if a country tries to close its 
external imbalance, its domestic absorption should necessarily be reduced. 
34 This was so because the negative income-effect on the level of activity dominated the positive price-
effect of changing the relative price between tradable and non-tradable goods. For a formal analysis of the 
re-distributive effects and the recessive impact of a devaluation see C. F. Diaz-Alejandro, “A Note on the 
Impact of the Devaluation and Distribution Effect”, Journal of Political Economy, 1963, No. 71 and P. 
Krugman, and L. Taylor, “Contractionary Effects of Devaluation”, Journal of International Economics, 1978, 
No. 8 
35 This point is analysed in depth by A. Canitrot, “La Experiencia Populista de Redistribución de Ingresos”, 
Desarrollo Económico, 1975, No. 59, vol. 15. 
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In addition to the recurrent foreign exchange crises, the expansionist demand policies 
applied in these years generated a large deficit in the public accounts. Between 1946 
and 1955, government over-spending caused a fiscal imbalance of 7.3% of GDP on 
average, with a peak of 15.6% in 1948. During the Peronist administrations, most of the 
public deficit had been covered by funds taken from the surplus in the newly-organised 
government pension fund system36. However, when this source started to dry up as 
workers retired and claimed their pensions; the government resorted to printing money 
to finance the fiscal gap: in the period 1956-63, more than half of this deficit (5.6% of 
GDP on average) was funded in this way37. 
 
The frequent use of the policy of exchange rate devaluation in an economy with bitter 
distributive conflicts and a large fiscal deficit contributed to the onset of an inflationary 
economy. The inflation rate which had averaged 2.2% per annum in the period 1940-44 
jumped to 20.1% on average in the period 1945-58, with a low of 3.8% in 1954 and a 
high of 38.7% in 1952. As a result of the serious economic crisis, inflation rocketed to 
114% in 1959 and thereafter averaged 23.7% per annum during the period 1960-63. 
This reveals that while the recurring foreign exchange crises were a salient feature of 
the first phase of the ISI model (1946-63), inflation was becoming endemic and would 
come to be the major challenge facing subsequent governments.  
 
III.2.2   Second Phase 1964-75 
 
The second phase (1964-75) covers the governments of Arturo Illia (1963-66), the 
Armed Forces (1967-73) and the third Peronist administration (1973-75). However, the 
study will focus first on the years 1964-74, so as to eliminate the effect of the economic 
chaos of 1975 from the average figures for the period.  
 
                                                 
36 This point is stressed by Cavallo. D. Cavallo and A. Pena, “Deficit Fiscal, Endeudamiento del Gobierno 
y Tasa de Inflación: Argentina 1940-82”, Estudios, No. 26, 1983, p. 45 
37 The net balance of the pension fund system went from a surplus of 3% of GDP during the 1950s to a 
fiscal burden of about 1% during the 1960s. A. Guadagni, “Economic Policy during Illia’s Period in Office, 
1963-6”, in G. Di Tella and R. Dornbusch (eds.) Op. Cit., 1989, pp.151 
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A widespread disenchantment with the model of industrialisation had begun to set in by 
the mid-1960s. Inefficiency and the inability to export were common problems in the 
manufacturing sector deriving from the lack of specialisation and the economy of scale 
and scope, as well as the policy of over-protection from foreign competition applied 
systematically by different governments38. For the first time, it was believed that the 
development strategy based on industrialisation by substitution of imports had run its 
course. However, this feeling disappeared rapidly during the second half of the 1960s, 
when there was a marked increase in manufacturing exports due to the important fiscal 
incentives offered by the government and an improvement in the management of the 
foreign exchange rate. With the relaxation of the foreign exchange constraint, a period 
of rapid industrialisation and uninterrupted growth took place in this phase.  
 
Between 1964 and 1974, GDP grew by 71%; that is 5.5% per annum on average; more 
than double that of the previous phase. Domestic demand (consumption and 
investment) continued to be the main factor of growth and its participation in total 
output increased from 97.2% in 1963 to 100.2% in 1974. As mentioned earlier, there 
was an improvement in the performance of the export sector which increased at a rate 
of 2.7% per annum on average, compared with 0.93% in the previous phase. A large 
proportion of exports came mainly from the new industries in the areas of chemicals 
and petro-chemicals, paper, rubber and metal products and oil refineries, all of which 
had been established in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Moreover, this industrial 
expansion helped to raise the productivity of the agricultural sector from the beginning 
of the 1960s. Despite this growth, the output share of the export sector fell from 12.5% 
to 8.1% between 1963 and 1974. This was mainly due to continued discriminatory 
policy against the agricultural sector, which increased at only 1.7% per annum on 
average. In contrast, the manufacturing sector received a great impetus growing at 7% 
per annum on average and as a result, its participation in total output rose from 29.9% 
                                                 
38 These were common problems of the ISI strategy in Latina America. See A. O. Hirschman, ‘’The 
Political Economy of Import-Substitution Industrialisation in Latin America”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Feb., 1968, vol. LXXXII, No. 1, pp.1-32 
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to 35.7% between 1963 and 1974.  
 
Although the process of industrialisation continued and the economy grew every year, 
during this phase, the country exhibited its typical income cycle with marked 
oscillations in the level of activity. This time, however, the fluctuations in aggregate 
output were more pronounced but less disruptive than in the past.  
 
Graph III.4 
Growth and Inflation, 1964-74 
(Percentage points) 
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Graph III.4 shows that, in the period 1964-74, cycles of inflation and growth developed 
together inversely: periods of upswings in the rate of growth occurred in years of falling 
inflation and periods of slow-down in the level of activity coincided with accelerations of 
inflation (stagflation). When Illia came to power at the end of 1963, the country was 
experiencing an annual inflation of around 30% coupled with the most prolonged 
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recession since the Great Depression (stagflation). The primary goal, therefore, was 
the reactivation of the economy, which was attempted by raising public expenditure 
and permitting a general increase in wages39. At the same time, an innovative 
exchange rate policy of allowing frequent, small, nominal devaluations of the peso - 
crawling peg - was applied in order to sustain the competitiveness of exports and thus, 
reduce the risk of further foreign exchange crises. As a result, in 1964 and 1965, the 
economy grew by 10.3% and 9.1% respectively and the foreign accounts accumulated 
a surplus of around US$ 1,400 million. However, during 1966, the conflicts between 
workers and capitalists intensified originating a wage-price spiral. In this year, inflation 
rose to 32%, the rate of growth declined to 0.6% and the stock of foreign reserves in 
the Central Bank fell to US$ 122 million (just 11% of total imports). The worsening of 
the economic situation weakened the political position of a government with a fragile 
electoral base40. In June 1966, Arturo Illia was deposed by a military coup led by 
General Juan Carlos Onganía (Revolución Argentina). 
 
During the period of military rule from 1967 to 1972, there was a new cycle of growth 
with moderate inflation followed by a period of recession with accelerated inflation. In 
1967, the Minister of Economy Krieger Vasena launched a stabilisation plan different 
from those applied before. This consisted of a wage and price freeze and an 
expansionist monetary policy, combined with an ambitious programme of public 
investment41. At the same time, the domestic currency was devalued by 40% in real 
terms. These policies proved effective in promoting growth and reducing inflation: in 
1967, 1968 and 1969, the level of activity rose by 2.7%, 4.3% and 8.6% respectively, 
and inflation declined from 29.9% in 1967 to 16.2% in 1968 and 7.6% in 1969.  
 
The worldwide revolutionary climate of the late 1960s began to take root in Argentina, 
its first manifestation being a student protest in the city of Córdoba, which was brutally 
                                                 
39 A law was passed establishing a minimum wage in 1966.  
40 Arturo Illia became President in 1963 with only 25% of the votes, due to the proscription of the Peronist 
Party. 
41 The monetary base was increased by 30% in 1967 and 27% in 1968. 
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put down by the government (Cordobazo). This resulted in the resignation of Onganía 
in 1969, and the initial success of the Krieger Vasena plan began to be affected by the 
growing political discontent. During the period 1970-72, the progressive loss of political 
control was reflected in a deterioration of the economic situation: the rate of growth fell 
from 8.6% in 1969 to 1.6% in 1972 and inflation started to rise reaching a high of 59% 
in 1972. At the same time, a growing deficit in the financial services account caused a 
foreign exchange crisis in 1971-72. On the political front, it was becoming evident that 
the continued proscription of the Peronist Party was unsustainable. In the elections 
held in 1973, Perón obtained an overwhelming majority and became President for the 
third time42.     
 
In 1973, Perón applied a more moderate version of the economic policy of his previous 
administrations. The Central Bank took control of bank deposits and was empowered 
to decide credit allocation, foreign trade was nationalised via the Junta Nacional de 
Granos y de Carne and foreign investment was permitted but strictly controlled. In 
order to deal with the immediate problem of rising inflation, the government, unions and 
the business sector agreed to freeze prices and wages, after salaries had been raised 
by 20% (Pacto Social). This was complemented by expansionist monetary and fiscal 
policies43. With idle capacity in the manufacturing sector and a surplus in the foreign 
accounts, these measures were successful in stabilising prices and reactivating the 
economy: the annual inflation rate fell from 60.3% in 1973 to 24.3% in 1974 and the 
rate of growth increased from 3.4% to 6.5%.  
 
However, from the first quarter of 1974 on, the inconsistency between the policy of 
demand expansion and the wage and price freeze was becoming apparent. In many 
sectors, price distortions and ‘black’ markets started to emerge due to an underlying 
                                                 
42 In the election of March 1973, Perón was not allowed to stand due to a ‘’residence qualification’’. The 
Peronist Party led by Hector Cámpora was victorious and invited Juan Perón to return from exile. Cámpora 
resigned in July and in new elections in September, the formula Perón-Perón (Juan Perón and his wife - 
Isabelita) obtained 62% of the vote. 
43 Between 1972 and 1973, the public deficit increased from 4% of GDP to 7.9% and the monetary supply 
in nominal terms rose by 180% (around 30% in real terms). 
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inflationary pressure which was not taken into account by the policy of price control. By 
the middle of the year, it was clear that the economy was overheating. In the political 
arena, the government started to face considerable pressure from different sectors who 
conditioned their support in order to obtain specific concessions44. The alliance made 
by Perón between the capitalists and labour unions was beginning to crack and the 
political and economic tensions rose further after the death of Perón in July 197445.  
 
During the government of María Estela Martínez - Isabelita (Peron´s wife and vice-
president), there were various attempt to re-balance the market disadjustments, but all 
their efforts were in vain and inflation continued to accelerate. In mid-1975, a 
devaluation of 140% followed by wage increases of 150% exacerbated the inflationary 
process (34.9% in July, an annualised rate of around 3,500%) which, in turn, re-fuelled 
sectoral conflicts46. All this increased the turmoil in an already agitated political 
scenario with an escalation of violence on the part of various armed groups (both right 
and left wing). Likewise, political differences inside the Peronist Party became public 
thereby further damaging the impaired credibility of the government. In an atmosphere 
of disenchantment and lack of public support for the government, the economy headed 
towards stagflation (GDP dropped by nearly 1% and inflation rose to 183% in 1975), 
while political violence continued to grow in scope and intensity. In early 1976, inflation 
jumped spectacularly: prices increased by 14.8% in January, 19.3% in February and 
34.6% in March (an annualised rate of more than 1,000%)47. This provoked the second 
hyperinflationary explosion in less than one year and the fifth replacement of the 
finance minister in less than one and a half years. Political and social unrest came to a 
head and the government’s credibility hit an unprecedented low in these months. A 
final desperate effort was made to manage the situation by trying an austerity plan in 
                                                 
44 These included nominal wage increases and better working conditions demanded by unions and more 
participation in the administration on the part of left wing of the Peronist Party. 
45 A political analysis of this period is found in D. G. Erro, Resolving the Argentine Paradox (1993), pp. 84-
87; L. De Riz, Retorno y derrumbe. El útimo gobierno peronista, 1981 and J. C. Torre, Los sindicatos en el 
gobierno 1973-76, 1983   
46 This hyperinflationary explosion was named Rodrigazo in honour of the then Minister of Economy, Mr. 
Celestino Rodrigo.  
47 The wholesale price index (WPI) accelerated from 19.5% to 54.1% during January-March. This means 
an inflation of 17,832% per annum, if the WPI of March is annualised.  
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agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, by that time, the 
country was on the threshold of a new institutional collapse. In late March, the long-
anticipated military coup d’état, finally took place. 
 
This overview of the main political and economic events of the second phase (1964-75) 
reveals that the cycles of growth and inflation were the consequence of the inability to 
establish a set of relative prices which could sustain simultaneously a distribution of 
income acceptable to both capitalists and workers and a rate of growth which would not 
endanger the solvency of the external accounts. On the one hand, when priority was 
given to balancing the foreign accounts, the prices of exportable goods (agricultural 
products) had to be high enough to restrict the internal demand and thus generate the 
required quantities for export. In this case, the level of general wages in real terms was 
too low to be acceptable to the workers, as most of their salaries were spent on 
products which the country was exporting. On the other hand, when the government 
tried to maximise economic growth with an acceptable distribution of income, the level 
of domestic absorption was high which meant, that real wages also had to be high and 
the rate of exchange low in real terms (overvaluation of the peso). In this case, the 
problem emerged on the external front, as the amount of foreign exchange generated 
was insufficient to maintain a high rate of growth for any length of time.  
 
It should be stressed that the fundamental cause of the economic cycles during the first 
and second phases was the same: the unstable equilibrium between a distribution of 
income which was ‘socially acceptable’ and a rate of growth which was ‘politically 
desirable’. However, in the period 1964-75, the nature of the economic problems was 
different because, by that time, a deep-rooted inflationary process had been 
established. This was the result of several factors which include: (a) the mechanism of 
monetary transmission to prices accelerated (price through), as the inflationary process 
became better understood by the economic agents; (b) the practice of both formal and 
informal price indexation became more generalised, which meant that the spiral of 
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price-wage increases became a habitual process48; (c) the fiscal deficit remained high 
and most of it was financed by printing money; (d) the size of the fiscal disequilibrium 
depended positively on the level of inflation because public expenditure, which was 
largely spent on salaries, tended to follow the rhythm of price increases and public 
revenues fell in real terms when inflation accelerated (Olivera-Tanzi-effect)49; and (e) 
the prevailing political instability undermined any attempt to resolve the fiscal 
disequilibrium. What is more, the weak political base of the successive administrations, 
which resulted largely from the proscription of the Peronist Party, severely limited the 
government’s power to control the distributive conflicts among different economic 
sectors, something which contributed greatly to the political and institutional instability. 
In other words, during these years, there was a close cause-effect interaction between 
the political and economic cycles.  
 
The implication of this macro-economic dynamic was that although the long-term goal 
of the ISI model of achieving a modern industrialised economy was never officially 
abandoned, it was relegated to second place behind the more pressing short-term 
problem of how to sustain high rates of growth and simultaneously bring inflation under 
control. At the same time, in this scenario of political and economic uncertainty, the 
private sector started to develop special survival skills, including a preference for the 
short-term in their investment decisions. The choice of the economic agents to be liquid 
and hence, more flexible, plus the continuation of the policy of protecting local industry 
from foreign competition resulted in a manufacturing sector which had began to fall 
behind the developed nations in terms of new technologies and industrial processes.  
 
 
                                                 
48 As Díaz-Alejandro stressed, during these years, the cost-push elements - wage increases and nominal 
devaluation - played an active role in the inflationary process’’. C. F. Díaz-Alejandro, Op. Cit. (1970), p. 
373 
49 This refers to the well-known Olivera-Tanzi effect.. Olivera, “Money, Prices and Fiscal Lags: A Note on 
the Dynamic of Inflation”, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, vol. 20, 1967, No. 28 
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III.2.3   Financial Policy 1945-7550  
 
Another often ignored factor which helps to explain the generally disappointing rate of 
growth of Argentina is the effect of the ISI policy on the financial system and the 
productivity of capital, as shown in the graph below51.  
Graph III.5 
Monetary Aggregates and Real Interest Rate, 1945-75 
(Percentage points) 
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In the period 1945-47, the stock of monetary assets as a proportion of GDP (M1/GDP 
and M3/GDP) declined by more than twenty percentage points, from 33.9% and 55.1% 
respectively to 12.5% and 29.9% in the period 1973-75. This extraordinary process of 
                                                 
50 Detailed studies of the financial policy of Argentina during ISI period are: A. Arnaudo, Cincuenta años 
de política financiera argentina (1934-1983), 1987; A. Arnaudo ‘’El Sistema Financiero’’, Nueva Historia de 
la Nación Argentina, t. 8: La Argentina del Siglo XX, 2001; and M. Rougier, Industria, finanzas e 
instituciones en la Argentina: La experiencia del Banco Nacional de Desarrollo, 2004 
51 One exception to this are the works done by A. Taylor, ‘’Argentina and the World Capital Market: Saving, 
Investment and Capital Mobility in the Twentieth Century’’, NBER, Working Paper 6302, 1997; A. Taylor 
‘’Capital Accumulation’’ in G. Della Paolera and A. Taylor, A New Economic History of Argentina, Op. Cit. 
2003, pp. 170-96 and M. Véganzones with C. Winograd, Argentina In The 20th. Century: An Account of A 
Long Awaited Growth,  OECD, 1997, pp. 197-230 
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de-monetisation was the consequence of a combination of inflation and a financial 
policy of systematically fixing the nominal rate of interest lower than the rate of inflation, 
which resulted in a negative return in real terms. As shown in Graph III.3, most of the 
time the interest rate on deposits in real terms was greater than -10% and that on loans 
more than -8% and in some years, they dropped to between -20% and -32% per 
annum. It should be stressed that this process of de-monetisation was much more 
marked in the first sub-period 1945-63, because the rate of growth of the monetary 
aggregates in nominal terms as a proportion of inflation was 32% lower than in the sub-
period 1964-75. This is explained by: (a) the negative real rate on deposits was, on 
average, greater in the first sub-period than in the second (-17% versus -12% per 
year); and (b) the rate of growth of monetary assets in nominal terms was nearly 
double in the sub-period 1964-74 (53% versus 24%). This was so because, over these 
years, most of the public imbalance was financed by printing money, unlike in the 
period 1946-63, when the surplus in the pension fund system was used to finance a 
large part of this deficit.  
 
Financial policy during the ISI period was based on the Keynesian theory of full 
employment, which prioritised the quantity rather than the quality of physical 
investment and failed to recognise the importance of an independent banking system 
for the overall efficiency of the saving-investment process: screening and selecting 
projects and borrowers, monitoring the use of funds, managing risks and enforcing 
contracts52. That is to say, the different administrations tended to see the financial 
system as merely a conduit through which funds (savings) were allocated in 
accordance with the governments’ priorities. In practice, this meant that the Central 
Bank set interest rate ceilings on both deposits and credits and, in many cases, banks 
received directives as to which sectors/activities should be granted loans. What 
resulted fits the description given by Ronald McKinnon and Edward Shaw of a 
                                                 
52 A revision of the role played by the financial system for the main school of economic thoughts is given in 
Chapter II, Section 2.   
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repressed financial system’, discussed at length in Chapter II53. For these authors, the 
strategy of keeping negative or low real rates of return on financial assets has strong 
negative effects on economic development because: (a) it fosters current rather than 
future consumption (savings); (b) interest rate ceilings create a bias which encourages 
credit allocation to low-yielding-projects; (c) the inability of borrowers to obtain credits in 
formal financial markets and the unwillingness of lenders to lend at the prevailing market 
rates generate segmentation in capital markets; and (d) the lack of incentives for saving in 
domestic financial assets results in a shallow financial structure. These effects were seen 
throughout the ISI period and constitute another factor which helps to explain the low 
rate of growth on average of Argentina over these years54.  
 
To sum up, two deep political and economic crises marked the opening and the closing 
of a new model of accumulation. First, it began as an internal reaction to the problems 
of import shortages generated by the Great Depression and the Second World War. 
Thereafter, from the second half of the 1940s on, it was adopted as the official 
development strategy devised to encourage the process of industrialisation by import 
substitution. This model of accumulation remained in place until the onset of the 
political and economic crisis of the mid-1970s. By this period, although an important 
industrial base had been constructed the overall functioning of the economic system 
lacked dynamism and efficiency. This was the consequence of various factors 
including: (a) industry was overprotected and heavily subsidised; (b) most of the 
factories failed to reach the optimal size as they supplied exclusively to the local 
market; (c) pressure groups with vested interests in maintaining the status quo 
emerged around the manufacturing sector; (d) the policy of systematic discrimination 
                                                 
53 The problems of the financial intermediation in developing countries were the result of the growing State 
intervention which implied - among other things - selective or sectoral credits, high reserve requirements, 
foreign exchange controls and interest rate ceilings on deposits and on loans combined with high rates of 
inflation. All these mechanisms were used by governments to obtain different goals such as: the transfer of 
resources from the financial system to the public sector, a reduction in the costs of financing fiscal deficits, 
the encouragement of private investments in areas regarded as priority by the authorities, as well as the 
maintenance of a high level of economic activity. According to these authors, all these practices lead to a 
state of ‘financial repression’.  
54 The damage to the financial system caused by over-regulation and its effects on the economy as a 
whole is stressed by Howard Davies and David Green, ``it is clear that excessive regulation can damage 
the functioning of financial markets and reduce their economic utility’’. H. Davies and D. Green, Global 
Financial Regulation. The Essential Guide, 2008, pg. 14 
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against the agricultural sector - the main generator of foreign exchange - had a 
negative effect on its long-term growth dynamic; (e) public regulations and direct State 
intervention prevented the appropriate running of several markets; and (h) the 
importance of generating savings in domestic financial assets and developing a sound 
financial system for an efficient allocation of funds was overlooked.  
 
All the above factors created complacency and resulted in an inefficient and outdated 
industrial sector which, ultimately, depended on the foreign exchange generated by an 
agricultural sector. Moreover, expansionist demand policies originated recurrent foreign 
exchange crises and accelerated inflation. In turn, distributive conflicts between 
capitalists and labour unions caused high rates of wage increases in nominal terms, 
which further fuelled the inflationary process. In this scenario, the country developed a 
macro-economic dynamic characterised by cycles of growth and depression. These 
economic fluctuations were also exacerbated by - and in some cases contributed to - 
the high political and institutional instability, affecting the long-term economic growth.  
 
Finally, it should be stressed that, besides the political and economic mistakes made in 
the implementation of the ISI, this State-directed-inward-looking development strategy 
was based on several assumptions which proved to be erroneous. First, the size of the 
domestic market was not sufficient to develop and sustain an efficient manufacturing 
sector. Second, the need for foreign exchange increased rather than decreased during 
the initial stages of the ISI. Third, the substitution of imports across the board failed to 
capitalise on the country’s comparative advantages; and fourth, the consequences of 
the market distortions generated by an inappropriate State intervention in the economy 
(‘government failures’) were simply ignored.  
 
By the mid-1970s, the Argentine economy was at a crossroads, while the country had 
achieved a broad industrial base, the weaknesses of the ISI were glaringly apparent. 
The question facing policy-makers was whether to attempt to correct these or to look 
for a new economic direction.  
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III.3   IN SEARCH OF A NEW MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
The first policies of the 1976 military government were designed to stabilise a situation 
characterised by hyperinflation, economic decline and default in external payments. For 
the new administration, however, the long-term solution required a fundamental change 
of the development strategy which the country had been pursuing since 1945. The new 
authorities believed that the policy of ‘forced’ industrialisation by import substitution and 
the size and role of the State were to blame for the poor economic performance of the 
previous four decades. This was neatly summarised by the Minister of Economy José 
Alfredo Martínez de Hoz: “since the 1930s, with only brief periods of respite, our 
governments have pursued a policy of manipulation of the exchange rates, export and 
import duties or taxes, or both at once, which have only distorted the economy and 
financed the growth now of one economic sector, now of another, at the expense of the 
one left in the lurch”55. In contrast, he believed that the liberalisation of the economy 
would restore efficiency to the market mechanisms and provide the bases for a rapid 
and sustainable growth. The intention was to build an outward-looking-market-oriented 
model of development which would allow Argentina to make the most of its 
comparative advantages by integrating the country into world trade and financial flows. 
To quote Bernardo Kosacoff: ‘’a programme of trade and financial liberalisation was 
organised with the aim of modernising and improving the efficiency of the economy 
based on a philosophy of full confidence in market mechanisms and in the subsidiary 
role of the State’’56.  
 
The new administration had three main goals: (a) the reduction of inflation without an 
increase in unemployment, (b) the limitation of government intervention to the ‘proper 
functions’ of the State and (c) the transformation of the economy by opening it up to 
foreign trade. With this aim, an economic recovery plan was announced in April 1976 
                                                 
55 Speech given by the Minister of Economy José A. Martínez de Hoz, Boletín Semanal, Ministry of 
Economy, No. 161, 24/XII/76 
56 B. Kosacoff, “Crisis y Estrategias de Industrialización’’, Economía de América Latina, Documento del 
Centro de Economía Transnacional, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, Vol. 12,  p. 70 
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(Programa de Recuperación, Saneamiento y Expansión de la Economía Argentina) 
with reforms in the following areas/sectors57: 
 
Market of goods and services: prices were to be freely determined by market forces. 
Government intervention in these markets would be eliminated so as to obtain a ‘free’ 
market allocation of resources. Accordingly, all prices - except that of labour - were to 
be de-regulated and the system of exchange control abandoned.  
 
Labour market: an increase in the flexibility of the market would be promoted through a 
modification of existing labour legislation. In the new system, nominal wage increases 
would be given based on increases in labour productivity only.   
 
Trade liberalisation and foreign direct investment: the opening-up of the economy to 
international trade and investment was considered essential for the elimination of price 
distortions generated by the ISI model. Quantitative barriers (quotas and licences) and 
restrictions on foreign investments were to be abolished. A programme of gradual tariff 
reduction would be introduced in order to increase international commerce and to 
improve national competitiveness.  
 
Monetary reform and financial liberalisation: the de-regulation of the banking system 
and the liberalisation of interest rates were seen as fundamental measures to eliminate 
the negative real interest rate and to return to market mechanisms in the allocation of 
loans. In June 1977, a financial reform decentralised deposits (Law 21495) and allowed 
financial institutions to receive deposits and allocate credits under a system of free 
market determination of interest rates (Law 21526)58. At the end of 1978, restrictions on 
foreign capital movements were eliminated in an attempt to improve market 
competition within the banking system.  
 
                                                 
57 Own classification of the structural reforms and the main measures contained in the economic plan. A 
full detail of this economic plan is found in the Boletín Semanal, Ministry of Economy, 143, 18/XI/1976 
58 Chapter IV presents a full account of the institutional reform of the financial system of June 1977. 
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Reform of the State: the size and activities of the public sector would be modified and 
reduced. The proposed changes in this area included the privatisation of firms and re-
sizing of the public sector (elimination of activities and the corresponding personnel 
and company down-sizing). In accordance with the neo-liberal view, the State should 
withdraw from the productive sector and concentrate on activities that ‘could not’ be 
carried out by the private sector such as national defence and law enforcement. 
Another proposal was to undertake a broad restructuring of the tax system.  
 
Following these policy guidelines, important economic reforms were carried out over 
the years 1976-81. Table III.2 summarises the sequence of policies applied during this 
experiment of stabilisation cum structural reform59. 
  
Table III.2 
Sequence of the Stabilisation Policies and of Structural Reforms, 1976-81  
 
Economic Policy 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
  2-4th Qs. 4th Q.    
A. Stabilisation:       
 Monetary restriction •      
 Fiscal restriction •      
 Wage freeze •      
 Price truce  •     
 Exchange rate ‘’tablita’’   • • • • 
 Tariff reduction   • • • • 
B. Structural Reform:       
 Market deregulation (goods/services) •      
 Labour reform •      
 Unification of foreign exch. Market •      
 Foreign trade reform  • • • • • • 
  - quantitative restriction • • • • • • 
  - tariff reduction • • • • • • 
 Foreign direct investment       
 Monetary and financial reform  • • • • • 
  - banking reform  •     
  - opening to foreign capital markets   • • • • 
 Reform of the State •      
Dots (•) indicate the period in which the policy/instrument was first used or continued to be used.  
Source: own construction based on Argentine Economic Development, Ministry of Economy, April 1976-
December 1980 
                                                 
59 Appendix B to Chapter III presents a chronology of the institutional and economic reforms applied in 
these years. 
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From the beginning, great efforts were made to bring inflation under control. The new 
government believed that the policies for the short- and the long-term, constituted parts 
of a ”global, coherent and indivisible” programme which would take Argentina from … 
”an economy of speculation to one of production”60. This opinion was based on the 
view that stabilisation policies were needed to control inflation but that a profound 
transformation of the economy was essential to secure and to reinforce the 
achievements in price stabilisation. This explains why over the period under study; 
there was a simultaneous application of anti-inflationary and structural reform 
measures. ‘’The new team not only adopted short-term measures to cope with the 
(economic) situation but also carried out some important structural reforms, of which 
the most radical took place in the financial sector’’61. In effect, between April 1976 and 
December 1978 some polices were designed to change the dynamic of inflation 
(monetary and fiscal restrictions and price and wage freezes) and others to change the 
bases of the ISI model (market de-regulation as well as trade and financial reforms). 
However, as the inflationary process persisted, from the beginning of 1979 on, the 
policies which were originally designed for the long-term - especially trade and financial 
liberalisation - started to be used for short-term purposes as anti-inflationary tools 
(Table III.2).  
 
The remainder of this Chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the country’s economic 
performance over the period 1976-81. The present section begins with a description of 
the policies applied and expands on the short-term macro-economic dynamic, including 
the evolution of the level of activity and the results obtained in the fight against inflation. 
To this end and due to the change in approach which occurred at the end of 1978, the 
period under analysis has been divided into two phases: from April 1976 to December 
1978 and, from January 1979 to March 1981. Finally, an evaluation of the structural 
consequences for the Argentine economy resulting from these policy-reforms is 
                                                 
60 Boletín Semanal, Ministry of Economy, Op. Cit., p. 5   
61 T. J. T. Baliño, ‘’The Argentine Banking Crises’’, IMF Working Paper, Nro. 103/87/77, pg. 5. (the word 
within brackets is added).  
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presented in the last section.  
 
III.3.1   First Phase 1976-78  
 
The economic situation in 1975 and early 1976 was characterised by an excess of 
domestic absorption (consumption and investment) above the level of total output and 
a high fiscal imbalance. Whereas the former explains the disequilibrium in the balance 
of trade and the low stock of foreign reserves in the Central Bank, the latter explains 
the large monetary expansion and high inflation of these years. In addition, as 
discussed in the previous section, these macro-economic disequilibria were occurring 
against a background of recession, generalised supply shortages and ‘black markets’, 
which were the result of the policy of government intervention in market prices applied 
by the Peronist administration.  
 
To deal with this, the government adopted an orthodox plan based on monetary, fiscal 
and wage restrictions. This phase was named ‘’período de sinceramiento’’ in which, 
market prices were allowed to find their ‘true’ levels and this, in turn, would lead to an 
adjustment of the macro-economic imbalances. In the words of the Minister of 
Economy Martínez de Hoz, the policies to be implemented were aimed at promoting 
‘’economic reactivation, reducing inflation, strengthening the balance of payments and 
eliminating limitations on trade and payments in foreign exchange’’62.  
 
As part of a plan agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), price controls and 
quantitative restrictions were eliminated in all markets of products and services, except 
for minimum wages which remained under government control (Law 21307)63. This 
policy was aimed at redressing relative prices while avoiding the wage-price spiral 
which had been occurring since mid-1975. Furthermore, restrictive fiscal and monetary 
                                                 
62  Boletín Semanal, Ministry of Economy, Op. Cit., p. 9 
63 After the suspension of collective bargaining in July 1975, the official minimum wage and the family 
allowances were set by the government.  
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measures were applied in an attempt to reduce domestic absorption (consumption and 
investment) and to close the external disequilibrium64.  
 
For the government, the main cause of inflation was the monetisation of the large fiscal 
deficit which had reached 13.5% per annum in the first quarter of 1976 (Table III.3). It 
was decided, therefore, that the sources of inflationary financing of the government 
deficit should be eliminated. To this end, public utility tariffs were raised and new taxes 
were introduced - taxes on financial assets, bank loans, capital, land, property and 
motor vehicles - and the value added tax (VAT) was increased from a rate of 13% to 
16%. The government estimated that these measures would generate extra revenues 
equivalent to 3% to 4% of GDP65. Moreover, in an attempt to reduce the erosion-effect 
caused by inflation on fiscal revenues in real terms (Olivera-Tanzi effect), the period of 
tax collection was shortened and unpaid-taxes were indexed66.  
 
With regard to fiscal expenditures, transfers of funds from the National Treasury to the 
Provinces and to State-owned enterprises were also reduced. These measures were 
complemented with a tight monetary plan, which included interest rate increases and 
strict control over the credit expansion to the public and private sectors. In addition, to 
deal with the monetary-effect of the fiscal deficit and to improve the management of the 
capital markets, new financial instruments were introduced, including a public bond 
adjusted by inflation (Valores Ajustables Nacionales)67.  
 
At the beginning, the critical position in the external accounts forced the government to 
reschedule short-term debts and to obtain new loans in the international market. The 
stand-by agreement signed with the IMF in August 1976 was aimed at securing fresh 
                                                 
64 Targets for reduction of the fiscal deficit and the minimum stock of foreign reserves held by the Central 
Bank were included in the two contingent agreements made in 1976 and in 1977. For a complete analysis 
of these agreements see J. M. Fanelli and R. Frenkel “La Argentina y el Fondo en la Década Pasada”, in EL 
FMI, el Banco Mundial y la Crisis Latinoamericana, Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (Ed.), Mexico 1984. 
65 J. M. Fanelli and R. Frenkel “La Argentina y el Fondo en la Década Pasada”, Op. Cit., (1984) 
66 J. H. G. Olivera, Op. Cit. (1967). 
67 A complete analysis of the monetary and financial situation of Argentina in this period is given in 
Chapter IV, Section 2.  
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funds, and helping the country to re-negotiate terms with private foreign creditors68. 
With the same aim, only long-term private investment projects - taking five years or 
more to complete - were allowed to be financed with foreign loans. The enforcement of 
this was carried out by the monetary authority, which established a monitoring of the 
level of indebtedness of the private sector in the international capital market. At the 
same time, the country needed to improve its net foreign position by generating a trade 
surplus. External tariffs and the exchange rate were the instruments used for this goal. 
Import tariffs were reduced by 40% (from a average rate of 93% to 52%), in conjunction 
with a reduction in export taxes on agricultural products from a rate-range between 
10% and 50% to one of between 5% and 25% (National Government Decree 
3008/76)69.  
 
However, in contrast with the pre-1976 period when export promotion had often been 
accompanied by the imposition of restrictions on imports, the level of tariff protection for 
local manufacturers was now reduced. Moreover, quantitative restrictions on imports 
were gradually eliminated and the system of import licensing was simplified. This was 
complemented with a new regime for foreign direct investment approved in August 
1976, which treated national and foreign capital on an equal basis (Law 21382). The 
only condition required was an authorisation of the government for foreign investors for 
projects in the areas of defence and national security, energy, education, insurance 
and financial activities and in the provision of the following public services: electricity, 
post office, gas, communications, transport, television, radio, newspapers and 
publishing.   
 
A gradual unification of the dual exchange rate system was carried out between March 
and November 1976. Over this period, the effective nominal rate of exchange at which 
commodities were traded was made up of a variable proportion of the two prevailing 
                                                 
68  Argentina sent a memorandum requesting an agreement with the IMF in July 1976.  
69 Between June 1976 and July 1977, export taxes on wool were reduced from 33% to 16%; on wheat 
from 56% to 5%; on corn from 46% to 16%. J. J. Nogués “La Economía Política del Protecionismo y la 
Liberalización en la Argentina”, Desarrollo Económico, 1988, vol. 28 No. 110, p.23 
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rates. In practice, this exchange regime operated as a hidden crawling-peg mechanism 
which contributed to the increase of the effective rate of exchange for exporters and 
importers until the final unification and ‘liberalisation’ of the system in November 1976. 
From then on, all types of foreign exchange transactions were carried out in a ‘free’ 
market, except for the case of financial swap operations70. Subsequently, a crawling 
peg system was adopted until the first quarter of 1978 when the rate of exchange was 
modified almost daily by the Central Bank by means of market operations - buying and 
selling dollars.  
Table III.3 
Key Macro-economic Variables, 1975-78 
 
Economic Variable 1975        1976          1977          1978
I II I II I II
 Rate of growth (% GDP) -0.9 -2.0 1.5 5.7 7.2 -4.4 -2.5
 Inflation rate - WPI (%) 348.3 228.0 48.3 51.7 62.9 57.6 54.3
 Inflation rate - CPI (%) 334.8 174.9 62.8 52.8 70.3 69.5 59.2
 Current account (in millions of US$) -1,289 124 507 796 463 980 806
 Trade balance (in millions of US$) -985 -534 1417 895 595 1,410 1,156
 Capital account (in millions of US$) 177 -487 -198 395 529 789 672
 Foreign reserves (in millions of US$) 619 321 1,491 1,616 2,423 5,770 6,037
 Real exchange rate 1975=100 100.0 108.5 122.6 123.7 100.1 93.4 82.6
 Nominal peso deprec. (%) 344.1 186.0 71.5 36.2 27.9 45.2 45.8
 M1/GDP (%) 8.7 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.5 6.5 6.2
 Real wages 1975=100 100.0 97.5 72.3 70.6 67.1 63.0 64.0
 Fiscal deficit (% of GDP) 14.1 13.2 12.5 12.1 11.6 11.2 9.6
Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The Central 
Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81; D. Cavallo and F. Peña “Deficit Fiscal, Endeudamiento 
del Gobierno y Tasa de Inflación en Argentina 1940-1982”, Revista de Estudios, June (1984).  
 
 
As can be observed in Table III.3, in a few months, the policies adopted had proved 
effective in closing the disequilibrium in the external accounts and in bringing down 
inflation. Credits obtained from the IMF as well as from other foreign lenders increased 
the stock of international reserves and reduced the amount of outstanding financial 
swap operations in the Central Bank.  Moreover, these funds helped to reduce - to a 
large extent - the degree of uncertainty in the foreign exchange market and to reverse 
the outflow of capitals, thereby further strengthening the country’s reserve position. By 
                                                 
70 The unification and liberalisation of the exchange market was a commitment made by the government in 
the contingent agreement signed with the IMF. J. M. Fanelli and R. Frenkel Op. Cit., 1984, p. 32. 
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mid-1976, the main factors which had exerted pressures on the ‘parallel’ exchange 
market between January and March had disappeared. On the commercial front, as a 
result of the real devaluation of the peso, the balance of trade passed from a deficit of 
US$ 534 million to a surplus of US$ 1,417 million between the first and the second half 
of 1976. The surplus in the balance of trade plus the funds borrowed by the country 
helps to explain the increase in the stock of foreign reserves to around US$ 1,500 
million by the end of the first year (Table III.3).    
 
As part of a general strategy of demand restriction, in the first year, the fiscal imbalance 
was reduced by 2% of GDP (from 14.9% to 12.9 % of GDP), due, to a large extent, to 
an increase in public revenues (Table III.3). This policy was complemented with a 
reduction in monetary growth as a source of government financing, which went from 
50% of the total public deficit in 1975 to 25% in 1976. With regard to the wage policy, 
every quarter, the basic wages - salarios básicos de convenio - were raised at a rate 
much lower than inflation and thus, real wages underwent a notable decline. This was 
particularly severe in 1976, when real wages declined by 28%. This fall in wages 
continued in 1977 and by the end of this year they had reached a level 33% lower than 
that of the beginning of 1976 (Table III.3). This was made possible by severe 
restrictions on trade union activities and public protests71. 
 
As a result, the level of domestic absorption fell and the economy was able to generate 
a surplus in the trade accounts of 3.4% of GDP during the second half of the first year. 
The policy of demand restriction contributed to a rapid drop in inflation: the increase in 
consumer prices went from 78.3% in the first quarter to 54.2% and 21.6% in the two 
subsequent quarters respectively. This was even more significant in wholesale prices, 
which declined from 136.8% to 38.5% and 24.8% over this period respectively72. 
 
In short, by the third quarter of 1976, several indicators show the improvement in the 
                                                 
71 During these years, many trade union activists were arrested and others fled the country.  
72 Own estimation based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The Central Bank 
of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81.  
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macro-economic situation of Argentina compared with the previous year. The balance 
of trade and current account had been transformed from deficits to surpluses, the 
amount of international reserves had tripled, the financial relationships with the foreign 
capital markets and the IMF had been restored, the fiscal disequilibrium had been 
reduced, the real exchange rate had risen by more than 20%, inflation had fallen 
markedly, and most market prices had started to operate freely again (Table III.3).  
 
This economic adjustment was not achieved without paying a high price. Over the first 
seven months of 1976, total production and gross domestic investment dropped by 
2.5% and 8.9% respectively73. This situation, however, was reversed in the rest of the 
year, and the country saw a period of prosperity in the next year: aggregate output rose 
by 5.7% and 7.2% in the first and second half of 1977 respectively. The main engines 
of growth were investment and exports, mainly of primary products. On the supply side, 
the reactivation was driven by the agricultural sector and then spread through the 
economy. At the same time, in 1977, there was a surplus in the balance of trade of 
US$ 1,490 million due to a significant increase in the terms of trade - the value of 
exports rose by 50%, while the value of imports increased by 23% (see Table III.3).  
 
The joint result of a high rate of growth and an increasing foreign trade surplus was 
atypical, if the history of Argentina of the previous thirty years is taken into account74. It 
came about because of the expansion of the agricultural supply, which helped to ease 
the foreign exchange constraint, in a year in which private and public consumption 
remained constant. Besides the evolution of the terms of trade, this was the result of 
the fiscal measures which cut current expenditures and to the wage policy which forced 
down the purchasing power of the workers. As was affirmed by Juan Sourrouille …. 
‘’from this data, it seems evident that the Argentine economy was undergoing one of its 
classical cycle movements of adjustment after an orthodox stabilisation plan, based on 
                                                 
73 If these negative results are added to the decline of the previous year, total output and gross domestic 
investment accumulated a fall of 3.2% and 17.5% respectively in the period January 1975 - October 1976.  
74 As was discussed in earlier in Section 2, a recurring feature of the (ISI) model was periods of growth 
combined with disequilibria in the balance of trade. 
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a massive exchange rate devaluation’’75.     
 
However, as can be seen in Graph III.6, the initial success in reducing inflation was 
short-lived and by the end of 1976, it had again become the major cause for concern 
for the government. In early 1977, due to a generalised process of price indexation on 
the part of the economic agents, inflation resumed its upward trend and consumer and 
wholesale prices increased by 25.8% and 26.5% respectively in the first quarter. In an 
attempt to halt this process, the authorities decided to change the policy and a price 
freeze was imposed on the products of the 700 most important industrial companies for 
120 days in March (Ministry of Economy, Resolution No.189). This marked the end of 
the period of price redress “período de sinceramiento de precios”. The new approach 
was justified by the Minister of Economy Martínez de Hoz with this speech: ‘’today, 
after one year and under different circumstances, what is required is a different therapy 
… I formally request businessmen to absorb the increase in nominal wages of 30% in 
March; and to maintain the price levels of February, without passing the new costs onto 
consumers for a period of 120 days’’. This call to business for social responsibility was 
accompanied by a veiled threat: … ‘in the past, it was observed that some sectors or 
companies took advantage of their monopoly or oligopoly position in the market to 
carry out frequent and steep increases in prices. I want to warn you that from now on 
this type of practices will be identified and, if necessary, we will take all the measures 
at our disposal, including the reduction of import tariffs, to put an end to irresponsible 
business practices’’76.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 J. V. Sourrouille, B. Kosacoff and J. Lucangelli, Transnacionalización y política económica en la 
Argentina, 1985, pp. 86 
76 Declaration of José A. Martínez de Hoz, Boletín Semanal, Ministry of Economy, No. 172, 14/III/77, p. 15  
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Graph III.6 
Quarterly Inflation Rates, 1976-78 
(Consumer Price Index - CPI) 
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 Source: own construction based on data taken from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The Central 
 Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81. 
 
 
 
Based on the belief that the inflationary process was fuelled by individual expectations, 
a price truce was proposed to reduce the inertial-effect of price increases. As a result, 
inflation of consumer and wholesale prices declined somewhat from a monthly rate of 
8.3% and 7.1% in February respectively to 6.5%, and 6.3% in May - representing a 
quarterly rate of 21.4% and 16.7% in the period between March and May of 1977.  
However, this dis-inflation was just a temporary phenomenon, since price increases 
started to accelerate again as soon as the truce ended in June (Graph III.6).  
 
The dynamic of inflation of these years is explained - to a large extent - by the evolution 
of the current account of the balance of payments and the capital inflow from abroad. 
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Graph III.7 
Current Account and Private Capital Movements, 1976-78 
(Millions of dollars per quarter) 
 
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
19
76
-I
19
76
-II
19
76
-II
I
19
76
-IV
19
77
-I
19
77
-II
19
77
-II
I
19
77
-IV
19
78
-I
19
78
-II
19
78
-II
I
19
78
-IV
M
illi
on
s 
of
 U
S
$
Flow of Private Capital
Current Account
Surplus
Deficit
 
 Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The  
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The graph above shows that, in the first half of 1977, there was a growing surplus in 
the current account, with a maximum of US$ 522 million in the second quarter. This 
was attributable to the increase in the real exchange rate of approximately 25% since 
March 1976. For the government, the monetary expansion caused by the trade surplus 
was to blame for the failure to bring inflation under control during the price truce period 
(see Graphs III.6 and III.7). This served to convince the monetary authorities that they 
lacked the policy-tools to deal with inflation, and that a comprehensive structural reform 
of the financial system could no longer be postponed. Furthermore, the liberalisation of 
interest rates was a cornerstone of the economic reforms of the military government, 
intended to encourage saving rather than consumption, which would help to control 
inflation in the short-term and would increase investment and consequently, stimulate 
growth in the long-term. 
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On June 3rd. the financial institutions were given the freedom to set interest rates and to 
allocate credits based on market forces77. The hope was that this would stimulate the 
demand for local financial assets and this, in turn, would provide a better control of the 
money supply. After the financial reform, the annual lending rates in real terms in the 
financial markets increased sharply from 6.2% to 52% over the third quarter78. At the 
same time, it was decided to slow down the rate of nominal devaluation in an attempt 
to moderate the effect of prices of tradable goods on local inflation and to reduce the 
monetary effect of the high surplus in the trade accounts. A restrictive monetary policy 
was, therefore, the main tool used in the battle against inflation in the second semester 
of 1977. 
  
However, the reduction of inflation did not go as expected and two factors account for 
this. Although the foreign trade surplus saw a moderate decline, the marked increase in 
the interest rate in real terms had the unforeseen consequence of attracting large 
amounts of foreign capital in the second half of this year (US$ 1,450 million), which 
resulted in an extraordinary increase in the money supply, exactly the opposite of what 
was desired (Graph III.7). Furthermore, the appreciation of the peso in real terms was 
mitigated by an increase in the terms of trade of exports of primary products, which 
worked against the expected decline in the trade surplus79. In fact, the external sector 
was responsible for an expansion of 85% in the money supply over this period. 
Consequently, there was no reduction in inflation, and consumer and wholesale prices 
went up by 29% and 27% in the third quarter and by 32% and 28% in the last quarter of 
1977 (Graph III.6).  
 
In addition to the monetary problems generated by the over-adjustment of the domestic 
demand which resulted in a high external surplus, the policy of monetary restriction 
started to have a negative effect on the real side of the economy in the last quarter of 
                                                 
77 A detailed description of the institutional reform of the financial system is given in Chapter IV, Section 3. 
78 Chapter V is dedicated to the analysis of the factors responsible for these high rates of interest.  
79 The value of Argentine exports in terms of imports increased by 40% over the years 1976-77. 
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1977. This is shown in the graph below, which depicts the relationship between the rate 
of growth in period (t) and the lending rate of the preceding six month-period (t-1).  
 
Graph III.8 
Economic Growth and Cost of Bank Loans, 1976-78 
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As can be seen in Graph III.8, there is a close negative relationship between the level 
of activity and the cost of bank loans (lending rate) with a delay (lag) of six months. The 
rise in interest rates which occurred during the second half of 1977 (shown graphically 
in the first half of 1978) was so dramatic, that it led to a reduction in the demand for 
finished consumer goods and physical investment which, in turn, resulted in a fall in the 
rate of growth from 10% of GDP in the third quarter to 4% in the fourth quarter of 
1977.The slowdown in the level of production continued thereafter and, by the end of 
first quarter of 1978, the country had entered into a deep recession with high and 
accelerating inflation.  
 
By March 1978, two years after the beginning of the programme, the macro-economic 
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results had been disappointing: aggregate output had declined to the level of mid-1977, 
annual inflation continued to run at more than 150% (around 25% per quarter) and the 
surplus in the foreign sector had generated an excessive monetary expansion (Table 
III.3). For the government, however, all the troubles were due to the large surplus in the 
external sector (Graph III.7). The Minister of Economy Martínez de Hoz stated … “we 
are in an exceptionally favourable situation with positive results in the balance of trade 
and current accounts and a large stock of international reserves as a result of a 
‘realistic’ exchange rate. In spite of this, the external sector is a source of monetary 
expansion which is working against the efforts made on the fiscal front to control the 
money supply’’80.  
 
Looking for the appropriate tool to deal with both inflation and recession, for the third 
time in a period of two years, the government decided to modify the stabilisation policy 
based on monetary restriction. Efforts were now focused on changing the exchange 
rate policy of crawling peg for one of a ‘dirty’ float in which, the Central Bank would try 
to manage the market price by buying and selling foreign exchange. The intention was 
to: (a) increase the level of uncertainty in the foreign exchange market for those 
speculating with the interest rate differential between the foreign and local financial 
markets; and (b) reduce the surplus in the balance of trade by allowing an appreciation 
of the peso in real terms. In addition, to limit the monetary expansion generated by the 
inflow of foreign capital, the Central Bank set a compulsory deposit requirement in local 
currency equivalent to 20% of the external capital. Finally, the other factor thought to 
be at the root of the inflationary process was the indexation of the economy. It was 
established, therefore, that the policy of wage restriction would continue and public 
utility tariffs would not rise automatically following inflation, but in accordance with the 
financial needs of each State-owned enterprise which, in turn, was required to lower its 
operating costs.  
 
                                                 
80 Boletín Semanal, Ministry of Economy, No. 234, 22/V/78, pg. 23 
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The new exchange rate policy proved very effective at discouraging the influx of foreign 
capital, which dropped from US$ 1,077 million in the first quarter of 1978 to US$ 460 
million and US$ 35 million in the second and third quarters respectively (Graph III.7). 
As a result, the monetary creation caused by the capital account of the balance of 
payments declined from 57% to 38% and 9% in the first three quarters of the year. At 
the same time, the policy of delaying nominal wage and tariff increases contributed to a 
reduction in inflation: the rate of increase in consumer prices fell from 31.8% in the first 
quarter to 28.6% in the second and to 22.3% in the third quarter (Graph III.6). However, 
the attempt to reduce the surplus in the balance of trade via an appreciation of the 
peso in real terms backfired: instead of the hoped-for reduction, the surplus in the trade 
accounts rose from US$ 278 million in the first quarter of 1978 to US$ 754 million in the 
third quarter. This was the result of an increase in the terms of trade of Argentine 
exports and the reduction in imports due to the decline in the level of activity initiated 
the previous year (Graph III.8). The net effect of the trade and capital accounts was a 
large increase in the stock of foreign reserves and with it, a huge monetary 
expansion81. This increase in liquidity caused an excess supply in the money market 
which, in turn, generated an excess demand in the real sector (market for goods and 
services). As happened in the second half of 1977, the adjustment to this disequilibrium 
was mainly via prices rather than quantities. This explains why after the temporary dis-
inflation, prices began to rise again, reaching a rate of 30.2% in the last quarter of this 
year; that is, an annual rate of more than 180% (Graph III.6). 
 
The results with regard to the level of activity also fell short of expectations: total output 
declined by 4.1% in 1978, basically due to a sharp fall in manufacturing sector of 8%. 
This decline in production affected almost all branches of industry with the exceptions 
of the paper and non-metallic minerals which grew slightly. Among the most negatively 
affected activities were the production of durable goods for household consumers and 
machinery. It should be pointed out that the overall economic decline would have been 
                                                 
81 At that time, the shallow capital market of Argentina prevented the Central Bank from issuing 
enough public bonds to sterilise this monetary expansion.  
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even more severe had it not been for the construction sector which grew by 7%. In 
turn, this is explained - to a large extent - by public construction which increased by 
12% due to several energy and road projects and public works in preparation for the 
Football World Cup held in Argentina that year.  
 
Although the government maintained its long-term objective of changing the model of 
economic development of industrialisation by import substitution, the short term macro-
economic dynamic - high and persistent inflation coupled with a deep recession - 
became the major concern of policy-makers. When the pressure of different economic 
groups became unbearable, a new economic programme was proposed at the end of 
1978. 
 
III.3.2   Second Phase 1979-81 
 
The plan launched on 20th December 1978 was an attempt to gradually reduce the rate 
of inflation and to achieve a structural reform aimed at integrating the country into the 
world economy. For the first time ever, the strategy of opening-up of the economy to 
international capital markets was considered explicitly as a policy instrument. The 
intention was to “change radically from a closed economy characterised by extensive 
State interventionism to one characterised by openness, in which the private sector is 
the engine of growth and the State plays a subsidiary role”82. At that time, the economic 
authorities insisted that the inflationary process was mostly influenced by a feedback 
mechanism which linked individual expectations to some forms of formal and informal 
types of indexation. With this diagnosis, the strategy adopted by the government was to 
rely on foreign competition and on the management of some fundamental prices to 
help discipline local economic agents. Furthermore, the intention was to limit the size of 
the fiscal disequilibrium, as well as the proportion in which it was financed via printing 
money. 
                                                 
82 Speech given by the Minister of Economy, Boletín Semanal, Ministry of Economy, no. 265, 25/XII/78 
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The stabilisation programme was organised around a pre-announced sliding schedule 
of monthly adjustments for the following variables: the nominal exchange rate, prices of 
public services, minimum wages and the rate of expansion of bank loans. As part of the 
exchange rate policy, therefore, the monetary authority was committed to buying and 
selling foreign exchange at the prevailing rate. Moreover, on the external front, the plan 
consisted of extensive financial and commercial reforms which included two policies: 
(a) the elimination of foreign exchange controls and an important reduction of barriers 
to foreign capital movements; and (b) a pre-announced schedule of tariff reduction for 
the next five years. The intention was to gradually reduce import tariffs from a non-
weighted rate of 29% on average in December 1978 to 15% in December 1984. This 
proposal was based on the assumption that the margin of nominal protection not used 
in relation with the external competition had already disappeared. This schedule was 
arranged as follows: 
 
Xit = Xio - (Xio -XtT) t/T = Xio (1 - t/T) + XiT t/T  (T = 20) ; (t = 1, ...., 20)  
Xit   = import tariff on product (i) - ad valorem- in quarter (t) 
Xio  = import tariff on product (i) - ad valorem- at the end of December 1978 
XtT  = import tariff - % value added - at the end of the reduction schedule 
For all  Xio ≥ 30 % ⇒ XtT = 30 %;  
Xio < 30 % ⇒ XtT = Xio 
 
Import tariffs which in December 1978 were higher than 30% would decrease steadily 
quarter by quarter at a constant rate to the government’s objective of 30% at the end of 
December 1981. Those import tariffs which were lower than 30% would remain equal. 
The rationale behind the stabilisation plan of pre-announcing a devaluation schedule at 
a declining rate is to be found in: (a) the direct effect on internal inflation arising from a 
lower rate of price changes in traded goods; and (b) the effect of lowering inflationary 
expectations by reducing the uncertainty about the course of the exchange rate. It was 
expected that price changes of non-traded products would converge rapidly with price 
changes in traded sectors for fear of being replaced by imported goods. The idea of the 
convergence of domestic prices with international ones received in the literature the 
appellation of the “law of one price”. In the same vein, it was expected that the local 
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interest rate would converge with foreign levels adjusted by the rate of devaluation plus 
the cost of arbitrage and a minimum exchange risk premium. This implied that in the 
long run, the interest rate in the local financial market was to be determined with total 
independence of the credit policy of the Central Bank. This is referred to as the “law of 
one rate”83. Therefore, the central variable of this stabilisation plan was the evolution of 
the nominal exchange rate which was to be changed according to a pre-announced 
scheme known to all individuals, this was known as the ‘’tablita’’ plan84.   
 
It should be stressed that a policy of pegging and managing the nominal exchange rate 
left the Central Bank with no control over the money supply. This is so, because when 
the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the monetary base becomes an endogenous 
variable to the sources of money creation in the external sector. In this situation if, for 
instance, the authority attempts to reduce the interest rate by raising the amount of 
credits, it will generate a capital outflow which will cause a decline in the stock of 
foreign reserves. This loss of reserves, in turn, will generate a reduction in the money 
supply until a new equilibrium is ultimately achieved, at which point, the stock of money 
returns to its previous level. The final result of this is that foreign reserves are entirely 
replaced by domestic financial assets. This means that in this foreign exchange 
regime, the Central Bank controls only the distribution between local and foreign 
sources of money creation but not the level or quantum of the money supply. One 
important implication of this is that the rate of growth of domestic credit will not be 
affected by the level of the interest rate. 
 
                                                 
83 The rationale behind the convergence of interest rates is given by the Fisher hypothesis, which 
maintains that for financial assets that are identical except in their currency denomination, the difference 
between their rates of return is equal to the expected change in the exchange rate parity between the 
countries (exchange rate premium). See, for instance, R. E. Cumby and M. Obstfeld, ‘’A Note on 
Exchange-Rate Expectations and Nominal Interest Rate Differentials: A Test of the Fisher Hypothesis’’. 
Journal of Finance, June 1981, Vol. 36, pp. 697-703 and M. I. Blejer, “Interest-Rate Differentials and 
Exchange Risk: Recent Argentine Experience,” IMF Staff Papers, June 1982, pp. 270-79. 
84 A formal model of the stabilisation programme followed over the period 1979-81 can be found in Roque 
Fernández, ‘’The Expectation Management Approach to Stabilisation in Argentina during 1976-82’’, World 
Development, Vol. 13, No. 8, pp. 871-892.;  C. A. Rodriguez, ‘’El Plan Argentino de Estabilización del 20 
de Diciembre’’, Documento de Trabajo, C.E.M.A., 1980, Nro. 4; R. B. Fernández y C. A. Rodriguez, 
Inflación y Estabilidad, 1982; and L. Sjaastad ‘’Failure of economic liberalism in the southern cone of 
Latinoamerica’’, The World Economy, 1983, March, pp. 34-79 
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The trade reform was designed to operate not only as an anti-inflationary instrument by 
moderating price increases but also, to change the incentives for allocating resources 
to the productive sector, aimed at taking full advantage of the country’s comparative 
advantages. It was understood, however, that this goal was entirely subordinated to the 
short-term anti-inflationary objective. In the words of the Minister of Economy Martínez 
de Hoz … ‘’if needed, the State would act to maintain market discipline in connection 
with price increases and for that reason, it was possible to anticipate some phases of 
the trade reform by accelerating the schedule of tariff reduction‘’85.  
 
As part of the re-definition of the role of the State in the economy, fiscal policy was 
designed to cut public expenditures and to intensify tax pressure as a means of closing 
the fiscal disequilibrium. The measures included the downsizing of the public sector 
and the decentralisation of some activities from the national administration (e.g. 
schools and hospitals) to the provincial governments. In connection with revenues, the 
taxation system was re-structured increasing the use of indirect taxes (Value Added 
Tax - VAT) and reducing tax exemptions. These measures were complemented with a 
strict control over the transfer of resources from the Treasury to State firms, and with 
the prohibition of direct financing from the Central Bank to the National Treasury. 
 
The policy-makers believed that after some period of adjustment, price increases of 
tradable goods would be equal to the rate of devaluation plus the rate of international 
inflation. In addition, they expected that the nominal interest rate in the domestic 
banking system would converge with the external one, adjusted by a minimum risk 
premium and, therefore, independent of the monetary policy of the Central Bank.  
 
As in the previous phase, the initial conditions in which the ‘’tablita’’ programme was 
launched is summarised first.  
 
                                                 
85 Speech given by the Minister of Economy, Boletín Semanal, Ministry of Economy, no. 265, 25/XII/78 
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Table III.4 
Key Macro-economic Variables, 1978-81 
 
Economic Variable 1978        1979          1980          1981
I II I II I II
 Rate of growth (% GDP) -3.5 8.3 6.0 -0.2 2.4 0.4 -11.9
 Inflation rate - WPI (%) 143.3 64.6 39.1 32.5 32.5 62.7 72.1
 Inflation rate - CPI (%) 169.8 63.9 46.4 42.0 32.2 47 57
 Current account (in millions of US$) 1,785 418 -989 -1,764 -3,026 -3,178 -1,514
 Trade balance (in millions of US$) 2,566 1,353 -255 -585 -1935 -531 244
 Capital account (in millions of US$) 1,461 2,389 2,624 892 1,090 596 299
 Foreign reserves (in millions of US$) 6,037 8,513 10,480 9,190 7,684 4,729 3,877
 Real exchange rate 1975=100 88.0 74.4 69.3 57.6 53.2 59.7 63.1
 Nominal peso deprec. (%) 91.0 37.4 27.6 15.2 23.4 125.9 105.1
 M1/GDP (%) 6.3 6.4 5.9 7.7 7.0 7.2 5.5
 Real wages 1975=100 63.5 67.5 74.0 76.8 81.6 84.0 85.4
 Fiscal deficit (% of GDP) 10.1 8.7 9.5 12.1 13.8 14.5 16.4
Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The Central 
Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-78, and from Cavallo and Peña, (1984) Op. Cit. 
 
 
 
 
By the end of 1978, the macro-economic situation of Argentina was characterised by a 
deep recession with high inflation (stagflation), a large surplus in the foreign accounts, 
a strong reserve position in the Central Bank and a relatively low indebtedness with the 
exterior. Internationally, favourable conditions existed in the financial and commercial 
markets: there was an excess of liquidity abroad, the country was receiving a large 
influx of foreign capital and the terms of trade for Argentine exports were historically 
high. Internally, the policy of price de-regulation plus the government’s control over 
nominal wage increases caused a marked reduction in the level of real wages. 
Moreover, the surplus in the balance of trade is evidence that the peso was not 
overvalued at the end of 1978, despite the real appreciation of around 30% that it had 
undergone from early 1977 (Table III.4). On the fiscal side, the efforts made to reduce 
the deficit had proved insufficient, and it remained at around 10% of GDP, not very 
different from what it had been at the end of 1976.  
 
The analysis of the economic results begins by looking at the evolution of the two ‘key 
prices’ - inflation and interest rates - which the government expected to converge with 
international standards. As shown in the graph below, the objective of dis-inflation was 
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achieved only partially and temporarily over the years 1979-81. 
  
Graph III.9 
Quarterly Inflation Rates, 1979-81 
(Consumer Price Index - CPI) 
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Measured by the consumer and wholesale prices, the inflation rate fell from 30.2% and 
26.9% in the fourth quarter of 1978 to 13.1% and 9% in the third quarter of 1980 
respectively. Subsequently, inflation stayed at 15.8% and 12.9% in the first quarter of 
1981 respectively. After the resignation of the Minister of Economy Martínez de Hoz in 
March 1981, there was an acceleration of inflation and consumer and wholesale prices 
increased by 27% and 44% per quarter during the second half of the year respectively. 
Over this period of temporary stabilisation and renewed inflation, three different phases 
can be identified (Graph III.9). In the first eight months, the inflation rate declined 
slightly but remained relatively very high (between 24% and 25% per quarter). This was 
due to inflationary expectations and an excess demand for non-traded goods - those 
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which were not directly influenced by the exchange rate policy and the tariff reduction86. 
Between January and August 1979, retail prices rose by 29% per quarter on average 
and wholesale prices by 31%. For the government, an increased foreign inflation was 
preventing a more rapid stabilisation of prices: it was estimated that half of inflation was 
explained by the rise in world prices87.  
 
As can be seen in Graph III.9, in the last quarter of 1979, the anti-inflationary policy had 
more effect and price increases experienced a marked drop: consumer and wholesale 
prices increased by 14.7% and 11.2% respectively. The declining rate of devaluation of 
the peso began to reduce inflationary expectations. Another important factor was the 
price of beef which declined as a result of lower prices in the international market. 
Subsequently, there was a temporary acceleration of inflation in the first half of 1980 
due to an increase in the level of uncertainty as a consequence of the onset of the 
banking crisis in March88. By the middle of the year, nevertheless, the country’s 
financial situation had improved somewhat and the anti-inflationary policy had begun to 
bear some fruit: consumer prices rose by only 13.1% and wholesale prices by 9% in 
the third quarter, in a period in which inflation measured by retail prices reached a 
minimum in August. This dis-inflation, however, was short-lived and the inflation rate 
began to rise in last quarter of 1980 (Graph III.9). By that time, there was growing 
uncertainty with regard to the future of the ‘tablita’ plan as the date for the pre-
established change of government approached. These fears proved to be well-
founded, in June 1981, the new authorities, realising the impossibility of sustaining the 
exchange rate scheme, devalued the peso by 30%, marking the end of the ’tablita’ 
plan. As a result, inflation soared and by the end of 1981 it had reached a rate similar 
to that of 1978 (Table III.4).  
 
 As well as the effect of foreign prices, price indexation and individuals’ expectations of 
                                                 
86 It was influenced by the price of meat which rose at a monthly rate of 13 % in the first eight months.  
87 Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The Central  Bank of Argentina 1980, p. 71. 
88 The origin and consequences of the banking crisis of 1980 are analysed later in Chapters IV, V and VI. 
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devaluation, another crucial factor to be blamed for the high inflation is the large fiscal 
imbalance over these years. Table III.5 presents the de-composition of the total public 
deficit, the proportion of it financed via money printing and the importance of the fiscal 
disequilibrium in comparison with the total money supply. 
 
Table III.5 
Fiscal Deficit and Its Monetary Financing, 1978-81 
(Percentage of GDP) 
 
Composition of the Fiscal Deficit 1978 1979 1980 1981
 Total fiscal deficit  10.1 9 11.9 16.4
 Total fiscal deficit net of debt services 1.8 2.4 7.2 8.2
 Indexation of public debt 1.4 1.3 0.6 1.1
 Monetary regulatory account (CRM) 2.8 0.9 -0.7 0.7
 Fiscal deficit financed by printing money (%) 60.1 52.3 63.4 76.1
 Fiscal deficit / M1 (%) 71.5 58.7 76.4 130.4
Source: own construction based on data obtained from Cavallo and Peña (1984), Op. Cit.  
 
As a result of the fiscal measures applied, the accounts of the national administration 
improved by 2.1% of GDP in 1979 (Table III.5). At the same time, the reduction carried 
out by the Central Bank of the reserve requirements for banks helped to reduce the 
deficit caused by the monetary regulatory account by 1.9% of GDP. Furthermore, the 
reduction in the rate of inflation meant a lower cost for debt indexation. However, the 
policy of limiting the financing of State-owned enterprises from the National Treasury 
did not prevent them from obtaining credits in the local and foreign capital markets. 
With this possibility, and given the high liquidity reigning internally and abroad, the 
public firms increased their spending - including interest costs paid on debts. Although 
the authorities claimed that these loans did not have a State guarantee, the banks 
believed that an implicit insurance existed and, therefore, decided to lend to these 
enterprises, charging very high interest rates in real terms. In just one year, from 
December 1978 to December 1979, the amount of loans granted by the local banks to 
the public sector increased by US$ 1,921 million - a growth of 26% in real terms. On 
this point, the then President of the Central Bank, Adolfo Díz affirmed: “no matter what 
we said, there was an implicit State guarantee regarding the debts of State-owned 
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firms89. This helps to explain the over expansion of bank credits granted to the public 
sector and the negative allocation efficiency of these funds, which subsequently 
generated serious fiscal and financial problems.    
 
The lack of discipline of these enterprises helps to explain why, despite the efforts of 
the government in some areas, the consolidated fiscal deficit showed only a marginal 
reduction of 1.1% of GDP - from 10.1% in 1978 to 9% in 1979 (Table III.5). The fiscal 
deficit increased further thereafter. Higher expenditures and lower revenues because of 
a fall in the level of activity led a consolidated disequilibrium of 11.3% of GDP in 1980 
and 16.4% in 1981. What is more, in contrast with the government’s aims, the 
proportion of the deficit financed by printing money grew from 52% in 1979 to 63% in 
1980 and 76% in 1981. This monetary issue, in turn, represented a high proportion of 
the total money supply in the economy (58.7% in 1979, 76.4% in 1980 and 130.4% in 
1981 - Table III.5). Thus, the expansionist fiscal and monetary policies of these years 
helped to sustain a high level of aggregate demand, which worked against the 
government’s goal of price stabilisation. 
 
The other economic variable which the authorities thought could be brought into line 
with international levels was the interest rate, adjusted by the rate of devaluation and 
the exchange rate risk. This was attempted as a means of integrating the country 
financially into world markets by opening up the economy to capital movements and by 
pre-announcing the time and the rate of nominal devaluation of the domestic currency. 
Graph III.10 presents the evolution of the financial spread between the interest rates in 
the international capital market and in the local financial system after the corresponding 
adjustment by the rate of nominal devaluation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 This was mentioned by the President of the Central Bank, Adolfo Díz to David Erro in an interview. See 
D. G. Erro, Op. Cit, p. 116 
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Graph III.10 
Financial Spread Between the Domestic and Foreign Interest Rates, 1979-81 
(Percentage points) 
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Financial Cost Gap
 
 Source: based on data obtained from R. Frenkel, ‘’La apertura financiera externa: el caso argentino’’, in 
 R.  French Davis (edit.), Las relaciones financieras externas, (1983), pp. 146-196 
 
 
As can be seen in the graph above, the second predicted convergence not only failed 
to occur but in fact, except for two short-periods, the local and the foreign interest rates 
diverged. That is to say, over these years, most of the time Argentina faced a growing 
exchange rate risk. At the beginning, the cost difference of borrowing internally and 
abroad - adjusted by the rate of nominal devaluation - increased from 0.9% to 3.2% per 
month in the period between January and October 1979 (Graph III.10). This was mainly 
due to the reduction in the rate of devaluation, which explains 78% of the increase in 
the financial cost, whereas the remaining 22% is explained by the increase in the 
domestic rate of interest. Thereafter, the reduction in inflation caused a marked decline 
in the financial spread which went from a monthly rate of 3.2% in the third quarter of 
1979 to 1.4% in the first quarter of 1980 (Graph III.10). This was the result of a positive 
combination of the following factors: a reduction in the interest rate of 2.5%, an 
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increase in the international one of 0.2% and a reduction in the rate of nominal 
devaluation of 0.9%, something already pre-defined in the exchange rate programme 
of nominal devaluation (‘tablita’). 
 
However, a turning point occurred in March 1980 and the exchange rate risk began to 
rise. This was mainly the consequence of an increase in the level of uncertainty caused 
by the liquidation of the largest private bank - Banco de Intercambio Regional which 
gave rise to a deposit run90. In the following two months, the exchange rate risk 
increased further to 4.4% in July 1980, representing an annual rate of 68%. Thereafter, 
as can be seen in Graph III.10, there was a temporary decline over the third quarter 
and, from then on, the exchange rate risk experienced a sharp increase from 2.8% per 
month in October 1980 to 4.7% in March 1981. This was the result of internal factors, 
as in this period, the interest rate in the foreign market (prime rate) remained stable at 
around 1.15% per month91.  
 
The failure to achieve the expected convergence of the inflation and interest rates with 
international standards, together with the existence of a large fiscal deficit, had 
important macro-economic consequences. To begin with, there was a continuous 
appreciation of the domestic currency in real terms. Twenty months after the beginning 
of the stabilisation plan, the peso had been devalued in nominal terms by 94.3%, when 
external inflation was 34.1% (Table III.4). In accordance with the criteria of price 
convergence (‘law of one price’), over this period, domestic prices should have risen by 
160.5%. The actual rise in wholesale and consumer prices was, however, 230.5% and 
284.5% respectively. This means that by August 1980, the peso had accumulated an 
overvaluation of about 40% (Table III.4). This forced the government to review the 
exchange rate guidelines. On 16th September 1980, for the first time, the pre-
announced devaluation rule was changed and the new rate of nominal devaluation of 
                                                 
90 This point is analysed later in Chapters IV and V. 
91 Own calculation based on the financial gap between borrowing internally and abroad - adjusted by the 
rate of nominal devaluation (Graph III.10)  
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the peso for the last quarter would be at 1% per month instead of 0.2% as had been 
previously established. At that time, the government gave no indication of what the 
pace of devaluation for the next quarter would be. Thereafter, on 10th December, it was 
announced that the devaluation per month for the first quarter of 1981 would be 2%, 
changing again the devaluation scheme of 1% applied in the last three months of the 
previous year. Finally, without any anticipation, an out-of-schedule devaluation of 10% 
was carried out in February 1981. Moreover, it was announced that the nominal 
exchange rate would increase at 3% per month until August 1981 which, in fact, 
marked the end of the policy of sliding devaluation established in December 1978.  
 
In spite of these nominal devaluations; by March 1981, the peso had appreciated by 
27% against its level at the beginning of the stabilisation programme (’tablita’). It should 
be stressed that this overvaluation is more important if it is considered that, in 
December 1978, the peso was already overvalued by 28% in relation with its level in 
January 1977 (Table III.3). This means that the real exchange rate was around 55% 
lower in dollar terms at the end of 1981 than in early 1977.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127
 
Table III.6 
Commercial and Capital Accounts of the Balance of Payments, 1978-81 
(Millions of dollars) 
 
Balance             Services Current Non-Compens. Changes in
Period of Trade Real Financial Account Capital Reserves
1978 2,566 -99 -632 1,834 1,334 6,037
1979 1,098 -764 -885 -550 4,915 10,480
I 351 -285 -130 -64 1,029 7,034
II 1,003 -154 -383 466 1,033 8,513
III 248 -159 -156 -67 1,335 9,694
IV -503 -166 -217 -886 1,515 10,480
1980 -2,519 -740 -1,509 -4,768 2,254 7,684
I -223 -419 -125 -767 1,126 10,667
II -361 -150 -477 -989 -793 9,190
III -747 -11 -387 -1,145 1,455 9,492
IV -1,188 -160 -519 -1,867 465 7,684
1981 -134 -616 -3,306 -4,056 -1,236 3,877
I -624 -682 -743 -2,049 -952 4,699
II 246 -33 -912 -699 -845 4,729
III 607 71 -796 -117 -112 4,646
IV -363 27 -855 -1,192 -1236 3,877
 
Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central,  
The Central Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81 
 
 
 
A direct consequence of the growing overvaluation of the domestic currency combined 
with the tariff reduction was the deterioration of the country’s external accounts92. After 
more than three years of surplus, a commercial deficit occurred in the last quarter of 
1979 and, in 1980, the trade imbalance reached US$ 2,500 million (Table III.6). In a 
period in which exports remained relatively stable, the deterioration of the balance of 
trade was entirely the result of the increase in all types of imports: capital and 
intermediate goods increased by 118% and 170% and consumer goods by 775%. 
These differential rates of growth led to a marked change in the composition by types 
of imports: imported consumer goods went from 5.5% of total imports to 17.3%, 
whereas capital and intermediate goods went from 28.6% and 65.9% to 21.8% and 
60.9% respectively. Moreover, high spending on tourism abroad and on financial 
services explains the increase in the deficit of the service account from US$ 632 million 
                                                 
92 Wogart and Marquez found that redundant tariff protection had already been eliminated by January 
1979. J. P. Wogart and S. Marquez, ‘’Trade liberalisation, tariff redundancy and inflation. A methodological 
exploration applied to Argentina’’, Review of World Economics, 1984, pp. 18-39 
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at the end of 1978 to US$ 1,509 million at the end of 1980. As a result, the current 
account went from a surplus of US$ 1,834 million in 1978 to a deficit of US$ 4,768 
million in 1980; a deterioration which occurred despite the recovery of 20% in the terms 
of trade of Argentine exports over the period 1979-80 (Table III.6)93.  
 
As shown in Table III.6, for the country as a whole, the continuous overvaluation of the 
peso led to an excess of domestic absorption (consumption plus investment) over the 
level of aggregate production which, in turn, implied a growing demand for external 
financing. Part of this capital was supplied by private investors, who were attracted by 
the high interest rate differential existing between the internal and external markets. 
Given this financial spread, the policy of pre-announcing the nominal devaluation and 
the reduction in the minimum term for loans to one year became a strong incentive for 
both domestic and foreign investors to: (a) borrow abroad to invest internally in physical 
assets; and (b) speculate in the financial system via arbitrage of interest rates. Another 
supplier of foreign funds was the public sector which began to borrow abroad so as to 
finance part of its deficit. As a result, between the first and last quarter of 1979, the 
country received foreign funds of more than US$ 4,900 million (8.7% of GDP - Table 
III.6). At that time, the deficit in the current account was relatively small and 
consequently, most of these funds went to increase the stock of foreign reserves in the 
Central Bank, which reached US$ 10,480 million in December 1979 (18.6% of GDP - 
Tables III.4 and III.6).  
 
However, by the end of 1979, the interest rate differential between the domestic and 
foreign markets had started to converge causing a notable reduction in the amount of 
private capital inflows: between January and March 1980, these funds were around 
two-thirds of the previous quarter (US$ 1,026 million) (Graph III.10 and Table III.6). In 
addition, as mentioned earlier, the country risk rose due to the banking crisis and, for 
                                                 
93 For the authorities, nevertheless, this decline in the real exchange rate was seen as a “positive” result, 
since they believed that the large trade surplus with the exterior of the period 1977-78 and thus, its internal 
monetary effects were due to a highly undervalued currency. 
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the first time since the beginning of the stabilisation plan, a capital outflow of nearly 
US$ 800 million took place in the second quarter of 1980 (Table III.6). In an attempt to 
halt the capital flight and loss of foreign reserves, new measures were applied in mid-
1980, which included: (a) an extension of the pre-announced exchange rate guideline; 
(b) the elimination of the minimum term for borrowing abroad; (c) an increase in public 
external borrowing; (d) an extra reduction of import duties and a new schedule aimed 
at reaching a uniform import tariff of 20% in the year 1984; and (e) the elimination of 
some contributions paid by employers in order to help local producers compete with 
imported goods.  
 
These measures proved effective at reversing the private capital movements and an 
inflow of external funds of US$ 1,920 million took place in the third and fourth quarters 
of 1980 (Table III.6)94. At the same time, the public sector demanded foreign borrowing 
of around US$ 1,500 million. This helped to ease the monetary restriction and resulted 
in a brief economic recovery in the third quarter of the year. However, by that time, the 
disequilibrium in the external accounts had reached US$ 2,900 million and the peso 
had accumulated a real appreciation of 35% in relation to the December 1978 level 
(Tables III.4 and III.6). These factors heightened expectations of a nominal devaluation 
threatening the sustainability of the exchange rate plan. This is shown in Graph III.10, 
which depicts an increase in the exchange rate risk - the interest rate differential 
between the local and foreign markets - in the second semester of 1980. This time, 
however, and in contrast with what had gone before, the increase in the interest rate 
did not compensate for the higher risk faced by financial investors and consequently, a 
capital flight of US$ 3,800 million occurred between October 1980 and March 1981 
(Table III.6).  
 
Over these years, the government followed a countercyclical policy in relation to private 
capital movements. 
                                                 
94 The monetary and financial measures taken over these years are analysed in Chapter IV. 
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Graph III.11 
Changes in Private and Public Foreign Debt, 1978-81  
(Millions of dollars) 
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 Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The 
 Central Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81 
 
 
Graph III.11 shows that until the last quarter of 1979, in the period in which there was a 
large influx of private funds, the public sector was relatively cautious about borrowing 
abroad. Subsequently, when the supply of private funds began to dry up, the public 
sector started borrowing heavily abroad in an attempt to maintain the exchange rate 
scheme: in 1980, the foreign debt of the public sector increased by 45%; that is, nearly 
US$ 5,000 million (see Table III.7). However, given that the credibility of the economic 
programme was deteriorating pari-passu with the overvaluation of the peso and the 
mounting deficit in the external sector, the increased public indebtedness did not 
contribute to strengthening the reserve position of the monetary authority, but to 
fuelling the process of capital flight. In effect, despite the supply to the Central Bank of 
around US$ 5,500 million by the public sector over the period of one year (from March 
1980 to March 1981), the stock of foreign reserves dropped by US$ 6,790 million, from 
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US$ 10,667 to US$ 3,877 million (Table III.6).  
 
As shown in the table below, the use of external borrowing on the part of the private 
and public sectors resulted in a huge increase in the country’s foreign debt. 
 
Table III.7 
Stock of Private and Public External Debt, 1978-81  
(Millions of dollars) 
 
Period Public  D ebt Private  D ebt G ross N et        Foreign R eserves
D ebt D ebt S tock Varia tion 
1978 8,357 4,139 12,496 6,459 6,037 1,998
1979 9,960 9,074 19,034 8,554 10,480 4,443
1980 14,459 12,703 27,162 19,478 7,684 -2,796
1981 20,024 15,647 35,671 31,794 3,877 -3,807
 
    Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The 
     Central Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81 
 
 
In just three years, (1979-81), the gross external debt tripled, from US$ 12,496 million 
to US$ 35,671 million. More importantly, the loss of foreign reserves after 1979 due to 
capital flight and the deficit accumulated in the commercial accounts caused a five-fold 
rise in the net foreign debt (gross debt minus the foreign reserves in the Central Bank) 
from US$ 6,459 million in December 1978 to US$ 31,794 million in December 1981 
(Table III.7). Internally, these funds contributed to generating a large monetary 
expansion and a notable increase in bank lending capacity: in the first six months, M3 
(money in circulation plus current savings and time deposits) went from 28.7% of GDP 
at the end of 1978 to 36.6% in mid-1979, and the stock of bank loans grew by 
114.8%95. Part of these credits went to finance the public sector, which helped to 
reinforce the government’s belief that the financing of the fiscal deficit would not be a 
problem. With regard to the level of activity, the rise in liquidity brought about strong 
economic reactivation at the beginning of the plan. Graph III.12 depicts the evolution of 
the rate of economic growth, private capital movements and the stock of bank credits. 
                                                 
95 Own estimation based on data obtained from the Central Bank, Boletín Estadístico, several monthly 
issues, 1978-80 
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Graph III.12 
Economic Growth and Private Capital Movements, 1978-81 
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 Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The 
 Central Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81 
 
 
 
In the first half of 1979, total output increased by 7.8%. In this period, there was across 
the board growth: 2.7% in agriculture, 8.7% in industry, 5.1% in the service sector and 
6.2% in construction. The banking sector experienced the largest growth (16.6%) due 
to an extraordinary rise in deposits and credits, in a scenario of free market allocation 
of funds96.  
 
However, the initial positive impulse began to run out of steam at the end of the first 
year together with the reduction in the influx of foreign capital and with the lost of 
                                                 
96 These growth figures are all the more striking as the economy was emerging from a deep recession in 
1978, when total output had declined by 4.1% and manufacturing by 8%. All data on the evolution of the 
main economic sectors presented in this section were obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, 
The Central Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81 and Estudios, Estadísticas de la evolución 
económica de Argentina, 1913-84, Op. Cit., 1986 
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competitiveness of the local producers as a result of the continuous appreciation of the 
peso in real terms and the high real interest rates in the financial system (Table III. 4 
and Graph III.12). The rate of growth fell to 6% in the second half of 1979 and to -0.2% 
in the first half of 1980. In this period, the rate of growth in agriculture and industry 
dropped to -5.3% and -3.9%, and in services and construction to 0.3% and 0.7% 
respectively. However, the banking sector experienced a different reality until March 
1980: despite the widespread recession in the real sector, financial business continued 
growing rapidly (19.2% on annual basis).  
 
Taking the year 1980 as a whole, total output increased by 1.4%, mainly as a result of 
the good performance of the service and construction sectors, in particular public works 
(Graph III.12). This result, however, contrasts with the evolution of the production of 
agriculture and industry, which fell drastically (5.9% and 3.8% respectively). The 
agricultural sector suffered the effect of adverse weather conditions and the real 
appreciation of the peso. Industry declined principally in those activities most affected 
by foreign competition such as textiles, clothing, paper and paper products, machinery 
and equipment, and in activities linked to exports, such as meat packing. In the case of 
the textile sector, for instance, the level of production dropped by 12%. The same trend 
is seen in the case of the sub-sector of machinery where production declined due to 
the general recession and also to the high interest rates in real terms in the local 
financial system. The same phenomenon is noted in the sub-sectors of iron and steel 
which fell 16%97. This extended picture of economic decline had only one exception, 
the motor vehicle industry where production rose by 41% in 1979 and by 12% in 1980. 
This was due to the special protection granted to the automobile industry, aimed at 
encouraging the production of medium-sized and large cars. 
 
By the end of 1980, agricultural and industrial production had declined to the same 
levels as those of the years 1978 and 1973 respectively. In contrast to the other 
                                                 
97 In addition, the steel industry was affected by a surplus in the world market. Data obtained from the 
Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The Central Bank of Argentina, Op. Cit., 1980 
 
 134
 
sectors of the economy, the financial sector continued to experience rapid growth, 
12.3% in 1980, a measure of this is the steady increase in the stock of bank loans of 
16%. However, the foundations of this growth were shaky as many bank debtors were 
demanding financing simply to keep their heads above water in a scenario of 
widespread recession. This suggests that along with the declining level of economic 
activity a general problem of solvency was developing in the financial system98. 
Subsequently, in 1981, this problem deepened further as the GDP continued to fall, by 
4.2% and 11.9% in the first and second halves respectively (Graph III.12).  
 
In short, at the end of 1981, after three years of the stabilisation plan most of the 
macro-economic variables had experienced a marked deterioration branding the 
stabilisation cum economic liberalisation experiment an abject failure. The recession 
deepened, the peso accumulated a large overvaluation, the commercial and capital 
accounts of the balance of payments went from highly positive to highly negative, the 
stock of foreign reserves in the Central Bank dropped dramatically, the fiscal imbalance 
increased further, a large proportion of the productive sector faced problems of 
profitability which, in turn, generated problems of solvency in the financial system and 
the country’s external debt increased five-fold. However, all this suffering was to no 
avail, since the main goal of the economic plan was far from being achieved: the 
annual inflation rate declined only marginally, from 170% in 1978 to 130% in 1981 (see 
above Graph III.9 and Table III.4).  
                                                 
98 This point is analysed in depth in Chapters IV and VI.  
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III.4    POLICY REFORMS AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, 1976-81 
 
This section presents an assessment of the structural transformation of the Argentine 
economy, with the aim of identifying the fundamental changes in the real sector, which 
resulted from the policy-reforms applied by the military government in the period 1976-
81. As explained in Chapter II, a consistent macro-economic analysis should take into 
consideration both the interaction between the real and financial sides of the economy 
and the integration of stock and flow variables99. This methodology is used to examine 
the evolution, composition, allocation and re-allocation of resources, distinguishing the 
economic dynamic in terms of the types of goods/services and supply and demand 
sectors, and those which were saving and investing at different points in time. To this 
end, the situation of 1970-74 is taken as the starting point, and will be used as a 
benchmark to contrast the economic evolution of the years under study. In addition, as 
in the previous section, the period 1976-81 has been divided into two sub-periods in 
order to identify structural changes before and after December 1978. Finally, the nature 
of the economic disadjustments generated by the new model of development (1976-81) 
will be compared with those of the ISI model applied between 1945 and 1975. 
 
To begin with, the evolution of the gross domestic product of Argentina is broken down 
into the main components of aggregate demand and supply, with the aim of identifying 
how they contributed to the expansion or decline in the level of activity, how their 
output-share changed over these years and what the main driving forces behind these 
alterations were.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 The building blocks of this analytical framework and its relevance for undertaking a consistent macro-
economic study are presented in Chapter II, Sections 3, 4 and 5.   
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     Table III.8 
Output Growth and Supply-Demand Dis-aggregation, 1970-81 
(Percentage of GDP) 
 
Total                 Consumption                Investment
Demand Total Private Public Total Private Public Exports
Total growth
1976-81 9.3 15.3 14.2 26.4 -9.5 4.0 -22.0 37.1
1976-78 1.1 0.2 -0.8 10.0 0.9 -8.5 9.6 37.1
1978-81 4.0 15.1 15.1 14.9 -10.3 13.6 -28.9 0.0
Average growth
1976-81 1.7 1.2 0.9 5.0 0.4 4.1 -1.7 11.0
1970-74 3.7 4.7 4.9 3.3 3.2 1.5 7.3 -2.4
Contribut. to growth
1976-81 114.6 84.6 70.2 14.5 -15.5 -7.4 -8.1 30.9
1976-78 101.2 3.0 -10.0 13.0 4.6 2.4 2.2 92.3
1978-81 112.7 123.7 111.4 12.4 -23.8 -11.1 -12.6 0.0
1970-74 100.0 89.3 84.3 5.0 15.7 6.5 9.2 -5.0
Output-share
1981-80 115.3 81.6 73.3 8.3 21.8 12.6 9.1 11.9
1970-74 108.6 78.1 71.6 6.5 22.1 13.2 8.9 8.4
Total Imports GDP Agric.,Cattle Mininng Industry Construc. Services
Supply and Fishing
Total growth
1976-81 9.3 138.1 3.6 20.2 32.7 -17.3 -22.8 2.8
1976-78 1.1 16.6 2.8 7.0 18.8 5.3 21.5 9.7
1978-81 4.0 104.2 0.8 12.4 11.7 -21.5 -36.4 -6.3
Average growth
1976-81 1.7 13.7 0.6 3.2 4.9 -2.8 -2.9 0.6
1970-74 3.7 0.4 4.0 4.0 9.6 8.2 -0.5 1.1
Contribut. to growth
1976-81 114.6 14.6 100.0 128.5 47.7 -273.1 -58.6 55.5
1976-78 101.2 1.2 100.0 11.2 6.4 21.8 13.8 46.8
1978-81 112.7 12.7 100.0 17.5 4.1 -72.9 -20.9 -27.8
1970-74 100.0 0.01 100.0 12.5 6.3 72.1 -0.8 10.0
Output-share
1981-80 115.3 15.3 100.0 14.1 3.5 32.4 5.6 44.4
1970-74 108.6 8.6 100.0 13.3 2.4 33.8 5.0 45.6  
 Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The 
 Central Bank of Argentina, several annually issues, 1976-81, and Estudios, Estadísticas de la 
 evolución económica de Argentina, 1913-1984, Op. Cit., 1986 
 
 
Between 1976 and 1981, the gross domestic product of Argentina grew by 3.6%, which 
means an average annual increase of 0.6% In both absolute and relative terms, this is 
a very low rate in comparison with the growth during the benchmark period (1970-74) 
of 20.1%, that is 4% per year on average (Table III.8). The most dynamic factors of 
aggregate demand were private and public domestic consumption and the foreign 
trade accounts (imports and exports). While the former explains more than 40% of the 
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total output growth, the latter accounts for more than 60% and consequently, offsets 
the negative contribution of total investments of 7.5% and, in particular, of public 
investments100.  
 
As can be observed in the figures above, this evolution is not homogeneous across the 
years. During the first sub-period (1976-78), the economy grew by 2.8% of GDP; which 
represents almost 80% of the total growth of the six years (Table III.8). Additionally, 
more than 90% of this rise is explained by the external sector, in particular, by the 
evolution of exports. All this was - to a great extent - the result of the policy of price 
redressing applied by the authorities during the first year, in particular, the high value in 
real terms set for the foreign exchange rate. However, the story changed radically in 
the second sub-period (1979-81). Total growth declined to 0.8% (0.25% per year), and 
consumption (private and public), in particular, of imported goods experienced a 
marked increase, in a period in which exports stagnated. More importantly, the 
magnitude of these changes was so great that they ended up re-shaping the country’s 
demand structure: the proportion of consumption to total output increased from 78.1% 
in 1970-74 to 81.6% in 1980-81, and that of investment fell from 22.1% to 21.8%. As a 
result, total domestic absorption (consumption plus investment) increased from 100.2% 
of GDP in 1970-74 to 103.4% in 1980-81. This, in turn, accounts for the higher deficit in 
foreign trade, which went from 0.2% of GDP in 1970-74 to 3.4% in 1981-80 (Table 
III.8). 
 
As with demand, on the supply side, there was also an uneven evolution of the different 
productive sectors in the period 1976-81: the primary activities (agriculture and mining) 
experienced an important rise, whereas industry and construction declined sharply 
(Table III.8). It should be stressed that this pattern is entirely due to the stabilisation 
cum liberalisation reforms applied in the years 1979-81. Indeed, in the first sub-period 
(1976-78), all sectors grew but in the second (1979-81), industry, construction and 
                                                 
100 Own calculation based on data of Table III.8 
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services dropped by 22.1% and 36.4% and 6.3% respectively (Table III.8). The lower 
production of these sectors helps to explain - to a large extent - the reduction of the 
rate of economic growth from 2.8% to 0.8% of GDP between the first and the second 
sub-periods. Furthermore, given the steep fall in industrial production, and knowing that 
its weight in the generation of total output is around one-third, the poor performance of 
this sector not only had a negative effect on the level of aggregate output, but also on 
the sectoral composition of the production structure: a process of de-industrialisation 
took place during these years101. The output-share of the manufacturing sector as a 
whole declined from 33.8% in the period 1970-74 to 31.2% in 1981-80 (Table III.8).   
 
The extent of this process of disarticulation of the domestic industry can be appreciated 
by looking at the intra-industry figures. 
 
Table III.9 
Composition and Evolution of the Industrial Structure, 1970-81 
(Percentage points) 
  
Rate of Growth (%) Estructure (% of GDP)
 Industrial Sector 1976/ 1976/ 1979/ 1976-81 1976-78 1979-81 1970-74
1981 1978 1981
 Total Industries -17.2 6.3 -22.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Food, Beverages & Tobacco 4.9 27.0 -17.4 21.3 21.0 23.7 18.3
 Textiles, Shoes & Clothing -26.6 -3.2 -24.2 11.2 11.7 12.2 12.5
 Wood & Wood Products -17.2 0.7 -17.8 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.0
 Paper, Printing & Publishing, -18.7 10.4 -26.4 5.1 5.1 4.9 5.3
 Chemicals, Rubber Petroleum,
 Other Derivaties & Plastics -41.6 -26.6 -20.4 14.1 13.9 12.9 20.0
 Non-Metallic Minerals -15.5 17.0 -27.8 5.3 5.3 4.7 5.1
 Basic Metals -51.2 -35.0 -24.9 5.4 5.1 4.2 8.8
 Metal Products, Machinery &
 Equipment, Transport Vehicles 5.8 34.4 -21.3 29.1 29.3 28.9 22.3
 Other Industries -17.2 20.3 -31.1 6.8 7.0 6.6 5.8
 Total Industries -17.2 6.3 -22.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Finished Consumer Goods -8.4 13.9 -19.6 37.7 33.1 39.5 32.7
 Capital and Intermediate Goods -23.2 2.6 -25.1 62.3 66.9 60.5 67.3
 
Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central,  
The Central Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81 
                                                 
101 This dramatic fall of the level of manufacturing production has been studied by several authors D. 
Azpiazu, R. Bisang and B. Kosacoff, ‘’Dos estudios sobre el caso Argentino (1973/84), Documento de 
Trabajo, CEPAL, No. 22, 1987a; J. Katz and B. Kosacoff, El Proceso de Industrialización en Argentina: 
Evolución, Retroceso y Prospectiva, CEPAL, 1989; A. Dorfman, Cincuenta años de industrialización en la 
Argentina, Buenos Aires, (1983), Op. Cit.; B. Kosacoff, ‘’El Proceso de Industrialización en Argentina’’, 
Documento de Trabajo, CEPAL, 1984; J. Lucangelli and J.V. Sourrouille, ‘’Apuntes sobre la historia 
reciente de la industria argentina’’, Boletín Informativo Techint, No. 219, 1985. 
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The disarticulation of industry was an across-the-board process from 1979 on: in the 
period 1979-81, the production of finished consumer goods declined by 19.5%, and 
that of capital and intermediate goods dropped by 25.1% (Table III.9). This was in 
sharp contrast to the evolution of the previous years (1976-78), when these sectors 
experienced growth, albeit at different rates (13.9% and 2.6% respectively). Taking the 
period 1976-81 as a whole, there is a great disparity in the performance of these 
sectors: the production of finished consumer goods declined by 8.4%, and that of 
capital and intermediate goods fell by 23.2%. This non-uniform evolution caused an 
alteration in the manufacturing structure: the output-share of finished consumer goods 
increased from 32.7% in 1970-74 to 39.5% in 1980-81, and that of capital and 
intermediate goods dropped from 67.3% to 60.5% in the same period (Table III.9).  
 
In a more detailed analysis, in the period 1976-81, the production of chemicals, rubber, 
petroleum, other derivatives and plastics and of base metals experienced the highest 
fall (41.6% and 51.2% respectively - see Table III.9). Consequently, the output-share of 
these sectors dropped from 20% and 8.8% in 1970-74 to 13.5% and 4.2% in 1980-81 
respectively. On the other extreme, the best performance in relative terms corresponds 
to the sectors of food, beverages and tobacco, machinery and motor vehicles with a 
growth of 4.9% and 5.8% in the period 1976-81. This resulted in an increase in their 
shares in manufacturing output from 18.3% and 22.3% in 1970-74 to 23.7% and 28.9% 
in 1980-81 respectively (Table III.9). This growth was due to the strong comparative 
advantages of Argentina in the case of the production of food, beverages and tobacco, 
and of the high level of effective protection in the case of the production of machinery 
and motor vehicles. Out of manufacturing production, total exports represented only 
6% during the period 1976-81. In addition, more than 85% of the value added by this 
sector was produced by industries which destined less than 10% of their production to 
the external markets and only fifteen types of industries were exporting more than 10% 
of their production102.  
                                                 
102 D. Azpiazu, R. Bisang and B. Kosacoff, ‘’Perfil y comportamiento de las empresas exportadoras de 
manufacturas’’, Documento de Trabajo, CEPAL No. 6, 1987b. 
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With regard to the manufacturing sector, the final comment to be made is that such a 
tremendous fall in industrial production has no precedent in the country’s history. 
Although there had been several industrial setbacks over the period 1945-75, the most 
serious took place in 1962, and was of 9.9%, only two-thirds of the decline of 1980, and 
less than half of the decline of the period 1979-81103. What is more, there is no 
incidence of a consecutive drop over a period of three years, something which 
occurred between 1979 and 1981.  
 
The analysis now expands on the evaluation of the saving and investment process and 
the identification of the economic sectors which were demanding financing (units with 
deficits) and those which were supplying financing (units with surplus). The objective is 
to examine the consequences of the policy-reforms discussed earlier on both the level 
and sectoral distribution of two main factors of growth: saving and investment. As 
shown in Chapter II, Section 3, the aggregate budget constraint of the economy - total 
income equals total expenditures - can be written as the sum of the surplus/deficits of 
all economic units. That is to say, based on this macro-economic identity, the sum of 
the surpluses/deficits of all economic units must be equal to zero. With the information 
available for Argentina, it is possible to estimate the surpluses/deficits of the private 
(SupP/DefP), government (SupG/DefG) and foreign (SupX/DefX) sectors only.  
                               
                                                 
103 Own estimation based on data shown in Graph III.1 
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Table III.10 
Saving, Investment and Financing, 1970-81 
 (Percentage of GDP) 
 
Period SupP/ PS PI SupG/ GS GI Inflation SupP*/ SupG*/ SupX/
DefP DefG Tax DefP* DefG* DefX
1976 15.2 25.6 10.4 -12.9 -1.70 11.2 8.9 6.3 -4.0 -2.3
1977 14.7 27.4 12.7 -11.9 -0.40 11.5 5.4 9.4 -6.5 -2.8
1978 13.7 23.0 9.3 -10.1 1.90 12.0 4.6 9.1 -5.5 -3.6
1979 7.4 18.9 11.5 -9.0 1.00 10.0 4.7 2.7 -4.3 1.6
1980 4.2 18.0 13.8 -11.3 -2.20 9.1 3.6 0.6 -7.7 7.1
1981 6.2 16.6 10.4 -15.0 -6.60 8.4 5.1 1.1 -9.9 8.8
1976-81 10.2 21.6 11.4 -11.7 -1.33 10.4 5.4 4.8 -6.3 1.5
1976-78 14.6 25.4 10.8 -11.6 -0.07 11.6 6.3 8.3 -5.3 -2.9
1979-81 5.9 17.8 11.9 -11.8 -2.60 9.2 4.5 1.4 -7.3 5.9
1970-74 4.2 17.0 12.7 -5.4 3.19 8.6 3.6 0.6 -1.7 1.2
 
 Where: (PS) and (GS) mean the flows of saving of the private and government sectors; and 
             (PI) and (GI) mean the flows of physical investment of the private and government sectors.  
Period SupX/ SupN/ NS NI SupP/ PS PI SupG/ GS GI
DefX DefN DefP DefG
1976 -2.3 2.3 23.9 21.6 15.2 25.6 10.4 -12.9 -1.7 11.2
1977 -2.8 2.8 27.0 24.2 14.7 27.4 12.7 -11.9 -0.4 11.5
1978 -3.6 3.6 24.9 21.3 13.7 23.0 9.3 -10.1 1.9 12.0
1979 1.6 -1.6 19.9 21.5 7.4 18.9 11.5 -9.0 1.0 10.0
1980 7.1 -7.1 15.8 22.9 4.2 18.0 13.8 -11.3 -2.2 9.1
1981 8.8 -8.8 10.0 18.8 6.2 16.6 10.4 -15.0 -6.6 8.4
1976-81 1.5 -1.5 20.2 21.7 10.2 21.6 11.4 -11.7 -1.3 10.4
1976-78 -2.9 2.9 25.3 22.4 14.6 25.4 10.8 -11.6 -0.1 11.6
1979-81 5.9 -5.9 15.2 21.1 5.9 17.8 11.9 -11.8 -2.6 9.2
1970-74 1.2 -1.2 20.1 21.3 4.2 17.0 12.7 -5.4 3.2 8.6
 
 
Where: (NS) and (NI) mean the flows of National Saving and National Investment respectively; and 
(Sup/Def) means the surplus or deficit of the External Sector (X), National (N), the Private Sector (P) and 
the Government Sector (G). 
Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The 
Central Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81 and Estudios, Estadísticas de la Evolución 
Económica de Argentina, 1913-1984, Op. Cit, 1986 
 
 
Looking at the evolution of the surpluses/deficits of these three economic sectors, it is 
observed that the government and the foreign sector were the units which demanded 
financing (Table III.10). During the first three years, these funds were supplied by the 
private sector (SupP/DefP) which recorded a surplus of 15% of GDP on average. 
Thereafter, from 1979 on, the external sector began to raise its financing of a growing 
domestic absorption and, at the same time, the private sector reduced its levels of 
surplus. Between 1978 and 1981, the saving rate of the foreign sector (SupX/DefX) 
 142
 
increased from -3.6% to 8.8% of GDP. That is to say, in a period of three years, the 
country accumulated a deficit in the balance of trade of 21.1% of GDP. Taking into 
account that the deficit of the public sector (SupG/DefG) did not change over this 
period on average, the internal counterpart of this higher foreign saving was the 
reduction in the surplus of the private sector (SupP/DefP), which fell markedly from 
13.7% of GDP in 1978 to 6.2% in 1981 (Table III.10). The substitution of domestic for 
foreign savings implied an increase in the foreign indebtedness of the country as a 
whole, and this had serious implications which will be discussed below. Before this, an 
assessment of the levels and distribution of the flows of saving and investment is 
undertaken; that is, the factors behind the changes in the surplus/deficit of the 
economic sectors.  
 
As can be seen in Table III.11, the private sector was the only unit which had positive 
saving (PS) over the first three years (25.4% of GDP on average between 1976 and 
1978). These funds went to finance the national investment (NI) of 22.4% of GDP - half 
private and half public - and the excess of expenditure over income (negative saving) 
of the public (GS) and the deficit of the foreign (SupX/ DefX)) sectors of 0.1% and 2.9% 
of GDP respectively (Table III.11). However, it should be stressed that the generation 
of this high rate of saving of the private sector was not entirely a voluntary 
phenomenon. Indeed, the erosion effect of inflation on the stock of money in real terms 
caused an undesired loss of purchasing power for individuals or, a ‘non-voluntary’ or 
‘forced’ saving (Inflation Tax) of 6.3% of GDP on average over the period 1976-78 
(Table III.10)104. Therefore, the genuine or voluntary rate of saving of the private sector 
(total private saving (PS) – inflation tax) was 19.1% of GDP on average; which means 
2.7% of GDP higher than the rate of the period 1970-74 (Tables III.1).  
 
An examination of the above figures year by year reveals that the rate of saving of the 
                                                 
104 The inflation tax (δt) was estimating using the following formula: δt = [- xt-1 (πt) / (1+πt)]; where: xt-1= 
stock of money in real terms at time (t-1) and πt = rate of inflation rate. For a formal analysis of capital 
gain/losses on the financial assets see Chapter IV, Section 2. 
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private sector not only did not increase after the financial liberalisation reform but in 
fact, declined sharply from 27.4% of GDP in 1977 to 23% in 1978. This trend continued 
thereafter in the period of financial integration into the international capital markets, and 
the rate of saving dropped to 18.9%, 17.5% and 16.6% of GDP in 1979, 1980 and 1981 
respectively. In the previous years (1976-78), the rate of the public saving had risen as 
a result of the fiscal adjustment. However, as with the private sector, the large inflow of 
foreign capital which the country received after the opening-up of the economy to the 
world capital markets (1979-81), caused a rapid and systematic increase in public 
expenditure and, therefore, a decline in the rate of saving of the government from 1.9% 
of GDP in 1978 to (-6.6%) in 1981. The combined evolution of the private and public 
savings explains the deterioration in national savings, which dropped from 27% of GDP 
in 1977 to 10% in 1981, that is, a fall of more than 60% in a period of four years (Table 
III.10).  
 
As can be observed, the reduction in savings did not have a significant effect on the 
rate of private investment, which followed a pro-cyclical pattern: it increased in periods 
of growth to 24.2% of GDP in 1977 and 22.2% in 1979-80 and decreased in periods of 
recession to 21.3% 1978 and 18.8 of GDP in 1981 (Table III.11). In the case of the 
public sector, the construction of the infrastructure in preparation for the Football World 
Cup helped to sustain a high rate of investment. Subsequently, this rate was reduced in 
an attempt to close the large fiscal deficit. Nevertheless, the rate of investment (private 
and public) remained very stable at around 21-22% of GDP until 1981, when it dropped 
and reached the minimum level: 18.8% of GDP (Table III.11).  
 
The above analysis shows that that the evolution of the rates of saving and investment 
of the private sector over the years 1977-81 neither fulfilled the neoclassical prediction 
nor achieved the government’s aims. In effect, the premise that the financial de-
regulation and the liberalisation of the interest rate would raise both national and 
foreign savings and that these new resources, plus a more efficient resource allocation, 
would increase the rate of investment, fostering economic growth, was not borne out in 
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this case105. In reality, the private sector of Argentina increased its expenditure on 
finished consumer goods and decreased its rate of saving. This was the result of the 
relaxation of the liquidity constraint on individuals as a consequence of: (a) the 
increase in liquidity in banks after the liberalisation of interest rates in mid-1977; (b) the 
authorisation of the free movement of foreign capital at the beginning of 1979; and (c) 
the wealth-effect on financial portfolios due to the continuous appreciation of the 
peso106. The combination of the liquidity and wealth effects more than compensated for 
the negative effect of the higher real rates of interest (price-effect) on spending which 
resulted from the banking reform. This helps to explain the increase in total 
consumption and the consequent reduction in the aggregate rate of saving. 
Furthermore, this change in the allocation of private income was not the consequence 
of inflation, since the rate of voluntary saving (net of the inflation tax) also fell sharply - 
from 22% of GDP in 1977 to 18.4% in 1978, and subsequently to 14.2%, 13.9% and 
11.5%107.  
 
With a declining rate of national saving and a constant rate of investment, the gap was 
financed by external funds after 1977. In this year, the rate of investment was financed 
entirely by national savings, but by 1981, more than 50% of the capital formation was 
financed by foreign funds. Nonetheless, taking into account that total investment did 
not increase in these years, it can be concluded that foreign savings, in reality, went to 
finance an increase in consumption rather than more physical investment. The financial 
counterpart of this was an increase in the country’s foreign indebtedness. The size, 
speed of accumulation and the economic background against which these foreign 
obligations were accrued resulted in a structural change with long-term consequences 
for the economy of Argentina.     
 
                                                 
105 For a detailed analysis of the theory of financial liberalisation and its effect on economic growth, see 
Chapter II, Section 2. 
106 The generation and propagation of the growing liquidity after the financial liberalisation reform of mid-
1977 is discussed in depth in Chapter VI, Section 3. 
107 Own estimation based on data shown in Table III.11 
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Graph III.13 
Evolution of the Country’s Level of Solvency, 1976-81  
(Percentage points) 
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 Source: own construction based on data obtained from Memorias Anuales del Banco Central, The 
 Central Bank of Argentina, several annual issues, 1976-81. 
  
 
 
What is more, 91% of these obligations were generated between 1978 and 1981, when 
the debt rose by US$ 25,993 million. At the same time, as discussed above, the high 
interest rates in the domestic financial market together with the continuous 
overvaluation of the peso generated a widespread erosion of the industrial base and 
the stagnation of the country’s exports.  
 
The combination of the debt burden and the disarticulation of production sector ended 
up compromising the country’s ability to fulfil its foreign obligations. Evidence of this is 
the sharp deterioration in the level of solvency of Argentina over these years. As shown 
in Graph III.13, the ratios of the financial services to total exports and the stock of net 
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foreign debt to aggregate output climbed respectively from 10.6% and 12.1% in 1978 to 
40.5% and 41.7% in 1981. Whereas the country’s external debt in 1978 was equivalent 
to 1 year of total exports and 15% of the GDP, in 1981 these obligations represented 
3.5 years of exports and 45% of GDP. 
 
As discussed in Section III.2, during the ISI years, Argentina repeatedly faced foreign 
exchange crises as a result of a disadjustment between the rates of growth of imports 
and exports plus a limited availability of foreign financing. These were, however, crises 
of liquidity, which were dealt with by a devaluation of the peso leading to reduction in 
domestic demand, resulting in a drop in imports and a rise in the amount of goods for 
export. That is to say, these were flow-flow disequilibria generated by a disadjustment 
between the trade disequilibrium and the amount of financing (foreign exchange) held 
by the Central Bank.  
 
However, the financial liberalisation and opening-up to the world capital markets 
carried out in 1978 when abundant foreign financing was available, provided all the 
liquidity necessary to cover a growing trade imbalance. The mounting dependence on 
foreign savings resulted in a huge stock-flow imbalance between the magnitude of the 
foreign obligations and the country’s capacity to meet them. The internal counterpart of 
this was the disadjustment between the stock of debt accumulated by the productive 
sector with the banks and its re-payment capacity (flow of income), which resulted in a 
widespread problem of solvency for the local financial system at the beginning of the 
1980s (banking crisis).  
 
While the historical flow-flow disequilibria could be resolved in a relatively short period 
of time (one to two years), the stock-flow disadjustments generated during the years of 
military rule represented the most important structural change since the 1930s and 
would radically affect the economic performance of the country for many years. For the 
first time ever, Argentina would experience ten years (1980-90) of zero economic 
growth on average; GDP actually fell by -0.6% over this period. 
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 III.5   CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the mid-1970s, Argentina was in the throes of a deep political and economic crisis.  
The armed forces took power in March 1976 and set in motion a transformation of the 
development strategy which the country had been pursuing since the 1940s. They 
believed that the strategy of ‘forced’ industrialisation by import substitution and the 
policy of State intervention were to blame for the disappointing economic performance: 
the average rate of growth was low because it was extremely uneven, the availability of 
foreign exchange was a recurrent constraint on economic development, the industrial 
sector was overprotected and uncompetitive and the policy of financial repression had 
a negative effect on the saving-investment process. To remedy this, the decision was 
taken to abandon the ISI in favour of an outward-looking-market-oriented model of 
development that would allow Argentina to make the most of its comparative 
advantages by integrating the country into world trade and financial flows. In line with 
economic theories in vogue at that time, a plan of trade and financial liberalisation was 
designed. This included the de-regulation of market prices and wages, the opening-up 
of the economy to international trade and investment via the elimination of quantitative 
barriers (quotas and licences) and restrictions on foreign investments. In the financial 
sector, the liberalisation of interest rates and the de-regulation of the banking system 
were seen as fundamental measures to raise the rate of saving and to improve the 
efficiency of investment and finally, in an attempt to increase financial competition, 
restrictions on foreign capital movements were lifted. In addition to the implementation 
of this ambitious programme of economic reform, the government also put into practice 
stabilisation measures to tackle the immediate problem of galloping inflation.  
 
The liberalisation cum stabilisation policies applied during the period 1976-81 had far-
reaching consequences for the Argentine economy. Price stabilisation was not 
achieved and the liberalisation of interest rates together with the opening-up of the 
economy to the international markets had harmful effects on both the real and financial 
sectors. On the productive side, the level of activity and total exports stagnated and the 
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country suffered a marked process of de-industrialisation. This was the result of the 
combined effect of the high interest rates in real terms which prevailed in the local 
financial system and the continuous overvaluation of the peso, which allowed cheap 
foreign imports to flood the domestic market. On the financial side, the country faced a 
widespread problem of solvency which culminated in a collapse of the banking system 
in the early 1980s, without precedent in the history of Argentina. The predictions of the 
neoclassical theorists on which the policy was based were not fulfilled; the financial 
liberalisation did not result in an increase, but rather in a decrease in the rate of saving. 
In four years, national saving dropped by more than 60%, from 27% of GDP in 1977 to 
10% in 1981. This decline in national savings occurred in a period in which the level of 
domestic investment remained constant and thus, the gap was financed by external 
funds (foreign savings). This caused an increase in the country’s foreign indebtedness 
to hitherto unseen proportions. More importantly, this rapid increase in the foreign 
obligations was accrued while Argentina was experiencing an across-the-board 
process of de-industrialisation, which seriously diminished its capacity to repay what it 
had borrowed.  
 
During the ISI years, with limited access to foreign financing, the typical economic 
crises had resulted from an inconsistency between the level of domestic absorption 
and the capacity to generate the amount of foreign exchange necessary to sustain the 
rate of growth. These were, in essence, crises of liquidity (flow-flow disadjustments) 
which could be remedied in one or two years by devaluing the peso, thus generating a 
contraction in domestic demand and restoring the external surplus. In contrast, the 
economic problems of the early 1980s were the consequence of an inconsistency 
between the amount of the foreign debt (stock) and the country’s ability to meet its 
obligations (flows). This time the problems were of solvency and, therefore, far more 
difficult to resolve. Such a large stock-flow disadjustment had never been seen before 
in the Argentine economy and its effects would be felt for many years.  
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IV.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter presents a macro-economic evaluation of the financial reform implemented 
in Argentina over the period June 1977 - March 1981. During these years, the country’s 
financial system went from being highly repressed and shallow through a process of rapid 
financial deregulation and deepening, which culminated in a far-reaching banking crisis. 
The aim of this study is to identify the policy, economic and institutional factors 
responsible for the financial ‘boom and bust’. For the first time, a quantitative and 
qualitative examination of the macro-financial structure of Argentina has been undertaken, 
analysing the size, evolution, composition and distribution of sectoral portfolios and the 
risk associated with the financial positions taken by both debtors and creditors in the 
economy between 1977 and 1981. The underlying idea is that banks are middle-men and 
thereby, the degree of fragility or robustness of the country’s financial structure is crucial 
for the soundness of the banking system.  
 
In general, the configuration of any country’s financial structure is the result of the 
following factors: one, the existing macro-financial arrangement or starting point; two, the 
design and application of the economic policies and institutional rules; and three, the way 
the economic agents react to these and other shocks, allocating funds according to their 
preferences and possibilities as well as to the risks and returns of all assets traded in the 
economy. In addition, as shown in Chapter II, it should be considered that the real and 
financial markets are linked via the concept of surplus/deficit: the difference between the 
flows of savings and investment (from the real side) or, alternatively, the supply of / 
demand for assets (from the financial side). This means that the size and evolution of 
sectoral surplus/deficits - two main components of the country’s financial structure - can 
be affected not only by the monetary and financial polices, but also by all measures and 
shocks in the real side of the economy, including fiscal and exchange rate policies. On 
this basis and taking into account these elements, the empirical study of the financial 
structure of Argentina is undertaken using the analytical framework constructed in 
Chapter II. 
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The remainder of this Chapter is arranged as follows. Section two deals with the initial 
conditions under which the Argentine banking system was liberalised. The goal is to 
pinpoint the macro-economic factors which contributed to the financial situation, and to 
identify the main features of the country’s financial structure before the reform of mid-
1977. In addition, this analysis will be used later as the starting point for studying the 
financial transformation over the years of ‘free’ market operation. Section three presents 
the re-organisation of the banking system along the lines of the ‘free’ market mechanisms; 
and gives an account of the ‘new’ rules established in June 1977. In section four, the 
impact of the policy reform on the macro-financial structure is studied in depth. It includes 
an assessment of how the country’s financial structure was transformed between 1977 
and March 1981 and why this happened. Section five uses the results obtained in the 
previous section to analyse the problems of financial fragility and systemic risk and their 
macro-financial consequences. Finally, conclusions are summarised in section six. 
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IV.2 A STATE OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION 
 
A total re-organisation of the financial system was one of the central objectives of the 
military government when they came to power in March 1976. The authorities advanced 
the idea that the new system should be market-oriented, competitive and efficient in order 
to promote sustainable and non-inflationary growth1. The Minister of Economy José A. 
Martinez de Hoz said “… both flexibility and efficiency are essential in banking institutions. 
This can be promoted by eliminating the present system of deposit centralisation, which 
prevents not only sound credit supervision but also inhibits the development and the 
responsiveness of the financial agents”2.  
 
In 1976, however, a once-and-for-all reform could not be implemented because of a deep 
monetary disadjustment3. With inflation at 78% in the first quarter of 1976, the demand for 
money and other assets remunerated at negative real rates was suffering a dramatic 
decline. On the supply side, the public deficit was fuelling a massive increase in monetary 
resources. In the first quarter, the Central Bank financed 60% of the total fiscal imbalance 
which amounted to 13% of GDP4. Another important source of money creation had been 
the deficit of the banking system. Banks received huge amounts in credits from the 
Central Bank to promote specific activities and to finance non-traditional exports. 
Additionally, rediscount loans were channelled through the state-owned banks to finance 
the Provincial deficits. The money supply also increased because of financial operations 
(‘operaciones de pase’) and imports of goods which had an exchange rate insurance for 
an amount of US$ 2,000 million5. The difference between the exchange rate at which 
these operations were ‘agreed’ and that at which they were finally liquidated, produced an 
                     
1 The Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA), Boletín Estadístico, 1976, p. 12 
2 Boletín Estadístico, Op. Cit., 1977, p. 25 (free translation from the Spanish). 
3 A detailed evaluation of the macro-economic situation as well as the policy-measures applied by the 
military government between 1976 and 1981 is made in Chapter III. Section 3.  
4 Own estimation based on data obtained from the Central Bank, Boletín Estadístico, Op. Cit., 1976 
5 ‘Operaciones de pase’ in foreign currency refer to external credits taken by private companies. These 
assets were sold to the Central Bank, and simultaneously they were re-bought at a certain term (usually at 
180 days) at the same exchange rate plus a future premium rate.  
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important monetary expansion. All this gave rise to a paradoxical result: balance of 
payments deficits together with a strong internal monetary expansion6.  
 
Monetary management was even harder as a result of the partial decentralisation of 
the financial system initiated by the third Peronist administration. Banks were 
authorised to receive time deposits and to allocate these funds according to their own 
preferences. Accordingly, a dual financial system emerged: one, totally centralised 
subject to 100% reserve requirements and another, completely decentralised with 0% 
compulsory reserves. The transfer of assets from the centralised system towards the 
decentralised segment produced a rapid reduction in the average coefficient of banking 
reserves and this in turn, caused an increase in the supply of monetary resources. 
 
The weak monetary situation prompted the authorities to postpone the programme of 
financial liberalisation7. In the meantime, the policy was directed towards increasing he 
demand for local financial assets and controlling the money supply. As a result, in the 
third quarter of 1976, the government began to have more control over the sources of 
monetary creation and with it, the inflationary rhythm was reduced considerably, to 
22% per month. However, by the end of this year, problems of excess supply of money 
re-appeared due to a surplus in the external accounts, which brought about a new 
acceleration in the rate of inflation. Economic instability still persisted at the beginning 
of 1977; and the authorities started to think that a structural reform was needed as a 
way of preserving the short-term stabilisation achievements. In an unstable macro-
economic scenario with inflation running at 130% per year and limited control over the 
sources of monetary creation, the delayed financial reform was finally launched in mid-
1977. The effect of these general economic conditions on the outcome of the reform 
will be seen later in this Chapter.  
                     
6 This macro-economic inconsistency was, however, not new in the Argentine monetary and financial 
history during the period of industrialisation by import substitution as described in Chapter III, Section III.2 
7 This was affirmed by the ex-President of the Central Bank. Adolfo C. Díz “La experiencia monetaria y 
bancaria de la década del 70”, in Política Monetaria y Banco Central. La Experiencia de los Años Ochenta, 
Valores en la Sociedad Industrial, 1994, Sep., Año XII No. 30, pp. 3-10 
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An ‘x-ray’ of the country’s financial structure at the moment of the institutional change is 
needed in order to identify its main features and how previous economic factors had 
produced this configuration. This analysis is undertaken using the financial matrix 
constructed in Chapter II. As stated earlier, at a point in time, the ‘matrix of stocks’ 
shows the composition and distribution of the financial wealth of the different sectors, 
and the structure of debts and credits among the selected economic units. Table IV.1 
displays the matrix of assets (liabilities with a minus sign) for Argentina as a 
percentage of GDP at the beginning of the institutional reform of mid-1977. It is 
organised into twelve kinds of assets and five economic units: Central Bank; Financial 
Sector and Private Sectors; Government and the Foreign Sector8. The last two 
columns show the macro-economic condition of consistency, which states that the total 
sum across debtors and creditors of financial instruments must be equal to zero, and 
the maximum stock of assets divided by each financial instrument.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
8 The definition of the assets/liabilities included in the financial matrix is given below in the “List of 
Symbols” in pg. 1  
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Table IV.1 
Stock Matrix of Assets and Liabilities, May 1977 
(Percentage of GDP) 
 
   SECTORS   
May-77 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. FOREIGN ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR UP ASSETS
 1. mon -5.63 -3.04 8.67 0.00 8.67
 2. res -22.98 22.98 0.00 22.98
 3. ccbg 0.98 -0.98 0.00 0.98
 4. dgbc -0.18 0.18 0.00 0.18
 5. red 18.50 -18.50 0.00 18.50
 6. sad   -2.58 2.58 0.00 2.58
 7. tip  -7.87 7.87 0.00 7.87
 8. cred   16.96 -14.22 -2.74 0.00 16.96
 9. bon 3.47 0.77 1.64 -5.87 0.00 5.87
10. jnv 5.46 -0.89 -4.57 0.00 4.57
11. jdep   0.00 0.00
12. jcred  1.49 -1.49 0.00 1.49
13. jbon  0.01 -9.78 9.77 0.00 1.76
 totass 28.40 41.31 20.76 0.18 9.77  92.41
 totliab -28.79 -31.98 -15.71 -19.38 -4.57  -92.41
 nfw -0.39 9.33 5.05 -19.19 5.20 0.00 0.00
 jtotass 5.46 1.49 0.00 0.00 9.77  8.71
 jtotliab 0.00 -0.89 -1.49 -9.78 -4.57  -8.71
 jnfw 5.46 0.61 -1.49 -9.78 5.20 0.00 
Source: own construction based on data obtained from the Central Bank, Boletín Estadístico, May 1977. 
 
 
 
This financial structure exhibits the characteristics of what McKinnon and Shaw called 
a ‘financially repressed’ economy9. That is to say, the interest rate ceilings combined 
with high inflation rates caused a lack of incentives for holding local assets in general 
and, in particular, for deposits within the formal financial system10. This can be seen in 
Table IV.1 by looking at the stock of total financial assets (totass) and the amount of 
deposits of the private sector (sad+ tip) in banks which reached only 20.8% and 10% of 
total output respectively11. As a result, the financial intermediation between the units 
                     
9 For the theoretical foundation of McKinnon and Shaw‘s hypothesis see Chapter II, Section 2 above. 
10 As discussed in Chapter III, this was the result of a period of about 30 years in which, most of the time, 
the rate paid out on deposits was negative in real terms.  
11 At that time, other Latin American countries of similar relative development such as Brazil, Mexico and 
Chile had a ratio deposits/GDP of 48%; 45% and 43% respectively. Source: International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics, 1977.  
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with deficits and those with surpluses was constrained by the low demand for assets 
and, at the same time, the shallowness of the system limited the overall capacity of 
borrowers to absorb debts12. In addition, the high reserve requirements of about 70% 
established by the authority resulted in large amounts of compulsory deposits of the 
banks in the Central Bank - banking reserves (res) - which amounted to 23% of GDP. 
The counterpart of the policy of centralisation of deposits was the huge amount of 
loans granted by the Central Bank to the financial system (red) for 18.5% of GDP 
(Table IV.1). In turn, the financial intermediaries allocated these funds following the 
prescriptions as to interest rates and economic sectors or activities which the monetary 
authority dictated.  
 
All the above suggests the existence of a segmentation in capital markets and thus, the 
chances of obtaining loans were linked not to the productivity of the investment project 
but to the ‘influence of the borrower’ on the bank as a result of: political pressure, 
cronyism, type of collateral, loan size or inducements given to credit officers. A direct 
effect of this is the great dispersion in the yield rates of investment projects characteristic 
of financially repressed economies as shown in Graph II.1 in Chapter II. The new 
economic team in power believed that the allocation of funds based on criteria other than 
market prescriptions had a damaging effect on the average efficiency of investment. The 
President of the Central Bank of Argentina, Adolfo Díz, stated that the setting of a ‘unique’ 
lending rate prevented a bank from distinguishing the different risk categories of projects 
and borrowers13.  
 
Another feature of the country’s financial structure previous to the institutional reform was 
the low proportion of assets denominated in foreign currency vis-à-vis those in local 
                     
12 As explained earlier in Chapter II, Section 2, for the neo-classical theorists, a policy of keeping low and 
negative return on financial assets has negative consequences on economic growth because: (a) it fosters 
current consumption instead of future consumption (savings); (b) potential lenders may decide to invest directly 
and not to borrow from the formal financial market and (c) interest rate ceilings may create a bias which could 
favour credit allocation to low-yielding-projects. 
13 Adolfo C. Díz, Op. Cit., p. 10 
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currency. For example, no deposits in dollars existed in the system on the part of the 
private sector (jdepp) or the government (jdepg). Additionally, the financial sector held 
3.6% of its total assets in dollars (jcredf), and out of the total public bonds, only 15% were 
in foreign currency (jbong) (Table IV.1).  These figures reflect the consequence of a long-
term policy of exchange rate control and of the political decision to keep the country out of 
international capital markets. 
 
With regard to public finance, 85% of the total government indebtedness had been raised 
in the local capital markets and, nearly half of it had been financed by the Central Bank in 
the forms of credits (ccbg) and government bonds (bonc) (Table IV.1). The rest of the 
national debt of the public sector had been granted by the banks following instructions 
given by the monetary authority. Besides this, one important source of government 
financing was the inflation tax: the erosion of the purchasing power of money held by the 
private sector (monp) because of inflation14. This happened because of the high inflation 
rate of about 130% per annum plus the large amount of money in circulation, 
approximately 8.6% of GDP in mid-1977. With these figures, and taking into account that 
the fiscal imbalance was 11% of total output in June, it is estimated that the annual 
inflation tax reached 4.5% of GDP15. This means that the inflation tax helped to finance 
around 40% of the total government deficit. Finally, it should be pointed out that the high 
real monetary balance in the hands of the private sector reflects the lack of alternatives 
available to individuals for distributing risks and returns among financial assets.  
 
                     
14 The inflation tax is the capital loss suffered by the creditor of a non-index financial asset (money) 
whenever there is a change in the general level of prices (inflation). This is a particular case of a re-
distribution of wealth as a result of changes in relative prices of assets. A thorough analysis of this topic is 
found in J. M. Fanelli Desequilibrio macroeconómico, restricciones financieras y políticas de estabilización, 
Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, Tesis de Doctorado, Buenos Aires 1988. See also W. Buiter, 
"Measurement of the Public Sector Deficit and Its Implications for Policy Evaluation and Design", Staff 
Papers, IMF 1983 Vol. 30, No. 2 
15 Own estimation based on data of the matrix of assets and liabilities (Table IV.1) and the rate of inflation 
per month in June 1977 obtained from the Central Bank, Boletín Estadístico, Op. Cit., several monthly 
issues 1976. With the assumption that the demand for money remained constant, the inflation tax was 
estimated using the formula: δt = [- xt-1  (πt)/(1+πt)]; where: xt-1= stock of money in real terms at time (t-1) and πt 
= inflation rate.  
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All the above shows the consequences of a policy of active government intervention in the 
financial system aimed at: (a) maintaining a high level of economic activity by lowering 
lending rates; (b) encouraging private investments in areas regarded as priority by the 
public sector; and (c) transferring resources from the financial system to the government 
to finance its high deficits. As stated by those who were promoting the liberalisation of the 
financial markets, the outcome of this policy had been a state of ‘financial repression’ 
which impinged seriously upon the quantity and the efficiency of the funds channelled 
through the banking system.  
 
With this diagnosis, the policy-makers - the majority of whom had been trained in the neo-
classical school of thought - decided to undertake a plan of financial liberalisation along 
the lines suggested by McKinnon and Shaw, which would solve all the problems faced by 
Argentina in the process of capital accumulation and would encourage economic 
growth16. 
 
                     
16 Among those sharing the neo-classical view - the so-called ‘Chicago boys’ of the military government - 
are: Adolfo C. Díz and Alejandro Reynal (President and Vice-president of the Central Bank respectively), 
Ricardo H. Arriazu (main financial advisor to the President of the Central Bank) and Guillermo W. Klein 
(the Secretary of Economic Planning and Coordination at the Ministry of Economy). 
 
 159
IV.3 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THE FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION OF 1977 
 
The reform was aimed at overcoming and preventing the recurrence of problems caused 
by government interference in financial markets (‘government failure’). In the hope of 
improving the process of capital accumulation, the re-organisation of the banking system 
initiated a radical movement towards ‘free’ market mechanisms. To achieve this goal, the 
following institutional transformations were assumed to be both necessary and sufficient: 
(a) the reactivation of the full capacity of the banking institutions to endorse a more 
effective financial intermediation; (b) the introduction of a legal framework which would 
encourage market competition and efficiency; and (c) the enhancement of the solvency of 
banks.  
 
In June 1977, the new financial regime was introduced through two main laws devised to 
re-organise the system into one of fractional reserve requirements (Law 21495) and to set 
up a new legal framework for the functioning of financial institutions (Law 21526)17. The 
reform covered six main areas including:  
 
Interest rates and loan allocation: the liberalisation of interest rates was at the core of the 
new financial regime. For the first time since 1945, deposit and lending rates were to be 
freely determined by the market without interference from the government. With the idea 
of standardising the information on interest rates and for the sake of transparency, 
financial agents were required to publish the ‘annual effective rate’ offered on deposits18. 
In this regard, the guidelines from the Central Bank on how and to whom loans were to be 
made were abolished19. Credit allocation now became the exclusive responsibility of the 
lending institutions. In addition, the authority would abandon the practice of charging 
commissions and special fees on loans; mechanisms which had been used to increase 
the cost of credits when the policy of interest rate ceilings was in force.  
                     
17 Law 21495 repealed Law 20520 of 1973, which centralised the banking deposits in the Central Bank. 
18 This rate results from calculating the interests on balance with re-investments on a compound basis. 
19 A brief analysis of the financial policy applied during the period of Industrialisation by Import Substitution 
is presented in Chapter III, Section 2 
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Deposit insurance: a scheme of full deposit guarantee nominated in local currency was 
applied to all kinds of financial institutions20. The establishment of a deposit guarantee 
was to promote market competition by preventing the adverse consequences of pre-
judgements that - in a scenario of free market rates - individuals might make about the 
solvency of the small institutions. Moreover, this guarantee was aimed at preventing the 
generalisation of liquidity crises in a banking system of fractional reserves. With deposits 
guaranteed, it was believed that investors would have more confidence that their funds 
were safe which, in turn, reduces the probability of a massive withdrawal of deposits, in 
the event of a problem of liquidity and solvency in one particular financial intermediary.  
 
In November 1979, in an attempt to avoid the problem of moral hazard on the part of 
depositors, the full deposit guarantee was replaced by a policy of limited coverage21. 
Deposits in local currency of up to $ 1 million - about US$ 640 - were fully insured, 
whereas those above that amount were insured only up to 90%22. The adherence to the 
new system was decided by each institution. Those who wanted to join the scheme had to 
pay a monthly fee equivalent to 3/10,000 of the liabilities subject to the reserve 
requirements of the bank23. Like the previous system, deposits denominated in foreign 
currency were not insured. 
 
Rediscount operations: the monetary authority recovered the role of lender of last resort 
by introducing rediscounting facilities to provide financial assistance to all kinds of financial 
institutions. These facilities were granted by the Central Bank to banks under the following 
conditions: (a) the accumulated debt for this kind of operation in one institution did not 
surpass 2% of its stock of deposits; and (b) the extension of these credits did not exceed 
45 days in 12 consecutive months or 7 days for each operation. Within these limits, the 
                     
20 Although there had been a system of deposit insurance for many years in Argentina, this was the first time 
that it had been applied in a scenario of free market determination of interest rates. 
21 The risk with a full deposit guarantee is that depositors will only consider the interest rate paid by the 
bank and not the soundness of the financial institution.  
22 Later on, these figures were to be adjusted by the Wholesale Price Index (WPI).  
23 This system, however, was not one of ‘funded scheme’ in which, the insurance fee is associated with the 
deposit coverage provided by the Central Bank. 
 161
rediscount operations were automatically agreed at a cost dictated by market conditions. 
Frequently, the rate of interest charged on these operations remained slightly above the 
average lending rates which prevailed in the credit market, so as to discourage banks 
from doing business with Central Bank funds.  
 
Reserve requirements: one objective of the reform was to improve the efficiency of the 
instruments of monetary regulation in order to have better control over the expansion of 
monetary resources. As commented in the last section, in mid- 1977, there was a limited 
governance over the sources of monetary creation due to several factors24. One, a drastic 
reduction in the fiscal deficit was something which could not be achieved in the short-
term. Two, the shallowness of the country’s financial structure made it impossible to 
finance a large proportion of the public deficit with bonds. Three, the Central Bank 
needed to increase the stock of international reserves in order to help stabilise the 
foreign exchange market. Four, interest rate liberalisation would encourage capital 
inflows which, in turn, would further increase monetary expansion.  
 
Taking all this into account and trying to maintain control over the money supply, in 
June 1977, the Central Bank decided to set a uniform coefficient of 45% for all kinds of 
deposits, with the intention of lowering it gradually thereafter25.This implied a reduction 
in the reserve requirements of 35% (from 80% to 45%) between May and June 1977. 
The establishment of a single rate was aimed at facilitating monetary management, 
since changes in the composition of deposits (current, saving and time deposits) would 
not affect the value of the banking multiplier - on average - for the financial system as a 
whole. The problem, however, was that high reserves in banking institutions would 
                     
24 In a system of fractional reserves, the amount of monetary resources in the economy is the result of two 
sources: one, the monetary creation - monetary base - as a result of the accumulation of foreign reserves as 
well as of the financing of the deficits of both the government and the financial sector (primary source); and 
two, the monetary expansion caused by the banking multiplier (secondary source). Formally, MB  =  FR  + 
 DC  (primary source) and; MR = k * MB  (secondary source); where: MB = monetary base; FR = foreign 
reserves; DC = domestic credit; MR = total monetary resources; and k = monetary multiplier.  
25 This rate is very high compared with international standards, which normally is in the range of 10% and 
20%. 
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signify a large cost in terms of both the efficiency and profitability of banks. This is so 
because the imposition of compulsory reserve requirements is similar to a tax on the 
activity of financial intermediation, which can be transferred to savers by lowering the 
deposit rate and/or to borrowers by raising the lending rate. In either case, the result 
would be a higher rate of spread in the financial system26.  
 
The mechanism devised to offset the side-effects of the high reserve requirements was 
an equalisation fund of interest rates, known as the ‘monetary regulatory account’ 
(Cuenta de Regulación Monetaria - CRM)27. This was to remunerate the banks with a 
compensation rate on reserves required on savings and time deposits, and to charge a 
fee based on the lending capacity of commercial banks derived from deposits in current 
accounts28. In this way, the Central Bank tried to compensate for the lower cost of 
obtaining funds enjoyed by commercial banks due to the fact that they were able to 
accept deposits in current accounts unlike other finance companies (financieras)29.  
 
Free entry, capital requirements and other prudential regulations: an important measure 
was the elimination of restrictions on opening new institutions and new branches. After the 
reform, no prior authorisation was required to open new branches for national banks. This 
was not the case of foreign institutions which needed the authorisation of the Central 
Bank. In addition, as will be described later in Section 4, the transformation of some 
institutions into other categories of intermediaries was encouraged in order to promote 
market competition within the financial system. 
 
During the period of deposit nationalisation (1973-76), the Central Bank bore directly all 
                     
26 As Howard Davies and David Green stressed, ‘’there is no doubt that regulation imposes high costs on 
financial institutions and markets, costs which are ultimately passed through to the end user’’. H. Davies 
and D. Green, Global Financial Regulation. The Essential Guide, 2008, pg. 14    
27 This equalisation fund was created by Law 21572. 
28 The reform did not allow commercial banks to pay interest on current accounts nor non-banking 
institutions (financieras) to receive current deposits. 
29 A detailed analysis of the ‘Cuenta de Regulación Monetaria’ (CRM) and its economic effects is given by 
J. Piekarz "Compensación de Reservas de Efectivo Mínimo, la Cuenta de Regulación Monetaria, el Déficit 
Cuasi-Fiscal del Banco Central y la Transformación del Sistema Financiero", Desarrollo Económico, Sep. 
1984, pp. 231 
 163
the financial risks and thus, there was no need for prudential regulation with regard to the 
levels of liquidity and solvency of banks. This changed with the reform of 1977 and new 
rules were established in the following areas: 
 
a. Minimum capital: the capital requirement varied depending on the location and on the 
kind of institution (banks, financieras, cajas de crédito, etc.). Capital requirements ranged 
from about US$ 6.5 million for large banking institutions located in Greater Buenos Aires 
to about US$ 80,000 for small ‘cajas de crédito’ in the provinces. These values, set at the 
beginning of the financial reform, were to be adjusted annually in line with the wholesale 
price index (WPI). 
 
b. Asset immobilisation: it was required that the immobilisation of assets (non-liquid 
assets) should not exceed 100% of the ‘net worth’ of the financial institution. In the case of 
new institutions, this ratio was established at 50% in the beginning and, it was allowed to 
increase later by 10% points per annum until the general limit of 100% was reached. 
Furthermore, non-current assets as well as non-performing loans could not exceed 5% of 
the institution’s ‘net worth’. Physical assets, expenses and all kinds of non-current value 
impaired loans were considered immobilised assets. 
 
c. Ratio of asset and liability for lenders and borrowers: it was established that the amount 
of liabilities in pesos should not exceed 25 times the ‘net worth’ of a financial intermediary. 
This limit was similar for all financial institutions. Moreover, the limit of maximum financing 
which a client could obtain from one institution was set at 50% of the borrower’s total ‘net 
worth’. This restriction was applied to all kind of loans, except those which used physical 
assets as collateral.  
 
d. Credit concentration: the maximum limit of financing for an individual client was set at 
40% of the financial institution’s capital. Exceptions to this rule were sometimes granted in 
the case of foreign trading companies.  
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e. Prudential regulation and banking supervision: the Central Bank carried out both the 
monetary and financial regulation and supervision of banks and non-banking institutions. 
Supervision was to be made through the evaluation of the balance sheets, statements 
and reports that each financial institution had to submit regularly and with in-situ 
inspections.  
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IV.4 POLICY REFORM AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE  
 
One way of studying financial crises is by considering the particular features of the 
institutions which failed. In many cases, this is a sensible approach because bad 
decisions and mistakes on the part of the bankers or problems of supervision and 
corruption explain bank failures. However, and particularly when trying to understand a 
major financial disruption, in which a large proportion of the financial system is at risk, as 
occurred in Argentina, to focus solely on the banks which failed may give an incomplete, 
and possibly misleading picture. In other words, it is vital to know if there are macro-
economic factors which have put stress on the banking system as a whole30. This is 
clearly seen in the metaphor used by Hausman and Gavin: “chains break at the weakest 
link, but that does not mean that the specific flaws in the weakest link fully explain why the 
chain broke: one needs to know what caused the tension on the chain”. They also stated 
“strengthening weak links in the chain only works if one succeeds in identifying the 
weakest link before it snaps, and even then will accomplish nothing more than causing the 
chain to break at another link if the tension on the chain is sufficiently high’’31. Following 
this approach, in the case-study, the question to be asked is: what were the factors which 
put such a strain on the ‘financial chain’ of Argentina in these years and where were the 
weak links?  
                     
30 Recent empirical studies have identified the most important macro-economic causes of unsound 
banking as: rapid credit expansions, reversal of capital inflows, declines in stock prices, increases in 
interest rates and corporate indebtedness, economic recessions and other shocks affecting the quality of 
banking assets, deposit runs and liquidity constraints, exchange rate and fiscal crises. The worldwide 
empirical studies in this area have been surveyed by C. J. Lindgren, G. Garcia and M. I. Saal (eds) Bank 
Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy, International Monetary Fund (1996). For more literature on this 
subject see, V. Sundurarajan and T..J.T. Baliño, ”Issues in Recent Banking Crises, in Banking Crises: 
Cases and Issues,V.Sundurarajan and T.J.T. Baliño (eds.), International Monetary Fund, 1991; pp. 1-57; 
H. Baer and D. Klingebiel, “Systemic Risk When Depositors Bear Losses: Five Case Studies”, in Banking, 
Financial Markets and Systemic Risk, Vol 7 of Research in Financial Services Private and Public Policy, 
G.G. Kaufman (ed.), 1995, pp.195-302; G. Caprio (Jr.) and D. Klingebiel, “Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad 
Policy or Bad Banking?”, paper presented at the World Bank Annual Bank Conference on Development 
Economics, Washington, Apr. 25-26, 1996; F. S. Mishkin, “Preventing Financial Crises: An International 
Perspective”, Working Paper, NBER, Feb. 1994, No.4636; Hausman and Gavin, The Roots of Banking 
Crisis: The Macroeconomic Context”, paper presented at the Inter-American Development Bank 
Conference on Banking Crisis in Latin America, held in Washington, 6-7 Oct. 1995; G. Kaminsky and G. 
Reinhart, “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments Problems”, Discussion 
Paper, No. 544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mar. 1996.   
31 Ricardo Haussmann and Michael Gavin Op. Cit.,1995, p. 1.  
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This assessment is an attempt to answer this question by looking at the policy, economic 
and institutional factors responsible for the configuration and evolution of the country’s 
financial structure. It is based on the idea that banks are middle-men in the process of 
financial intermediation and consequently, their health is affected by the degree of 
financial fragility or robustness of all economic units. It should be stressed that a macro-
consistent study of the financial relationships and the risk associated with the sectoral 
portfolios in Argentina over these years, has not been undertaken before. The remainder 
of this Chapter, therefore, is dedicated to analysing how the financial structure was 
transformed; why it happened and; what the macro-financial consequences were. The 
first two points are considered in this section, whereas the latter is left for the next. 
 
IV.4.1   Market Competition and Financial Deepening 
 
The institutional reform of 1977 produced an important transformation both in the number 
and kind of agents (physical structure) and in financial portfolios (financial structure). With 
regard to the former, the intention was to shift from a system of ‘specialised’ agents for 
each type of operation to one of ‘universal’ banking in which there is one kind of financial 
agents for all types of operations32. Accordingly, the bancos comerciales were the agents 
empowered to carry out all kinds of operations and the only ones authorised to receive 
current account deposits. However, the new system was not totally pure since the other 
types of institutions which existed previous to the reform were not eliminated and, 
consequently, remained in operation; the only exception being the sociedades de crédito 
para consumo, which were abolished. Over this period, the major changes occurred as a 
result of the elimination of restrictions and the simplification of legal requirements which 
encouraged the incorporation of new institutions as well as the transformation and merger 
                     
32 Before the reform, the Argentine financial system was made up of a wide rage of institutions which differed 
in the type of operations which they could carry out. Within this system there were commercial (comercial) 
banks with investment (inversión), development (de desarrollo) and mortgage-loan (hipotecario) banks; 
financial companies (financieras) with savings and loans institutions for various types of functions or activities 
including: savings (cajas de ahorro), hire purchase (cajas de crédito and sociedades de crédito para consumo) 
and mortgage-loan operations for houses and other properties (sociedades de ahorro y préstamos para la 
vivienda y otros inmuebles). 
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of existing agencies33. In particular, the financieras were given the opportunity to become 
commercial banks whereas, the cajas de crédito and cooperativas de crédito were 
‘invited’ to become financieras or bancos cooperativos. A period of one year was given for 
compliance with the new regime. Table VI.2 summarises the changes that occurred in the 
type and number of private and state-owned financial institutions as a result of the reform 
of June 1977. 
 
Table IV.2 
Financial System: Number and Type of Institutions, May 1977- July 1979 
 
Type of Institution (*) Existing in Ceased New Existing in 
 May 1977 Operation Entities July 1979 
  Bancos Comerciales  110    6  98 202 
  Bancos de Inversión      5    2   -    3 
  Bancos Hipotecario      1    -   -    1 
  Bancos de Desarrollo      2    -   -    2 
  Cajas de Ahorro       1    -   -    1 
  Compañías Financieras    79  16   81 144 
  Sociedades de Credito para Consumo    69  69   -   - 
  Cajas de Créditos   423         305    3  121 
  Sociedades de Ahorro y Préstamos 
  para la Vivienda y Otros Inmuebles    35    1   -    34 
  TOTAL   725         399 182   508 
  (*) See above footnote no. 36 for reference of the different types of institutions.  
  Source: Boletín Estadístico, Central Bank of Argentina, July and Sep. 1977 
 
 
 
First of all, it is important to clarify that the numbers in the ‘Ceased Operations’ and ‘New 
Entities‘ columns may refer not only to closures and incorporations of new institutions but 
also, to those which changed category or were acquired by or merged with existing 
institutions. It is observed that the number of total institutions dropped by 217, due to 399 
‘Ceased Operations’ and 182 ‘New Entities‘. Out of the total ‘Ceased Operations’ only 28 
were effective closures, the rest changed their legal status but remained in the system. 
The same happened with the ‘New Entities‘: 30 were brand-new institutions, and 152 
                     
33 The transformation of the existing financial agencies was established in the articles 58, 60 and 62 of the 
Law 21526. 
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were transformations of already existing agencies including: (a) 68 new bancos 
comerciales which emerged from 50 cajas de crédito, 17 financieras and 1 sociedad de 
ahorro y préstamo para la vivienda; (b) 81 new compañías financieras which were ex-
cajas de crédito, and (c) 3 new cajas de crédito.  
 
The above sketch shows two important characteristics of the physical configuration after 
the reform: one, the system was made up of a large number of institutions; and two, the 
commercial banks and financieras - the main intermediaries - experienced remarkable 
growth in a short period of time. All this reflects the spirit of the new policy, which aimed at 
promoting market competition by ‘opening the door’ to a large number of players. In line 
with the ideas of McKinnon and Shaw, the deregulation policy and the liberalisation of 
interest rates was regarded as essential for increasing the competition for funds in the 
market for deposits and for giving greater access to credits to those who wanted to borrow 
at competitive rates. In turn, from the perspective of the potential financers, it was a 
formidable opportunity to become bankers in a scenario of ‘free’ market operation. These 
two circumstances, the government’s need to have many institutions operating as soon as 
possible on the one hand; and the desire of many aspirants to become members of the 
‘new club’ on the other hand, helps to explain the swift approval received by many 
commercial banks and financieras, nearly doubling those which existed at the beginning 
of the reform34.  
 
In connection with the financial structure, this sub-section focuses solely on the evolution 
of the degree of financial deepening - the only variable that the neoclassicals considered 
relevant in their analysis of the soundness of a financial structure35. The purpose is to test 
the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis about the positive effect of financial liberalisation on the 
evolution of the stock of asset holdings of the agents (financial deepening, something 
which they considered fundamental for accelerating the rate of economic growth).  
                     
34 Problems of selection of the new financial intermediaries and their consequences for the financial 
system are discussed below.  
35 The theoretical arguments of this school of thought are given in Chapter II, Section 2. 
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Usually, financial depth is defined as the ratio of total financial assets to total output. The 
information for this analysis is obtained from the matrix of stocks of assets and liabilities 
calculated at the end of each calendar month36. Chart IV.1 shows the evolution of total 
assets held by the private sector in the period April 1976 - March 198137.  
 
Graph IV.1 
Stock of Financial Assets Held By The Private Sector, 1976-81 
(Millions of dollars) 
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    Source: own construction based on data obtained from The Central Bank of Argentina; Boletín 
    Estadístico, several monthly issues 1976-81 
 
 
This graph shows the remarkable financial expansion which Argentina experienced over 
these years. Measured by the highest monetary aggregate held by the private sector, M5, 
the stock of financial assets climbed from 17% of GDP in April 1976 to 47% in March 
                     
36 Appendix to Chapter IV presents the matrices of stock of assets and liabilities for Argentina for the period 
July 1977 - March 1981. 
37 In order to have a clear picture of the financial evolution before and after the institutional reform of June 
1977, this analysis begins one year before, in April 1976. 
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1981, a growth which surpassed 110% points in real terms38. Three different phases can 
be distinguished in this process. In the first period, between April 1976 and May 1977, the 
monetary aggregate experienced the fastest growth, rising 107% points. This was 
mainly the consequence of two measures: one, the severe monetary restriction applied 
by the government aimed at curbing the inflationary rhythm and of encouraging the 
demand for financial assets; and two, the continuation of the policy of partial 
decentralisation of deposits which was initiated in 1975 by the Peronist administration, 
allowing the banks to receive time deposits at free market rates. As argued earlier, this 
partial deregulation generated a dual system: one, totally centralised and subject to full 
reserve requirements; the other, completely decentralised with no legal reserve 
requirements. The monetary effect of this was a rapid decline in the average coefficient of 
banking reserves and a significant increase in the money supply39.  
 
Subsequently, the liberalisation reform of mid-1977, and the opening of the economy to 
international capital movements at the end of 1978 gave new impetus to financial 
growth which continued until the first quarter of 1980. During this second phase, the 
accumulation of assets by the private sector continued steadily: the monetary aggregate 
M5 rose 54% points and this resulted in a growth in the country’s financial depth from 21% 
to 32% of total output (Graph IV.1). In this scenario, the stock of savings and time 
deposits went up by 87% points and the share of banking deposits to total asset holdings 
of individuals increased from less than 50% to 70%, indicating the strong confidence felt 
by the economic agents in the banking institutions in those years. Moreover, as shown in 
Chapter III.4 and in Chapter VI.3, over this period, the country was experiencing a 
fantastic expansion in the level of economic activity.  
 
All this suggests that, by the end of the 1970s, the predictions made by the neoclassicals 
                     
38 M5 is defined as the sum of the total assets held by the private sector at a point in time, denominated in 
both local and foreign currencies including: money in circulation or currency (monp), current and saving 
deposits in (savp), time deposits (tipp, jdepp), and public bonds (bonp, jbonp).  
39 Problems for controlling the sources of monetary creation over this period were discussed earlier in 
Section IV.2.  
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that the liberalisation of capital markets in a scenario of market competition would give 
rise to a process of financial deepening, which would lead, in turn, to an increase in the 
rate of economic growth seemed to be a fulfilling prophecy. However, this process 
changed thereafter, as observed in Graph IV.1, the sharp financial expansion which had 
begun in 1976 came to an end at the beginning of 1980. In the year March 1980 - March 
1981, the process of re-monetisation languished, and the ratio M5 showed an erratic 
pattern with an overall decline of 8% points. This was mainly the result of the reduction in 
the demand for currency and time deposits by the private sector, which dropped by 19% 
and 1.3% respectively. This stagnation in the process of financial growth was the result of 
serious problems in the financial system, which had been developing over these years 
and would lead to the worst financial crisis that Argentina had ever experienced.  
 
IV.4.2   Supply and Demand for Financial Assets 
 
‘Who financed whom’ is vital in order to identify the supply of and demand for assets, 
and to recognise both the kind and magnitude of financial relationships between the 
different economic sectors. This information is obtained from the flow matrix of 
assets/liabilities and by considering the changes in net financial wealth (Δnfw) dis-
aggregated by assets of all economic units over a period of time. As discussed in 
Chapter II. Section 4.2, the sectors which increase their financial wealth are those 
which obtain a surplus and consequently, are those which demand assets. The supply 
of these instruments comes from the units with deficits, which are issuing debts and 
thereby, are reducing their financial worth. By following the basic accounting principle 
that the sum of changes in the net financial wealth across all economic sectors must be 
zero, it is possible to identify ‘who finances whom’. Moreover, this powerful analytical 
tool helps to identify the ‘main markets’ and who the main suppliers of, and demanders 
for the different kinds of financial assets are, so as to evaluate how the economic units 
are financially linked and, ultimately, who bears which risks.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this analysis is to identify the magnitude of the 
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sectoral deficits/surplus and their consequences for the financial structure. With this 
aim, the original sketch has been re-arranged to show changes in the net financial 
wealth of all sectors dis-aggregated into the most relevant types of assets. It deals first 
with the period which lasted from the financial reform of July 1977 until March 1980 and 
then, for the period March 1980 - March 198140.  
 
Table IV.3 
Changes in Net Financial Wealth, Jul.1977- Mar.1980 
(Percentage of GDP) 
 
    SECTORS    
Jul.77 - Mar. 80 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. FOREIGN TOTAL 
 BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR ASSETS
 1. Δ mon -0.02 -0.01 -0.03   -0.03
 2. Δ totdep -0.57 11.44 11.58 -0.70  10.88
 3. Δ totcredt -0.02 18.53 15.14 3.38  18.51
 4. Δ totjinv -0.91 -2.85  -3.76 -3.76
 5. Δ totbon  -3.37 1.51 1.23 8.13 8.76 8.13
 6. Δ red -0.38 -0.38 -0.38
 7. Δ othasset 1.27   1.27
 8. Δ otheliab 1.27   
    Δ totass -4.68 18.46 12.78 -0.70 8.76 34.62
    Δ totliab 0.68 11.05 15.14 11.51 -3.76 34.62
    Δ nfw -5.36 7.41 -2.36 -12.21 12.52 0.00
Source: own construction based on data obtained from the Central Bank, Boletín Estadístico, July 1977 
and March 1980. 
 
 
The last column of Table IV.3 presents the evolution of assets dis-aggregated by each 
type of financial instrument. As observed, a distinctive feature of this sub-period is the 
spectacular growth in total financial assets (Δtotass) by 34.6% of GDP. It should be 
highlighted that the main beneficiaries of this process were the financial and private 
sectors which accumulated assets for 18.5% and 12.8% of GDP respectively. By 
considering the changes in the net financial wealth by sectors, the first comment to be 
made is that, the country as a whole increased notably the use of foreign loans. Over 
this period, the net foreign debt (Δnfww) rose spectacularly by US$ 15,000 million 
                     
40 The matrices of assets and liabilities for Argentina were calculated for every month during the period 
1977-81. The periods considered most relevant for this study are presented in the Appendix to Chapter IV. 
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(12.5% of the annual GDP), quintupling the country’s net external debt (Table IV.3)41. 
Internally, these funds helped to strengthen the process of financial deepening and 
generated a huge amount of assets in the economy. In effect, this influx of foreign 
capital represented 32% of the increase in total financial assets, 56% of the asset 
growth in banks and 83% of the rise in total asset holdings of the private sector. At the 
same time, this meant a sharp increase in the external exposure of the country: the 
ratio of foreign debt to exports more than doubled rising from 105% in 1977 to 234% in 
1980; whereas the proportion of interest payments to exports rose from 6.6% to 
11.8%42.  
 
At this point a differentiation of changes in portfolio by asset composition is needed in 
order to identify the local suppliers of and demanders for financial assets. Looking at 
the matrix by rows, it is observed that the evolution in the country’s financial structure in 
the sub-period under analysis (Jul.1977 - Mar.1980) is largely explained by three kinds 
of assets/markets: public bonds; deposits and bank loans43. In the case of the public 
bonds (Δtotbon), they were issued with the aim of financing the large fiscal deficit which 
averaged 8.5% of GDP per annum44. In turn, if the quasi-fiscal imbalance of the Central 
Bank is included, the total State disequilibrium amounted to 10.5% of GDP per annum 
                     
41 Own estimation based on data presented in Table IV.3. The factors responsible for this jump in the 
country’s external debt are explained in Chapter III, Section 3.  
42 A detailed analysis of the genesis of the external indebtedness and the evolution of the foreign fragility 
of Argentina over these years is found in R. Frenkel, J. M. Fanelli and J. Sommer, “El Proceso de 
Endeudamiento Externo Argentino”, Documento CEDES, No. 2, 1988; and in E. Feldman and J. F. Sommer 
Crisis Financiera y Endeudamiento Externo,1984. 
43 As observed in Table VI.4, the other two assets, currency (Δmon) and foreign exchange (Δtotjinv) did 
not experience a significant change over the sub-period Jul.1977 – Mar.1980. 
44 There are two ways of calculating the government deficit/surplus: (a) ‘over the line’ by measuring the 
shortage or excess of the public expenditures over its revenues; or (b) ‘under the line’ by considering the 
changes in the financial wealth of the government. It should be stressed that the latter has some important 
advantages over the conventional measurement of the fiscal deficit. One, the identification of the sources of 
financing of the fiscal gap is essential for evaluating the impact of the flows of assets on the financial system. 
Two, the quasi-fiscal deficit of the Central Bank, which is not included in the government budget, can be 
calculated in order to obtain the aggregate estimation of the deficit/surplus of the public sector. Three, the 
borrowing requirements of the government can be distinguished from changes in the net financial wealth as a 
result of capital gains/losses on the sectoral portfolio (inflation tax). For a theoretical consideration of the 
‘under the line’ analysis of the fiscal deficit see, for instance, W. Buiter, Op. Cit, 1983; and J. M. Fanelli, Op. 
Cit., 1988, Chapters 1 and 2. 
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(authors’ estimation based on data of Table IV.3)45. It should be noted that out of the 
government bonds issued in dollars for US$ 9,960 million, about 92% of them (US$ 
9,170 million) were sold in the international capital markets. This means that 60% of 
the increase in the foreign debt of Argentina is explained by the fiscal gap, and this 
share climbs to 77% when the quasi-fiscal deficit is included. 
 
The evolution of the last two markets (deposits and banking credits) shows the strong 
process of financial intensification which the country experienced until the beginning of 
1980. Over these years, financial business flourished as can be inferred from the 
remarkable increase in deposits in real terms (Δtotdep) of 170% and in credits (Δtotcredt) 
of 110%. This represented a spectacular jump in the stock of deposits and credits from 
10.5% and 18.5 of GDP in May 1977 to 28.4% and 39.5% in March 1980 respectively46. 
As argued earlier, the driving forces of this growth were the interest rate liberalisation and 
the opening of the banking system to international capital markets. These measures 
provided incentives for holding local financial assets and eliminated the restrictions on 
arbitrages between the internal and external financial markets.  
 
However, there were other policies besides market de-regulation which contributed 
greatly to financial expansion. To begin with, the monetary effect of the lax fiscal policy 
has already been discussed. In addition, the Central Bank had been progressively 
reducing the reserve requirements of banks from 45% in July 1977 to 11.5% in March 
1980, giving an average coefficient over the period of 32.5%. As stressed by Adolfo 
Buscaglia, the expansion in the lending capacity of banks gave rise to a multiplicative 
effect of credits-deposits-credits, which accounted for about 35% of the deposit growth 
                     
45 These figures are very close to the ‘under the line’ estimations made by Cavallo and are presented in 
Chapter III, Table III.3 D. F. Cavallo and A. Peña "Déficit Fiscal, Endeudamiento del Gobierno y Tasa de 
Inflación en Argentina 1940-1982", Revista de Estudios, Fundación Mediterranea, June 1984.  
46 Own estimation based on data shown in matrices of assets and liabilities presented in Appendix to 
Chapter IV.  
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in real terms (Δtotdep) over these years (Table IV.3)47. Another key factor in this process 
of financial expansion was monetary policy through the ‘Cuenta de Regulacion 
Monetaria’ (CRM). This account showed a negative result of US$ 2,100 million; an 
amount equivalent to 24% of the increase in the monetary base, and 1/3 of the 
reduction in the net financial worth of the Central Bank. Finally, the process of financial 
deepening also benefited from the policy of pre-announcing the nominal rate of 
devaluation (‘tablita’) which was in place from the beginning of 1979. In effect, by lowering 
the exchange rate risk, this measure contributed to encouraging the foreign indebtedness 
of the private sector which passed from an increase in absolute terms of US$ 1,049 
million in the two years 1977-78 to one of US$ 8,564 million in the years 1979 and 198048.  
 
Contrary to the predictions of McKinnon and Shaw, another distinctive feature of these 
years was the high rates of spread and on loans charged by banks in real terms, which 
averaged 17% and 25% per annum respectively between July 1977 and March 1981. 
Although the purpose of this study is to identify not the reasons for but the consequences 
of these high interest rates on the financial structure, it is important to make clear the 
macro-economic conditions of supply and demand in the market for credits. Some authors 
have claimed that the high rates were the result of a crowding out in the market for 
loans, caused by the demand for funds by the government to finance the large public 
disequilibrium49. However, this hypothesis is not corroborated by the figures of the 
matrix of assets and liabilities, since most of the supply of credits was allocated to the 
private sector and only 18% went to the government50. It should be noticed that the 
lending capacity of banks was expanded as a result of the reduction in the reserve 
                     
47 This figure represents 70% of the total monetary effect of the bank multiplier. If, the full effect is computed, 
the reduction in reserve requirements applied by the Central Bank would have increased the amount of 
deposits by 85%.The ‘total’ effect occurs when the banks allocate all their lending capacity to credits and 
then, all the funds lent return to the financial system as new deposits, giving rise to a new round of credits-
deposits and so on. In other words, it happens when there is no ‘filtration’ in the multiplication process of 
deposits-credits-deposits. Newspaper article by Adolfo Buscaglia, ‘Crisis en el sistema financiero’, La 
Prensa, 24 April 1980, p. 10 
48 These estimations are taken from R. Frenkel, J. M. Fanelli and J. Sommer, Op. Cit., 1988, pp. 33 and 35 
49 A. A. Arnaudo, Cincuenta Años de Política Financiera Argentina, 1987, Chapter. 7, p. 121; Newspaper 
article by Adolfo Buscaglia, Op. Cit., p.10 
50 (Δ totcredt) to the private and public sectors in Table IV.3 
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requirements of the Central Bank and at the same time, the government was reducing 
the demand for funds from the banking system. The approach in this study proves that 
the existence of high lending rates in the banking system cannot be easily explained by 
the pressure exerted by the public sector on the market for credits. Instead, what is 
required is a micro-economic evaluation of the way in which banks decide the interest rate 
to be charged, something which will be undertaken in Chapter V.  
 
As observed in the financial structure, the huge volume of financial intermediation carried 
out at high rates of mark-ups plus the transference of resources via the Cuenta de 
Regulación Monetaria, helped to explain the extraordinary increase in financial wealth of 
the banking sector (Δnfwf) by US$ 11,100 million (7.4% of GDP) between July 1977 and 
March 1980 (Table VI.3). This huge surplus produced a result which is really impressive: 
the rate of return on the total ‘net worth’ (capital plus reserves) of the aggregate financial 
sector - a proxy of the banks’ profit - averaged a yield of 44% per year on a compound 
basis in these years. By taking into account both the high rates of spreads and the large 
profits of banks, it can be argued that in Argentina the interest rate competition among 
banks was highly imperfect and, therefore, the economic resources were not efficiently 
allocated during these years51.   
 
So far, the main conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis are: one, a strong 
process of financial deepening was the result of the liberalisation of capital markets, the 
private sector and the banks being the main beneficiaries in terms of asset growth. Two, 
besides the financial policy, there were other measures such as the monetary, fiscal and 
foreign exchange, which contributed largely to the generation of a ‘credit boom’ in these 
years. Three, the opening up of the economy to the international capital markets brought 
about a strong dependence on the external sector, raising the risk of devaluation for the 
country as a whole. Four, a large proportion of the external debt of Argentina is explained 
by the fiscal and quasi fiscal deficits. Five, no indication exists of a financial ‘crowding 
                     
51 Chapter II, Section 2 presents the theoretical analysis of a policy of financial liberalisation.  
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out’ by the government and consequently, the demand for funds from the public sector 
cannot be blamed for the high lending rates and spreads which prevailed in the banking 
system. Finally, there are strong indications that the ‘price competition’ inside the financial 
markets was weak and hence, the efficiency in resource allocation - one central postulate 
of the neo-classical theorists of financial liberalisation - was not fulfilled.  
 
The analysis now focuses on changes in the financial structure in the sub-period March 
1980 - March 1981.  
 
Table IV.4 
Changes in Net Financial Wealth, Mar.1980 - Mar.1980 
(Percentage of GDP) 
 
   SECTORS    
Mar.80 - Mar.81 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. FOREIGN TOTAL 
 BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR ASSETS
 1. Δ mon -0.19 -1.35 -1.53   -1.53
 2. Δ totdep -0.03 1.40 0.10 1.27   1.37
 3. Δ totcredt 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.17   0.19
 4. Δ totjinv -6.49 0.53  -5.95 -5.96
 5. Δ totbon 3.26 -0.70 -1.04 8.66 7.14 8.66
 6. Δ red 4.43 4.43  4.43
 7. Δ othasset 0.00 -0.18    -0.18
 8. Δ otheliab -0.18 0.00    
     Δ totass 1.26 -0.22 -2.47 1.27 7.14 6.98
     Δ totliab -0.40 4.48 0.02 8.83 -5.95 6.98
     Δ nfw 1.66 -4.70 -2.49 -7.56 13.09 0.00
Source: own construction based on data obtained from the Central Bank, Boletín Estadístico, May 
1980 and May 1980 
 
 
 
In contrast with the previous years, the process of financial deepening underwent a 
notable slow-down over this period. As observed in Table IV.4, total assets in the 
economy (Δtotass) increased by 6.9% of GDP; while the stock of assets in hands of the 
private and financial sectors declined by 2.5% and 0.2% of GDP respectively. In this 
scenario, the financial dependence of Argentina on the ‘rest of the world’, documented 
previously, continued and increased further. In one year, the country’s net foreign debt 
grew by US$ 16,260 million (13.1% of the annual total output); a debt-increase greater 
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than that accumulated over the three previous years. Two related factors help to explain 
this: one, the needs for funds to finance the government deficit and two, the needs of the 
Central Bank for the financing of the current account deficit and of the people’s demand 
for foreign exchange from the onset of the banking crisis of March 1980. The State 
satisfied these double needs by issuing more debt abroad and then, feeding the Central 
Bank with these dollars in order to sustain the foreign exchange rate policy52. The matrix 
above shows the decline in foreign assets held by the Central Bank (Δtotjinvw) by -5.95% 
of GDP, and an increase in the public obligations with the foreign sector (Δtotbonw) by 
7.14% of total output (US$ 7,393 million). In addition, in the sub-period under study, the 
government increased its external obligations by 37% and this, in turn, helps to explain 
55% of the rise in the foreign indebtedness of the country as a whole (Table IV.4).  
 
Internally, all the economic sectors, with the exception of the Central Bank, had deficits 
and, consequently, they had reduced their net financial wealth. With regard to the private 
sector, the net financial wealth declined by 2.5% of total output (Table IV.4). This was the 
result of: one, the sharp deceleration in the evolution of deposits and credits compared 
with the previous years; and two, the lower holdings in currency (Δmonp) and government 
bonds (Δtotbonp) by US$ 3,900 million; an amount equivalent to -2.6% of GDP (Table 
IV.4). All this was the result of a widespread perception that the country was facing 
serious economic difficulties53. Accordingly, economic agents began to shift from local 
assets which had been allocated in banks to foreign assets which were then held 
abroad: over this period, capital outflows amounted to US$ 4,100 million54. In addition 
to this, the country was running a large deficit in the current account of more than US$ 
4,700 million (see Table III.4 in Chapter III). All this led to an extraordinary reduction in 
the net foreign asset position of the Central Bank (Δtotjinvcb), which lost US$ 8,800 
                     
52 For more details about the exchange rate policy applied in this period see Chapter III.3 and III.4 
53 A deeper analysis on this topic is given below in Section 4 
54 Since these funds were taken out of the formal financial system, they are not considered as assets of 
the private sector in the financial matrix.   
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million in one year; or around 6.5% of the annual GDP (Table IV.4)55.  
 
In aggregated terms, however, the Central Bank more than compensated for the loss in 
foreign assets with an increase in the stock of public bonds (Δtotbonc) and in credits 
given to the financial sector (Δred) by 3.3% and 4.4% of GDP respectively (Table IV.4). 
The former contributed to financing the large fiscal deficit of this period which 
amounted to 7.7% of GDP. The latter represents the support given to the banking 
system aimed at solving what was initially perceived as a liquidity problem. However, it 
can be proved that this was actually something far more serious for the banks than a 
transitory liquidity trouble. The banks suffered a dramatic loss (Δnfwf) of about US$ 7,000 
million (4.7% of total output, or 18.5% of the total loans granted to the private sector) 
which affected the solvency of the entire financial system. The net financial wealth of the 
banks dropped in just one year by 60% (Table IV.4). This result is even more striking if 
one takes into consideration that the banks had passed from a positive return on ‘net 
worth’ of 44% per annum over the period July 1977 - March 1980 to the negative yield of 
28% in the year March 1980 - March 198156.  
 
To sum up, this suggests that the main concern of the economic agents in 1980 was the 
stability of the banking system and the sustainability of the exchange rate policy. In effect, 
the withdrawal of deposits from banks and the capital flight are a clear indication of the 
fear that the individuals felt regarding the evolution of the liquidity and exchange rate risks. 
The policy-response to this - supplying liquidity to the banking sector and dollars to the 
foreign exchange market - helped to keep the economic plan alive, but it could not prevent 
an acute deterioration in the solvency of the financial system. By the same token, the 
financial conditions of the banks’ borrowers - the government and the private sector - also 
worsened, aggravating further of the situation of the banking system. 
                     
55 This was made up of a decline in gross reserves by US$ 6,400 million (from US$ 9,200 million in March 
1980 to 2,800 million in March 1981) and, an increase in liabilities by US$ 2,400 million. 
56 Own estimation based on data of Tables IV.3 and IV.4. 
 180
IV.4.3   Term-structure of Financial Assets 
 
The present and the next sub-sections are dedicated to the analysis of the evolution of the 
liquidity and exchange rate risks, two main factors responsible for the re-allocation of 
portfolios detailed and discussed above. The analysis begins with a study of the term-
structure of financial assets by asset holders which is an essential input for understanding 
the risk of liquidity faced by the different economic sectors57. It should be pointed out 
that, from a financial point of view, an economic agent is ‘liquid’, if he holds a positive net 
asset position - assets minus liabilities - in the short-term. It is naturally so because, in this 
situation, there would be enough funds to meet short-term obligations and, therefore, 
there is no risk of facing a liquidity crisis. In the same vein, from a dynamic perspective, 
the risk of being illiquid increases when the maturity of the debts shortens vis-à-vis that of 
the financial assets on average.  
 
Graph IV.2 shows both the share of short-term and long-term assets (the graph bars) and 
the evolution in the maturity of assets measured in days (the graph line) of the private 
sector on average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
57 As discussed earlier, the risk of liquidity is analysed in this Chapter from a macro-economic perspective. 
Chapter V, Section 4 expands on of this type of risk from the micro-economic perspective of the financial 
intermediaries. 
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Graph IV.2 
Maturity and Term-Structure of Assets of the Private Sector, 1977-81 
(In percentage points and in days - on average) 
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  Source: data obtained from the Central Bank, Boletín Estadístico, several monthly issues 1977-81 
 
 
Before the reform of mid-1977, the maturity of financial assets in the portfolio of the 
private sector was very much concentrated in the short-term. As observed in Graph VI.2, 
in May 1977, currency (monp) plus demand and saving deposits (sadp) reached 12% of 
GDP, which means that short-term assets accounted for 55% of the total assets of this 
sector (see also Table VI.1), the maturity of which was of 23 days on average. On the 
liability side, the credits received from banks were of longer maturity on average and, 
therefore, this sector as a whole had a liquid portfolio. The counter face of this was the 
non-liquid position of the financial intermediaries. While the banks granted medium and 
long-term loans to the private and public sectors, they were holding short-term liabilities 
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(deposits). At that time, however, the liquidity risk was entirely borne by the Central Bank, 
which was the only provider of liquidity in the economy58.  
 
With the institution of the fractional reserve system in mid-1977, the financial agents 
began to face the risk of being illiquid. Graph IV.2 shows that, at the end of 1977, the 
proportion of long-term assets in the portfolio of the private sector reached its maximum of 
60%, and this meant that the maturity of assets rose to 28 days on average. Afterwards, 
maturity shortened further as individuals increased their preferences for liquidity on 
various occasions over the period under study. First, in 1978, when the Central Bank 
authorised the banks to receive time deposits for a minimum period of 7 days. This 
brought about a rapid portfolio adjustment raising the proportion of short-term assets 
from 40% to 61% points. Accordingly, the maturity of assets dropped to 20 days on 
average in December 1978 (see Graph IV.1)59. Later on, during 1980 and 1981, 
preferences for liquidity increased even more encouraging the economic agents to re-
allocate banking deposits into more liquid assets60. As can be observed in Graph IV.2, in 
this period, the proportion of short-term assets rose and reached its maximum of 77% in 
March 1981. The result of this was an extra decline in the maturity of assets, which 
dropped to 15 days on average.  
 
In a scenario in which individuals’ preferences for liquidity were rising, the banks tried to 
avoid an increase in the probability of encountering liquidity problems. With this aim and, 
in order to keep pace with the reduction in the maturity of deposits (bank’s liabilities), the 
length of loans on average was also reduced (bank’s assets). Despite these efforts, 
however, it was not possible to prevent an increase in the mismatch of the maturity of 
assets vis-à-vis that of liabilities and thus, the banks ended up facing a higher liquidity risk. 
This is so because, a basic financial principle is that each creditor has a corresponding 
                     
58 In a system of deposit centralisation, the Central Bank is, ultimately, the unit which provides liquidity to the 
rest of the economic sectors. 
59 The Central Bank of Argentina, Boletín Estadístico, Op. Cit. (1978), p. 111 
60 These liquid assets include the ‘dollars bought’ by the private sector for the capital flight commented on 
earlier in Sub-section IV.4.2 
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debtor(s) and hence, if one sector is liquid holding a positive net asset position in the short 
term, there must be one or more units which are facing the risk of being illiquid. By holding 
a negative net asset position, the latter economic sector (e.g. banks) is providing liquidity 
to the former (e.g. private sector).  
 
The above suggests that the policy of financial liberalisation, which had proved effective 
for a rapid re-monetisation of the economy in general, and for an extraordinary increase in 
deposits and credits in particular, had been much less effective at extending the maturity 
of assets. On the contrary, over these years, the maturity of both deposits and credits in 
the banking system moved towards the short-term, shrinking the financial structure as a 
whole. In this scenario, the preferences for liquidity of the aggregate private sector led to a 
substantial increase in the liquidity risk of the banking institutions from the end of 1978 on. 
 
IV.4.4   Currency Denomination of Financial Assets 
 
Based on the McKinnon-Shaw prescription, in December 1978, Argentina opened its 
economy to the international capital markets with the aim of attracting additional funds 
and at solving the problems of short-term lending and high costs faced by local 
investors61. In accordance with these ideas, policy-makers believed that by swapping 
short-term debts for long-term foreign loans, borrowers could extend the maturity of 
their liabilities which, in turn, would improve their liquidity position. This debt re-
structuring though, brings another kind of problem: the exchange-rate or devaluation 
risk. This occurs when debts are de-nominated in foreign currency and the revenues 
generated by the firms are linked to the course of the internal economy62. This sub-
section is dedicated to the study of the evolution of the devaluation risk from a macro-
perspective by looking at the net asset position in foreign currency of the different 
economic sectors. Table IV.5 presents the composition of portfolio divided into assets 
and liabilities nominated in dollars at three different points in time, July 1977, 
                     
61 For more details on this economic programme see Chapter III, Section 4. 
62 All other things being equal, exporters are not obviously subject to this type of risk. 
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December 1978 and March 1981. 
 
Table IV.5 
Stock of Assets and Liabilities Nominated in Dollars, Jul. 1977 - Mar.1981    
(Percentage of GDP) 
 
   SECTORS   RATIO
Jul. 77 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. FOREIGN jtotass/
 BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR totass 
 jtotass 5.79 1.6 0.0 0.0 10.1 24.9%
 jtotliab 0.00 -1.2 -1.6 -10.1 -4.6 
 jnfw 5.79 0.32 -1.56 -10.09 5.53 
 Dec.78  
 jtotass 6.1 2.6 0.1 0.0 12.1 24.3%
 jtotliab 0.0 -2.4 -2.0 -12.7 -3.8 
 jnfw 6.10 0.17 -1.85 -12.68 8.26 
 Mar.81  
 jtotass -1.6 6.4 0.7 0.1 31.1 31.9%
 jtotliab 0.0 -4.4 -4.3 -28.1 0.0 
 jnfw -1.61 2.09 -3.61 -28.02 31.1 
Source: own calculation based on data obtained from the Central Bank, Boletín Estadístico, July 1977 
 
 
 
The last column of Table IV.5 shows the ratio of assets in foreign currency/total financial 
assets. As can be observed, in July 1977, this ratio was already high around 25%. 
However, the dollarization of portfolios further increased after the opening of the economy 
to international capital movements, when this ratio rose from 24.3% in December 1978 to 
31.9% in March 198163. Over this period, the net external debt of Argentina increased 5 
times; an amount equivalent to US$ 28,100 million. As discussed earlier, the key factor is 
this process was the government, which explains 67% of the increase in the country’s net 
foreign debt over these years. The consequence was a growing deterioration of the 
government position in foreign currency - a rising foreign exposure - as can be observed 
                     
63 Appendix B to Chapter IV shows the composition of assets and liabilities nominated in foreign currency 
involved in this process. 
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by considering the change in its net financial worth in dollars (jnfwg) from 13% of GDP in 
December 1978 to 28% in March 198164 (Table IV.5).  
 
The programme of pre-announced exchange rate crawling peg (‘tablita’) launched at the 
end of 1978, did encourage companies to substitute debts nominated in pesos for 
external loans as a means of reducing financial costs. Additionally, banks and other firms 
began to borrow abroad to then re-lend locally in order to take advantage of the cost 
differential between the national and the international capital markets, which averaged 
29.7% per year in 1979 and 38.1% in 198065. As observed in Table IV.5, this produced an 
increase in the assets and liabilities in foreign currency in the financial and private sectors. 
Nevertheless, the risk exposure of these two sectors was quite different. In the case of the 
private sector, the net financial wealth in dollars (jnfwp) decreased from -1.56% of GDP in 
July 1977 to -1.85% in December 1978 and to -3.61% in March 1981. In contrast, the 
banking sector maintained a positive net asset position (jnfwf) in this period (0.32%; 
0.17% and 2.09% of total output respectively) and, consequently, they were not assuming 
‘directly’ any risk of devaluation whatsoever.  
 
What is important now is to identify the factors and variables which these economic 
units considered for the management of the net foreign asset position in these years. 
Graph IV.3 presents the external exposure of banks measured by the ‘currency-ratio’ 
(assets/liabilities denominated in dollar), and the stock of net foreign reserves in the 
Central Bank over the period 1977-8166. 
 
 
 
                     
64 In turn, this large external financing of the fiscal disequilibrium was possible because of the abundance 
of resources in the international capital markets at that time. These funds were largely the surplus of 
Middle-Eastern countries (‘petro-dollars’) which were deposited in banks in the ‘north’ (developed 
countries) and then, recycled towards the ‘south’ (developing countries). For an analysis of this process 
see, for instance, B. J. Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: a history of the international monetary system, 
1996, pp. 85-88  
65 The financial cost in the international capital markets includes the pre-announced rate of devaluation. 
These figures were estimated by E. Gaba, ‘’The Argentine Financial Reform’’, Annex 1 Table no. 4, p. 27  
66 It should be borne in mind that, in this period, the Central Bank was the only supplier in the market of 
foreign exchange. 
 186
Chart IV.3 
Exchange Rate Risk of Financial Agents and 
Net Foreign Reserves of the Central Bank, 1977-81 
(In units and millions of dollars) 
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Three phases can be distinguished in the evolution of the currency risk faced by banks. 
From July 1977 to December 1978, the relation peso/dollar was fixed by the economic 
authority and, the agents knew neither the rate nor moment at which this relative price 
would change. In this scenario, the currency-ratio defined above was well above one, 
which means that the banks behaved very cautiously holding a hedge position in foreign 
currency, despite the large amount of foreign reserves which the Central Bank had for 
market intervention. During the second phase, the guidelines of pre-announcing both the 
speed and the rate of the nominal devaluation of the peso, plus the high amount of 
reserves in the Central Bank, gave the financial agents the necessary confidence to 
assume riskier positions and consequently, the currency-ratio was sharply reduced from 
1.4 in December 1978 to a minimum of 0.78 in July 1979 (Graph IV.3). 
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From mid-1979 on, however, the financial agents reversed that strategy and began to 
return to a rather less risky position, despite the high amount of reserves held by the 
Central Bank and the pre-determined scheme of devaluation in place at the time. This 
was so, because they perceived a mounting uncertainty associated with the future 
evolution of the nominal exchange rate. In effect, the exchange risk premium measured 
by the interest rate differential - adjusted by the rate of devaluation - between the national 
and the foreign capital markets went from 20% per year in the first half of 1979, to 40% in 
the second half. At that time, the Central Bank had not lost an important amount of 
reserves, yet the increase in the risk-premium suggested difficulties ahead with the 
programme of exchange rate. All this was taken into account by the financial agents who 
decided to protect themselves against the risk of devaluation. Accordingly, in November 
1979, the currency-ratio returned to one, which means a hedge position in foreign 
currency. In the next year, the Central Bank suffered a dramatic drain on reserves and 
this led to an increase in the ‘exchange risk-premium’ to 45% per annum in the second 
half of 1980. The banks reacted by further increasing the risk-coverage, and the ratio of 
asset/liability in dollars reached 1.3 in March 1981 (Graph IV.3). 
 
Finally, it is important to know why the private sector had a positive and growing foreign 
exposure in a period in which the devaluation risk was rising. First of all, the aggregate 
private sector has to be divided into two different groups: the depositors (savers) and 
the borrowers (investors) of the banking system. In addition, it should be borne in mind 
that over the whole period 1977-81, around 98% of the deposits and 85% of the credits 
in banks were nominated in pesos. Table IV.5 shows that the fall in the net financial 
worth in dollars of the private sector occurred mainly during 1980. This was the 
consequence of two facts: one, the growing exchange-rate-risk encouraged depositors 
to withdraw their savings in pesos from the financial system, to convert them into 
dollars and, to send these abroad; and two, the banks’ decision to swap the currency-
condition of some credits granted in pesos for one of dollar nomination. This is why 
there was a similar growth in private sector liabilities (jtotliabp) and in banks’ assets 
(jtotassf) nominated in dollars between March 1980 and March 1981, as can be seen in 
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Table IV.5. 
 
It has been shown that the opening up of the economy to international capital markets 
was very effective in channelling external savings into the banking system and in 
contributing to the large financial expansion of these years (quantitative effect). This 
policy, however, was much less successful in connection with the risk of devaluation 
(qualitative effect), which had been rising steadily from mid-1979 pari-passu with the 
growing uncertainty in the foreign exchange market. In this context and, in an attempt 
to protect themselves against a higher risk of devaluation, the banks decided to change 
the currency nomination of part of their credits from pesos to dollars. Nonetheless, this 
risk-coverage was no more than a veil, since the increase in the exchange rate risk 
faced by the borrowers had a knock-on effect on the quality of the banks’ assets and, 
ultimately, on the soundness of the financial system as a whole. 
 
IV.4.5   Pitfalls in the Institutional Framework 
 
This sub-section begins by considering the rationale for regulating financial activities. It 
should be stressed that the regulatory role of the government in the financial sector goes 
beyond that in virtually almost any other sector of the economy. In capital markets, 
prudential regulation exists because the failure of a financial agent can have important 
externality-effects on the economy with high costs for the society as a whole. This is so, 
because a substantial fraction of their loans is financed through deposits obtained from 
the public and also because the banks run the exchange and payment mechanism in the 
economy. In addition, since the banks transform short term debts (deposits) into long term 
assets (loans), they hold a non-liquid position. A high leverage (debt/capital ratio) and a 
non-liquid situation are what explain the high level of fragility and hence, the high risk of 
failure which these agents face. Based on the fact that there is differential information and 
differential incentives between depositors and bankers, both the existence and stability of 
the latter depend very much on an ‘intangible asset’: the perception that the former have 
about the economic soundness of those to whom they are delegating the use of their 
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savings. Any event which seriously affects that ‘asset’ (e.g. a perceived liquidity or 
solvency problem) could lead to a run on the bank in which the social costs are always 
much greater than the private costs. In turn, if this action produces a negative externality-
effect on other institutions, a run on one bank may escalate into a panic affecting the 
entire financial system and the whole economy. In short, paraphrasing Howard Davies, 
both problems of systemic risk and asymmetric information are the principal strands to the 
rationale for financial regulation67.   
 
It should be stressed that any policy of financial regulation is based on a theory or model 
of bank behaviour and historical experience. In the Argentine reform of 1977, following the 
neo-classical approach, the policy-makers believed that financial markets were like any 
other market68. Accordingly, provided that there are solvent financial institutions, free 
market competition and the liberalisation of interest rates were regarded as the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for an efficient operation of banks69. In this view, the regulatory 
policy focused mainly on the instruments for controlling the money supply and on capital 
adequacy requirements and less on those which discouraged and monitored the level of 
risk assumed by the financial agents. That is to say, although the new regime established 
some restrictions in an attempt to limit the risk of the banks’ investment policies (e.g. asset 
immobilisation, lending and borrowing ratios and credit concentration), the monetary 
authority did not consider this to be a critical issue for the financial system. This explains 
why, in early 1978, some of these regulations were modified with the aim of granting the 
banks more autonomy in credit allocation. In this regard, the maximum limit of lending 
defined as a proportion of the bank’s capital was abolished70. According to the Minister of 
                     
67 H. Davies, ‘’Why Regulate?’’, Henry Thornton Lecture, City University Business School, 4 Nov. 1998, 
pg. 3-5 
68 In the words of Bernardo Kosacoff quoted in Chapter III, Section III.3, ‘’a programme of trade and 
financial liberalisation was organised with the aim of modernising and improving the efficiency of the 
economy based on the philosophy of full confidence in market mechanisms and in the subsidiary role of 
the State’’. 
69 The cornerstones of this policy were: (a) the reactivation of the full capacity of the banks to endorse a more 
effective financial intermediation; (b) the introduction of a legal framework which would encourage market 
competition and efficiency; and (c) the enhancement of the solvency of banks (see above, Section IV.3 in this 
Chapter). 
70 This was not the case of the limit defined as a proportion of the borrower’s capital which remained 
unchanged. 
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Economy Martinez de Hoz, the reason for this ‘de-regulation’ was that the financial 
intermediaries had to “... fully regain their right to evaluate and determine in each case, 
the appropriate degree of financial assistance, taking into consideration the activity and 
the size of the borrower”71. This suggests that the monetary authority relied strongly on 
the effectiveness of ‘market discipline’ as a way of maintaining the soundness of the 
financial system in line with the ideas of McKinnon and Shaw.  
 
However, as was stressed in Chapter II.2, the fundamental problem of the neo-classical 
theory of financial liberalisation is that it pays no attention to ‘market failures’ due to 
asymmetric information between economic agents. Bad lending practices and their 
externalities are at the root of these failures and, are what ultimately explain the role of the 
government in limiting and monitoring these activities. Furthermore, as stressed by Stiglitz 
and Greenwald, “given that the regulator (supervisor) has (also) imperfect information and 
can control only indirectly the bank, the theory of bank regulation is a classical principal-
agent problem: the regulator (supervisor) (the principal) tries to control or affect the 
behaviour of the bank (the agent), to make the bank act more in accord with social 
objectives”72. Accordingly, it is suggested that the government should play a role in the 
regulation of incentives of banks and the constraints that they face, in order to discourage 
them from making bad loans or from lending at terms which are not commensurate with 
the risk. Additionally, adequate supervision is essential to guarantee that banks do not 
engage in bad lending practices.  
 
Based on this approach, what follows is dedicated to showing the areas in which the 
Argentine reform of 1977 failed to prevent or, in some cases, encouraged high/excessive 
risk-taking by the financial intermediaries. It starts with the policy of market de-regulation 
and ‘free’ entry. With the aim of promoting market competition, the decision was to open 
                     
71 The Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina, Boletín Estadístico, Buenos Aires 1978, p. 15 (free 
translation from Spanish). 
72 J. E. Stiglitz and B. Greenwald, Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics, 2003, p. 209 Italics 
added.  
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up the door to new agents, who had to operate in a new scenario with new opportunities 
for both risk taking and profit making. Based on the neo-classical theory, the government 
selected the players taking into account the adequacy of capital and other legal 
requirements while, other qualifications and antecedents including knowledge, 
experience, reputation and honesty of the owners and managers of the institutions were 
not considered at all. That is to say, there was no appraisal of the quality of those who 
would be the market operators.  
 
With regard to financial deepening and credit expansion, the lack of limits on the growth in 
the amount of deposits and on the number and size of loans contributed to the reduction 
of the banks’ capacity to screen loan applications and to monitor the use of funds 
effectively. The capacity for risk-assessment was also weakened by some regulations of 
the Central Bank which helped to facilitate roll-overs of non-performing loans into new 
credits through cosmetic accounting73. In the same vein, there were neither constraints for 
risk taken nor incentives for risk adjustments for capital standards connected with, one, 
the interest rates paid on deposits and charged on loans and; two, liquidity and foreign 
exchange exposures. Consequently, the bankers did not have strong motives for a more 
conservative portfolio allocation. Moreover, it should be stressed that the idea of 
preventing the banks from taking risky actions based only on requirements of capital 
adequacy is mistaken as a consequence of the high leverage position of these institutions 
(capital/asset ratio less than 10%). That is to say, since most of the banks’ assets are 
other people’s money, the structure of incentives generally pays for misbehaviour on the 
part of the banks74.   
 
The failure on the part of the Argentine authorities to take into account the problems 
and consequences of imperfect information in capital markets becomes obvious by 
examining the deficiencies in the supervision of the financial system by the Central 
                     
73 Magazine report, Convicción, Sunday 27, April 1980, p.12 
74 This has been pointed out by - among others - J. E. Stiglitz and B. Greenwald, Op. Cit., 2003, p. 213-
222 
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Bank. In this regards, Tomás Baliño affirms that the procedures and practices continued 
to be largely biased towards monitoring quantitative rules associated with money supply 
rather than the ‘quality’ of the banks asset allocation75. This explains why several aspects 
of the credit operations including factors such as specialisation, size and loan 
concentration, loans in arrears and non-performing operations as well as the 
relationship between loans and collaterals, were not investigated76. The task of the 
Central Bank was complicated further as a result of the rapid growth in the number of 
banks and in the number of loan operations in an ever-changing economic scenario 
characterised by high and variable rates of inflation77. Finally, besides being short of 
information about the portfolio allocation of banks, the problem of the Central Bank of 
Argentina at that time also lay in the total lack of experience and, in all probability, 
ability to supervise a swiftly liberalised capital market.  
 
With a weak institutional framework - flawed prudential regulation and defective 
banking supervision - the probability of cases of cheating and fraud within any financial 
system increases. These problems have been verified several times in Argentina 
where some banks misrepresented information in order to convince the authority they 
were behaving in accordance with the law. There are some notorious examples that 
illustrate this graphically. The Secretary of Economic Planning and Coordination 
Guillermo Klein recognised this when he said “the Banco de Intercambio Regional 
(BIR) had not complied with some technical requirements of the Central Bank laid 
down in article 34 of law 21526; but this was not easy to prove, as the bank had 
concealed these irregularities and the supervision procedure of the monetary authority 
was not adequate”78.  
                     
75 T. J. T. Baliño “The Argentine Banking Crisis of 1980”, IMF Working Paper, WP/87/77, Nov.1987, p. 41. 
76 In Argentina, over the period under study, lack of information on the part of banks regarding loans in 
arrears and non-performing credits is a fundamental reason for undertaking the examination of the 
business conditions of the banks’ borrowers made in Chapter VI.  
77 The consequences of the high and variable inflation rates for financial markets are further discussed in 
Sections 2, 3 and 4 in Chapter V.  
78 Memorandum on the banking system made by the Central Bank of Argentina presented by Guillermo W. 
Klein in a press conference (free translation from Spanish). Clarín, Thursday 29, May 1980, p. 12  
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Moreover, important cases of delinquency and corruption in relation to the financial 
sector have been identified over these years. For example, the Vice-President of the 
Central Bank Alejandro Reynal affirmed ‘’on various occasions the BIR did not manage 
to maintain its cash reserves at the minimum required by the law. But, there are many 
other technical relationships which permit control of the development of a bank, and 
which in the case of the BIR demonstrated the serious situation of this bank’’. In 
addition, he said, “this was a situation that had become more complicated over the last 
few years, but which was overcome by modifications in the regulations introduced 
periodically by the Central Bank, which were designed to give the BIR a breathing 
space to continue operating”79. In connection with this, fifteen years later, the former 
President of the Central Bank, Diz, admitted that the BIR and other financial institutions 
received special concessions following direct orders from the Presidential Palace. In 
return high-ranking members of the Armed Forces received ‘special favours’ such as 
long-term mortgages at very low interest rates80.  
 
More importantly, all these facilities were granted while the owners of the BIR were 
committing a spectacular fraud. This was later confirmed by an investigation which 
shows that during the presidential term of Piñeyro-Pacheco in the BIR, some firms 
which belonged to him including ‘Agropecuaria S.A’.; ‘Concomex S.A’.; ‘Mutuo S.A’. 
and ‘Raúl Piñeyro-Pacheco S.A’. obtained loans from the bank without presenting the 
correct and appropriate collateral, and that these loans were several times greater than 
the ‘net worth’ of the companies themselves. In turn, these credits were used to 
purchase BIR shares, despite the fact that the bank was on the verge of bankruptcy81. 
The investigation also revealed that the companies owned by Piñeyro-Pacheco had 
                     
79 This included the Newspaper interview, La Razón, Monday 31, May 1980, p. 7 
80 This confession was made more than fifteen years later by Adolfo Díz - President of the Central Bank 
between 1976 and 1981 - to the author in a personal interview (free translation from Spanish). 
81 At the beginning of 1980, José Rafael Trozzo sold the Banco de Intercambio Regional to Raúl Piñeyro-
Pacheco - one of the main borrowers of the bank - who became President of the Board of Directors. The 
excuse was “to rescue the institution”. 
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issued faked cheques to try to create ‘fictitious profits’ in order to avoid the closure of 
the BIR, something which finally occurred in May 198082. On top of this, it was 
discovered that the fire in the main computer centre of the BIR in April 1979, was not 
an unfortunate accident, but a ‘planned operation’ to simply wipe out all records of 
transactions of the bank83.  
 
In the case of the Banco de Los Andes and Banco Oddone, Secretary Klein said: “they 
had been violating regulations by making loans to themselves (companies linked to 
them) and resorting to subterfuges to cover this up”84. In this regard, it is worth 
mentioning a story told by the ex-President of the Central Bank Adolfo Díz85. The Bank 
Oddone began to operate in November 1979. It was part of an important Argentine 
conglomerate specialising in oil, insurance and construction among other sectors 
(‘Oddone Group’), In barely two months it was in ninth place among private banks 
based on the amount of deposits86. At the beginning of the year 1980, all its records 
showed the institution to be in ‘perfect shape’, with loan allocation to very important and 
well established firms. The Central Bank did not have any thing to complain about 
regarding the situation of the bank. One day, the Federal Police found a clandestine 
printing press located in a basement in the ‘city’ of Buenos Aires. At first, it was 
believed that the find was a ‘mere’ illegal commerce with no further implications. 
However, since all the products of this printing firm were papers, documents made for 
various firms and for one bank, Banco Oddone, the Police called in the specialised 
inspectors of the Central Bank. The surprise was that the printing press belonged to the 
bank and was used to falsify the papers (logos, internal documents, seals, etc.) of the 
                     
82 With the closure of the BIR, Piñeyro-Pacheco and other directors were arrested. By that time, Trozzo had 
fled to Mexico, a country which did not have an extradition treaty with Argentina. In March 1981, Piñeyro-
Pacheco was released. However, the trial continued and twelve years later, in 1992, the court found Piñeyro-
Pacheco, along with other members of the Board of Directors, guilty of aggravated financial misdemeanour. He 
was sentenced to 5½ years in prison and to pay a fine of US$ 8,000 million. As Piñeyro-Pacheco did not 
appear to have this amount in his possession, this sum was never paid. In addition, he did not go to jail 
because in Argentine law, the minimum sentence for serving prison time is 8 years. Newspaper report, Ambito 
Financiero, Thursday 30, April 1992, p. 21    
83 Newspaper report, Ambito Financiero, Thursday 30, April 1992, p. 21 
84 La Razón, Monday 31, May 1980, p.13 
85 This story was narrated by Adolfo Díz to the author in a personal interview. 
86 Convicción, Loc. Cit., p.12.  
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borrowers, in order to fake loan operations (contracts, disbursements, interest 
payments, etc.) between the Banco Oddone and several of the reputable companies 
which the bank had shown as its ‘true and genuine’ borrowers.   
 
The above anecdotes illustrate the problems in the Argentine financial sector caused 
by an ill-designed institutional framework. Had the regulations and supervision been 
stricter, some of this excessive risk taking and misconduct could have been avoided. 
The authorities realised this in late 1979, only when the misbehaviour in the financial 
system had become glaringly obvious. The monetary authority then announced a re-
organisation of the prudential regulation and banking supervision87: After many months 
of elaboration, the new rules included changes in the: (a) accounting standards for 
financial institutions; (b) minimum standards for external auditing and internal controls; 
(c) system of monitoring the financial system; and (d) system of inspections and 
verification of financial institutions. These regulations were aimed at homogenising and 
extending the use of information, documentation and control within the financial 
institutions. The purpose was to facilitate and to improve the activities of verification, 
monitoring and analysis by the Central Bank. For the first time, efforts were made to 
assess the internal and external aspects of the credit operations (specialisation, size, 
debtor, loan concentration)88. This was complemented by an evaluation of the 
performance of the financial agents including indicators of liquidity, efficiency and 
solvency. Moreover, by using ‘alert indicators’, a preventive study was undertaken to 
identify a priori problems of liquidity and of non-performing loans in the financial sector. 
The problem, though, was that this new set of rules was introduced at the end of 1981 
and, therefore, came too late to prevent some of the misconduct described earlier. 
 
                     
87 Memorias del Banco Central, The Central Bank of Argentina of 1979 and 1980. 
88 Guidelines for  the Auditor (Manual del Analista de Control). 
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IV.5 FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
The last section focused on two main issues: the evolution of variables associated with 
the quantity and quality of the financial system. This study provides the key elements for 
an analysis of the level of financial fragility and systemic risk of Argentina over the period 
1977-81. First of all, a definition of the concepts which will be used needs to be made: (a) 
financial vulnerability or fragility is used to describe a position of weakness for absorbing 
negative shocks as a result of the high risk-exposure taken by the economic agents; (b) 
systemic or macro-economic risk, disorder and instability refers to the effect of a negative 
shock which spreads throughout the financial system causing a disruption in the payment 
mechanism and in the banks’ capacity to allocate capital. In this regard, it should be 
pointed out that systemic failures are usually of short duration, but can have long-term 
consequences. Another characteristic is that they are inherently unavoidable by individual 
or institutional investors and consequently, cannot be spread by portfolio management.   
 
It has been shown that the liberalisation of capital markets was extremely successful in 
increasing the stocks and flows of financial assets (quantitative-effect) in Argentina until 
the beginning of 1980. Nevertheless, the development of various ‘quality-features’ of the 
macro-financial structure was less positive. Indeed, by trying to promote competition, 
many players were allowed to enter the financial markets, on the basis of only capital 
adequacy but not of their knowledge, experience, reputation and honesty89. In this way, 
the doors of the system were opened to ‘economic predators’90. In addition, in the 
period July 1977 - March 1980, several economic polices - monetary, fiscal, banking 
and exchange rate - contributed to the generation of a large financial expansion which 
resulted in a ‘credit boom’. The banks were being flooded with money and consequently, 
funds had to be invested quickly in productive activities. In this context, the standards of 
banks for screening and selecting projects and borrowers were relaxed so as to speed 
                     
89 Vital qualities for those who believe in the importance of asymmetric information in capital markets. 
90 An analysis of the speculative behaviour of some financial intermediaries during these years is carried 
out in Chapter V, Section 6  
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up the process of lending91. This, however, had a negative effect on the quality of 
resource allocation. It should be also mentioned that after many years of operating under 
the direct control of the Central Bank, the banks had neither the expertise nor the 
information for sound credit allocation92. In this regard, the high spreads and lending 
rates charged by banks, together with the large profits that they made in these years, 
indicate the lack of price competition in the banking system and the fact, that the banks 
were assuming high/excessive levels of risk. By the same token, there were important 
cases of misbehaviour, fraud and corruption due to a flawed institutional framework 
and cronyism in the Central Bank where, on various occasions, the regulations were 
ignored, bent or modified in order to benefit some intermediaries. 
 
Another factor that should be borne in mind is that, over these years, there was a general 
desire on the part of the depositors to hold liquid assets in order to be as flexible as 
possible in an uncertain and instable economic scenario. Not only did the macro-financial 
structure remain highly concentrated in short-term assets but, it actually shortened 
further from the end of 1977. The consequence of this was a persistent increase in the 
mismatch between assets and liabilities of banks and thus, in the risk of facing liquidity 
problems. Additionally, the concentration of the macro-financial structure in the short-
term was a problem that could not be reverted by the policies which encouraged the 
dollarization of portfolios together with the programme of pre-announcing the rate of 
devaluation. These measures instead, contributed to raising primarily the vulnerability 
of all sectors (except banks) in connection with devaluation risk. The major threat was 
posed by the large external indebtedness accumulated by the public sector in these 
years which, ultimately, structurally changed the risk position of the country as a whole. 
Furthermore, the reduction of the exposure of banks in foreign currency is an indication 
of the growing lack of confidence of the ‘city’ from mid-1979 on regarding the 
sustainability of the exchange rate programme.  
                     
91 See Chapter II, Section 2 for an analysis of the roles of the financial intermediaries. 
92 A description of the pre-1976 organisation of the financial system can be found in Chapter III, Section 2. 
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The above factors take on greater importance when the externality-effect as well as the 
inter-dependence of risks assumed by the different economic units are taken into 
account. In general, the position of risk of one debtor is of relevance for his creditor(s) 
since the economic health and the prospects of the former are what, in the end, will 
determine the value and liquidity of the creditors’ claims. It should be emphasised that 
a country’s financial structure is made up of a continuous multiparty network of debtor-
creditor-debtor relationships, in which there are units which have the double role of 
being debtor and creditor of other economic unit(s). Accordingly, from a macro-
economic perspective, a risk may not only be important for the first link but also, for 
other links in the financial chain and, hence, the possibility of a domino effect is always 
latent. This is evident in the case of the banks, which are at the same time debtors and 
creditors and, therefore, there is a kind of inter-dependence between the risks of those 
who supply the funds (depositors) and the risks of those who ask for loans (borrowers). 
This is a two way transmission of risks, from depositors to bank borrowers and vice-
versa in which, the bank is in the middle bearing the risks on both sides of the balance 
sheet. In turn, the way in which the bank behaves also affects the risks borne by its 
depositors and its borrowers. In effect, by definition a risk-loving bank takes greater 
risks than a risk-adverse bank and consequently, the externality-effects that they 
generate on their clients are different. 
 
By taking the risk inter-dependence into account, in the case-study, the banks held a 
hedge position in foreign currency from the end of 1979 on and yet, they were bearing 
indirectly the risk derived from the foreign exchange exposure assumed by their 
depositors and borrowers in the private and public sectors. The same approach is used 
to judge the macro-economic consequences of the risks derived from the existence of 
a large fiscal deficit, and the way in which it was primarily financed; that is to say, via 
overseas funds. Besides the threat of the high exposure in foreign currency, economic 
agents experienced great uncertainty in relation to their future return on assets as, in 
the event that external financing was reduced or cut, the government would be forced 
to find these funds internally. The rationale for this worry was the manifest 
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incompatibility between the size of the public borrowing requirements and the financial 
depth of the economy: the total fiscal deficit represented two-thirds of the amount of 
credits granted by the financial system in the period July 1977 - March 198093.  
 
All these elements suggest that the general quality of the country’s financial structure 
was undergoing an acute deterioration and a more vulnerable financial system was 
resulting. In early 1980, the perceived risk on the part of the agents with regard to the 
banking system shifted drastically and the mounting financial fragility developed into a 
systemic risk. This marked the beginning of a process of financial disintegration94. The 
sequence of events was as follows: in early 1980 rumours about serious troubles in 
some financial institutions led individuals to begin withdrawing deposits. In the words of 
the Vice-president of the Central Bank, Alejandro Reynal, “a lot of gossip about debtors 
in trouble was circulating in the city” 95. Then, on 28th March, the Central Bank decided to 
close the largest private bank of Argentina - Banco de Intercambio Regional (BIR). This 
had a strong negative impact on investors’ confidence and triggered a run on the banks 
(black Wednesday 02-04-1980)96. A domino effect and the reshuffling of deposits spread 
the crisis. In the month of April, the three institutions which had suffered the largest drain 
on deposits were taken over: Banco de Los Andes, Banco Oddone, and Banco 
Internacional (thereafter, the first two were closed). In only five months, between February 
                     
93 This, in turn, shows the importance of the external financing of the public deficit in the generation of the 
credit boom commented above. 
94 In the beginning of 1980s, banking crises also occurred in Chile and Uruguay where programmes of 
economic and financial liberalisation similar to the Argentine one had been applied. See, for instance, C. F. 
Díaz-Alejandro, "Good-bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash", Journal of Development Economics, 
1985, 19, 112, pp. 1-24; V. Corbo, J. De Melo and J. Tybout “What Went Wrong with the Recent Reforms in 
the Southern Cone”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, April 1986, vol. 34, No. 3, A; F. Larrain 
"Financial Liberalization in Uruguay: Success or Failure?, CDP Discussion Paper Feb. 1987 No.1987-1; A. 
Velazco “Liberalization, Crisis, Intervention: The Chilean Financial System, 1975-1985”, IMF Working Paper, 
1988, WP/88/66;; and R. Zahler "Estrategias Financieras Latinoamericanas: La Experiencia del Cono Sur", 
Colección Estudios CIEPLAN Santiago, 1988, No. 23. 
95 Newspaper interview, Clarín, 24 January 1980, p. 8 (free translation from Spanish).  
96 A banking panic arises because the depositors fear that that the bank will not have the liquid funds in 
the event all of them decide to remove their money at the same time. Under the first-come-first-served 
rule, the depositors will try to avoid losses by not being at the end of the line if they think that other account 
holders intend to withdraw their funds. The first theoretical explanation of the deposit run was given by D. 
Diamond and P. Dybvig “Bank Runs, Liquidity and Deposit Insurance”, Journal of Political Economy, 91, 
pp. 401-419. An alternative explanation based on asymmetric information is given by C. W. Calomiris and 
G. Gorton, “The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation”, in R. G. Hubbard (ed.), 
Information, Capital Markets and Investment, National Bureau of Economic Research (1990), pp. 109-73. 
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and June, the decline in deposits in real terms amounted to US$ 3,190 million (2.6% of 
GDP). 
 
What follows is an account of the economic interactions, the policy response and the main 
consequences for the financial system caused by the systemic failure. The main statistical 
support for this study is a series of ‘snap shots’ of the country’s financial structure 
(financial matrix) per month between March 1980 and March 1981 included in the 
Appendix to Chapter IV. To begin with, the deposit run did provoke serious liquidity 
problems inside the financial sector and a large re-allocation of funds within the banking 
system from institutions suspected of being unsound to others considered to be more 
solvent. In particular, savings were taken out of banks which had expanded rapidly in a 
short period of time due to the policy of paying high nominal rates on deposits, to be re-
deposited mainly in state-owned and in foreign-owned institutions. At that time, in a 
street interview, a random depositor, Juan Estevanel affirmed: “it is preferable to make 
deposits in well-established reputable banks, even though they pay lower rates of 
interest. Banks which grow overnight ‘he said’ cannot be trusted”97 98. This explains 
why between March and June, the growth in nominal deposits for the financial system 
as a whole averaged a rate of 31% points. However, while deposits grew by 44% and 
43% in State and foreign-owned banks, local private institutions accounted for only 
16%99.  
 
In light of the scale of the deposit withdrawal, the monetary authority believed that the 
scheme of lender-of-last-resort in operation was insufficient to maintain the stability of 
banks and, therefore, a ‘safety net’ was established in April100. As a result of this decision, 
                     
97 Clarín, Tuesday 1st April 1980, p.13 (free translation from Spanish). 
98 As explained in page 40, a bank’s reputation is an intangible asset: the perception of the depositors 
regarding the soundness of the institution to which they are entrusting their savings. Any factor negatively 
affecting this perception can lead to a run on the bank. 
99 For a deeper analysis on the re-distribution of deposits and its effects on the Argentine financial crisis, 
see A. A. Arnaudo “Las Enseñanzas de la Crisis Financiera”, Novedades Económicas, Córdoba, Argentina 
1983 No. p. 30 
100 Circular R.F. No. 1051. Resolution issued by the Central Bank of Argentina offering financial assistance 
to deal with cases of temporary decline in deposits (Adelantos para atender situaciones originadas en la 
reducción temporaria de depósitos). 
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the Central Bank provided ordinary and extraordinary assistance, amounting to US$ 
4,600 million (3.7% of GDP) between February and June. It should be highlighted that the 
interest charged on these loans was equivalent to one and a half times the discount 
rate; which means that for the banks these funds were much more expensive than the 
deposits they lost. In addition, the loans had to be paid off over a relatively short period 
in order to avoid a situation of non-compliance with the banking regulations101. 
 
The figures presented above show that the amount of rediscount loans granted by the 
Central Bank to banks was 30% greater than the total deposit withdrawals from the 
financial system during the period February - June. This means that the banking 
system had a net absorption of funds of US$ 1,400 million; equivalent to 3% of total 
lending to the private sector. Two factors help to explain this: one, the financial 
assistance given by the Central Bank covered the run on deposits of each bank. 
However, this amount surpassed the deposit loss of the banking system, since part of 
the deposits were re-allocated to other institutions and thereby, they did not go out of 
the system; and two, various institutions needed funds to deal with problems of liquidity 
and profitability caused by distress borrowing. As discussed earlier, there were banks 
which were concealing non-performing loans from the monetary authority by writing 
down unpaid interest as ‘new’ credit operations102. All this suggests that the Central 
Bank behaved counter-cyclically, and that the monetary policy cannot be blamed for an 
increase in the lending rate or a credit crunch, something which could deepen the 
crisis103. 
                     
101 Newspaper article by Adolfo Buscaglia, La Prensa, Monday 24, April 1980, pp. 10-11 
102 An account of the practice of “cooking the books” in the financial sector of Argentina commented on 
earlier was pointed out by A. J. de Juan, “The Root of Banking Crisis: Microeconomic Aspects and 
Supervision and Regulation’’, in Banking Crisis in Latin America, 1996, pp. 95-116.  
103 Accordingly, the monetarist interpretation put forward by Milton Friedman suggesting that the origin and 
deepening of the Great Depression was due to the monetary restriction decided by the authority (The 
Federal Reserve System of United States of America) was not the cause of the Argentine financial crisis. 
M. Friedman and A J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of The United States, (1963). The argument that the 
Central Bank of Argentina behaved counter-cyclically is also shared by Roque Fernández, ‘’La Crisis 
Financiera Argentina: 1980-1982’’, Desarrollo Económico, 1983, April - June, Vol.  2 No. 89 p. 79 
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Without doubt, these official loans were essential for keeping the banking system on its 
feet. It was achieved, however, at the expense of accelerating the process of capital 
flight which, in turn, reduced the external reserves of the Central Bank and helped to 
further raise the exchange rate risk. By trying to protect themselves against this higher 
risk, the banks changed the currency-denomination of some credits from pesos to 
dollars and this worsened the external exposure of their borrowers. In addition, the 
need to finance the fiscal deficit abroad and re-stock the international reserves in the 
Central Bank caused a notable increase in the external exposure of the public sector.  
 
In an attempt to halt the deposit drain, the banks increased deposit and lending rates in 
nominal terms per year from 76% and 91% in March to 102% and 125% in July 
respectively. It should be stressed that the liquidity problem is the only explanation for 
the increase in interest rates since the inflation rate remained stable in this period104. 
With that inflation, the increase in the nominal deposit and lending rates meant a sharp 
increase in real terms which passed respectively from 12% and 43% to 22% and 59%. 
In turn, these changes entailed an increase in the margin of intermediation (real 
spread) from 10% to 16%. Furthermore, the banks decided not to re-lend all the funds 
obtained as loan-payments, generating a severe credit restriction for the private sector 
of US$ 1,650 million (1.8% of GDP) between April and June. At the same time, on the 
real side, the situation was no less troublesome: companies had been suffering an 
erosion of their profitability due to a general decline in the level of activity and strong 
competition from the exterior, in a scenario characterised by a high overvaluation of the 
exchange rate. The combined effect of the harder financial conditions imposed by 
banks and the poor business environment faced by the firms, aggravated the problems 
of distress borrowing and non-performing loans generating an amazing fall of 36% in 
the total financial worth of the banking system, from US$ 11,664 million to US$ 7,446 
million, between March and July 1980 (see Appendix to Chapter IV).  
                     
104 This hypothesis is fully confirmed by the estimations of the model of interest rate decision made in 
Chapter V. 
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As a result, it is highly probable that this sharp decline in banks ‘net worth’ had not only 
a once-and-for-all negative effect on the soundness of the banking system but also, on 
the subsequent behaviour of the banks regarding risk taking in credit allocation. Stiglitz 
and Greenwald pointed this out “when the ‘net worth’ of a bank falls below a critical 
level, the bank shifts from being risk averse to being a risk lover”105. This is a typical 
case of moral hazard in which, the bank has less capital (own funds) to lose and 
consequently, is less afraid of taking higher risks in investment decisions106. As argued 
by Lindgreen “as a banking system becomes unsound, normal relationships between 
policy instruments and targeted objectives become less predictable and may be 
perverse in some cases. This occurs because unsound banks that are less able to 
control their balance sheets are less sensitive to increases in their cost of funds and 
are more willing to accept risky borrowers who will pay higher rates, which discourages 
more creditworthy customers”. In the case of Argentina, the general loss of credibility of 
banks caused by the crisis, made the flow of deposits more sensitive to real and 
monetary shocks. This helps to explain how the deposit run (a monetary shock) spread 
throughout the banking system generating an extra increase in the risk exposure of the 
different economic agents and consequently, in the degree of the country’s financial 
fragility.  
 
Besides bank closures and the assistance given to institutions with liquidity problems, 
the authorities adopted other emergency polices. These included the extension of the 
deposit insurance granting a full guarantee for funds up to $ 100 million of 1980 (US$ 
58,000). The scheme was made retroactive to 18th November 1979, the date when the 
scheme of deposit guarantee instituted in June 1977 was changed107. In the same vein, 
the reserve requirements of banks were increased to try and absorb the monetary 
expansion108. In addition, in July 1980, the restriction of a minimum period of one year 
                     
105 J. E. Stiglitz and B. Greenwald, Op. Cit., p. 213.   
106 C-J Lindgren, G. Garcia and M. I. Saal (eds), Op. Cit., p. 69. 
107 See above section 3.  
108 This can be seen as a reversal of the policy based on the neo-classical prescription of minimising 
government intervention in financial markets. 
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for the inflow of foreign capital was eliminated, and short-term capital was welcomed.  
 
These measures contributed to ending the runs on banks and capital flight. Following a 
temporary decline, the monetary variables began a rapid recovery from mid-year on. 
Five months after the closure of the BIR, liquidity in the financial system was re-
established and the amount of deposits and credits were above March 1980 levels in 
real terms. These elements led the government to believe that the crisis had ended. In 
the words of the President of the Central Bank, “the deposit run was over by mid-year, 
and the banking system was again operating normally by September”109.  
 
However, in a scenario of highly sensitive markets, the economic risks derived from the 
large fiscal and external disequilibria plus the deep economic recession continued to 
increase the vulnerability of the macro-financial structure over the second half of 1980. 
By October, deposit growth had stagnated, and the difficulties in banks had re-appeared. 
This time, it was becoming evident that the banking system had structural problems, 
and that the liquidity assistance given by the Central Bank had done no more than 
‘paper over the cracks’. As pointed out by Aristobolo de Juan, a long period of liquidity 
difficulties is always a reflection of the fact the banks have more deeply-rooted 
problems110. In effect, in the case of Argentina, this was confirmed by the Treasury 
Secretary Juan Alemann: “if the banks wrote off all the non-performing loans on their 
books, several of them would be in the red”111. To cope with this problem, the 
government introduced an extensive debt-rescheduling plan and refinanced US$ 6,500 
million (around 4.5% of GDP) between November 1980 and December 1981, equivalent 
to 12% of the stock of banking credits of March 1980 and 15% of the lending given to the 
private sector. These funds, however, proved ineffective at stopping an unprecedented 
banking crisis. During the two years after the liquidation of the BIR, 70 institutions closed 
                     
109 Banco Central. La Experiencia de los Años Ochenta, Valores en la Sociedad Industrial, Sept. 1994, 
Año XII No. 30, p. 123 (free translation from Spanish). 
110 A. J. de Juan, Op. Cit.,1996, p. 105 
111 Newspaper interview, Clarín, 4 December 1980, p.10.  
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their doors accounting for 16% of the total assets of the banking system, and the Central 
Bank had to increase the amount of lending to the financial system by 19% of GDP112. As 
a result of this, the ‘direct’ fiscal loss alone amounted to approximately 15% of GDP and 
this crisis contributed to an accumulated fall of 12% in GDP over the period 1980-81.  
 
                     
112 V. Sundararajan and T.J.T Baliño, “Issues in Recent Banking Crisis in Developing Countries”, IMF 
Working Paper, March 1990, p. 36  
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IV.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Argentine financial system underwent a remarkable transformation over the period 
1977-81. Departing from a state of high financial repression, the liberalisation of capital 
markets in line with McKinnon and Shaw’s theory brought about an extraordinary financial 
expansion up to early 1980. In these years, financial activities flourished - deposits and 
credits grew at a fast pace - generating a positive effect on economic activity. At the same 
time, however, the quality-features of the whole financial structure of Argentina were 
deteriorating. This was the result of the flawed design of the institutional change and other 
policy reforms, based on a narrow theory of financial markets and bank behaviour. 
Indeed, the government believed that all that was needed to obtain a deep and sound 
financial system was to guarantee competition and a free market determination of interest 
rates, without paying attention to the risks that the banks and their clients were assuming. 
In other words, for the neo-classical approach adopted, what matters is the quantity but 
not the quality of the financial system. This helps to explain the several shortcomings of 
the liberalisation attempt. One, by trying to promote competition, many players were 
allowed to enter the financial markets, taking into consideration only the requirements of 
capital but not their knowledge, experience, reputation and honesty. Two, the monetary, 
banking, fiscal and exchange rate policies generated a ‘credit boom’. This, in turn, relaxed 
the banks’ standards for screening and selecting projects and borrowers, negatively 
affecting the ‘quality’ of resource allocation. Three, although there is strong evidence of 
the high levels of risk which the banks were assuming - high spread, lending and profit 
rates - the Central Bank did not establish any constraints on risk taken nor incentives for 
risk adjustments for capital standards. Four, in a context of high inflation and uncertainty, 
the authority tried to make deposits in banks more attractive by reducing the minimum 
period for time deposits to 7 days. However, no importance was given to the higher 
liquidity risk which the banks had to assume as a result of a greater mismatch between 
assets and liabilities. Five, by opening the economy to the international capital markets, 
the government encouraged external indebtedness with no limit on the foreign exchange 
exposure of banks and their borrowers (private and public sectors), and with no minimum 
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period for bank deposits of overseas capital. This shows the lack of importance given by 
the government to the growing risk of devaluation and its implications for the banking 
system, regarding the stability of deposits and the solvency of the banks’ borrowers. 
Finally, the financial system was also badly affected by important cases of misbehaviour, 
fraud and corruption as a result of a faulty institutional framework - bad regulation and 
poor banking supervision - as well as cronyism inside the Central Bank where, on various 
occasions, the regulations were ignored, bent or modified so as to benefit some financial 
intermediaries.  
 
The general worsening of the quality of the macro-financial structure had been steadily 
raising the country’s levels of financial fragility until March 1980, when it finally cracked. 
With the collapse of the BIR, the perceived risk of individuals increased sharply and the 
state of financial fragility changed to one of systemic risk. This marked the end of the 
process of financial deepening and the beginning of a process of financial disintegration. 
The first manifestations of the macro-financial disorder were the deposit runs and capital 
flight, which aggravated the liquidity problems and threatened the stability of the banking 
system as well as the foreign exchange rate scheme. Five months later, and after huge 
monetary assistance given by the Central Bank, the banking crisis appeared to be over, 
since the deposits and credits had returned to their pre-crisis levels. However, what had 
been done was no more than emergency first aid in order to overcome the liquidity crisis, 
the infection ran much deeper: the solvency of the whole banking system had already 
been seriously compromised.  
 
This chapter shows that the high and growing strain that the policy reform imposed on the 
Argentine financial structure made a banking crisis inevitable.  
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V.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter focuses on the behaviour of financial intermediaries throughout the period 
of financial liberalisation, 1977-81. Banks operate in both the markets of assets and 
liabilities and they, therefore, bear simultaneously liquidity, interest rate and credit risks. 
The magnitude of these risks depends on the creditworthiness of borrowers and on the 
degree of mismatching between assets and liabilities in connection with the interest 
rates, maturity and currency. In an ideal and perfectly matched position, a bank faces 
no financial risk. However, the absence of mismatching is not usually seen as desirable 
since it would yield a low or, possibly, no return at all. 
 
A financial middleman who has a completely matched portfolio position is called a 
‘broker’. His only raison d’ être is the reduction of search costs by bringing together 
complementary transactors. This study deals only with asset-transformers, that is to 
say, agents who are assuming a position of risk. No bank can expect to be always right 
in its predictions of cash-flows, interest rates, prices, exchange rate movements and 
loan repayment. Thus, the challenge confronting any bank is not to avoid risk but to 
manage it in order to sustain an appropriate level of short term liquidity and long term 
profitability. Hence, the main goal of this Chapter is to assess the attitude of banks 
towards these risks. This requires the evaluation of how the intermediaries dealt with 
the risk associated with interest rate decisions in the uncertain macro-economic 
scenario which prevailed in Argentina in the period 1977-81 and the impact these rates 
had on the default risk of banking clients. By the same token, the policy for procuring 
deposits and allocating credits will be considered in connection with the liquidity, 
interest rate and solvency risks. 
 
In the analysis, special attention is paid to the evolution of the financial spread: the 
difference between the interest revenues on bank’s assets and interest expense on 
bank’s liabilities as a percentage of its total assets. Since this mark-up is a key factor in 
the performance of a financial institution in connection with liquidity, efficiency and 
 
 
210 
solvency, a great deal of effort has been devoted to understanding how they priced 
loans and deposits in an inflationary economy with free interest rate determination; and 
what effects the pricing criteria had on the interest rate and on the credit risk positions 
of the banks.  
 
The present analysis starts with the financial intermediaries as an aggregate. Then, a 
more dis-aggregated study is undertaken in order to identify the degree of homogeneity 
in the behaviour of the banks. This point is crucial since the approach towards risk may 
differ among the intermediaries. Moreover, variations in the risk position over time of 
one bank can imply changes in the distribution of risk for the financial sector as a 
whole. All these elements will be taken into account so as to identify cases of 
excessive risk taking and speculative behaviour by banks as well as their effects on the 
aggregate financial system between 1977 and 1981. The identification of these factors 
and their consequences constitutes an important contribution to understanding the root 
causes of the Argentine financial collapse of 1980-81. 
 
The remainder of the Chapter is as follows: the second section considers the problems 
of information in connection with market prices, and the role of expectations in an 
inflationary economy. Section three shows the evolution of the deposit and lending 
rates and of the financial spread during the period of free market operation, 1977-81. 
Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the components and determinants of the 
margin of financial intermediation. In an attempt to rationalise the pricing policy of the 
financial agents of those years, section four presents a model of interest rate decisions in 
a highly inflationary economy. In section five, the topic of liquidity management is 
considered so as to identify deviations in the behaviour of some intermediaries from that 
of the aggregate banking sector. Finally, section six explores cases of excessive risk 
taking and speculative behaviour within the banking sector. The conclusions are 
summarised in section seven. 
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V.2 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, INFLATION AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
The purpose of this section is two fold: one, it attacks the bases of the neo-classical 
paradigm with regard to the informational role of the price mechanism and market 
efficiency; and two, it helps to frame the analysis around the issue of price decisions 
which economic agents make in an inflationary scenario like that of Argentina over the 
period 1977-81.  
 
Long ago Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu claimed that, under several restrictive 
assumptions, market prices - in general - lead to an efficient allocation of resources 
and coordination of individuals’ decisions1. In theory, market prices transmit all the 
relevant information to the public domain and consequently, no incentives exist to 
invest resources in generating and acquiring information2. Reality, however, departs 
from this idealised neo-classical formulation. Among other factors, the informational 
efficiency of the market economy is hampered by the lack of a complete set of markets 
extending infinitely into the future3. Without contingent or futures markets, economic 
agents face a world of uncertainty4. This suggests that all the information which helps 
to improve the prediction of the future has economic value and consequently, it is 
bound to be costly5. 
 
By the same token, the efficiency of market prices is also challenged in the event of 
market imbalance. Theoretically, with the emergence of an excess demand (supply), 
                                                          
1 J. K. Arrow and G. Debreu, “Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy”, Econometrica, 
1954, No. 22 pp. 265-290 
2 J. K. Arrow, “An extension of the basic theorem of classical economics”. Proceeding of the Second 
Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Studies and Probabilities, J. Neyman (ed.), 1951, pp. 507-532; G, 
Debreu The Theory of Value, 1959 
3 See, for instance, S. J. Grossman and J. E. Stiglitz, “Information and competitive price systems”, 
American Economic Review, 1986, No. 66, pp. 246-53 and; J. E. Stiglitz, Whither Socialism?, 1994, 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3, pp. 1-44   
4 Here, there is no distinction between the concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ as proposed by Knight. F. H. 
Knight Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 1921  
5 See for instance, S. J. Grossman “An introduction to the theory of rational expectations under 
asymmetric information”, The Review of Economic Studies, 1981, No.48, pp. 541-559; A. Cukierman, 
Inflation, Stagflation, Relative Prices and Imperfect Information, (Cambridge 1984), pp. 23-34; S. J. 
Grossman and J. E. Stiglitz, “On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets”, American Economic 
Review, 1980, No. 70, pp. 393-408 and J. E. Stiglitz, Op. Cit., 1994, Chapter 6, pp. 83-107 
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market prices will theoretically increase (decrease) until the equilibrium is ultimately 
restored. In a perfectly competitive economy, however, no endogenous mechanisms 
exists that move the market forces towards a new market equilibrium. In effect, with 
price-takers, there is a lack of market forces which start a dynamic process of price and 
quantitative adjustment leading to a new equilibrium position6. The adjustment of an 
excess supply and demand is then a process where the economic agents decide and 
fix prices. In reality, there is no such thing as a perfectly competitive market. With price-
setter agents and an incomplete set of future markets, the informational character of 
market prices is substituted by the conjectures of agents regarding prices, quantities 
and qualities of the goods and services that will be bought and sold. 
 
An important conclusion can be drawn from the above discussion: not only does the 
efficiency of an economic unit depend on its productive side but also on the accuracy of 
its predictions. This becomes even more important with inflation: a circumstance where 
the general level of prices rises due to an aggregate macro-economic disadjustment, 
for instance, fiscal deficit. Inflation may affect the real value of nominal variables such 
as wages, prices, return on assets, stock of money, net worth, and so on. This explains 
why everybody looks at variables in real terms, yet most of the time one can only 
manage prices in nominal terms. In an inflationary scenario, therefore, expectation 
about price changes becomes crucial for the economic performance of every agent.  
 
Several factors account for the formation of individuals’ expectations of inflation such 
as their own experience, past and new information about the macro-economic 
environment and market conditions as well as their attitude towards risk. Within the first 
two, the aspects taken into account are the magnitude of both the ‘aggregate’ 
economic disequilibrium (inflation) and, that of the ‘relative’ market imbalance (supply-
demand) where the agent operates. It should be highlighted that these two disequilibria 
are inter-related phenomena: the former can generate an ex-post market imbalance if 
                                                          
6 This was first pointed out by Arrow. See J. K. Arrow “Toward a Theory of Price Adjustment”, in The 
Allocation of Economic Resources, 1959 
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suppliers and demanders do not coincide in their expectations of inflation. Likewise, 
disequilibrium in a single market can cause price re-accommodations which might not 
be totally counterbalanced by price movements in other markets and thus, the general 
level of prices (inflation) on average will be altered.  
 
This interrelated aggregate-relative imbalance contributes to the explanation of the 
existence of a positive correlation between the level of inflation and the volatility of 
relative market prices7. Indeed, it is commonly noticed that the higher the rate of 
inflation, the deeper and more frequent the relative price adjustments will be. Without a 
rapid flow of information circulating among the markets, the conjecture about the rate of 
inflation differs among individuals who operate in different markets. This is so, as 
everybody estimates inflation taking into account mainly what is happening in their own 
sector (sectorial inflation); without considering that market prices are subject to specific 
and general market supply and demand shocks. Accordingly, individuals operating in 
different markets come up with different estimates of the current and future inflation 
rates and this, in turn, has a knock-on effect on the demand-supply position of different 
markets.  
 
Another manifestation of the price interaction commented on above is the positive 
correlation between the ‘mean’ and the ‘variance’ of inflation. A typical pattern shows 
that the inflation rate becomes more unstable when price increases are higher. 
Volatility, however, does not necessarily mean unpredictability. The latter depends on 
the accuracy of the inflation forecast. This means that an estimation of the inflation 
uncertainty is given by the variance of the forecast error: the deviation of individuals’ 
expectations from the effective rate of inflation. In the same vein, as the errors of 
prediction are usually greater when the instability in the general level of prices is 
higher, the variance of inflation is commonly taken as a proxy of the above measure of 
inflation uncertainty (variance of the forecast error).  
 
                                                          
7 This was explained in depth by A. Cukierman, Op. Cit., 1984, Chapter  4,  pp. 53-68 
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So far, it has been shown that informational problems of market prices are pervasive in 
the economy and also that agents use private information when they decide prices. 
Besides the economic troubles derived from imperfect or incomplete information, there 
are others which arise due to asymmetric information and knowledge among the 
agents. Chapter VI will demonstrate that individuals can make use of their informational 
advantage for their own benefit. As stressed by Stiglitz, with asymmetric information, 
what is involved in an economic transaction is not only the mutual benefit of buyers 
(borrowers) and sellers (lenders) but also, the possibility that one party could be 
cheating the other8.  
 
Informational problems related to the allocation of capital and the monitoring of its use 
are what make financial markets ‘special’. This has been correctly pointed out by Diaz-
Alejandro: "a butcher will seldom turn down a customer who wants to buy with cash 
everything in sight at the price announced by the butcher (he will just make sure the 
cash is not counterfeit), a bank will surely (sic) not lend all a customer wants to borrow 
at the going interest rate. The former is a spot transaction; the latter involves a promise 
to repay in the future which may or may not be sincere or wholly credible. Enforcing the 
loan contract or liquidating collateral property will involve costs, and even with speedy 
enforcement the bank may be unable to get all its money back. The bank will incur 
costs to explore the credit worthiness of borrowers (transaction costs); the butcher will 
not care much about the reputation of cash-carrying customers’’9.  
 
Hidden information and hidden action because of asymmetric information are at the 
root of the problems of adverse selection, incentive effects, monitoring, transaction 
costs and moral hazard10. In capital markets, these effects may have different 
consequences including, a significant drop in lending which, in turn, could result in a 
decline in investment and economic activity; or alternatively, an excess of loans 
                                                          
8 J. E. Stiglitz, Op. Cit., 1994, p. 35  
9 C. F. Díaz-Alejandro "Good-bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash", Journal of Development 
Economics, 1985, No. 19, 112:1-24, p. 2 
10 For further details of the consequences of asymmetric information in financial markets see Chapter II, 
Section 2; as well as the bibliography cited therein.  
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granted to risky borrowers and allocated to risky projects, which could have an impact 
upon the fragility of the aggregate financial structure. All these problems are likely to be 
exacerbated in an inflationary scenario with high volatility in both absolute and relative 
prices.   
 
The interaction between inflation and asymmetric information is an obvious result, yet 
surprisingly, few theoretical and empirical works exist on this topic11. The originality of 
the present study can be encapsulated as: information problems make financial 
markets ‘special’; and inflation causes ‘special’ problems of economic information. 
What happened in Argentina in the period 1977-81 is a perfect illustration of how an 
inflationary macro-economic environment led to a greater degree of asymmetric 
information in financial markets which, in turn, seriously affected economic efficiency as 
a whole. What follows is an attempt to explain this phenomenon.   
 
                                                          
11  Within these contributions are A. Cukierman, Op. Cit., 1984, pp. 15-124 and; R. I. McKinnon, “Financial 
Liberalization and Economic Development: A Reassessment of Interest-Rate Policies in Asia and Latin 
America”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 1989, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 45-67 
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V.3  INTEREST RATES AND FINANCIAL SPREADS IN ARGENTINA, 1977-81 
 
This section is dedicated to an analysis of the evolution of interest rates and the margin of 
financial intermediation throughout the period of free market operation. At that time, the 
month was the relevant period in the Argentine banking system since the bulk of 
individuals’ decisions to allocate resources in the financial system were made on the basis 
of a term-maturity of thirty days. Graph V.1 shows the rate of inflation per month 
measured by the variation of the Wholesale Price Index (WPI); and the deposit and 
lending rates in nominal terms for thirty days between June 1977 and March 1981. 
 
Graph V.1 
Inflation, Deposit and Lending Rates in Nominal Terms, 1977-81 
(Monthly rates) 
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  Source: based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina, Boletín Estadístico, BCRA several monthly 
  issues, 1977-81. 
 
 
The liberalisation of financial markets implemented in an economic scenario characterised 
by a rate of inflation of between 5% and 12% per month, brought about an extraordinary 
increase in the nominal rates of interest. As Graph VI.1 shows, during the first and second 
halves of 1977, the deposit and lending rates jumped from about 3% and 4% to 8.7% and 
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10.7% per month respectively. Thereafter, an important drop in the nominal deposit and 
lending rates is observed throughout 1978, followed by a moderate decline in the first 
half of 1979 to 6.4% and 7.1%. This was due to an increase in the money supply, as a 
result of a less restrictive monetary policy applied by the monetary authority and, of a 
large inflow of foreign funds12. This downward trend was reversed briefly between July 
and November 1979 and then, these rates continued declining in nominal terms until 
mid-1980 (Graph V.1). However, in real terms, the rates of interest increased sharply 
from the third quarter of 1979 and; thereafter, during the first quarter of 1980, the real 
deposit and lending rates reached 1.1% and 1.9% per month respectively13. As can be 
seen in the graph above, although high nominal rates prevailed over these years, the 
depositors were roughly compensated for inflation. That was not the case of the lending 
rate, which - ex-post - was not only positive in real terms, but also resulted in very high 
levels on average14. Between July 1977 and March 1981, the rate paid by the banks on 
deposits averaged in real terms 0.28% per month (3% per annum) and the lending cost 
averaged 1.4% and 2.1% (18% and 27% annum) for first and second class companies 
respectively15. Another point that should be stressed is that these real returns differed 
markedly before and after mid-1979. In the first sub-period, July 1977 - August 1979, the 
real deposit and lending rates were -0.86% and 0.42% per month (-9.9% and 5% per 
annum) and, in the second sub-period, Sept. 1979 - March 1981, these rates averaged 
1.8% and 2.8% per month respectively (24.5% and 39.6 per annum)16. 
 
                                                          
12 For more details of this monetary policy, see Chapter III, Section 3 
13 Interest rates in real terms were estimated by the author based on the data presented in Graph V.1 
14 The subject of the high lending rates in real terms following the liberalisation of the financial markets in 
1977 has been studied by several authors, including: T. J. T. Baliño "The Argentine Banking Crisis of 
1980", IMF Working Paper, November 1987, No. 87/77;J. M. Dagnino Pastore "Las Tasas de Interés Bajo 
Distintos Contextos Cambiarios y Financieros", Desarrollo Económico, April-June 1987, 27 (105) pp. 61-85; 
C.F. Díaz-Alejandro, Op. Cit., 1985, p. 1-24; R. Frenkel "Mercado financiero, Expectativas Cambiarias y 
Movimientos de Capitales", El Trimestre Económico, 1983, No. 200. pp. 2041-76; L. Leiderman and M. Blejer 
"The Term Structure of Interest Rates During a Financial Reform: Argentina 1977-81, Journal of Development 
Economics, April 1987, No. 25 (2) pp. 285-299; R. I. McKinnon, Op. Cit., 1989 
15 The lending rates for the second class companies were taken from Clarín, Economic Section, Thursday 23, 
July 1981, p. 12 
16 Own calculation based on data depicted in Graph V.1 
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A high degree of volatility is also observed from the beginning of the new financial regime 
in both nominal and real rates of interest17. As the variability of the inflation rate over these 
years was even greater, the volatility noticed in the real returns surpassed markedly that 
of the nominal rates. Measured by the coefficient of variation, the real deposit and lending 
rates exhibited a variability of 1.94 and 1.14 respectively; yet in nominal terms, these 
returns showed a volatility of 1 and 0.94.  
 
All this suggests that individuals were making greater mistakes forecasting the inflation 
rate when this became higher and thus, more unstable18. In effect, negative rates on 
deposits may have been due to the difference between the ex-ante and ex-post rates of 
inflation. By considering the high price variability, errors of prediction in connection with 
the rate of inflation may account for differences between the ‘planned’ and the ‘actual’ 
rates on deposits in real terms as argued in the last Section19. These negative rates were 
also the result of the lack of alternatives to bank deposits to which people could allocate 
their funds20. However, the persistence of the extraordinary high levels reached by the 
lending rates in real terms can hardly be attributed to a defective inflationary estimation 
and hence, the factors which led the banks to price their loans at these rates is a point 
which merits further investigation21. 
 
In a scenario of high and variable real rates of interest, the re-distribution effects inside the 
financial system increased pari-passu with the variance of the inflation rate22. This is 
shown by the evolution of the margin of financial intermediation. Table VI.1 presents the 
                                                          
17 This point was stressed by Leiderman and Blejer "The Term Structure of Interest Rates During a 
Financial Reform: Argentina 1977-81, Journal of Development Economics, April 1987, No. 25 (2) pp. 285-
299. 
18 As stated in Section 2, the variability of the inflation rate is usually higher when the level of inflation is 
higher. 
19 This view is shared by A. A. Arnaudo “Expectativas Inflacionarias en Argentina. Una Interpretación, 
Documento de Trabajo, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, August 1980.  
20 Over these years, the stock market of Argentina was shallow and from Dec. 1978 on, the exchange rate 
was fixed following a pre-announced crawling peg. For more information see Chapter III, Section 3 and the 
bibliography cited therein.   
21 This is done in Sections V.4 and V.5  
22 A thorough analysis of the effect of inflation on individuals’ predictions is given by A. Cukierman, Op. 
Cit., 1984, pp. 23-34  
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annual rate of spread in nominal and real terms deflated by the CPI and the WPI for the 
period 1976-81. 
 
Table V.1 
Financial Spread in Nominal and Real Terms, 1976-81 
(Annual rates) 
 
  Financial Spread 
Year Nominal Deflated by CPI  Deflated by WPI
 1976 13.89   3.09   4.40 
 1977- I semester 15.34   7.96   8.17 
 1977- II semester 73.55 27.50 30.25 
 1978 46.48 17.43 19.62 
 1979 17.57   8.00    8.74 
 1980 19.08 10.83 12.74 
 1981 55.36 25.74 21.89 
      Source: Central Bank of Argentina, Boletín Estadístico, several monthly issues, 1976-81. 
 
 
 
To begin with, a huge transfer of resources happened within the financial system in this 
period, given the notable differences between the returns on deposits vis-à-vis those on 
credits. Whereas the depositors received negative or slightly positive real returns, the 
production sector suffered from extremely high lending rates in real terms on average23. 
Additionally, although the nominal rates on deposits and on loans exhibited a similar 
pattern, the gap between them did not remain constant throughout that period. 
Consequently, large and variable rates of intermediation spreads in both nominal and real 
terms emerged as another distinctive feature of the financial liberalisation attempt of 
197724. Table V.1 demonstrates that in the period 1977-81, the margin of intermediation 
charged by the banks averaged an astonishing 19% per annum in real terms. This is even 
more striking when one recalls that aggregate output fell by 0.2% and industrial 
production dropped by 2.5% on average during this period25. The result of this experience 
was neatly chronicled by a national newspaper: “there is no doubt that the high level and 
                                                          
23 This point was stressed by E. Gaba, “La Reforma Financiera Argentina: lecciones de una experiencia”, 
Ensayos Económicos, September 1981, No.19, pp.1-33  
24 Ibid., pp. 21-33  
25 For a detailed analysis of the economic cycle during 1977-81, see Chapter III and Chapter V; and the 
bibliography mentioned therein. 
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the volatility of the interest rates affected business activity and the financial structure of 
companies. Indeed, it should be highlighted that after a long period in which the real rate 
of interest became positive and continued growing, economic activity declined in the last 
quarter of 1979 and continued to do so during the first quarter of 1980. Additionally, 
changes in the interest rates brought about serious financial difficulties for many 
enterprises”26. Why did the financial intermediaries charge these high lending rates in real 
terms which resulted in such a large margin of intermediation in the financial system? 
What was the role played by the banks in the transmission of systemic shocks and macro-
economic imbalances? Did all the banks behave in a similar manner and what were the 
consequences of their behaviour for the aggregate financial structure? These are 
important questions which will be addressed in this study. 
 
In a scenario with asymmetric information, transaction costs regarding the negotiation, 
monitoring and enforcement of contracts are the best explanation for the existence of 
financial intermediaries and thus, of banking spreads: the difference between lending and 
deposit rates27. This is equivalent to the financial intermediation margin - the difference 
between interest revenues on assets and interest expenses on liabilities - as a 
proportion of total banking assets. The objective of this subsection is to identify the 
elements which constitute the financial spread and to quantify their importance in the 
levels which prevailed in Argentina in 1977-81. 
 
The financial intermediation spread is made up of: one, the net cost of reserves per unit of 
deposit and; two, the gross financial yield charged by the banks. The net cost of reserves 
is associated with the minimum reserve requirements set by the Central Bank and the 
amount of reserves over and above held by each institution. While the former is intended 
to regulate the stock of monetary resources and to maintain some degree of liquidity in 
                                                          
26  Newspaper report, Clarín, Loc. Cit., July 1981, p. 12  
27 This financial view is discussed in G. Benston and C. W. Smith, “A transaction cost approach to the 
theory of financial intermediation”, Journal of Finance, 1976, No. 31, pp. 215-31; D. Diamond, “Financial 
intermediation a and delegating monitoring”, Review of Economics Studies, 1984 No. 51, pp. 393-414; H. 
E. Leland and D. H. Pyle, “Informational asymmetries, financial structure and financial intermediation”, The 
Journal of Finance, 1977, 32, pp. 371-87 
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the financial system, the latter is the amount of liquidity deemed necessary by the financial 
institution28. Whenever there are banking reserves, an opportunity cost of not using them 
in other ways arises. However, there are cases in which part or all of the banking reserves 
are remunerated - as happened with the Cuenta de Regulación Monetaria - and naturally, 
this income has to be taken into account in order to obtain the net cost of reserve 
requirements. The factors described below affect the cost of banking reserves. 
 
a. Excess Reserves: the minimum reserve requirements were computed monthly as an 
average of the balance position held by an institution per day29. Within a particular 
calendar month, a financial agent could have an excess or shortage of banking reserves, 
which had to be averaged to meet the rate required by the Central Bank. Following the 
financial reform of 1977, the cost of having excess reserves was very high due to: one,  
the lack of expertise on the part of the financial agents in using the assets optimally in a 
scenario of high and variable inflation; and two, the legal reserve position at the end of the 
month was very hard to predict due to the large variability in the stock of monetary 
resources available in the economy, which affected the lending capacity of the financial 
institution throughout the month. The way in which the reserve requirements of the 
Central Bank were calculated caused intermediaries to bear a substantial cost for holding 
funds which exceeded the requirements of the monetary authority. 
 
b. Monetary Regulatory Account - Cuenta de Regulación Monetaria (CRM): as 
commented in Chapter IV, a high requirement of reserves was devised to curb the 
monetary expansion as a result of the institutional reform of mid-1977. However, a 
substantial immobilisation of assets in the financial system would have implied a large 
interest rate differential. The authority attempted to prevent this by means of the CRM. 
The CRM was a mechanism through which an inflationary tax levied on deposits in 
current accounts was transferred to the Central Bank, which, in turn, helped to pay 
                                                          
28 For an assessment of the liquidity management by the financial intermediaries, see below Section V.5 
29 For more details on this topic see Chapter IV, Section 3 
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interest on banking reserves. The CRM impacted on the gross financial yield per unit of 
deposit in both interest (gfyi) and non-interest bearing deposits (gfyd) as follows: 
 
(1) gfyd =  il  (1 - r )  -  ich  (1 - r - δ)   
(2) gfyi  =  il  (1 - r ) -  id 
 
where: 
il   = nominal lending rate. 
id  = nominal deposit rate. 
ich  = rate charged on lending capacity in current account. 
ico = compensation rate on minimum reserve requirements accounted on interest bearing 
       deposits. 
r   = rate of legal reserve requirements. 
δ  = margin on free lending capacity in current account. 
 
The gross financial yield - per unit of deposit - of both interest and non-interest bearing 
deposits are equal if the following conditions hold: one, the Central Bank charges and 
pays the same rate; and two, the margin on free lending capacity in current account is 
zero. Therefore, 
 
(3) gfyi  = gfyd =  (il  - id) * (1 - r) 
 
c. Distribution of Deposits: expression (4) means that - per unit of deposit - the Central 
Bank charges on the lending capacity of demand deposits what it pays for the legal 
reserve requirements on interest-bearing deposits. Nonetheless, the net result of the CRM 
per unit of total deposits (crmdt) depends not only on the rate of ‘payments and charges’ 
but also, on the distribution of types of deposits within the financial system as well. The 
distribution of deposits is the basis on which the ‘charges and payments’ are calculated. 
Accordingly, the lower the proportion of demand deposits, the higher the interest rate 
differential will be.      
 
(4) crmdt = ich  (1 - r - δ)  (dd/ td) - ico * r (ibd/ td) 
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where: 
dd    = stock of demand deposits. 
ibd   = stock of interest bearing deposits. 
td     = stock of total deposits. 
 
The CRM is in equilibrium if the following conditions hold: (i) the return per unit of deposit 
on the demand and interest bearing deposits are equal (expression 3) and; (ii) the ratio of 
demand deposits over interest bearing deposits is equal to the ratio of the coefficient of 
reserve requirements over the coefficient of the total lending capacity of the financial 
system. By making crmdt = 0, expression (5) is obtained. 
 
(5) dd / ibd  =  r / (1- r) 
 
In mid-1977, neither of the two conditions needed to achieve equilibrium in the CRM were 
being met. To begin with, the return per unit of deposit on demand deposits was higher 
than that on interest bearing deposits as the margin on free lending capacity in current 
account (δ) had a positive value (see expression 3). In addition, the second condition 
(expression 5) did not hold as the coefficient of reserve requirements was 0.45, while the 
ratio demand deposits/interest-bearing deposits reached 0.59. Consequently, the CRM 
showed a large deficit at the beginning of the new financial regime which, in turn, led to 
large monetary expansion as shown in Chapter IV30. Therefore, the result of the 
‘equalisation fund’ depended on the following factors: (i) individuals’ behaviour regarding 
the distribution of deposits in the financial system; and (ii) the monetary policy through 
modifications in the coefficient of minimum reserve requirements.  
 
                                                          
30 The sources of monetary expansion in the period 1977-81 are discussed in Chapter IV, Section 3. 
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d. Gross Financial Yield: this consists of the operating costs of the bank plus the profit 
margin per unit of deposit31. The gross financial yield - per unit of deposit - of a bank can 
be written as follows: 
 
(6) gfy =  il (1 - r - re)  + ico * r (ibd/ td) - ich  (1 - r - δ) (dd/ td) - id (ibd/ td) 
 
where: 
 
gfy = gross financial yield. 
 re  = excess reserves. 
 
The differential between deposit and lending rates can be obtained from the expression 
(6). That is, 
 
(7) il - id  =  gfy  +  (il  - ico) r  +  il * re  +  [ il (1 - r - δ)  - (id  - ich* r)] (dd/ td) 
 
Expression (7) shows the interest rate differential in nominal terms that prevailed in the 
financial system at the end of a period. However, what matters is the real value of the 
financial spread. It is obtained by dividing expression (7) by the nominal lending rate.  
 
(8)       (il - id) /(1+ il) =  gfy/ (1+ il) + r (il - ico) / (1+ il) + il * re / (1+ il) +1/ (1+ il)  
               [ il (1- r- δ) - (id - ich* r)] (dd/ td) 
 
Expression (8) breaks down the interest rate differential into gross financial yield and the 
cost of reserve requirements, deposit composition and excess of banking reserves. It 
should be pointed out that modifications in the cost of reserves may not necessarily be 
reflected in the interest rate differential, as they can be partially or fully absorbed by an 
opposite change in the gross financial yield. Table VI.2 shows the determinants of the 
                                                          
31 Within these costs, the following taxes on banks’ activities were included: (a) a sales tax of 4.1% on the 
gross financial yield; and (b) 2% on total banking loans, a contribution to the Instituto Sociales Bancarios 
(an institution which belongs to the banking sector trade union). 
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interest rate differential per semester - on average - between the second half of 1977 and 
the first half of 1981. (Appendix A to Chapter V presents these figures on a monthly base). 
Table V.2 
Determinants of the Financial Spread, 1977-81 
(Monthly rates) 
 
Year/Sem. Financial Gross Fcial. Minimum  Free Deposit 
 Spread Yield Reserve Cost Reserves Composition 
 1977-II  1.767 0.879 1.191 0.155 -0.459 
 1978-I  1.934 1.044 0.963 0.131 -0.204 
 1978-II  0.919 0.663 0.271 0.042 -0.057 
 1979-I  0.620 0.505 0.144 0.054 -0.084 
 1979-II 0.662 0.577 0.095 0.036 -0.046 
 1980-I  0.779 0.741 0.085 0.035 -0.082 
 1980-II 0.880 0.856 0.086 0.033 -0.095 
 1981-I  1.774 1.692 0.280 0.043 -0.241 
 Source: based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina, Boletín Estadístico, BCRA several monthly 
  issues, 1977-81. 
 
 
The above factors contributed to the high level of financial spreads in real terms that 
prevailed between July 1977 and June 1981. In the first year of the new financial regime, 
high minimum reserve requirements together with the increased profitability of the 
financial intermediaries (gross financial yield) helps to explain - to a large extent - these 
interest rate differentials. Thereafter, an important decline in the rate of financial spread is 
noticed in the second half of 1978, followed by another in the first semester of 1979. That 
was a result of the reduction in the total cost of reserves and in the gross financial return 
per unit of deposit. The cost of reserves declined due to a lower coefficient of minimum 
reserve requirements and a more efficient use of their lending capacity by the banks32. 
The total cost of reserves continued to drop until the end of 1980, but that effect was more 
than counterbalanced by an increase in the gross financial yield and, therefore, the 
financial spread began to move upwards from the second half of 1979 (Table VI.2). It 
should be stressed that the increase in the rate of mark-up ‘coincided’ with an increase in 
the lending rate in real terms, which the banks charged. In the first half of 1981, the 
                                                          
32 The Central Bank reduced the reserve requirements from 45% in June 1977 to 11% in March 1980. The 
effect of this reserve reduction on the financial spread is emphasised by Adolfo Buscaglia Newspaper 
report, “The crisis of the financial system” by Adolfo Buscaglia, La Prensa, Thursday 24, April 1980, p. 10 
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financial spread returned to the spectacular rate of 23.5% which had existed in the second 
half of 1977, whereas the gross financial yield per unit of deposit reached its highest rate 
of that period: 22% per annum.  
 
Regarding relative participation, the gross financial yield rose sharply and increased its 
share from about 50% to 95% over that period. A lesser contribution of the other factors 
was - to a large extent - a result of the relaxation of monetary policy. The participation in 
the financial spread of the cost of minimum reserve requirements - net of the deposit 
distribution effect - declined from 41% to 2% in these years. Accordingly, as time elapsed, 
the pattern of interest rate differential became more similar to that of the gross return of 
the financial intermediaries. What should be emphasised is that high and growing rates of 
mark-ups existed from the second half of 1979 on, despite the efforts made by the 
authorities to diminish the interest rate differential by raising the banking multiplier and 
expanding the monetary base33.  
 
At this point, the following counterfactual enquiry arises naturally: what would the rate of 
financial intermediation spread have been if the banking sector had maintained the 
average (5.5% per annum) gross return per unit of deposit which prevailed during the third 
quarter of 1977, all other things being equal ? Graph VI.2 depicts the effective and the 
projected annual rates of financial spreads and the gross yield obtained by the financial 
intermediaries in real terms between July 1977 and June 1981.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 The policy of reserve requirements followed by the Central Bank is described in Chapter IV, Section 3 
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Graph V.2 
Actual and Projected Rates of Financial Spread, 1977-81 
(Monthly rates) 
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 Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank , Boletín Estadístico, several monthly issues, 
 1977-81. 
 
The first point to be highlighted is that the projected rate of financial intermediation is 
always below the effective rate of financial spread, which indicates that the gross financial 
yield was always higher than the ‘base rate’; that is to say, the gross financial yield on 
average of the third quarter of 1977. Had financial intermediaries maintained the base rate 
of the gross financial yield at 5.5% per annum, in March 1981 the annual rate of spread 
would have been 7.3% and not, the rate which actually resulted of 37.4% per annum. This 
shows that the gross financial yield is the driving factor of the financial spread, which 
explains its persistent increase from mid-1979 on. In effect, the effective rate of spread 
was higher by about 48% than the hypothetical curve in February 1980, and most of that 
difference - more than 90% - is totally due to the gross return (profits) obtained by the 
financial agents. The growing relative importance of the gross financial yield in the rate of 
spread is clearly seen in the graph above.  
  
 
 
228 
Several aspects of the evolution of the interest rates, financial spread and gross 
financial yield need to be stressed. To begin with, these rates show an increase in the 
sub-periods in which there was relatively higher macro-economic uncertainty (between 
July 1977-March 1978 and September 1979-July 1981). Additionally, there was a 
notable transfer of income and wealth towards the banking sector from both depositors 
and borrowers. This occurred as the former were nearly compensated for inflation and 
the latter did pay very high lending rates in real terms (see Table VI.1). At the same 
time, by reducing the cost of reserves, the Central Bank attempted to encourage banks 
to bring down the lending rate and, therefore, the rate of spread. This policy was – to 
some extent- effective until mid-1979. However, from this time on, the attitude of the 
banks was to maximise their profits (gross financial yield) by raising the lending rate 
That is to say, the higher gross financial yield in real terms was not the result of a 
decline in the rate on deposits but, of an increase in the lending rate. Finally, the rate 
on deposits was higher in real terms when the rate of inflation was lower, and that 
‘coincided’ with the period in which the gross financial return for banks was rising, 
between mid-1979 and mid-1981.  
 
The remainder of the Chapter is devoted to explaining these matters by studying how 
financial intermediaries decided on the interrelated issues of setting interest rates on 
deposits and on loans during 1977-81; and how this affected the banking risk position 
with regard to the liquidity, profitability and solvency of the institutions. 
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V.4 INTEREST RATE DECISIONS IN A HIGHLY INFLATIONARY ECONOMY 
 
This section develops a micro-economic model of interest rate decisions in a scenario of 
high inflation and uncertainty in order to explain the origin and the consequences of the 
extraordinarily high lending rates, mark-ups and gross financial yields of Argentine banks 
throughout the period 1977-81. For a financial agent, the problem of uncertainty is 
connected with changes in prices, value and quantities in the markets for assets and 
liabilities due to both macro-economic or systemic risks and micro-economic or 
idiosyncratic risks. While the former depend on factors exogenous to the bank and cannot 
be diversified by portfolio management, the latter constitutes the risks of banking activity 
itself and they include: the credit, interest rate and liquidity risks34.  
 
The credit (or default) risk derives from the possibility that the bank’s debtors are not 
willing or able to meet their obligations at the agreed time. As a result of this, the bank can 
suffer from fluctuations in its market value and/or in the yield on its assets. Within the 
framework of the borrower-lender relationship, this type of risk will be considered in 
Chapter VI in which the factors affecting the economic performance of the non-financial 
private sector throughout the period of the financial liberalisation reform will be examined. 
 
The risk-of-rates (or market risk) of a financial agent refers to changes in its net worth as 
a result of fluctuations in the returns on loans and on deposits which, in turn, are 
associated with the term-structure of assets and liabilities. In Section V.1, it was 
suggested that the practice of borrowing public deposits in order to lend them for longer 
periods gives rise to an interest rate exposure. That is, a balance sheet or duration 
mismatch, which is inherent to the operation of a financial asset-transformer, implies an 
interest rate risk. The economic consequence of this type of risk is variability in the levels 
of liquidity and the revenues of the financial agents. Whereas the credit risk involves the 
                                                          
34 For a detailed theoretical analysis of this type of risks see X. Freixas and J.C. Rochet, Microeconomics 
of Banking, 1999, Chapter 8. pp. 221-56  
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problem of solvency, the risk-of-rates is connected with the liquidity and profitability of the 
bank. 
 
Finally, as a borrower, a financial agent bears the risk that its creditors (depositors) do not 
wish to renew their deposits, or that they are willing to do so but only on different 
conditions, that is the liquidity risk. Due to the duration mismatching between assets and 
liabilities, a bank can suffer liquidity distress when there are significant deposit 
withdrawals. A way to pre-empt or abort this problem could be by raising the nominal rate 
of interest on deposits. This measure, however, could give rise to another economic woe 
for the bank: a reduction in its intermediation margin - lending minus deposit rates - which 
in turn, implies a lower banking profit. By the same token, in order to preserve its previous 
financial mark-up, the financial intermediary can increase the interest rate charged on 
loans. However, this could have a negative affect on the probability of loan repayments 
and, therefore, the default or credit risk would be augmented35.  
 
This suggests that the decision on deposit and lending rates - the intermediation margin - 
is a key element in the equation: liquidity-profit-solvency of a bank. Furthermore, the 
bank’s decision on the interest rate is likely to acquire more importance in a scenario of 
macro-economic instability, where both the demand for deposits and the returns on 
loans are highly uncertain. Indeed, the bank has to decide the nominal rate of interest 
that will be charged on loan contracts in the next period. An optimal decision implies a 
‘full equilibrium’ which, in turn, depends on the following elements: (a) an accurate 
forecast of the nominal rate of interest which will clear the credit market over the next 
period; and (b) a correct estimation of the rate on deposits that the bank will have to 
pay over the next period. While the former depends on the supply of and demand for 
loans, the latter depends on the supply of and demand for deposits over the next 
period.  
                                                          
35 The negative effect of increasing lending rates on the probability of loan re-payments was examined by 
J. E. Stiglitz and A. Weiss, “Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information”, American Economic 
Review, 1981, No. 71 (3), pp. 912-27. For a general analysis of the connection between quality and price 
see, J. E. Stiglitz “The causes and consequences of the dependence of quality on price”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, March 1987, vol. XXV, pp.1-48 
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The next section presents a model of interest rate decisions of financial agents in a 
scenario of uncertainty and rampant inflation36. It should be stressed that previous 
analyses of interest rate setting in Argentina did not consider the effect of economic 
instability and inflation on the way banks make price decisions37. The present study 
was inspired by the approach used by Roberto Frenkel for the market of goods, it has 
been re-designed in order to examine the behaviour of financial agents from a new 
perspective38. This analytical framework will then be used to evaluate both the liquidity 
and interest rate risks of financial agents in Argentina over the period 1977-81.  
 
V.4.1   A Model of Interest Rate Decision with Imperfect Information 
 
The decision as to interest rates, which will be modelled below, can be summarised as 
follows: if an intermediary charges a low nominal rate - below the market equilibrium 
rate - one should then expect all the funds offered to be allocated. Although this policy 
should give rise to a flow-gain in the next period, the bank could face liquidity and 
capital losses. This may occur under the following conditions: (a) the intermediary has 
lost deposits compared with its previous stock (liquidity loss); and (b) the intermediary 
has to pay a higher rate of interest on deposits (capital loss). Vice-versa, if the bank 
has charged a high rate on loans - above the equilibrium rate - there is a possibility that 
not all the credits offered were allocated. Whereas this will generate a potential income 
loss, it could avoid suffering liquidity and capital loss. Therefore, a rational banking 
decision about interest rates should take into account not only returns on flows but also 
                                                          
36 Models of interest rate decisions can be found in T. Ho and A. Saunders, “The determinant of bank 
interest rate margins: Theory and empirical evidence”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
1981, No.16 (4), pp. 581-600; J. Dermine, “Deposit rates, credit rates and bank capital: The Monti-Klein 
model revisited”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 1986, No. 10, pp. 99-114; M. Monti, “Deposit, credit and 
interest rate determination under alternative bank objectives”, In Mathematical methods in investment and 
finance, G. P. Szego and K. Shell eds., 1972; J. Yawitz, “An analytical model of interest rate differentials 
and different default recoveries”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1977, No. 12 (3), pp. 481-
90. 
37 One notable exception is the study by Donald Mathieson, ‘’Inflation, Interest Rates, and the Balance of 
Payments during a Financial Reform: The Case of Argentina’’, Staff Papers, IMF, December 1982, pp. 
815-826 
38 Roberto Frenkel analysed how price decisions are taken by retailers in a highly inflationary scenario and 
the consequences for them of over- or under- estimating the rate of inflation. R. Frenkel, “Desiciones de 
Precios en Alta Inflación”, Desarollo Económico, 1979, vol. 19, No. 75, pp. 21-69   
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on stocks. Furthermore, in the short-term, that decision should take into account the 
bank’s liquidity position.  
 
It is assumed that there is a single period planning horizon. At the beginning of this 
period, the financial intermediary makes plans to pay a certain rate on deposits and to 
charge a specific rate on loans throughout the period (t+k). This means that the bank 
faces a stochastic demand for deposits and for loans. Yet, as will be pointed out below, 
the stock of deposits - the liquidity risk - is taken into account in the decision on the 
nominal rate of deposits. When the decision as to the interest rate is made, the 
amounts of deposits which were attracted (or retained), as well as the amounts of loans 
which were allocated by the bank, remain constant over the period (t+k). Moreover, it is 
postulated that the financial agent sets the price of his credits with a mark-up over his 
unitary costs; and this ex-ante rate of financial mark-up is considered constant in the 
short-term. In each period, the financial intermediary takes decisions regarding loan 
allocation at a certain rate of interest. As a result, the intermediary faces three types of 
risks: 
 
a. Income Risk refers to the possibility that the supply of credits of a financial agent 
cannot be totally allocated. This type of risk is due to possible mistakes in the 
estimation of the nominal lending rate which will ‘clear’ the market of credits in the next 
period. With regard to the economic effects, the income-risk can originate a banking 
loss equivalent to the cost of excess reserves. This can be measured by the quantity of 
funds which were not lent, multiplied by the difference between the effective lending 
rate and another alternative investment return - an opportunity cost - for the financial 
intermediary. The conjectured “income loss” depends on the sensitivity of the demand 
for credits to changes in the difference between the lending rate and the return on an 
alternative allocation, as well as on the length of the period throughout which the 
chosen rate will remain fixed. Formally, the income risk can be expressed as: 
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(1) ΓI  = (L t  - La t+h) * (il t  - iTt) = - (L t  - La t+h) * ω           since  La t+h  ≤  L t  ⇒   ΓI  ≥ 039 
 
with: ω = (il t  - iTt)  [opportunity cost to the bank lending] 
 
where: 
ΓI  = income loss. 
il   = nominal lending rate. 
iTt  = the rate of interest on Treasury Bonds (Letras de Tesorería). 
L t  = stock of credits offered at time (t). 
Lat+h = stock of loans allocated at time (t+k). 
 
 
b. Capital Risk is related to the estimated cost of the funds which the bank will use to 
grant loans. The cost of funds - in percentage points - for credits which are allocated in 
the period (t), is given by the effective nominal rate on deposits of the next period (t+k). 
Accordingly, when the conjectured cost of loans ‘underestimates’ or ‘overestimates’ the 
effective rate on deposits in the next period, a financial intermediary obtains a capital 
loss or a capital gain respectively. By the same token, no capital effects occur when the 
conjectured cost of loans equals the effective nominal rate on deposits. From now on, 
the conjectured or expected cost of loans means the cost of funds - in percentage 
points - for credits which had been granted in the period (t). The effective rate on 
deposits means the nominal interest rate which clears the market of deposits in the 
period (t+k); that is to say, the ‘’equilibrium rate’’. Formally, the “capital loss/gain” of a 
financial agent can be written as follows:  
         (ΓC < 0) 
(2) ΓC  =  (id t + k  -  icd t + k) * La t+h     with (ΓC = 0) 
         (ΓC > 0) 
 
where: 
ΓC = capital loss/gain40.  
id  = nominal rate on deposits. 
icd t + k = the conjectured cost of loans (in percentage points). 
                                                          
39 It is assumed that the maximum amount of credits which the bank can allocate is constrained by its own 
lending capacity. 
40 Expression (2) can be zero, positive or negative, representing a neutral effect, a capital loss or a capital 
gain respectively. 
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c. Liquidity Risk is connected with the uncertainty regarding the stock of deposits that 
the intermediary will hold after the adjustment of the deposit market over the period 
(t+k)41. The economic effect of the liquidity risk is obtained by taking the nominal rate 
on deposits at time (t+k), multiplied by the difference between the stocks of deposits 
held by the bank between (t) and (t+k). The liquidity risk can also be expressed as the 
stock of deposits at time (t), multiplied by the difference between the effective rate on 
deposits at (t+k) and the ‘liquidity-constant rate’: the nominal rate of interest which 
maintains the amount of deposits at the level of the previous period.  
 
       (ΓL < 0) 
(3) ΓL  = (iLd t + k  -  id t + k ) * D t   with (ΓL = 0) 
       (ΓL > 0) 
 
where: 
ΓL = liquidity loss/gain. 
iLd t + k = nominal interest rate which maintains the stock of deposits held at time (t).  
D t = stock of deposits at time (t). 
 
Equation (3) can be expressed in terms of the interest rate elasticity of the demand for 
deposits (supply of funds)42. 
 
(4) ΓL = [-(D t +k - D t )/ D t +k ] * id t + k * (1/ εdD ) * D t  
 
with: εdD = [-(D t +k - D t )/ D t +k ] * [id t +k / (iL t +k - id t +k)] 
 
where:  εdD = interest-rate-elasticity of the demand for deposits (supply of funds).  
 
Equation (4) shows that the “liquidity risk" is a function which depends on the stability of 
the demand for deposits (supply of funds) and on its interest-rate-elasticity. 
In order to express the economic results of the three types of risks - income, capital 
and liquidity - as a proportion of total loans, equations (1), (2) and (4) are divided by 
                                                          
41 This measure of the “liquidity risk” is different from that which is presented below in Section V.5.  
42 The elasticity means the sensitivity of an endogenous variable - per unit point - to changes in a certain 
exogenous variable, while all other explanatory variables remain constant. In this analysis, the term 
elasticity refers always to the interest-rate-elasticity. 
 
 
235 
(Lt). In addition, the stock of deposits included in equation (4) is replaced by its loan 
equivalent [D t= Lt/(1-r)]. 
 
(1’) ΓI  =  ω * λ l  
(2’) ΓC = (id t + k  -  icd t + k ) * (1 -  λl ) 
(4’) ΓL = - [ id t + k * (1/ εdD ) * [1/(1-r)] * λ d ]      
 
where: r = rate of legal reserve requirements. 
 
with: 
 
[λl = (1 - La t +k /L t)]; the amount of credits which was not allocated at time (t+k) as a 
proportion of total loans offered at time (t) and; 
 
[λd = (1-Dt / Dt +k)]; changes in the stock of deposits between (t+k) and (t) as a 
proportion of the total deposits available at time (t).  
 
By considering the interest-rate-elasticity of the demand for credits as well as the 
supply of deposits (demand for funds), the expressions (λl) and (λd) are equal to: 
 
(5) λl = (∂ LD/ LD) = (- εlD) * (∂ il / il) = (- εlD) * (∂ id / id)43 
 
(6) λd = (∂ DD/ DD) = (- εdS) * (∂ id / id) 
 
where: 
εlD = interest-rate-elasticity of the demand for loans. 
εdS = interest-rate-elasticity of the supply of deposits (demand for funds). 
 
Therefore, the equations (1’); (2’) and (4’) can be re-written as follows:  
 
(1’’) ΓI = - [ ω * εlD * (1/ id t + k ) * (id t + k - icd t + k)] 
(2’’) ΓC = (id t + k - icd t + k ) + [ εlD * (1/ id t + k ) * (id t + k - icd t + k )2 ] 
(4’’) ΓL = [(εdS / εdD ) * [1/(1-r)] * (i d t + k  + k – icd t + k)] 
                                                          
43 See equation (14) below in which il = id * (1+ ϕ); therefore (Δil / il) = (Δid / id), (ϕ) being constant in the short-
term. 
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It is observed that the economic effects of the three types of risk are defined in terms of 
the decision variable (α): the difference between the effective nominal rate on deposits 
(id t+k) and the conjectured nominal cost of loans (icd t+k).  
 
        (α>0) 
(7) α = (id t + k -  icd t + k)     with:  (α=0) 
        (α<0)   
 
 
However, it should be pointed out that the variable [ α = (id t + k - icd t + k)] depends on the 
absolute value of the nominal rate on deposits (id t+k) in some terms of these equations, 
whereas in others it does not [see equations (1’’), (2’’) and (4’’)]. This means that the 
variable (α), cannot be taken as the “common variable” for the three risk functions, 
since there is a linear dependency on the absolute value of the nominal rate of interest 
(id). The direct effect of this would seem to be that the decision to ‘overestimate’ or 
‘underestimate’ the lending cost depends on the absolute value of the nominal interest 
rate. In fact, this is totally incorrect. For a correct formulation, a “normalisation” of the 
expressions (1’’); (2’’) and (4’’) is required so as to eliminate the dependence of the 
variable (α) of the absolute value of the nominal interest rate (idt+k). Accordingly, the 
following restriction is imposed: 
 
(8) α = (id t + k -  icd t + k) = (id t + k -  icd t + k) * (1/ id t + k); which implies that:  id t + k = 1 
  
That is to say, when the effective nominal rate of interest is set at one percentage point 
(1%), the decision variable (α) is simultaneously: (a) the nominal difference between 
the deposit rate and the conjectured lending cost; and (b) this same difference as a 
percentage of the nominal rate on deposits. By adding up the equations that represent 
the income, capital and liquidity risks, the aggregate loss/gain risk function of a bank 
comes out as: 
 
(9) Γ(α)  =  α - [ ω * εlD + (εdS /εdD ) * 1/(1-r)] * α + εlD * α2  
 
 
 
 
237 
where: 
 
  0        if  α = 0 
 Γ(α) =  α + [ (εdS / εdD ) * 1/(1-r) ] * α     if  α > 0 
  α + [ - ω* εlD + (εdS  /εdD ) * 1/(1-r)] * α + [εlD ] * α2   if  α < 0 
 
When the conjectured lending cost underestimates the effective rate on deposits for the 
next period (α >0), the following economic effects will occur: (a) a capital loss per unit 
of loan equivalent to (α) and; (b) a liquidity loss per unit of loan equal to {[(εdS/εdD ) * 
1/(1-r)] * α}. In this case, it is assumed that the entire amount available for loans has 
been allocated and hence, there is no income loss. With regard to “capital risk”, since 
the cost of funds (effective deposit rate) which have been lent is higher than predicted, 
the bank suffers a capital loss. Moreover, a liquidity loss comes about because the 
stock of deposits which a bank retains at time (t+k) is lower than the amount held at 
time (t). 
 
On the other hand, the economic consequences of overestimating the conjectured cost 
of loans in relation to the effective nominal deposit rate (α<0) are the following: (a) an 
income loss which is equivalent to [ ω * εlD * α]; (b) a capital gain equal to {α+ [ εlD * α2 ]} 
and; (c) a liquidity gain equivalent to {[(εdS/ εdD) * 1/(1-r)] * α}. Whereas the income loss 
indicates that the amount of potential loans was not totally allocated, the capital gain 
implies that the financial agent has overvalued the costs of funds lent. In turn, the 
liquidity gain suggests that the intermediary has obtained a higher amount of deposits 
at (t+k) compared with the stock held at time (t). 
Graph V.3 depicts the risk function (Γ) of a financial intermediary in the period (t) in 
connection with the decision variable (α): the difference between the effective nominal 
rate on deposits and the conjectured cost of loans for the period (t+k).  
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Graph V.3 
The Loss/Gain Risk Function  
(In percentage points) 
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The aggregate risk function Γ(α) is asymmetric with regard to the position of 
underestimation or overestimation of the conjectured cost of loans in relation to the 
effective rate on deposits. In effect, when the conjectured cost of loans has been set 
lower than the effective rate on deposits (α>0), the right side of the risk function has a 
line with a negative slope [1+ (εdS/εdD )]. For a given value of (α), the lower (higher) the 
interest-rate-elasticity of the demand for (supply of) deposits, the higher the expected 
banking loss. The sensitivity of the risk function to the interest-rate-elasticity of the 
demand for and supply of deposits is due to the ‘liquidity- and capital-effects’ on the 
banks. 
 
However, in the case that the conjectured cost of loans is higher than the rate on 
deposits (α<0), the left side of the loss/gain function has a quadratic form, with one of 
ΓI 
ΓII 
ΓIII 
α - α 
- Γ(α) 
Γ(α)
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its roots located in the origin of the (Y-X) axis. In this position and depending on the 
functional parameters, there is a possibility that the bank can obtain economic gains by 
overestimating the effective return paid on deposits. The outcome is positive when the 
capital and the liquidity gains more than outweigh the ‘income loss’ which is sustained 
by not being able to allocate all the amount of credits offered. By the same token, when 
the conjectured cost of loans equals the nominal rate on deposits for the next period, 
the bank does not suffer capital losses or gains (α=0). 
 
It should be pointed out that the optimal banking decision about the cost of loans (icd t+k) 
depends on the parameters of the risk function as mapped above. Graph V.1 shows 
the loss/gain function in three different positions. By taking the function (ΓI ), the risk of 
suffering losses is higher if the cost of loans is overestimated rather than 
underestimated in relation to the effective nominal rate on deposits, for all absolute 
values of (α). However, by changing the parameters and allowing a clockwise rotation 
of the risk function Γ(α), the probability of making economic losses increases with an 
underestimation and decreases with an overestimation of the effective rate on deposits. 
If this movement continues, there comes a point where the financial intermediary will 
confront the alternatives of risking the possibility of making a profit by overestimating 
the effective rate on deposits or, on the contrary, of underestimating that rate and 
suffering economic losses. In other words, when the loss/gain function moves from 
position (ΓI) to (ΓIII), the appropriate banking decision about the conjectured cost of 
loans changes from a position in which an overestimation of the effective nominal rate 
on deposits has to be avoided, to another in which that option becomes optimal.  
   
It can, therefore, be concluded that the decision of a bank to overestimate or to 
underestimate the expected nominal rate on deposits depends on: (a) the parameters 
of the risk function and; (b) the degree of uncertainty about the future return that the 
bank will have to pay on deposits (the effective nominal rate on deposits which will 
prevail in the next period). Moreover, as will be seen later on, there is a fundamental 
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interrelation between the level of economic uncertainty and the value of the parameters 
of the loss/gain risk function. 
 
To simplify the analysis, it can be assumed that the expected nominal deposit rate paid 
by all banks - on average - coincides with the ex-post market rate on deposits. With 
fully informed rational financial agents, the optimal decision in relation to the cost of 
loans depends purely on the parameters of the loss/gain function. In other words, the 
optimal banking decision is obtained by maximising the objective function (Γ) in relation 
to the variable (α) [max. equation 10]. 
 
(10) α  =  (id t + k - icd t + k)  =  {(ω* εlD - [(εdS/εdD )* 1/(1-r) +1]} / [2 * εlD ] 
 
with: ied t+k = id t+k; 
 ied t+k = expected nominal rate on deposits for the period (t+k). 
 
There are only two possible outcomes of this maximisation process: either the financial 
agent sets a cost of loans which equals the estimated nominal rate on deposits over 
the next period (α=0), or the conjectured costs of loans overestimate the expected 
deposit rate (α<0). While the former can be taken as a “normal” economic result, the 
latter is the “special” outcome which this model has identified. It must be pointed out 
that the result in which the conjecture cost of loans underestimates the expected rate 
on deposits (α>0) is not feasible with perfect information and rational agents. In other 
words, the underestimation is only an open possibility for the case of decisions made 
under uncertainty. 
 
From equation (10), the conjectured cost of loans - in percentage points - is equal to: 
 
(11) icd t + k =  id t + k + {[(εdS  /εdD ) * 1/(1-r) + 1] - ω * εlD } / [2 * εlD ] 
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This suggests that the condition for overestimating the expected rate on deposits is that 
the aggregate effect of the liquidity and capital gains has to be higher than the income 
loss44. That is,  
 
(12) {[(εdS/εdD) * 1/(1-r) + 1]  > ω * εlD}.  
 
If the above condition holds, the conjectured cost of loans rises whenever there is: an 
increase (decrease) in the interest-rate-elasticity of the supply of (demand for) deposits 
(εdS/εdD); a decrease in the interest-rate-elasticity of the demand for loans (εlD); an 
increase in the rate of legal reserve requirements (r) and; an increase in the opportunity 
cost for the financial agent (ω). When the functional parameters change in the direction 
commented on above, the function Γ(α) rotates clockwise as shown in Graph VI.3. 
 
A final point to be considered is the interconnection between the cost of funds for the 
bank and its margin of financial intermediation. Throughout this section, it has been 
assumed that the banks set the price of loans with a mark-up over their unitary costs. 
The study begins by defining the financial spread - margin of intermediation - of a bank 
as the difference between the nominal lending and deposit rates as a percentage of the 
deposit rate [m t = (il t - id t)]. Hence, the rate of spread for the period (t) is as follows: 
 
(13) ϕ t =  m t / id t 
 
Thus, the nominal lending rate of a bank for the period (t) can be expressed as a 
function of the nominal rate on deposits and the rate of financial mark-up. 
 
(14) il t  =  id t * (1+ ϕ t )  
 
From expression (8), it is known that the cost of loans which was conjectured by the 
bank for the period (t+k) can be equal to, or higher or lower than the interest rate which 
will prevail in market of deposits in that period. That is,  
                                                          
44 In this case, the overestimation of the expected cost of loans is an optimal result for the bank. 
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(15) icd t + k  =  ied t+ k  + α 
 
α = the rate of overestimation (α>0) / underestimation (α<0) of the effective deposit 
rate of the period (t+k). 
 
By using expressions (14) and (15), the nominal lending rate for the period (t+k) can be 
written as: 
 
(16) il t + k  =  icd t + k * (1+ ϕ t) = (ied t+ k + α) * (1+ ϕ t) 
Equation (16) shows that the nominal lending rate set in the period (t) is a function of 
the conjectured cost of funds and of the financial spread of the bank. In addition, the 
extension of (k) - the period which lies between (t) and (t+k) - affects the level of 
uncertainty in connection with the expectation of the nominal rate on deposits. If (k=0), 
there is no uncertainty with regard to the rate on deposits and hence, the lending rate 
becomes the expression (14). 
 
With (k>0) and, if the expected nominal rate on deposits of the banks coincides with 
the ex-post market rate on deposits on average then, its nominal lending rate for the 
period (t+k) will be: 
 
(17) il t + k = id t+ k + m t + α  * (1+ ϕ t)  
(18) m t + k = m t  -  α * (1+ ϕ t)   with: m t+ k = (il t + k - id t+ k) 
 
Expression (18) above shows that the difference between the ex-post rate of spread 
[mt+k] and its ex-ante rate [m t ] is equal to the rate of overestimation/underestimation of 
the nominal rate on deposits [α] multiplied by the factor [1+ ϕ t]. In other words, a high 
ex-post rate of financial spread can be the result of an overestimation by the bank as to 
the nominal rate on deposits. 
 
 
 
 
 
243 
V.4.2   Testing the Model: A Case-Study of Interest Rate Decisions under 
  Uncertainty 
 
The objective now is to verify the empirical relevance of the model of interest rate 
decisions in the case of Argentina throughout the period 1977-81. In this assessment, 
particular attention is given to the effect of changes in the economic environment on 
the interest-rate-elasticities; which consist of the behavioural variables of the loss/gain 
function45. The analysis begins by estimating the demand for and the supply of 
deposits as well as the demand for loans so as to obtain the interest-rate-elasticities of 
the risk-function46. The other functional parameters - the opportunity cost and the legal 
reserve requirements - are calculated as a mean-value of those years, which is also 
the criterion followed with the rates of elasticity. Graph VI.4 presents this loss/gain 
function (ΓA) for the period Jul. 1977 – Dec. 1981. 
                                                          
45 These changes in the economic environment include cases of financial distress, a sharp increase in the 
devaluation risk, runs on banks and so on. A detailed analysis can be found in Chapter IV, Sections 4 and 
5.  
46 Appendix B to Chapter V contains the regressions used to estimate the interest-rate-elasticities included 
in the loss/gain risk function presented above in Graph V.4 
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Graph V.4 
The Loss/Gain Risk Function of Argentina, 1977-81 
(Monthly rates) 
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 Source: own construction based on the model developed on pp. 24-28 with data obtained from the Central 
  Bank of Argentina, Boletín Estadístico, several monthly issues, 1977-81. 
 
 
The parameters of the function (ΓA) are: the rates of elasticity: [εdS = 2.39; εdD = 1.92; εlD 
= 0.70]; the alternative investment return of the financial intermediary [ω = 1.76]; and 
the coefficient of legal reserve requirements [r = 0.25]. The first comment to be made is 
that the values of the functional parameters confirm something which is evident in the 
graph above: the condition of overestimation of the expected rate on deposits exhibited 
above is fulfilled: the aggregate effect of the liquidity and capital gains is greater than 
the income loss. In effect, {[(εdS/εdD) * 1/(1-r) + 1] = 2.6  >  ω * εlD = 1.2}. Accordingly, the 
optimal banking decision implied an overestimation of the expected nominal rate on 
deposits by about 0.6% per month on average throughout the period under study47. 
This means that, for instance, if the expected nominal rate on deposits was 8% per 
month (152% per year), the financial agent would have taken a monthly rate of 8.6% 
                                                          
47 This ‘optimal’ rate overestimation was obtained by assuming that the expected nominal rate on deposits 
of the different financial agents - on average - coincides with the ex-post market rate of deposits.  
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(169% per year) as the cost of the funds which had been allocated to loans in the 
previous period48. This result - overestimation of the effective rate of deposit on the part 
of the banks in Argentina during these years - is fully confirmed by the econometric 
study of Donald Mathieson: ‘’differences between actual and expected inflation have 
implied that ex-post real interest rates have been higher than ex-ante (or expected) real 
interest rates’’49 
 
Another goal of this study is to test whether the behavioural variables - the elasticity 
rates - of the loss/gain function were affected by changes in the general economic 
conditions. This is carried out by contrasting two loss/gain functions: the loss/gain 
function estimated for the whole period 1977-81 compared with that which corresponds 
to a sub-period characterised by a higher level of uncertainty and distress in the 
financial market.  
 
It has been argued that shocks on supply and demand determine the variations in a 
particular market price; and this is usually taken as a measure of the degree of market 
uncertainty50. With regard to the level of uncertainty in the market of deposits, the 
variability of the ex-post nominal rate on deposits presents a standard deviation of 
1.9% between mid-1977 and the end of 1981. The volatility of this rate rises sharply 
reaching a standard deviation of 2.32 between August 1979 and December 1981. 
Moreover, as analysed in Chapters IV and VI, - the issue of financial distress and the 
worsening in the general economic conditions of the private sector started to be evident 
in the third quarter of 1979. Hence, it seems appropriate to compare a sub-period with 
a relatively higher level of uncertainty August 1979 - December 1981; with the whole 
period under analysis July 1977 - December 1981. 
                                                          
48 For a different period of the Argentine economy (1963-76) and following a different approach, Mario 
Blejer confirms that inflationary expectations - the main component of the bank decision in our analysis - 
played a crucial role in the determination of the level of nominal interest rates. M. Blejer, “Money and the 
Nominal Rate of Interest under Rapid Inflation: An Empirical Test,” Journal of Political Economy, June 
1978, pp. 529-34.   
49 D. Mathieson, Op. Cit., 1982, p. 825 
50 This has been explained earlier in this Chapter in Section V.2 
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Following the same criteria and taking the regressions used for the loss/gain function 
(ΓA), the function (ΓB) is estimated for the selected sub-period (see Graph VI.4). The 
parameters of this risk function are: the rates of elasticity: [εdS = 2.60; εdD = 1.43; εlD = 
0.70]; the opportunity cost of the bank [ω = 1.80]; and the coefficient of legal reserve 
requirements [r = 0.20]. Taking into account that the elasticity rates are the only 
behavioural variables in the model of interest rate decisions, it is important to identify 
the factors which modified the functional parameters in the two periods under analysis.  
 
To begin with, a more inelastic demand for deposits from the depositors indicates that 
agents demanded more than a proportional increase in the nominal return on deposits 
to offer an extra unit of saving. This situation was the result of an increase in the level 
of economic uncertainty which implied that agents, for a given supply of funds, asked 
for a higher rate premium in order to compensate for the higher risk that they were 
assuming. In addition, a more elastic supply of deposits - demand for funds from banks 
- reveals that there was higher interest rate competition among the banks in the market 
of deposits after the liberalisation reform of 1977.  
 
With these parameter values in the risk function (ΓB), the optimal decision of the 
intermediaries was to overestimate the expected nominal rate on deposits by about 
1.4% per month on average between August 1979 and December 198151. It should be 
noted that the rate of overestimation in this sub-period was more than the double that 
calculated for the whole period Jul. 1977 – Dec. 1981.  
 
What is important now is to identify the extent to which the income, capital and liquidity 
effects contributed to that result. This requires a substitution of the parameter values in 
the equations which represent separately the three economic effects (eqs. 1’’, 2’’ and 
4’’). The examination shows that the higher overestimation of the rate on deposits is 
                                                          
51 The condition of overestimation in the sub-period Aug. 1977- Dec. 1981 is the following: {[(εdS/εdD) * 1/(1-
r) + 1] = 3.34 > ω * εlD = 1.26} 
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totally due to the liquidity-effect. This is so, as the functional parameters which 
correspond to the equations of the risks of income and capital - the elasticity rate of the 
demand for loans (εlD) and the opportunity cost of the bank (ω) - changed slightly (from 
1.2 to 1.6) over either the sub-period or the whole period under analysis. 
  
Next, the consequences of the overestimation of the nominal rate on deposits must be 
considered. As the ex-ante rate of financial mark-up is taken to be constant in the 
short-term, variations in the lending rate are due to changes in the conjectured cost of 
the funds to be lent. As shown in equations (13-16), if the cost of funds which was 
conjectured by the intermediary is above the effective nominal rate on deposits, the ex-
post rate of financial mark-up will be higher than its ex-ante level. Indeed, over the 
period 1977-81, the ex-post annual rate of spread in real terms was on average 15.9%. 
With an overestimation of the annual cost of funds of about 7.3%, the actual rate was 
8.6%. Therefore, an overestimation of the expected nominal rate on deposits gave rise 
to an ex-post annual rate of financial mark-up which was nearly double the 
corresponding ex-ante rate. By the same token, over the sub-period August 1979 - 
December 1981, the ex-post rate of spread (18.1%) was twice its ex-ante value (8.9%) 
per year, which implies an overestimation equivalent to 9.2% per year. 
 
With the empirical testing of the model of interest rate decisions, it has been proved so 
far that: first, the overestimation of the expected nominal rate on deposits was an 
‘optimal decision’ of the financial agents given the macro-financial circumstances 
operating in Argentina between mid-1977 and 1981. Secondly, the higher the level of 
economic uncertainty, the higher the overestimation of the expected nominal rate on 
deposits between August 1979 and December 1981. Thirdly, out of the three effects 
considered above (income, capital and liquidity); an increase in the level of uncertainty 
affected primarily the risk of liquidity of banks. Fourthly, the overestimation of the cost 
of funds lent by the bank explains the extremely high and variable rates of financial 
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spread characteristic of the period 1977-8152. Finally, an increase in the level of macro-
economic uncertainty led to an ex-post increase in the gross financial yield and in the 
lending rate charged by the banks53. 
 
All this suggests that the financial intermediaries increased the interest rate differential 
(financial spread) between deposits and loans as a way of protecting themselves from the 
consequences of the increasing volatility evidenced in the demand for deposits (supply of 
funds). In other words, a higher financial spread was aimed at compensating for the 
growing interest rate risk that the intermediaries started to encounter from mid-1979 on54. 
In this way, the bank attempted to pass on the interest rate risk to the private and 
government sectors. However, as will be discussed in Chapter VI, this policy backfired, as 
the probability of loan repayments was negatively affected by the increase in the lending 
rate.  
 
Finally, a point to be discussed is the position of banks in connection with credit allocation 
in the period in which the probability of loan repayment was declining, as a result of an 
increase in the lending rates. In this situation, the typical result put forward by Stiglitz and 
Weiss is that the loan supply curve bends backwards and, after a certain point, higher 
lending rates will only decrease the supply of credits raising the excess demand for 
loans55. At that point, the optimal decision for the bank is not to increase the rate on loans 
but to ration credits. This, however, was not the decision taken by the bankers in 
Argentina who, contrary to that sensible practice, continued lending to riskier borrowers 
and allocated funds to riskier projects. What must be asked is whether this was simply an 
irrational policy decision or whether the banks had other reasons for behaving in this way. 
                                                          
52 Mathieson reached the same conclusion for Argentina: ‘’The spread between the deposit and the 
lending rates has been influenced by not only domestic financial policies (e.g. the reduction in the reserve 
requirement and the payment on interest on reserves) but also by the elasticity characteristics of the 
demand and supply of bank loans and time deposits’’, Op. Cit., 1982, p. 826 
53 Following a different approach, Frenkel found the same cause-effect relationship between the level of 
uncertainty in the foreign exchange market and the nominal lending rate. See R. Frenkel, Op. Cit., 1983, 
pp. 2041-76.  
54 The connection between the level of macro-economic uncertainty and the interest rate risk has been 
explained earlier. 
55 J. E. Stiglitz and A. Weiss, Op. Cit.  1981, pp. 912-27.  
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The model developed by Stiglitz and Weiss is a partial analysis which takes into 
consideration only the asset side of the bank. If one includes both the asset and the 
liability sides of the balance sheet as was done earlier, the decisions as to what is optimal 
for the financial intermediary may be completely different. That is, the rate on loans that 
the bank charges depends - among other factors - on the costs of funds (deposit rate) that 
it has to pay out. Thus, nothing can ensure that the lending rate which maximises the 
return of a bank is compatible with its overheads plus the interest rate prevailing in the 
market for deposits. In other words, what the banks need to pay out to retain their 
deposits may not necessarily be lower than the lending rate which maximises the return of 
banks. Whereas the former depends on the short-term conditions of liquidity in the market 
for deposits, the latter depends on the long-term conditions of profitability of borrowers. 
Therefore, there may be cases where the interest rate that is optimal for the bank’s 
profitability may not be compatible with the optimal rate for preserving its level of deposits. 
This is of great importance in a scenario of economic uncertainty and inflation where the 
demand for deposits (supply of funds from the depositors) becomes more unstable and 
the likelihood of making mistakes in predicting inflation is consequently greater.  
 
In short, the model constructed is this Chapter offers a more comprehensive analysis than 
that of Stiglitz and Weiss and demonstrates that banks take into consideration not only the 
profitability but also the problem of liquidity when setting interest rates. By this means, it 
has been proved that the above mentioned interest-rate-incompatibility emerged in the 
financial system of Argentina between mid-1979 and 1981. That is, by trying to reduce the 
probability of running into short-term problems of liquidity, the banks were augmenting 
their probability of facing long-term problems of solvency. 
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V.5 THE MANAGEMENT OF LIQUIDITY RISK 
 
The previous section focused on the connection between short-term price decisions 
taken by financial agents and the issue of banking risk. In this section, the topic of 
liquidity risk within the banking system is analysed further by considering how the 
banks managed their assets and liabilities over the period of financial liberalisation56. 
An appropriate way to begin is by defining the notion of liquidity as possessing the 
funds when needed at reasonable cost. This cost per unit of deposit is reasonable if it 
lies in a range between the lending rate and the deposit rate of the bank. A financial 
agent usually meets his obligations with cash reserves or by attracting new deposits, 
selling short-term assets and/or borrowing from the credit market or the Central Bank. 
All these alternatives have an associated cost: assets that could have been allocated at 
higher returns and the expense of further borrowing. Given that either an excess or a 
lack of liquid assets have economic costs, optimal liquidity management is attained 
when the financial intermediary is able to meet his obligations at a minimum cost. 
 
Two special features of financial activity explain the origin of the liquidity risk in banks. 
To begin with, one of the main functions of the bank is the transformation of maturities 
and the provision of liquidity to other economic sectors. Accordingly, the key to the 
success of an asset-transformer intermediary lies in their ability to hold an illiquid 
portfolio - a negative net asset position in the short-term - and yet to operate without 
suffering liquidity distress57. What actually matters to banks is global asset-liability 
management, and this depends on the maturity of assets and liabilities and on the 
relationship between the two: the balance sheet mismatch. 
                                                          
56 For a thorough analysis of liquidity risk management in banks see, for instance, E.I. Altman, Corporate 
Financial Distress: A complete guide to predicting, avoiding and dealing with bankruptcy risk, 1983; E. 
Baltensperger and H. Milde, “Predictability of reserve demand, information costs and portfolio behaviour of 
commercial banks”, Journal of Finance, 1976, No. 31, (3), pp. 835-43; G. H. Hempel and D. G. Simonson, 
Bank financial management: Strategies and techniques for a changing industry, 1991; C. F. Huang and R. 
Litzenberg, Foundations for financial economics, 1988; J. E. Ingersoll (Jr.), Theory of financial decision 
making, 1987; D. Kim and A. Santomero, “Risk in banking and capital regulation”, Journal of Finance, 
1988, No. 35 (5), pp. 1235-44; D. Pyle, “On the theory of financial intermediation”, Journal of Finance, 
1971, No. 26 (3), pp. 737-47; B. Stanhouse, “Commercial bank portfolio behaviour and endogenous 
uncertainty”, Journal of Finance, 1986, No. 41 (5), pp. 1103-14.  
57 A negative short-term net asset position means that the amount of short-term liabilities exceeds the 
amount of short-term assets. 
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Moreover, a financial intermediary is - to a large extent - uncertain about the funds that 
will be required to meet their obligations. This is so, as both the current and savings 
deposits mature at the discretion of the depositors and, therefore, the requirement for 
resources cannot be accurately anticipated. Another source of uncertainty are liabilities 
with a fixed maturity such as time deposits, which may or may not be renewed when 
they mature. Consequently, the bank’s need for funds is highly dependent on the net 
flow of deposits - inflows and outflows - and on the demand for loans, all of which is 
hard to foresee. 
 
These two factors - the degree of balance sheet mismatching and the uncertainty about 
the net flows of deposits - are the reasons why banks hold liquid assets58. Banking 
reserves constitute a ‘liquidity buffer’ which helps to protect the institutions from the 
effects of deposit withdrawals, which are not always controllable or predictable.  
 
VI.4.1   Net Defensive Position 
 
The simplest way to measure bank liquidity is by looking at the amount of liquid assets 
in relation to total deposits. This can be done by aggregating the assets and liabilities 
held by the banks into certain balance sheet categories as follows: 
 
(19) Deposits  +  Equity  =  Defensive Assets  +  Loans and Investments  
 
In this simplified accounting identity, the deposits and the capital plus reserves - net 
worth - of the financial intermediary are divided into two types of assets: loans and 
investments (long-term) and defensive assets or banking reserves (short-term). The 
category of ‘loans and investments’ is illiquid in the short-term or its value is uncertain, 
                                                          
58 This is also the rationale for the existence of liquidity regulation by the Central Bank. For more details, 
see Chapter IV, Section 3. A theoretical justification of these regulations is found in: M. Dewatripont and J. 
Tirole, The prudential regulation of banks, 1994; E. Fama, Banking in the theory of finance, “What’s 
different about banks?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 1985, No. 15 pp. 29-40; X. Freixas and J.C. 
Rochet, Op. Cit., Chapter 9, pp. 257-94. 
 
 
 
252 
which means that this kind of asset can be converted into liquid funds only at some risk 
of loss. In contrast, the ‘banking reserves’ are assets of very high liquidity including 
cash reserves, deposits in other banks and in the Central Bank, treasury bills, overnight 
loans and, commercial bills which can be sold, discounted or pledged within the 
financial system in return for cash. 
 
While the assets considered as ‘loans and investments’ generate the flow of revenues 
to the financial agent, those aggregated into the category of ‘defensive assets’ protect 
them from unexpected liquidity problems. Within the latter, two types of banking 
reserves can be identified: one is the compulsory reserves - primary reserves - 
required by the Central Bank as a means of monetary regulation. The other is the result 
of the portfolio decisions made by the financial agent and, it is made up of liquid assets 
held in excess of the legal reserve requirements - secondary reserves. 
 
Both, the kind and the amount of defensive assets retained by a bank is an indication 
of the liquidity risk that an institution is running59. In order to measure this banking risk, 
the net defensive position of the financial agent is defined as the amount of the bank’s 
reserves - defensive assets - in excess of the funds required by the authority60. 
 
(20) Net Defensive Position = Defensive Assets – Reserve Requirements  
 
By substituting equation (20) in the accounting identity (19), the net defensive position 
per unit of deposit can be written as follows: 
 
(21) ndp = (1 - r ) + (Equity - Loans and Investments) / Deposits 
 
                                                          
59 As shown in Chapter VI, the risk position of a firm or a bank with regard to liquidity and solvency is not 
independent of the general economic cycle. See also B. S. Bernanke, “Bankruptcy, Liquidity and 
Recession”, American Economic Review, May 1981, No. 71 (2), pp. 155-159; F. Mishkin “Financial 
Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets Countries”, NBER Working Paper, 
2001, No. 8087; P. Krugman, “Balance sheets, the transfer problem and financial crises”, 1999, mimeo. 
60 This analytical framework was presented by James Tobin, ”The Commercial Banking Firm: A Simple 
Model”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1982, No. LXXXIV, 4, pp. 4-23. 
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where: ndp = net defensive position per unit of deposit. 
r = coefficient of legal reserve requirement. 
 
Equation (21) indicates that the net defensive position is equal to the lending capacity 
(1 - r) plus the difference between equity and loans and investments per unit of deposit. 
When the negative net defensive position (ndp) is positive, the banks are complying 
with the liquidity regulations. A negative (ndp) means that the reserve requirements are 
not being fulfilled.  
 
The decision as to the level of the net defensive position in a point in time is part of the 
portfolio management of the bank. This means that the intermediary takes into account 
the cost-benefit evaluation between the expected revenues from allocating the funds to 
loans and other investments, and the expected costs of facing liquidity distress for not 
holding enough liquid assets. Accordingly, an optimal allocation is reached when the 
expected marginal revenues on long-term assets equal the expected marginal costs of 
being illiquid. Alternatively, an optimal liquidity position is reached when the ratio of the 
bank liquidity premium - lending minus deposit rates - to its ‘penalty’ rate for being short 
in liquidity is equal to one61. When this is achieved, the bank reaches the optimal, 
expected utility-maximising deposit and loan rates or, in other words, the optimal rate of 
financial spread62. 
 
The degree of the liquidity risk depends on the (ndp) held by the financial intermediary. 
When this is positive, the probability of a bank being illiquid in the next period is low 
and, therefore, its liquidity risk is small63. However, when the (ndp) is negative, the 
liquidity risk becomes a positive function of the gap between the defensive assets and 
those which are required by the monetary authority (see eq. 20). This suggests that the 
higher the (ndp) of the agent, the higher the expected lending yield must be, so as to 
compensate for the higher cost for holding ‘insufficient’ liquid assets.  
                                                          
61 Freixas presents a formal analysis about the optimal amount of banking reserves. X. Freixas and J.C. 
Rochet, Op. Cit., pp. 228-9.  
62 See T. Ho and A. Saunders, Op. Cit., 1981, pp. 581-600. 
63 So far, it has been assumed that the demand for deposits is stable.  
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It should be highlighted that the level of deposits and the portfolio composition are 
intertwined64. For a given amount of loans and investments, the net defensive position 
of a bank changes whenever there is an inflow or outflow of deposits. If variations in 
the volume of deposits prove to be constant, the bank will have to adjust its volume of 
long-term assets so as to sustain its previous safety margin. Uncertainty about the 
future level of deposits explains why a risk-averse agent usually maintains more liquid 
assets than required by the Central Bank; that is, a positive net defensive position. 
Thus, cautious portfolio management implies that the net defensive position rises 
whenever there is an increase in uncertainty in the financial market65. On the contrary, 
a risk-loving agent takes a bolder liquidity stance - lower defensive assets - in the event 
of increased volatility in the flow of deposits66. 
 
All this means that the different banking positions regarding liquidity risk in the financial 
system can be inferred by considering both the level and the evolution of the (ndp) held 
by the financial intermediaries. Based on this approach, an empirical assessment was 
undertaken to evaluate the attitude towards this kind of risk followed by the Argentine 
banks between 1977 and 1981. In an attempt to verify the existence of speculative 
behaviour and excessive risk taking within the financial sector, this analysis focuses on 
the liquidity management of the main institutions which collapsed giving rise to the 
financial crisis of 198067. That is to say, the liquidity risk positions of three banks - 
Banco Internacional, Banco de Los Andes and Banco de Intercambio Regional - are 
contrasted with that of the financial system as a whole. To make an appropriate 
comparison, the liquidity management of the aggregate financial system is taken net of 
the effect of these three banking institutions. 
                                                          
64 This interaction is what helps to explain the need for a simultaneous setting of deposit and lending rates, 
as modelled in the previous Section.  
65 Here, a higher uncertainty means a higher interest rate risk faced by the bank. 
66 The effect on banking reserves of an increase in uncertainty regarding deposit withdrawals is analysed 
by T. Ho and A. Saunders, Op. Cit., pp. 583-88; and E. Prisman, M. Slovin and M. Sushka, “A general 
model of the banking firm under condition of monopoly, uncertainty and recourse”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, (1986), No.17 (2), pp. 293-304. 
67 Although the presence of large liquidity risk within the financial system has been suggested by several 
authors, there is a distinct lack of this kind of studies for the period 1977-81. A notable exception is A. A. 
Arnaudo and R. Conejero, “Anatomía de las Quiebras Bancarias de 1980”, Desarrollo Económico, Jan-
Mar 1985, vol. 24, pp. 605-616.  
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Graphs V.5 - V.8 
Net Defensive Position per Unit of Deposit, 1977-81 
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Graph V.6
Banco Internacional
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Graph V.7
Banco de Los Andes
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Graph V.8
Banco de Intercambio Regional
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            Source: own construction based on data obtained from the Central Bank of Argentina, 
            Boletín Estadístico, several monthly issues, 1977-81. 
 
 
The graphs above show the net defensive position per unit of deposit (columns) and its 
evolution on average - after being adjusted logarithmically (line). The first thing which 
strikes one is that the aggregate banking system did maintain a positive net defensive 
position, yet its average level dropped from 5% to less than 2% between August 1977 
and March 1981. This reduction in the amount of liquid assets - secondary reserves - 
occurred in a period in which, the reserve requirements of the Central Bank - primary 
reserves - were reduced progressively from 45% to 12%68. In this context, as observed 
in Graph V.5; the liquidity risk of the banking sector as a whole increased sharply 
during these years, as the ratio of short-term assets to total deposits fell from 50% to 
less than 14%.  
 
It should be noted that the level of secondary reserves held by each of the three banks 
was much lower than that of the aggregate banking sector throughout the period under 
study. Furthermore, these agents showed a greater instability in the level of defensive 
assets which, in turn, resulted in a negative net defensive position for several months. 
                                                          
68 See Chapter IV, Section 3 for more details on the institutional change regarding reserve requirements of 
the Central Bank and the establishment of the Monetary Regulation Account (Cuenta de Regulación 
Monetaria). 
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The intermediaries which were taken over by the Central Bank in 1980 had, therefore,   
been following a relatively riskier liquidity policy than the rest of the banks. 
 
Attitudes towards the liquidity risk, however, were not uniform across these institutions. 
In effect, judging by the evolution of the net defensive position per unit of deposit on 
average, the Banco Internacional took the most cautious position in relative terms. 
Although there were periods during which it had a lower level of liquid assets than 
required, on the whole, this bank did maintain a positive defensive position over these 
years. More importantly, the level of liquidity of this institution improved markedly from 
September 1979 on, as shown by the positive and growing net defensive position, 
which reached about 9% in March 1980 (Graph V.6).  
 
The other two institutions - Banco de Los Andes and Banco de Intercambio Regional - 
show marginally the riskiest management of liquidity. Over the first two years, the 
former tried to regain liquidity so as to improve its weak initial conditions. However, the 
excess of funds over the requirements of the Central Bank did not last long and, the net 
defensive position dropped from 5% to -5% between July 1979 and March 1980 (Graph 
V.7). In the same vein, the BIR presents a sharp deterioration in liquidity throughout the 
period, as evidenced by the decline in its net defensive position from around 7% in 
August 1977 to nearly -2% in March 1980 (Graph V.8). With regard to these two 
institutions, the risk of encountering liquidity shortages increased further from mid-1979 
on, when the coefficient of the net defensive positions became negative. 
 
To sum up, the three institutions which were first suspended by the Central Bank in 
1980 had taken relatively more risks in portfolio management regarding liquidity than 
the rest of the financial sector on average. Of these institutions, the Banco 
Internacional is the only one which was not encountering problems of liquidity when the 
monetary authority decided to suspend its operations. However, this is not the case of 
the Banco de Los Andes and Banco de Intercambio Regional, where mounting liquidity 
problems were apparent from mid-1979 on. As previously mentioned in Chapter IV, 
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Section 4.5, this was recognised by the Vice-president of the Central Bank: “In the last 
twelve months on various occasions the BIR did not manage to maintain its cash 
reserves at the minimum required by the law”69. It was also revealed that “the liquidity 
situation of the Banco de Los Andes was similar to that of the BIR”70. Finally, it should 
be stressed that this imprudent management existed in a context in which the 
aggregate amount of liquid assets was deteriorating rapidly and the fragility of the 
financial system as a whole was rising71. 
 
                                                          
69 Newspaper interview with Alejandro Reynal, La Razón, Monday 31, March 1980, p.7  
70 Newspaper interview with the Secretary of Economic Planning and Coordination Guillermo W. Klein, 
Clarín, Thursday 29, May 1980. p.12 
71 A macro-financial analysis of the evolution of the fragility/robustness of the aggregate banking sector is 
given in Chapter IV, Section 5. 
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V.6 SPECULATION AND EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
Not only does a higher balance sheet mismatch cause an increase in liquidity risk, it 
also raises interest rate risk72. In turn, a higher interest rate risk may affect the 
profitability and ultimately, the solvency of the bank. This happens because the 
lengthening of the maturity gap increases the risk associated with the different 
sensitivity of the short-term returns on deposits vis-à-vis the long-term returns on 
loans73. In the last section, it was mentioned that a financial intermediary sometimes 
raise the lending rate in an attempt to counterbalance the higher interest rate risk which 
results from an extension in the maturity gap. This could be an explanation for the fact 
that the reduction in the net defensive position of the aggregate banking system 
occurred together with a widening in the margin of financial intermediation from July 
1979 on (Graphs V.3 and V.4). Moreover, as suggested earlier, a higher mark-up via 
an increase in the lending rate may have had a deleterious effect on the solvency risk 
of the financial institutions, since the probability of loan repayment could be negatively 
affected74. This suggests that an assessment of the relationship between liquidity 
management and the decisions about the margin of intermediation is essential for a 
thorough understanding of the banks’ attitude towards risk. It should be stressed that 
after an extensive bibliographical search, no study was found on this subject for 
Argentina. 
 
With this aim, the present analysis focuses on the relationship between the rate of 
financial spread and the liquidity risk position taken by the financial institutions. It 
begins by running the model of interest rate decisions developed earlier in this Chapter 
in Section 4 for the three cases under study: Banco Internacional, Banco de Los Andes 
and Banco de Intercambio Regional. Following the procedure outlined above, the risk 
                                                          
72 While liquidity risk is due to the difference in the marketability of the liabilities issued vis-à-vis the assets 
held by the bank, interest rate risk is due to the difference in maturity of its assets and liabilities.   
73 The importance of interest rate changes and their effect on banks’ portfolio was recognised early by 
Samuelson. P. Samuelson, “The Effects of Interest Rate Increases on the Banking Behaviour”, American 
Economic Review, March 1945, pp. 81-98 
74 Chapter VI presents an evaluation of the relationship between the lending rate and level of leverage and 
the probability of loan repayment. 
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functions of these institutions were estimated for the period August 1977 - February 
1980. These estimations of the three banks and that of the aggregate financial system 
are shown in Graph V.9 as a function of the decision variable (α): the difference 
between the effective rate on deposits and the expected cost of loans75. This time, the 
decision variable (α) is expressed as an annual rate in real terms, equivalent to the 
annualised nominal rate on deposits per month, after subtracting the annual inflation 
rate on average for this period.     
 
Graph V.9 
The Loss/Gain Risk Function, Speculation and Excessive Risk 
Taking in the Financial Market, 1977-81 
(Annual rates in real terms) 
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 Source: own construction based on data obtained from the Central Bank of Argentina, Boletín 
 Estadístico, several monthly issues, 1977-80. 
 
 
The different locations of these four risk functions are explained by the values of the 
interest rate elasticity of the demand for deposits - supply of funds from the depositors 
                                                          
75 Appendix B to Chapter V contains the econometric estimations used to calculate the interest-rate-
elasticities for Argentina included in the loss/gain risk function presented in Graph V.5 
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(εdS)76. These rates have the following values: Financial System (ΓI) (εdS=1.6); Banco 
Internacional ((ΓII) (εdS=1.7); Banco de Intercambio Regional (ΓIII) (εdS =1.95) and Banco 
de Los Andes (ΓIV) (εdS =2.2).  
 
Graph V.9 shows that the expected nominal rate on deposits was overestimated in 
each of the four cases under study. This overestimation, however, is higher in the case 
of these three single institutions than in the aggregate banking system (net of these 
banks); that is to say, (ΓI) < (ΓII) < (ΓIII) < (ΓIV). Moreover, of these three banks, those 
that were less cautious in the management of liquidity, are those that show the higher 
overestimation of the rate on deposits. In effect, the Banco Internacional presents the 
most careful management of the net defensive position and was also the institution with 
the relatively lowest overestimation of the rate on deposits (ΓII) (Graphs V.6 and Graph 
V.9). On the other hand, both the Banco de Intercambio and Regional Banco de Los 
Andes exhibited the most reckless stance in connection with liquidity and they also 
showed the highest rate of overestimation of the expected cost of funds, shown in the 
loss/gain risk functions (ΓIII) and (ΓIV) respectively (Graphs V.7 and V.8; and V.9).  
 
More importantly, it can be proved that this positive correlation recognised between the 
liquidity risk and the degree of overestimation of the rate on deposits is also a cause-
effect relationship. In the model of interest rate decision, it is possible to identify if and 
to what extent the income, capital and the liquidity effects contributed to the 
overestimation of the deposit rate. By substituting the corresponding parameters in the 
model equations (1”); (2”) and (4”), it can be demonstrated that the difference in the 
behaviour of these three single institutions and the aggregate financial system comes 
down to their attitude towards liquidity risk77. This is so, as the only difference between 
the four risk functions shown in Graph V.9 is the elasticity rate of the demand for 
                                                          
76 The rest of the functional parameters are the same as used in Section V.4 
77 The liquidity risk is due to the uncertainty about the amount of deposits that the bank will hold in the next 
period, after the market of deposits adjusts to a new equilibrium position. See Section V.4.1 
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deposits (supply of funds to the bank) and, this parameter is found only in the equation 
which measures the ‘liquidity effect’ in banks. 
 
Moreover, in the last section, it was shown that the difference between the ex-ante and 
ex-post rates of mark-up of banks is explained by the overestimation of the rate on 
deposits. Therefore, the hypothesis suggested earlier is also borne out in the case of 
the three single institutions: the financial agents raised the ex-ante rate of spread as a 
way of protecting themselves against possible problems of liquidity in a context in 
which the uncertainty about the demand for deposits (supply of funds) was rising and, 
the ratio of liquid-assets/total-deposits was declining. As shown earlier in Section 4.2, 
this means that the banks overestimated the cost of deposits so as to increase their 
rates of mark-up. This means that the higher liquidity risk for holding a lower level of 
net defensive assets in those banks was to be compensated with a higher financial 
spread. It should be stressed that with an enlargement of the ex-ante rate of mark-up, 
the banks obtained more room to manoeuvre by raising the nominal rate on deposits, 
so as to help them to retain or to attract new funds in the event they needed to do so.  
 
In this study, the overestimation of the interest rate was undertaken using as a 
benchmark the rate on deposits on average that prevailed in the banking system. Table 
V.3 summarises the main outcome of this subsection and presents the estimations of two 
- the hypothetical and the effective - rates of spread calculated as the difference between 
the lending and deposit rates per annum in real terms over the period July 1977 - March 
1980. It also shows the interest rate premium over the real rate on deposits that some 
institutions paid on average throughout those years. 
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Table V.3  
Spread and Premium Paid over the Rate of Deposits  
in Real Terms on Average: Jul. 1977 – Mar. 1980  
(Annual rates) 
 
 
Financial Institutions 
 
Financial Spread 
Premium over the
Rate of Deposits 
 A B C = A – B 
    
 Fcial. System (on aver.) [13.0 –  (-1.6)] = 14.6 [13.0 – (-1.6)] = 14.6 0 
 Bco. Internacional [14.2 – (-1.6)]  = 15.8 [14.2 – (-0.2)] = 14.4 1.4 
 Bco. de Interc. Regional [20.8 – (-1.6)]  = 22.4 [20.8  –  6.9] = 13.9 8.5 
 Bco. de Los Andes [24.6 – (-1.6)]  = 26.2 [24.6 – 10.1]  = 14.5 11.7 
Source: own construction based on data obtained from the Central Bank of Argentina, Boletín Estadístico, 
several monthly issues, 1977-81.  
 
 
Departing from the assumption that all financial agents paid the average market rate on 
deposits, it is interesting to undertake the following exercise: what would the rate of mark-
up have been that would have compensated for the different liquidity risks taken by the 
banks? Column (A) in Table V.3, shows the result of this simulation. It should be noted 
that while the spread of the aggregate banking system in real terms averaged 14.6% per 
annum; this margin should have reached a rate of 15.8%; 22.4% and 26.2% respectively 
in the three cases under study: Banco Internacional; Banco de Intercambio Regional and 
Banco de Los Andes. This happened, as the optimal for the banks would have been the 
following overestimation of the nominal rate on deposits: Aggregate Financial System 
6.2%; Banco Internacional 7.4%; Banco de Intercambio Regional 14.4% and Banco de 
Los Andes 18.2% per annum on average over the period July 1977-March 198078.  
 
Taking into account that these rates of financial spread are average values for that period, 
they need to be weighted with the conclusion reached earlier in this Chapter, Section 
V.4.2: from mid-1979 on, the margin of intermediation rose pari-passu with the increase in 
the general economic uncertainty. Therefore, in early 1980, at the moment that these 
                                                          
78 These estimations are the equivalent to the annualised nominal rate of deposits per month obtained for 
the loss/gain functions presented in Graph V.9 
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banks went into liquidation, the rate of financial spread must have been even more 
striking than the figures presented above. 
 
The hypothesis outlined earlier is once again corroborated: the financial intermediaries 
who took a relatively more risky position in connection with liquidity are those which show 
a higher hypothetical rate of spread79. By the same token, since these estimations were 
carried out assuming that all banks paid the same rate on deposits, this result can only be 
explained if the less cautious financial agents had priced their credits at a higher rate. In 
effect, the Banco de Intercambio Regional and Banco de Los Andes would have had to 
charge an annual lending rate of 20.8% and 24.6% in real terms on average; while the 
Banco Internacional and the rest of financial system as a whole would have had to charge 
much lower rates: 14.2% and 13% respectively during the period under study (Colum A in 
Table V.3). In practice, the different lending rates that a bank charges depend on both 
the credit and the borrower’s risk and are not usually revealed to the public. These 
figures are estimates based on the result of the model of interest rate decisions 
outlined above. 
 
So far, the conclusion which can be drawn from this simulation exercise is: the higher 
the interest rate risk which resulted from the worsening of the net defensive position, 
the wider the financial spread needed to be in order to sustain the previous banking 
risk. Finally, it should be stressed that this is a counterfactual analysis and thus, it 
shows not what in fact happened but, what the rate of mark-up would have been had all 
the intermediaries paid the average nominal rate on deposits which prevailed in the 
market, given the liquidity risk that they were assuming.  
 
Column (B) in Table V.3 shows the financial spread effectively charged by the banks. 
This was calculated as the difference between the ex-post deposit and lending rates in 
real terms. As observed, differences in the ex-post rate of mark-up were not that 
important among the banks. Where they differed markedly was in the rate on deposits 
                                                          
79 See Section V.4.2 pgs. 42 and 43 
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that they offered to the public. For instance, the Banco Internacional; Banco de 
Intercambio Regional and Banco de Los Andes paid a nominal return of 133%; 150% 
and 157% per annum respectively. The average rate for the system as a whole was 
130%. This means that they paid a premium over the average market rate on deposits 
in real terms of 1.4%; 8.5% and 11.7% per year respectively over the period July 1977- 
March 1980 (Column C, Table V.3). With this data, the first temptation is to proclaim a 
relationship between the interest rate premium paid by the banks and the liquidity risk 
that they were assuming. This has yet to be proved. 
 
Graph V.9 depicts the ‘optimal’ deposit rate, which has been estimated taking into 
account the different risk positions assumed by the banks. It has been found that the 
more vulnerable the liquidity position of the bank, the higher the rate on deposits that 
maximises its risk function. Additionally, from these estimations, the ‘optimal’ interest 
rate in real terms that the Banco Internacional; Banco de Intercambio Regional and 
Banco de Los Andes should have paid over the average market rate on deposits is 
respectively 1.6%; 8.3% and 11.4% points per annum. As observed, these rates are 
very close to the premium which was in fact paid by these institutions and, therefore, 
the conjecture suggested above is fully verified (see the last column of Table VI.3)80. 
That is to say, the interest rate premium paid by these three banks is what in practice 
compensated for the different liquidity risks that they had assumed. 
 
It is now possible to integrate the counterfactual assessment shown above in Table V.3 
of the rate of spread (Column A) with that of the financial mark-up which was effectively 
charged by the banks (Column B). The former shows, for a given deposit rate, what the 
increase in the rate of mark-up of the bank is which compensates for the extra-risk of 
liquidity derived from a reduction in the net defensive position. As stated above, a bank 
reaches an optimal portfolio allocation when its expected marginal revenues on assets 
equal its marginal costs of being illiquid. Hence, if there is an increase in the cost due 
                                                          
80 These estimations are corroborated by an empirical assessment of the interest rate premium that these 
banks did actually pay to depositors. See  A. A. Arnaudo and R. Conejero, Op. Cit., (1985), pp. 606-8. 
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to a reduction in the liquidity position, the bank should raise the lending rate which, in 
turn, will result in a wider spread. With a greater degree of freedom in this margin, the 
financial agent can raise the rate on deposits so as to retain or to attract new funds in 
the event they need to do so (Table VI.3 Column A). 
 
Column (B) in Table V.3 reveals how the banks under study actually managed the issues 
of liquidity and interest rate setting in the markets of deposits and loans. It shows ex-post 
that these banks preferred not to hedge the extra-risk resulting from an illiquid position 
with a higher rate of spread; but to pay a premium over the market rate on deposits with 
the aim of attracting new funds. The consequence of this was that, over the period July 
1977-March 1980, the amount of deposits in real terms rose on average 137% per year 
in the financial system as a whole; while deposits in the Banco Internacional; Banco de 
Intercambio Regional and Banco de Los Andes, grew by 169%; 315% and 465% 
respectively. 
 
There is no doubt that the inflow of new deposits towards these banks was instrumental in 
sustaining a policy of low or negative net defensive position. This helps to explain why the 
banks with a relatively less liquid portfolio - Banco de Intercambio Regional and Banco 
de Los Andes - were those which offered the highest premium over the average market 
deposit rate. It was recognised that “the Banco de Intercambio Regional paid extremely 
high deposit rates and allocated loans to firms that were undergoing serious financial 
difficulties due to the general economic situation”81. In addition, “the Banco de Los 
Andes was one of the fastest growing institutions, it went from ninth among private 
banks to second place in the ranking in terms of deposits in the period 1978-79. The 
amount of its deposits rose sharply, attracted by the highest deposit rates in the 
market”82. 
 
                                                          
81 Newspaper report, Clarín, Saturday 29, March 1980, p. 5. 
82 Magazine report, Convicción, Economía, Sunday 27 April 1980, p. 12 
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The great difference of attitude towards scale and kind of risk that the Banco de 
Intercambio Regional and Banco de Los Andes assumed compared with that of the 
Banco Internacional and the rest of the financial system on average confirms the 
hypothesis that these intermediaries were assuming too much risk over those years83. 
Given the importance of the first two institutions within the banking system (the first and 
second private banks at the beginning of 1980), the way they managed liquidity risk 
certainly had a negative impact on the functioning of the banking system. In effect, the 
decision to be short in liquid assets required the setting of relatively high deposit rates. 
As mentioned above, these rates accelerated the growth of these institutions, since a 
large amount of deposits was re-directed towards those banks which were assuming 
an excessive level of risk. The increase in the liquidity risk combined with the 
misallocation of resources caused the financial system as a whole to become more 
fragile.  
 
The extremely high rates on loans in real terms that the risk-loving banks charged - 
Banco de Intercambio Regional and Banco de Los Andes - is the counter face of the 
interest rate premium that they paid on deposits (see Table VI.3). However, as argued 
earlier, the policy of raising the lending rate so as to counterbalance the extra risk 
derived from an increase in the deposit rate, would have a negative effect on the quality 
of loan allocation. This is so as risk-averse borrowers, those who are less likely to default, 
were not prepared to borrow at these rates and, therefore, went elsewhere (adverse 
selection). At the same time, less trustworthy borrowers came to obtain funds offering 
potentially more profitable and consequently, riskier projects (incentive effect). This had a 
negative effect on the loan-risk distribution of the banks84.  
 
These two factors - the drop in quality of the borrowers and investment projects due to 
high and rising lending rates - exacerbated the widespread problem of non-performing 
                                                          
83 It was affirmed that out of these three institutions, “the Banco Internacional has the best prospects due 
to its structure”. Newspaper interview with the Secretary of Economic Planning and Coordination Guillermo 
W. Klein, Clarín, Thursday 29, May 1980. p.13. 
84 This point is further analysed in Chapter VI. 
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loans faced by these two banks at the beginning of 1980. It was estimated that in 
February, the BIR had bad debts amounting to about 40% of its total loans (US$ 300 
million) and; that it was losing approximately US$ 15 million per month (2% of its stock 
of loans)85. This situation was recognised by the monetary authority: … “the BIR 
showed several problems in the relationship between capital and deposits as well as in 
the percentage of loans in arrears. Recently, although the amount of deposits against 
capital was almost at the limit allowed, what particularly worried us was the fact that by 
paying excessively high interest rates on deposits it had a lot of difficulty making loans 
at high rates. That is, they were paying out a lot and this apparently forced them to 
make riskier loans - low quality allocations - in order to meet their needs86. As analysed 
in Chapter IV, this statement confirms that the Central Bank had severe problems of 
regulation and supervision which, in turn, enabled banks to behave recklessly and 
speculatively in those years87.  
 
For some authors, the existence of a deposit guarantee is what explains the excessive 
risk taking and the speculative behaviour on the part of the banking sector88. It was 
believed, therefore, that the interest rate premium paid by some banks was possible 
because the depositors did not discriminate against the risk taken by the different 
institutions as they assumed that their savings were ‘state-guaranteed’ anyway. 
Although the establishment of deposit insurance may have contributed - to some extent 
- to worsening the problems of moral hazard between depositors and bankers, it does 
not explain some issues identified in this assessment. Lack of incentives for depositors 
to screen the banking risks could have benefited some institutions, yet the increase in 
                                                          
85 A similar pattern is noted in the case of the Banco de Los Andes. La Prensa, Tuesday 1, April 1980, p.4. 
86 Newspaper interview with the Vice-president of the Central Bank, Alejandro Reynal , La Razón, Monday 
31, March 1980, p. 7.  
87 The subject of banking regulation and supervision goes beyond the scope of this Chapter and was 
analysed previously in Chapter IV, Section IV.4.5.  
88 This argument was advanced by Adolfo Diz (ex-President of the Central Bank in the period 1976-81; 
and by Roberto Alemann (ex-Minister of Economy in the first half of 1982) in personal interviews with the 
author. See also, R. Alemann, Boletín Semanal, Ministerio de Economía de Argentina, May 10, 1982; R. 
B. Fernández, "La Crisis Financiera Argentina, 1980-82", Desarrollo Económico, Oct.-Dec 1983, vol. 23, 
No. 89, pp. 79-97; R.B. Fernández, "La Crisis Financiera Argentina, 1980-82. Réplica", Desarrollo 
Económico, Oct.-Dec 1983b, vol 23, No. 91, pp. 456-459 and; A. C. Diz, “La experiencia monetaria y 
bancaria de la decada del 70”, Politica Monetaria y Banco Central. La Experiencia de los Anos Ochenta, 
Valores en la Sociedad Industrial, (Sept. 1994), Ano XII No. 30, pp. 3-26.  
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the rate of spread was a phenomenon seen throughout the entire financial system from 
mid-1979 on. (see Section V.4). This was so because, as explained in Chapter IV, in a 
highly inflationary economy like that of Argentina the problems of information between 
debtors and creditors - depositors/bankers and bankers/lenders - are due to differences 
in the estimation of inflation and changes in relative prices in different economic sectors 
and this can hardly be attributed to the existence of a deposit guarantee in banks. 
Thus, the inconsistency of the banking reform of 1977 lies mainly in the decision to free 
the financial market in a highly unstable macro-economic scenario without adequate 
banking regulation and supervision and to a much lesser extent, in the implementation 
of that policy reform together with a state deposit guarantee. 
 
The main findings of this section can be summarised as: no signs of speculative 
behaviour are found in the Banco Internacional if one looks at its liquidity performance 
over the period under analysis. This is the reason why this institution did not pay a large 
premium over the average market rate on deposits and, therefore, was not forced to 
charge extremely high lending rates. Why then was this bank liquidated by the monetary 
authority together with the other two institutions ?. Here, the problems were not due to the 
bank’s eagerness to make large profits quickly but, to the high proportion of loans to the 
conglomerate which owned the bank - the Grupo Sasetru. This was pointed out by the 
Secretary of Economic Planning and Coordination: “this bank operated normally until the 
end of 1979 but it started to lend in excess to sister companies, which then began to 
face problems of solvency”89... In the case of Sasetru group, about US$ 1,000 million 
were non-performing loans and, around 15% of them had been granted by the Banco 
Internacional” (35% of its total credits). This is another example of the deficiency of the 
Central Bank’s regulatory and supervisory policies.  
 
The situation was quite different in the case of the Banco de Intercambio Regional and 
Banco de Los Andes. They followed a pattern of speculative behaviour with regard to 
the interest rate and management of their portfolios. These financial intermediaries 
                                                          
89 Newspaper interview with Guillermo W. Klein, Clarín, Thursday 29, May 1980, p.13 
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took a highly risky liquidity stance with the aim of allocating the maximum amount of 
loans at the highest possible rate. Very high deposit and lending rates were set as a 
way of protecting themselves against possible problems of liquidity. This strategy 
proved effective in keeping an operative level of liquid assets in the short-term but, at 
the expense of their solvency in the long-term. When this problem became public 
knowledge, the practice of obtaining funds by raising the deposit rate began to lose its 
effectiveness90. In street interviews several individuals said that they preferred to 
withdraw their money and to re-deposit it into other institutions, despite the fact that the 
Banco de Los Andes offered rates between 4% and 5% higher than other banks on 
deposits of 30 and 60 days91. The monetary authority realised that the problems of 
these banks was not only one of liquidity but also of solvency and thus, the decision 
was taken to shut down their operations in early 1980.  
                                                          
90 “The problems began in the summer of 1979-80 and worsened in the months of February and March 
when it was noted that in spite of paying high interest rates the bank was not managing to replace the 
amounts it had to pay out with new deposits. Newspaper interview with the Vice-president of the Central 
ank, A. Reynal, La Razón, loc. cit., p. 7 
91 Newspaper report, El Cronista Comercial, Monday 31, March 1980, p. 4 
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V.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Large and volatile rates of financial spread in both nominal and real terms were a 
distinctive feature of the banking sector of Argentina after the reform of 1977. At the 
beginning, this was mainly the result of the cost implied by the high reserves required by 
the Central Bank to prevent a rapid monetary expansion. With the reduction in the 
reserve requirements, the financial margin declined progressively throughout the year 
1978 and the first half of 1979. Thereafter, the widening of the spread was entirely due 
to the desire of banks to increase profits as much as possible by raising the mark-up 
(gross financial yield) which reached a striking 22% per annum in the first semester of 
1981. 
 
The first conclusion to be drawn is that the growing rate of mark-up seen in the banking 
sector from mid-1979 on was the result of an increase in the level of systemic risk in 
Argentina. This, in turn, was due to the possibility of large and unexpected short-term 
deposit withdrawals based on the expectation of a high volatility in the return on assets, 
as the prospects for the economy were becoming more and more uncertain. The 
reaction of savers to this was to shorten the maturity of their deposits, which led to a 
higher balance sheet mismatch in banks. Although the financial agents followed suit 
and shortened the maturity of their loans, this was not enough to offset a rise in the 
liquidity risk. In an attempt to counterbalance the extra risk, the banks increased the 
margin of intermediation by raising the rate charged on loans. This gave them the leeway 
to raise the rate on deposits in order to retain or to attract new deposits should they need 
to do so, without suffering a misalignment between the price paid and charged for the 
funds. However, an increase in the lending rate would have a knock-on effect on the 
solvency of the banking institutions as the level and the quality of their borrowers’ net 
worth was negatively affected. In effect, the short-term problems of liquidity which had 
emerged in the financial system at the end of 1970s had been transformed into long-term 
problems of solvency by the end of the year 1980.   
 
 
 
272 
Besides the evolution of the systemic risk (exogenous factors), there were other reasons 
inside the banks (endogenous factors) which helped to increase the financial fragility and 
hastened the collapse of the Argentine banking system in 1980-81. Indeed, it has been 
proved that there were cases of speculative behaviour and excessive risk-taking within 
the banking sector, which had a deleterious effect on the financial structure. This was 
verified in a micro-economic analysis of the behaviour of two financial intermediaries: the 
Banco de Intercambio Regional and the Banco de Los Andes. These banks followed an 
extremely risky policy of portfolio management which led, in the short-term, to problems 
of liquidity. To pre-empt this, they tried to obtain more deposits by offering a premium 
above the average market rate. This was very effective in generating new funds, which 
brought about a reduction in the liquidity risk and a substantial increase in resources 
which could be allocated. By the same token, the lending policy of these banks was 
extremely risky, paralleling the way they managed the liability side. This shows that the 
aim of maximising the amount and the rate of lending was part of the logic of paying a 
premium above the market rate on deposits. Furthermore, the highly illiquid position of 
these banks also helps to explain their eagerness to channel the funds obtained as 
deposits (short-term liabilities) into assets of a longer maturity (loans). Additionally, 
extremely high lending rates in real terms were charged in an attempt to maximise the 
rate of interest at which these financial intermediaries could allocate all available funds. 
 
This attitude towards risk assumed by the Banco de Intercambio Regional and Banco 
de Los Andes had a negative impact on the risk distribution of banking sector as a 
whole. On the one hand, the practices used by these banks to attract funds gave rise to 
a re-distribution of resources within the financial system. This is shown by the dramatic 
growth in their market share, by the end of the 1970s these institutions had risen to first 
and second places in the ranking of deposits respectively. On the other hand, the need 
to allocate quickly a rapidly-growing amount of credits and the desire to do so at high 
lending rates was to have secondary effects on the quality of projects and borrowers 
that they financed. In this way, the probability of loan repayment declined for the 
financial system as a whole.  
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It must be stressed, however, that not all the banks which ended up in trouble had 
been guilty of the same sins. There were cases where the weakness of the bank was 
the result of a large concentration of loans to firms belonging to the economic group 
which owned the institution in question. This is shown in the study of the Banco 
Internacional. This intermediary did not take risks either in relation to the management 
of liquidity or to the setting of the deposit and lending rates. Its problems were instead 
associated with that of ownership which, in turn, led to a deficient distribution of risk 
within its portfolio. In other words, as it was part of the Sasetru group, the Banco 
Internacional could not pursue an independent policy and consequently, a large 
proportion of its credits were allocated to sister firms. With too many eggs in the same 
basket and, with the performance of these companies deteriorating sharply due to the 
economic recession, the Central Bank decided the intervention of this institution in the 
first half of 1980. 
 
In short, the model developed in this study confirms that the interaction of macro- and 
micro- economic factors plus institutional failures caused the banking crisis of 1980. 
The first account for the growing fragility of the country’s financial structure, in an 
economy with large macro-economic imbalances. This situation together with a lack of 
- or highly deficient - banking regulation and supervision by the Central Bank, created a 
fertile ground for cases of excessive risk-taking and speculative behaviour inside the 
financial system. This, in turn, brought about two interrelated effects: on the one hand, it 
speeded up and worsened the macro-financial conditions because the risk distribution of 
the banking system changed as a whole and; on the other hand, it caused the failure of 
some institutions, which triggered a far-reaching financial crisis. Given the size of these 
banks and the fact that they were paying the highest rates on deposits, the news that they 
had been taken over and closed down by the monetary authority, created panic in the 
banking system and a further weakening of the financial structure. 
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VI.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter presents a study of the financial health of the non-financial private sector 
and its effects on the banking system over the period of financial liberalisation, 1977-
81. Previously, it has been suggested that the problems in the financial system lay 
ultimately in the inability of many debtors to fulfil their obligations with banks. This can 
normally be verified by looking at the amount of non-performing loans in banking 
institutions. This information, however, is not available for Argentina for the years under 
evaluation. What has been done, therefore, is to examine the changes in the level of 
indebtedness of the business sector vis-à-vis its capacity to repay debt in order to 
identify the extent and the gravity of problems of borrower distress and their 
consequences for the soundness of the banking system. 
 
Debt is a contract which entails a promise to repay the principal and interest on a loan 
at a specified time in the future, while the creditor has the right to seize the collateral in 
the event of default. This is not a spot transaction and thus, a debt contract always 
bears an associated risk: the possibility that the promise will not be fulfilled. As the 
future is uncertain, the number and nature of all possible contingencies are clearly very 
large, and some of them cannot be identified ex-ante. This suggests that the cost of 
negotiations regarding the course of action to be taken in each circumstance may well 
be prohibitive. Accordingly, when the probability of such occurrence is small and the 
cost of reaching an agreement is high, it may pay to leave the resolution of the issue 
unspecified with the possibility of renegotiating the contract, should that becomes 
necessary.  
 
As discussed in Chapters II and V, the existence of asymmetric information also 
causes problems for the parties involved in a contractual arrangement. Asymmetric 
information exists due to the division of tasks and specialisation. Collecting information 
from independent sources is costly and there is no reason to believe that informational 
asymmetries can be reduced otherwise. For instance, in the case of financial agents, to 
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be fully informed about a specific industry (e.g. steel) would require that a bank 
become a manufacturer (e.g. steel producer), a condition that would undo the 
specialisation of activities that is essential for the efficiency of the economic system. 
With informational gaps, individuals have the incentive to use private information for 
their own benefit in two different ways: one, when there is information and knowledge 
which is not voluntarily revealed before the contract is signed in order to obtain more 
favourable terms; and two, when one of the parties behaves differently following the 
signing of the agreement to benefit himself. That is to say, the practices of ‘hiding 
information’ and ‘hiding action’ as a result of asymmetric information are what make 
contracts incomplete. 
 
Following an asymmetric information approach, this evaluation deals with the 
interaction between the financial structure of the business sector and the level of 
economic activity on two levels of des-aggregation: from a macro-financial perspective, 
special attention is given to the evolution of the degree of financial fragility by looking at 
the variations in the liquidity and solvency of the non-financial private sector over the 
economic cycle. The informational dimension of the debtor-creditor relationship is 
emphasised to stress how changes in the economic environment exacerbated the 
problems caused by asymmetric information in the credit market and how these, in 
turn, affected the quality of the financial intermediation process. From a micro-financial 
viewpoint, the financial structure of a sample of Argentine firms is studied with the aim 
of identifying the causes and implications of changes in the level of corporate fragility.  
 
The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section two presents a macro-
economic analysis of the vulnerability of the non-financial private sector and its effects 
on the borrower-lender relationship. This is an evaluation of the levels of liquidity and 
solvency and changes in the financial risks faced by this sector as a whole over the 
economic cycle. In section three, the financial structure and the economic performance 
of the business units are studied at a corporate level using a sample of firms. Section 
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four deals with the problem of distress borrowing and its consequences for banks in the 
light of the findings of the previous sections. Section five presents the conclusions.  
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VI.2 FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC CYCLE 
 
Periods of economic booms followed by deep and prolonged recessions are usually the 
cause of widespread debtor distress. Borrower indebtedness increases when there is a 
rosy economic outlook, as debtors expect that future cash-flows will be sufficient to 
meet their obligations. Lenders, in turn, see an opportunity to obtain returns in a 
scenario in which there is a high probability that loans will be re-paid on time and, 
should distress borrowing occur, the assets used as collateral will be easily marketable 
at a high value. In contrast, when a deep economic contraction occurs, the situation of 
borrowers worsens as the expected cash-flows and the ‘return on assets’ cannot be 
achieved. Borrower failure can lead to cash-flow inadequacies for creditors who may, in 
turn, pass this on to other economic units, thus spreading the initial negative financial 
effect. This can produce a demand contraction in product and labour markets, further 
worsening the financial positions of both borrowers and creditors. In this scenario, the 
possibility of a massive forced liquidation of assets increases, and this could diminish the 
realisation value of assets given as collateral. All this suggests that aggregate problems 
of financial distress are not independent of what has taken - or is taking - place in the 
real side of the economy. To quote Benjamin Friedman ‘‘… for most borrowers, 
however, including individuals as well as businesses, both the size of the cash-flows 
and the value of marketable assets depend to a great extent on prosperity or recession 
in the economy at large’’1.  
 
The above seems to be a good description of what happened in Argentina over the 
years 1977-81. Indeed, the credit boom generated by financial deregulation resulted in 
problems for banks in a period in which the level of activity was falling. In this context, 
as emphasised by Adolfo Buscaglia, ‘’the origin of the increased financial risk lay in the 
virtual inability of many businessmen to pay off their debts with banks, in a scenario in 
which corporate assets were becoming less marketable. Many companies had been 
                                           
1 B. Friedman, “Debt and Economic Activity in the United States”, in The Changing Roles of Debt and 
Equity in Financing U.S. Capital Formation, B. M. Friedman (ed.), Chicago, 1982, pg. 45 
 
 279 
refinancing their debts with banks with the aim of paying them off in the future when 
their business improved’’2. The present analysis is an attempt to verify this real-
financial interaction by looking at the relationship between the level of activity and the 
evolution of the indebtedness of the non-financial private sector with banks between 
1977 and 1981. Graph VI.1 depicts the indices of the gross domestic product (income) 
and of the stock of banking credits granted to the non-financial private sector (debt). 
 
Graph VI.1 
Total Output and Stock of Banking Credits, 1977-81 
(Index 1977 = 100) 
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Source: own estimation based on information of the matrix of assets and liabilities for Argentina calculated 
 in Chapter IV with data obtained from the Central Bank. The Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina, 
 Boletín Estadístico, monthly issues (1977-81). 
 
 
The stock of credits given by banks to the business sector and the level of output followed 
a similar pattern between April 1977 and August 1979 (coefficient of correlation of 0.74)3. 
This high positive correlation occurred in a period in which there was one period of short 
                                           
2 Newspaper article by Adolfo Buscaglia, Crisis en el Sistema Financiero, La Prensa, 24 April 1980, p.10 
3 These estimations were calculated using quarterly figures taken from the matrix of assets and liabilities 
for Argentina presented in Chapter IV based on data obtained from the Central Bank of Argentina, Boletín 
Estadístico, several monthly issues, 1977-81. 
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and moderate recession, from the third quarter of 1977 to the second quarter of 1978; and 
one phase of expansion, from the second quarter of 1978 to the second quarter of 1979. 
Over these three years, the level of economic activity went up by 5% and the aggregate 
level of indebtedness of the non-financial private sector with banks rose by about 45%. 
This caused an increase in the debt/income ratio of this economic sector by more than 
one third; that is, from an index of 100 in 1977 to 135 in August 1979. From then on, the 
picture changed and the evolution of the variables depicted above diverged: the level of 
output underwent a rapid decline whereas the indebtedness of the private sector as a 
whole kept rising. The index of gross domestic product which had reached a value of 106 
in the third quarter of 1979, had dropped below 98 at the end of 1981. At the same time, 
the index of bank loans rose from 100 to 145. As a result, the debt/income ratio jumped 
from 140 in the second quarter of 1979 to 180 in first quarter of 1980 and reached 231 at 
the end of 19814.  
 
This dis-adjustment between the level of indebtedness and the capacity to repay debt 
may have caused financial problems for the non-financial private sector from early 1980 
on. This conjecture, however, cannot be verified by considering only the debt-income 
ratio, while ignoring the asset side of the balance sheet. Benjamin Friedman stressed 
this point by saying that the degree of financial fragility is related not to the aggregate 
level of banking loans in the private sector as such, but to the distribution of assets and 
liabilities among agents and enterprises. It depends on whether the borrowers hold both 
the amount and the right kind of assets to ensure the re-payment of their debts in the 
event of a fall in their income. In his words, ‘‘their ability to do so depends on the income 
they will receive and on the assets they will have available to liquidate, if doing so 
becomes necessary’’5. This means that financial solvency is about the balance 
between the value of assets and debts and consequently, measurements which only 
take into account the liability side are not totally reliable when assessing financial risks. 
An assessment of the full balance sheet position is, therefore, needed in order to 
                                           
4 These indices were calculated based on the figures of the Central Bank of Argentina depicted above in 
Graph VI:1 
5 B. Friedman, Op. Cit,1990, pg. 33 
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analyse the changes in stocks of assets and liabilities as well as the evolution of the 
position of liquidity of the business sector over the economic cycle6. However, as stated 
above, this quantitative information is not freely available in Argentina and, hence, this 
study was only possible by first constructing a macro-financial matrix and then, 
applying the data of the ‘net financial wealth’ and ‘net worth’ obtained for the non-
financial private sector to analyse the evolution of the levels of liquidity and solvency 
throughout the business cycle7. Graph VI.2 shows the evolution of stocks of ‘net worth’ 
(nwp) and of ‘net financial wealth’ (nfwp) of this economic sector in the period 1977-81. 
 
Graph VI.2 
Net Worth and Net Financial Wealth of the Business Sector, 1977-81  
(Index 1977=100) 
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 Source: own estimation based on information of the matrix of assets and liabilities for Argentina calculated 
 in Chapter IV with data obtained from the Central Bank. The Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina,  
 Boletín Estadístico, monthly issues, 1977-81. 
                                           
6 For a formal analysis of the role of borrowers’ balance sheets in the business cycle see, for instance, B. 
S. Bernanke, and M. Gertler, “Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluctuations, American Economic 
Review, March 1989, 79, 1, pp. 14-31; M. Gertler “Financial Capacity and Output Fluctuations in an 
Economy with Multi-Period Financial Relationships”, Review of Economics Studies, 1992, 59, pp. 455-472; 
and M. Gertler and R. G. Hubbard, “Financial Factors in Business Fluctuations” in, Asymmetric 
Information, Capital Markets and Investment, R. G. Hubbard (ed.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1990. pp. 35-67 
7 The macro-financial matrix for Argentina was constructed in Chapter IV, using the methodology outlined 
in Chapter II. 
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From a macro-economic point of view, the evolution of the aggregate degree of liquidity 
and solvency of one economic unit can be analysed by looking at both the levels and 
the changes in ‘net financial wealth’ and in ‘net worth’. To begin with, some of the 
concepts studied in Chapter II should be recalled8. In general, the ‘net financial wealth’ 
of one economic unit (nfw) is equal to the difference between the stocks of financial 
assets and liabilities. By the same token, a change in the financial wealth (∆nfw) is 
explained by the surplus/deficit - saving minus physical investment - generated by the 
economic unit over a period of time (income effect), plus (minus) the capital gains 
(losses) calculated on its portfolio (price effect)9. This means that if one unit has a 
positive net financial asset position (nfw>0) and is accumulating financial assets 
because of a surplus (∆nfw>0), the probability that this economic unit faces problems 
of liquidity is very low. Nevertheless, this possibility is definitively higher in the case of 
units with deficits in which, the lower the ‘net financial wealth’ position, the greater the 
risk of becoming illiquid  
 
The ‘net worth’ (nw) of one economic unit is equal to the difference between its stocks 
of all types of assets (financial and physical) and of debts10. Given that the (nw) is 
made up of the sum of the ‘net financial wealth’ (nfw) and the amount of physical 
assets, a change in the net worth (∆nw) of one economic unit is equal to the flow of 
savings plus (minus) the capital gains (losses) on its portfolio. The (nw) is a measure of 
the level of solvency of one unit and, therefore, a positive or negative change (∆nw) in 
this variable indicates the way in which its level of solvency evolves over time.  
 
For the case-study, Graph VI.2 shows that the aggregate levels of liquidity and 
solvency of the non-financial private sector (nfwp) and (nwp) experienced a significant 
increase first and then, a marked decline. Between July 1977 and June 1979, the ratio 
of financial assets to liabilities - an index of liquidity - passed from 1.18 to 1.33. At the 
                                           
8 Chapter II, Section 3 
9 For a theoretical explanation of the capital gain/loss as a result of changes in relative prices see Chapter 
II, Section 3.  
10 Capital gains/losses on financial portfolio include - among others - the effect of changes in the real rate 
of exchange and in the rate of interest in real terms.  
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same time, the level of solvency was rising as a result of the increase in the ‘sectoral 
net worth’. However, this positive development ended in mid-1979 pari-passu with the 
deterioration observed in the (nfwp) and (nwp) position.  
 
What is striking about this process, though, is the magnitude and the speed at which 
the liquidity and solvency of the business sector declined over the period mid-1979 - 
end of 1981. Indeed, in less than one year, between May 1979 and March 1980, the 
(nfwp) declined in constant terms by more than 70% (from US$ 9.9 to US$ 2.8 billion) 
leading to a fall in the index of liquidity from 1.31 to 1.06. This process continued, and 
this index dropped to nearly 1 at the beginning of 1981, and fell to 0.79 at the end of 
this year. The same pattern occurred with the level of solvency of the business sector 
and consequently, the proportion of debt to ‘net worth’, the leverage ratio, rose from 
21% over the years 1979 to 30% in 1980 and 42% in 1981.  
 
The above suggests the existence of an endogenous real-financial interaction between 
the aggregate level of activity and the financial structure of the business sector: the 
levels of liquidity and solvency of the non-financial private sector increased in periods 
of economic growth and decreased in periods of recession. In other words, the level of 
financial fragility/robustness of this economic unit behaved pro-cyclically. As discussed 
in Chapter II, this has important consequences for the efficiency of the process of 
financial intermediation and hence, for the overall economic performance11. In effect, 
with imperfect information and costly default, a strong balance sheet position means 
that the borrower has more assets to lose and is, therefore, more likely to behave 
cautiously. This, in turn, signals a lower credit risk for the lender and consequently, the 
problems of ‘hidden information’ and ‘hidden action’ posed by asymmetric information 
are less significant. The implication of this is that the agency costs (cost of negotiation 
and monitoring) are reduced and, in the event of borrower default, the lender has more 
chance of recovering his investment. By the same token, when the balance sheet 
                                           
11 A summary of the main theories of asymmetric information and aggregate level of activity is presented in 
Chapter II, Section 2.  
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position is weak, the problem of asymmetric information is exacerbated. With less to 
lose, the probability of the borrower engaging in riskier activities is increased. He may 
also misrepresent his financial position and/or the purpose for which the funds were 
borrowed so as to be seen as less of a risk. As stressed by Bernanke and Gertler ‘‘… 
generally, the less of his own wealth a borrower can contribute to the funding of his 
investment project, the more his interests will diverge from those of the people who 
have lent to him. When the borrower has superior information about his project, or the 
ability to take unobserved actions that affect the distribution of the project returns, a 
greater incompatibility of interest increases the agency costs associated with the 
investment process’’12.  
 
In cases of a generalised deterioration in the balance sheet of the business sector, 
financial agents will be faced with a situation in which information in their possession 
with regard to the quality of their clients and projects is no longer accurate. As a result, 
the cost of borrowing is increased and this further affects the financial health of the 
debtor, reducing the rate of investment and, ultimately, economic growth. This theory 
was used by Bernanke to explain the extent and duration of the Great Depression in 
the United States of America. In his words … ‘’because markets for financial assets 
(claims) are incomplete, intermediation between some classes of borrowers and 
lenders requires non-trivial market-making and information gathering services. The 
disruptions of 1930-33 reduced the effectiveness of the financial sector in performing 
these services. As the real cost of financial intermediation increased, many borrowers 
found credit to be expensive and difficult to obtain. The effect of this credit-squeeze 
aggravated and prolonged the economic depression’’13. This is precisely what 
happened in Argentina in the period immediately following the collapse of the Banco de 
Intercambio Regional in March 198014.  
                                           
12 B. Bernanke and M. Gertler, “Financial Fragility and Economic Performance”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1990, p. 88. 
13 B. Bernanke, ¨Non-monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the propagation of the Great Depression’’, 
American Economic Review,  June 1983, 73, pg. 257  
14 A full description of the chronology of the collapse of the financial system is given in Chapter IV, Section 
5 
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What follows is an attempt to prove this endogenous interaction between the aggregate 
level of activity and the Argentine financial structure between 1977 and 1981. Although 
this type of studies of this real-financial relationship have been undertaken to analyse 
the Great Depression in the United States of America, this is the first time that such an 
analysis has been applied to the case of the banking crisis of Argentina of 198015. It 
begins by estimating econometrically the following equations: 
 
(1) nfwpt =  α11 + β11 ind-outputt -  4  + β12 credpt  + β13 spreadt + β14 nfwpt -1 
(2) nwpt  =  α21 + β21 ind-outputt - 4  + β22 spreadt + β23 nwpt -1 
 
with:  
ind-output = total industrial output 
credp = stock of bank loans granted to the non-financial private sector  
spread = rate of financial spread charged by the financial agents 
nfwp = stock of ‘net financial wealth’ of the non-financial sector 
nwp = stock of ‘net worth’ of the non-financial private sector 
 
These equations include the price and income effects described above as explanatory 
variables of changes in the levels of liquidity and solvency of the non-financial private 
sector. In the case of equation (1), the industrial output (ind-output) and the bank 
credits (credp) are the variables chosen to represent the effect of the deficit/surplus of 
this economic sector on the financial wealth (income-effect), whereas the impact of 
changes in relative prices on financial assets and liabilities is represented by rate of 
spread (price-effect). As can be seen, the same explanatory variables are included in 
equation (2), with the exception of the amount of bank credits. The reason for this is 
that the only difference between the (nwp) and (nfwp) is the stock of physical assets 
(capital), which can be financed by funds generated inside the business sector 
(sectoral savings) and/or by funds borrowed from other sources (credits). Furthermore, 
                                           
15 Some of the best known of these studies are: B. S. Bernanke, Op. Cit., June 1983, pp.257-76. O. 
Eckstein and A. Sinai “The Mechanism of the Business Cycle in the Post-War Era”, in The American 
Business Cycle: Continuity and Change, R. Gordon (ed.), 1986, Chicago. F. S. Mishkin, “The Household 
Balance Sheet and the Great Depression” Journal of Economic History, December 1978, 38, pp. 918-937.  
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the variables (nwp) and (nfwp) lagged in (t-1) periods are included to identify the 
existence of partial adjustment or inertia effect in the model equations. All the data of 
these estimations has been seasonally adjusted and thus, the seasonal effect has 
been eliminated. The econometric results of the estimations are presented below. 
 
Table VI.1 
Estimation of the Net Financial Wealth of the Business Sector, 1977-82 
 
 Dependent Variable: nfwp 
 Method: Least Squares 
 Sample (adjusted): 1977:1 1982:4 
 Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -13599.17 7254.233 -1.874652 0.0763
ind-output(-4) 85470.54 31339.51 2.727245 0.0134
credp -0.173957 0.069052 -2.519210 0.0209
spread -23955.93 8086.914 -2.962308 0.0080
nfwp(-1) 0.695898 0.096299 7.226434 0.0000
 R-squared 0.908548          Mean dependent var. 2340.292
 Adjusted R-squared 0.889295          S.D. dependent var. 7506.488
 S.E. of regression 2497.584          Akaike info criterion 18.66709
 Sum squared residual 1.19E+08          Schwarz criterion 18.91251
 Log likelihood -219.0050          F-statistic 47.18992
 Durbin-Watson stat. 2.242700          Prob.(F-statistic) 0.000000
Source: own estimation based on information of the matrix of assets and liabilities for Argentina calculated 
in Chapter IV and statistics of national accounts obtained from the Ministry of Economy of Argentina. 
Econometric software: E-Views 3.0, Quantitative Micro Software 1997. 
 
 
The above results show good econometric fitness of the equation (1). The coefficient of 
regression is high (adjusted R-squared=0.89); the model equation is statistically 
significant (F-statistic); and the single coefficients of the explanatory variables are all 
statistically significant (t-statistic) and have the ‘expected’ sign (+/-). Additionally, all 
these results have passed satisfactorily the standard tests of normality (Jarque-Bera’s 
test), heteroskedasticity (White’s test) and autocorrelation (Lagrange Multiplier and 
Ljung-Box Q-statistic tests) of the economic series. (The econometric results of these 
tests are presented below in Appendix B to Chapter VI). 
 
 
 
 287 
Table VI.2 
Estimation of the Net Worth of the Business Sector, 1977-82  
 
 
 Dependent Variable: nwp 
 Method: Least Squares 
 Sample: 1977:1 1982:4 
 Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 9228.205 12268.82 0.752167 0.4607
ind-output(-4) 89941.21 33314.84 2.699734 0.0138
Spread -25376.88 8325.854 -3.047961 0.0064
nwp(-1) 0.771671 0.106659 7.234932 0.0000
 R-squared 0.875641          Mean dependent var. 131524.8
 Adjusted R-squared 0.856987          S.D. dependent var. 6978.177
 S.E. of regression 2638.941          Akaike info criterion 18.74515
 Sum squared residual 1.39E+08          Schwarz criterion 18.94150
 Log likelihood -220.9419           F-statistic 46.94152
 Durbin-Watson stat 2.148856           Prob.(F-statistic) 0.000000
Source: own estimation based on information of the matrix of assets and liabilities for Argentina calculated 
in Chapter IV and statistics of national accounts obtained from the Ministry of Economy of Argentina.   
Econometric software: E-Views 3.0, Quantitative Micro Software 1997. 
 
 
A satisfactory econometric fitness is verified also for equation (2). The ‘net worth’ of the 
non-financial private sector is explained largely by the independent variables (adjusted 
R-squared = 0.86). In addition, the model equations as well as the single coefficients 
are statistically significant and have the ‘expected’ sign (F- and t-statistics). As with the 
previous estimation, the tests of normality, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the 
series were all passed satisfactorily16.  
 
A point to be stressed is that besides the importance of these results taken individually, 
when looked at together, these estimations prove the econometric consistency of the 
overall formulation. This is so because the same structure of independent variables is 
statistically significant to explain the evolution of both the ‘net financial wealth’ and ‘net 
worth’ (net wealth) of the business sector as a whole. In addition, as stated earlier, 
these explanatory variables represent the income- and price-effects on the sectoral 
                                           
16 With a 5% significance level, the estimated regression satisfactorily passed the autocorrelation tests of 
residuals (Lagrange Multiplier and Ljung-Box Q-statistic tests) and the White’s test of normality; see 
Appendix B to Chapter VI. 
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portfolio. Therefore, from the economic point of view, it can be affirmed that these 
findings prove not only a correlation of variables, but a cause-effect relationship: the 
levels of liquidity and solvency of the non-financial private sector over these years 
depended positively on the level of activity measured by the industrial output (income-
effect) and negatively on the rate of spread charged by the financial intermediaries 
(price-effect). Furthermore, the level of liquidity of the business sector as a whole 
depended negatively on the amount of loans granted by the banks. In these 
estimations, there was a lag of four quarters in the variable (ind-output); that is to say, 
twelve months elapsed between an initial change in industrial output and the final effect 
on the level of liquidity and solvency of this sector. Finally, the coefficients of the 
variables nfwp(-1) and nwp(-1) show the existence of a partial adjustment or inertia-
effect in these estimations.  
 
In short, these econometric results fully confirm the interaction suggested above 
between the aggregate level of economic activity and the financial structure of the non-
financial private sector. This interaction is shown in the graph below, which depicts the 
re-feeding process which took place in the Argentine economy between mid-1977 and 
mid-1979. 
Graph VI.3 
Real-Financial Interaction, Jul.1977– Jul.1979 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own construction based on the real-financial interaction described below.  
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This can be rationalised as follows: the credit boom which followed the financial reform 
of mid-1977 helped to increase the rate of investment which, in turn, led to an 
expansion in the level of activity. This growth brought about an increase in the financial 
wealth and in the ‘net worth’ of the non-financial private sector and this, both increased 
the quantity and improved the quality of the collateral given by borrowers to the banks. 
As the banks were flooded with deposits and eager to lend these funds, this wealth 
enhancement was welcomed as new collateral for further loans17. This was so because 
the improvement in the financial position of the business sector contributed to a 
reduction in the informational risk of the banks and, therefore, in the probability that their 
borrowers would default.  
 
 
Nevertheless, a change for the worse in the macro-economic conditions from mid-1979 
on transformed the virtuous circle described above into a vicious downward spiral. 
From this time on, the decline in the aggregate level of activity caused a marked 
deterioration in the levels of liquidity and solvency of the non-financial private sector. 
As discussed earlier, in this scenario, problems of distress borrowing are likely to 
appear during the down swing of the cycle, where there are low margin prices and 
returns on capital, high borrowing costs and a weak balance sheet position. This 
occurred in Argentina in the early 1980s, as the business sector continued 
accumulating debts with banks in order to survive. The new funds went to finance not 
an increase in investment but the operation and the continuity of already-established 
businesses. This means that the financial vulnerability of this economic sector as a 
whole was rising pari-passu with the reduction in its capacity to repay debts and thus, 
the probability of cases of distress borrowing was rising.  
 
 
 
                                           
17 Usually, the entire ‘net worth’ of an economic unit (agent or firm) and not one specific asset is 
considered by the financial institutions as collateral for commercial credits. 
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VI.3 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE  
 
Although the macro-financial analysis undertaken in the last section is very useful as a 
means of recognising the direction and the speed of change in the levels of liquidity 
and solvency of the non-financial private sector as a whole, this is not so for the 
identification of the factors responsible for the increase in the degree of financial 
fragility. This requires a breakdown of the elements which affected the economic 
performance of the business units. The information needed for this kind of evaluation is 
contained in the financial statements of the companies. Unfortunately, this data is 
available in Argentina only for firms quoted on the stock exchange, and not for all 
companies. However, this group of firms accounted for around 25% of GDP and 70% 
of total exports and was engaged in different areas, including: food and beverage 
processing (Molinos Río de la Plata, Swift-Armour, Bonafide, Ledesma, Cervecería 
Quilmes), steel and aluminium production (Acindar, Aluar), tobacco (Massalin 
Particulares, Nobleza Piccardo), textiles (Alpargatas) and automobile manufacture 
(Renault), among others.       
 
The sample of firms used in this study as a proxy for the whole business sector 
consists of 153 industrial enterprises quoted on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange 
between 1977 and 198118. At the end of the period under study, the size of this sample 
measured in terms of the stock of total assets was US$ 9,500 million, and in terms of 
‘net worth’ US$ 5,400 million which means, around 76% of all the corporate assets 
which were quoted on the Stock Exchange and 27% of the total loans granted by the 
banking institutions to the private sector.  
 
Given the regulations in force in Argentina during these years, the balance sheet data 
contains a partial adjustment for inflation: the fixed capital was re-valued taking inflation 
into account, and the assets and liabilities in local and foreign currencies were taken at 
                                           
18 The data for this sample of companies were obtained from the World Bank Project on “Liberalization 
with Stabilization in the Southern Cone” carried out by Humberto Petrei and James Tybout. A. H. Petrei 
and J. R. Tybout, “Financial Adjustments of Industrial Firms in Argentina during 1976-1981, paper 
submitted to the Econometric Society Latin American Regional Meeting, Santiago, mimeo, July 1983. 
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their end of the period value19. This data base contains annual information for the five 
accounting periods, 1977-81. For the sub-period, 1977-79, the figures were obtained 
from financial statements reported close to the middle of the year. For the more 
unstable years, 1980-81, in an attempt to reduce the inflationary effect on nominal 
values, the data was gathered on a quarterly basis, based on financial statements 
close to the middle of each quarter20.  
 
A study of the evolution of the profitability, liquidity and solvency of this sample of firms 
is carried out by looking at the following indices21: 
 
Index of profitability: 
a. Return on equity = operative + non-operative gain (loss) / net worth  
 
Index of liquidity:    
b. Current ratio = short-term assets / short-term debts 
c. Quick ratio = (short-term assets - investments) / short-term debts 
d. Immobilisation of assets (I) = long-term assets / net worth 
e. Inmobilisation of assets (II) = long-term assets / (net worth + long-term assets) 
 
Index of solvency:  
f.  Leverage = total debt / net worth 
g. Leverage (in foreign currency) = debt in foreign currency / net worth 
h. Liabilities as (%) of assets = total liabilities / total assets 
i. Net worth as (%) of assets = net worth / total assets  
j. Net worth index = net worth of each year / net worth of the base year (1977)  
 
Table VI.3 summarises the main changes in corporate financial structure over the 
period 1977-81. 
 
 
                                           
19 These re-valuations corrected only partially the effect of inflation on corporate portfolios. In Argentina, 
the accounting statements were not adjusted by inflation until 1981.  
20 The financial statements of the firms were not adjusted by inflation. 
21 These are the typical indices for a study of the corporate financial structure. For a theoretical 
bibliography on this subject see,  R. A. Brealey and S. C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, Chapter 
VII, 1998 
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Tables VI.3 
Profitability, Liquidity and Solvency of the Sample of Firms, 1977-81 
 
Total Firms (Ratios and Values) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
      
 a. Return on equity 26.0 16.0 22.0 12.0 3.0 
 b. Current ratio 1.23 1.16 1.13 1.11 1.14 
 c. Quick ratio 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.63 0.61 
 d. Immobilisation of assets (I) 1.04 1.16 1.23 1.28 1.69 
e. Immobilisation of assets (II) 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.95 1.04 
 f.  Leverage 0.73 0.85 0.89 0.98 1.22 
 g. Leverage (in foreign currency) 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.55 
 h. Liabilities as (%) of assets 0.42 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.59 
 i.  Net worth as (%) of assets 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.45 
 j.  Net worth (in millions US$) 506 504 519 482 494 
 
Total Firms (Index 1977=100) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
            
 a. Return on equity 100 62 85 46 12 
 b. Current ratio 100 94 92 90 93 
 c. Quick ratio 100 99 95 88 86 
 d. Immobilisation of assets (I)  100 112 119 123 163 
 e. Immobilisation of assets (II) 100 104 106 107 117 
 f.  Leverage 100 116 121 134 166 
 g. Leverage (in foreign currency) 100 130 136 155 272 
 h. Liabilities as (%) of assets 100 109 111 117 139 
 i.  Net worth as (%) of assets 100 94 92 88 78 
 j.  Net worth Index  100 99 103 95 98 
 
Source: own construction based on data taken from A. H. Petrei and J. R. Tybout, “Financial Adjustments 
of Industrial Firms in Argentina during 1976-1981, paper submitted to the Econometric Society Latin 
American Regional Meeting, mimeo, Santiago, July 1983. 
 
 
These figures show that the economic performance of the sample of firms underwent a 
significant deterioration in these years. To begin with, the rate of corporate profits or 
the ‘return on equity’ declined from 26% per annum in 1977 to 3% in 1981. As can be 
observed, this was not a steady decline: this return dropped to 16% in 1978 and then 
increased to 22% in 1979. Subsequently, it fell dramatically to 12% in 1980 and to 3% 
in 1981. More importantly, in the period 1977-79, there was an accumulated profit of 
54% and yet, the ‘net worth’ rose only 3% in real terms. This was so because the 
positive contribution to corporate wealth of the ‘return on equity’ was only slightly higher 
than the capital loss which resulted from the effect of changes in relative prices on the 
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stock of assets and liabilities of these companies22. However, between 1979 and 1981, 
the rate of profit declined sharply and failed to compensate for the capital loss suffered 
by these enterprises and as a consequence, the corporate ‘net worth’ declined in real 
terms. Over these years, the companies increased their level of indebtedness as a 
proportion of total assets, and this had two effects on the corporate financial structure. 
On the one hand, there was a decline in the degree of liquidity: the current and quick 
ratios dropped from an index of 100 in 1977 to 93 and 86 respectively in 1980. 
Additionally, the two indices of immobilisation of assets (I) and (II) increased to 163 and 
117. All this reveals the mounting liquidity risk which the business sector faced over 
this period. It should be noted, however, that the current ratio did not fall below the 
critical level of 1, where a firm is considered technically ‘illiquid’.  
 
On the other hand, the accumulation of debt brought about an increase in the level of 
corporate leverage from 73% in 1977 to 122% in 1981. Furthermore, a large proportion 
of the new debt was obtained in the international capital markets and this explains the 
170% increase in leverage in foreign currency. As argued earlier, the evolution of the 
level of corporate debt and the asset side of the balance sheet will be considered in the 
assessment of the risk of solvency of these companies. In this regard, Table VI.3 
shows that the ratio total debts to total assets increased by 39%; and the ratio ‘net 
worth’ to total assets declined by 22% between 1977 and 1981. Additionally, the level 
of corporate ‘net worth’ declined in real terms. All this confirms the hypothesis that 
these companies were covering their losses - including the inflationary effect - with 
debts. It can, therefore, be concluded that the sample of firms, on average, faced rising 
exchange rate and solvency risks over the whole period under analysis, and in 
particular from 1980 on. However, as stated in connection with liquidity, the above 
ratios do not show a generalised problem of insolvency in these enterprises.  
 
                                           
22 As analysed earlier, a change in the level of corporate ‘net worth’ in real terms is the result of the effect 
of the ‘return on equity’ plus (minus) capital gains (loses) on the net financial asset position due to changes 
in relative prices. Capital loss (gains) is the net effect produced by changes in relative prices on the assets 
and liabilities held by one economic unit. For a formal analysis, see Chapter II, Section 3. 
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So far, it has been found that this sample of companies faced increased risks of 
liquidity, foreign exchange and solvency over the period under study23. The combined 
effect of these three types of risk was to make the firms far more financially fragile 
overall. The challenge now is to identify the factors responsible for the deterioration in 
the financial health of these enterprises. This analysis begins by considering the 
evolution of the ‘return on equity’, the most relevant indicator of the economic 
performance of a firm24.  
 
In general, the economic result of a company (gain/loss) is the difference between the 
income generated by its stock of assets and the expenditures generated by its stock of 
liabilities. After some transformation, the ‘return on equity’ (corporate profitability) can 
be expressed as shown in equation (3). A full formal explanation of the real and 
financial factors (including the leverage-effect), which affect the ‘return on equity’ and 
on ‘assets’ of a company, is presented below in Appendix A to Chapter VI. 
 
(3) τ  = (1 + ξ) σ - r ξ    
 
where: τ = return on equity = operative + non-operative gain (loss) / net worth 
 σ = return on assets = operative + non-operative gain (loss) / stock of assets 
  ξ = leverage = total debt / net worth (L/NW)  
 r = average rate of interest paid on debts  
 
Equation (3) presents the ‘return on equity’ (τ) as a function of the difference between 
the increase in the stock of assets [(1 + ξ) σ] and the cost of liabilities [r ξ ]; both 
expressed as a proportion of the total corporate ‘net worth’. It should be noted that in this 
equation, the change in assets depends on two variables: the level of leverage (ξ) and the 
‘return on assets’ (σ); the change in liabilities also depends on the level of corporate 
                                           
23 Following a different approach and applying the theory of financial fragility put forward by Hyman 
Minsky, Julio Dreizzen obtained the same result: the financial vulnerability of this sample of firms increased 
over the period 1977-81. J. Dreizzen, Fragilidad Financiera e Inflación, Estudios CEDES, (1985). A 
summary of Minsky’s theory is given in Chapter II, Section 2.  
24 A formal analysis of the variables which affect the rate of corporate profitability is given in Appendix A to 
Chapter VI. 
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leverage and on the rate of interest paid on debts in real terms, the financial cost (r). 
Finally, the importance of equation (3) for the present analysis should be stressed: it 
makes it possible to identify the effects of factors both endogenous and exogenous to the 
firm on the ‘return on equity’. Indeed, provided that there is not extensive credit rationing in 
the financial market, the level of corporate leverage is the result of the financial policy 
followed by the managers of the company (endogenous variables). However, the other 
two factors affecting the firm’s profitability - the ‘return on assets’ and the interest paid on 
debts - depend largely on government policies including, commercial and foreign 
exchange policies, anti-inflationary and wage policies and the monetary policy; variables 
which are exogenous and, therefore, beyond the control of the firm25. Furthermore, this 
kind of analysis will allow the identification of the weight which the real and the financial 
factors had on the economic performance of these firms (for a technical analysis, see 
Appendix A to Chapter VI).      
 
Graph VI.3 presents the results of equation (3) for the sample of companies under study: 
the evolution of the ‘return on equity’ and its components - the changes in the stocks of 
assets and liabilities as a proportion of the corporate ‘net worth’ - over the period 1977-81. 
In addition, the variables responsible for these results - the return on assets, the cost paid 
of debts, the level of corporate leverage and the interest rate in real terms in the local 
financial market - are presented below in Table VI.4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
25 It is true that, in the case of a single firm, the ‘return on assets’ depends also on various elements which 
are under managerial control such as the technology adopted, the level of productivity obtained and the 
price strategy decided. However, these endogenous factors become less relevant in a study of the 
business sector represented by a sample of firms with a wide range of economic activities in which, factors 
exogenous to the firm take on a greater importance. 
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Table VI.4 
Breakdown of the Return on Equity, 1977-81 
(Percentage points) 
 
Year Return on Cost of Corporate Real Lending     Corporate Leverage (ξ) 
 Asset (σ) Debts (r) Rate in Local Market Total In Foreign Curr.
1977 13 -3.7 -12 0.73 0.20 
1978 10 2.6 6 0.85 0.26 
1979 9 -5.3 -13 0.89 0.28 
1980 8 3.9 9 0.98 0.31 
1981 10 19.5 32 1.22 0.55 
Aver. 77-79 10.7 -2.1 -6.3 0.82 0.25 
Aver. 80-81 9 11.7 20.5 1.10 0.43 
Aver. 77-81 10 3.4 4.4 0.93 0.34 
Source: own construction based on data taken from A. H. Petrei and J. R. Tybout, Op. Cit. 
 
Graph VI.4 
Return on Equity of the Sample of Firms, 1977-81 
 (Percentage points) 
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  Source: own calculation based on data taken from A. H. Petrei and J. R. Tybout, Op. Cit.  
 
 
As can be seen in Graph VI.4, the evolution of the ‘return on equity’ mirrors inversely 
the pattern followed by the financial cost paid by the firms for their debts whereas the 
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‘return on assets’ as a proportion of corporate ‘net worth’ follows a much smoother 
path. During the first year, debt payments rose by 6.4% and the ‘return on equity’ 
declined by 10.4%. In the following year, the former dropped by 8% and the latter 
increased by 7%. Finally, between 1979 and 1981, the financial costs increased by 
25% and the ‘return on equity’ fell by 20%. It should be stressed that if the whole period 
under analysis is taken into account, the fluctuations in interest rates explain, to a great 
extent, the evolution of the corporate profitability.  
 
Two different periods can be distinguished in the evolution of the ‘return on equity’, 
before and after 1979. As described above, the rate oscillated between a maximum of 
26% and a minimum of 16% per annum, with an average of 22% between 1977 and 
1979. Then, in the second period, the ‘return on equity’ experienced a rapid decline 
from 12% in 1980 to 3% in 1981, with an average of 7.3%. The factors behind these 
movements were the following: at the beginning, the financial reform of 1977, launched 
in an unstable macro-economic scenario, resulted in a credit boom with negative or 
very low lending rates in real terms26. This encouraged the companies to raise their 
leverage position from 0.73 to 0.89 between 1977 and 1979. On the real side, the 
‘return on assets’ of these companies declined in these years from 13% to 9%, mainly 
due to the economic recession which occurred between the third quarter of 1977 and 
the second quarter of 197827. However, given that the yield obtained on assets was 
higher than the cost paid for the funds borrowed, the enterprises benefited from a 
positive leverage-effect [(σ > r) L/NW] - the difference between the ‘return on assets’ 
and the cost paid for the funds borrowed, multiplied by the stock of debt as a proportion 
of ‘net worth’. Based on equation (4), it is estimated that 50% of the rate of profits is 
explained by the net return - the positive leverage-effect - which these firms obtained 
on the funds borrowed. In other words, the difference of 11% between the returns on 
equity and on assets in 1977-79 is explained by the positive leverage-effect 
                                           
26 As shown in Chapter IV, Section 4, the monetary, fiscal, exchange rate and financial policies contributed 
to the generation of this `credit boom´ over the period 1977-79.   
27 As described in Chapter III, Section 4, during the period 1979-81, Argentina suffered a dramatic fall in 
the level of activity; GDP fell by 5.5% and production in the industrial and construction sectors dropped by 
22.1% and 36.4% respectively.  
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experienced by these corporations (Graph VI.4). This shows that raising the level of 
corporate indebtedness was the appropriate policy in these circumstances as it 
resulted in increased profits. 
 
After mid-1979, the large ‘easy’ gains obtained in the previous years by the business 
sector as a result of the low borrowing costs began to disappear. This was so because 
the rate of interest in real terms in the domestic credit markets increased dramatically 
from -13% in 1979 to 9% in 1980 and 32% in 1981. In spite of the higher costs, the 
firms continued raising their leverage position and consequently, debt payments 
increased from -5.6% of corporate ‘net worth’ in 1979 to 3.9% in 1980 and 15.7% in 1981 
(Table VI.4). However, on the real side, the companies performed relatively poorly with a 
low ‘return on assets’ (around 8-10%) as a result of the continuous appreciation of the 
real exchange rate coupled with the economic recession, which began in the second 
half of 1979. This explains the notable deterioration in the rate of corporate profits over 
these years: the ‘return on equity’ dropped from 21% on average in the period 1977-79 to 
12% in 1980 and to 3% in 1981 (see Graph VI.4 and Tables VI.3 and VI.4). In this 
scenario, given that the ‘return on assets’ of these companies remained fairly stable, 
the reduction in the ‘return on equity’ was mainly the result of the decline in the 
leverage-effect (see above equation 4): the leverage-effect [(σ > r) L/NW] fell from 
10.8% in the period 1977-79 to 4.0% in 1980 and, thereafter, it became negative [(σ < 
r) L/NW] -7% in 1981. This means that the economic performance of the firms was 
affected adversely by the level of indebtedness, as the cost per unit of the money 
borrowed was higher than the return which these funds were generating (negative 
leverage-effect)28. The negative leverage-effect accounts for 96% of the total decline in 
rate of corporate profits in the period 1980-8129.   
                                           
28 See below Appendix A to Chapter VI for a formal analysis of the ‘leverage-effect’. 
29 The importance of the high real lending rate in the explanation for the decline in the level of activity in 
these years is emphasised by several authors including: Adolfo Buscaglia, Op. Cit.. 1980, p.10; Ernesto 
Feldman, "La Crisis Financiera Argentina, 1980-82. Algunos Comentarios", Desarrollo Económico, Oct.-Dec. 
1983, No.19, vol. 23, pp. 449-455; Carlos F. Díaz-Alejandro, "Good-bye Financial Repression, Hello 
Financial Crash", Journal of Development Economics, 1985, 19, 112:1-24, p. 2; Roque B. Fernández, "La 
Crisis Financiera Argentina, 1980-82", Desarrollo Económico, Apr.-Jun.1983, No. 89, Vol.23, pp.78-95; 
James Tybout, "A Firm-Level Chronicle of Financial Crises in the Southern Cone", Journal of Development 
Economics, 1986, pp. 371-400.  
 299 
In short, it has been shown that the economic performance of the sample of companies 
as a whole is largely attributable to factors associated with the liability side - real rate of 
interest and the level of corporate debt - and not the asset side of the balance sheet. 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that debt obligations rose before mid-1979 mainly 
due to a micro-economic or endogenous variable - the corporate financial policy - and 
thereafter, due to a macro-economic or variable exogenous to the firm - the real 
lending rate charged by the banks30.  
 
This evaluation is completed with the identification of the impact of each of the three 
factors (‘return on assets’, interest rate and level of leverage) on corporate profitability. 
This will be done by running the following counterfactual analysis: what would the 
evolution of the corporate ‘return on equity’ have been if: 
 
(a) the ‘return on assets’ and the leverage position which prevailed in the year 1977 
had remained unchanged, while the interest rate in real terms evolved as it did 
(Simulation I: interest rate-effect);  
(b) the leverage position and the interest rate in real terms which prevailed in the year 
1977 had remained unchanged, while the ‘return on assets’ followed its actual pattern 
(Simulation II: return on asset-effect);  
(c) the ‘return on assets’ and the interest rate in real terms which prevailed in the year 
1977 had remained unchanged, while the level of leverage rose as it did (Simulation III: 
leverage-effect);  
(d) the corporate debt had been accrued in the domestic financial system - no foreign 
financing - all other factors changing as they did (Simulation IV: borrowing-effect). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
30 A detailed study of the factors responsible for the increase in the lending rate is given in Chapter IV. 
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Table VI.5 
Evolution of the Return on Equity: Real and Simulated Cases, 1977-81  
(Percentage points) 
 
  Simulation I Simulation II Simulation III Simulation IV 
Period Real Case Interest Rate Return on Assets Leverage Dom. Borrow.
  Effect Effect Effect Effect 
1977 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 31.3 
1978 15.9 20.6 21.0 29.3 13.4 
1979 22.3 26.5 19.3 29.5 28.6 
1980 12.0 19.7 17.6 30.9   7.0 
1981   2.7 12.6 21.0 36.2 -16.8 
Aver. 77-79 21.5 24.5 22.2 28.3 24.4 
Aver. 80-81   7.3 16.1 19.3 33.5  -4.9 
Aver. 77-81 15.8 21.1 21.0 30.4 12.7 
Source: own construction based on data taken from A. H. Petrei and J. R. Tybout Op. Cit. 
 
As can be seen in Table VI.5, on average, the actual decline in corporate profitability 
was greater than that obtained in Simulations (I) and (II) between 1977-79 and 1980-
81. Alternatively, the ‘return on equity’ in the first two hypothetical cases was higher, on 
average, than that obtained in practice. This means that the interest rate and the ‘return 
on assets’ effects individually would have had a negative effect on the rate of corporate 
profitability (Simulations I and II). However, this fall was greater in reality, as the firms 
were suffering the effects of both factors simultaneously. Simulation (III) demonstrates 
that the policy of raising the leverage position would not have resulted in a drop in the 
level of corporate profits if the ‘return on assets' and the interest rates in real terms had 
been maintained at 1977 levels. However, in practice, as the lending rate for these 
companies increased on average from -2.6% per annum in 1977-79 to 11.7% in 1980-
81, the accumulation of debt contributed to reducing the level of profitability of the 
companies.  
 
Based on these figures, it is estimated that the combined effect of the increase in the 
real lending rate and in the level of leverage account for 79% of the decline in the rate 
of profits between 1977-79 and 1980-81 on average, while the fall in the ‘return on 
assets’ explains the remaining 21%. Moreover, 75% of the rise in debt payments is the 
result of the increase in the interest rate in real terms. In turn, this implies that nearly 
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60% of the total decline in the rate of profits can be attributed to the increase in the cost 
of money (higher lending rate).  
 
It should be stressed that these results correspond to large firms with full access to 
international capital markets. For enterprises which were at the mercy of the domestic 
financial market, the negative effect on profits would have been even greater 
(Simulation IV). Indeed, if all the loans had been obtained locally, the rise in the cost of 
debt would have explained 87% of the decline in the ‘return on equity’. This is very 
important because many small and medium-sized businesses - the mainstay of the 
Argentine economy - which were unable to obtain funds abroad, must have found it 
hard to cope with the dramatic increase in the cost of their obligations31. In this case, it 
is estimated that the increase in the cost of financing would have caused a decline in 
the ‘return on equity’ of nearly 30%, from 24.4% to -4.9% between 1977-79 and 1980-
81 (last column Table VI.5).  
 
In fact, one consequence of this high and growing level of financial fragility of the firms 
in the sample was that, of the 153 companies, 23 were so seriously affected that they 
ended up either in ‘concurso’ or liquidation during the period 1980-8132. Although this 
represents only 15% of the total firms in the case-study, it cannot be assumed that the 
remaining 130 were financially healthy. This is so because they were burdened with 
loans taken out at a time of negative real interest rates on average (1977-79) and were 
now faced with the prospect of re-payment in a period in which the real lending rate 
was rising and the ‘return on assets’ was not (1980-81).  
                                           
31 With regard to this, Cavallo and Petrei affirmed: ‘’the financial costs for small firms were almost three 
times those of large firms’’ and … ‘’smaller firms had to get financing from institutions which operated 
almost exclusively with domestic funds’’. D. F. Cavallo and A. H. Petrei, ``Financing Private Business in an 
Inflationary Context: The Experience of Argentina Between 1967 and 1980. Journal of Development 
Economics, 32 (2), April 1891, pp. 169-96, pp.171 and 175.   
32 In general, a firm is at risk of insolvency when the difference between its assets and its debt obligations is 
marginal. When the assets no longer exceed the liabilities - the ‘net worth’ is nil or negative - the firm is 
technically insolvent and becomes the property of its creditors. This implies that the assets of the company 
will be sold and the proceeds will be divided among creditors. In some countries like Argentina, the selling 
of assets is usually postponed in the hope of a formal agreement for repayment of the debt between the 
debtor (company) and its creditors. This system called ‘concurso’ is aimed at avoiding capital losses 
associated with the distress selling of assets. If the agreement is not fulfilled during the trial period, the firm 
can be declared bankrupt and liquidated. 
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VI.4 BORROWER FRAGILITY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
 
In Section 2, it was shown that from mid-1979 on there was a sharp deterioration in the 
levels of liquidity and solvency of the private sector as a whole and it was suggested 
that this was the consequence of the high indebtedness in a period in which the lending 
rate was rising rapidly while the level of activity was falling. In Section 3, it was found 
that a sample of firms followed a similar pattern of liquidity and solvency and that the 
lending rate and their leverage positions were key factors in explaining the increase in 
the level of financial fragility of these companies. These findings are very important 
because when one looks at a universe (all the economic units) and identifies certain 
trends and then, these same patterns are found for a representative part of the whole 
(a sample of firms), and a key factor is recognised, it is it is reasonable to assume that 
this factor also affects the whole universe. This assumption can be tested by looking at 
the evolution of the amount of assets frozen by the Courts for the business sector as a 
whole as companies went into either ‘concurso’ or liquidation.  
 
Graph VI.5 
Firms’ Assets in Default and/or Bankruptcy, 1977-81 
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Graph VI.5 shows the evolution of assets of firms declared bankrupt in the Buenos 
Aires Courts over the period 1977-81. It is estimated that all companies operating in 
this geographical district accounted for around 30% of the stock of credits given by the 
banks to the productive sector and for 15% of the credits given to the private sector as 
a whole (individuals and enterprises)33. As can be seen above, problems of solvency in 
the business sector were relatively insignificant until mid-1979; representing 0.28% of 
the bank credits granted to firms in Buenos Aires. This situation changed dramatically 
during the second half of this year, when the amount of assets in receivership 
(‘concurso’) more than quadrupled, going from US$ 25 to US$ 130 million; that is, from 
0.28% to 1.2% of the total loans allocated to firms. Subsequently, after a slight 
improvement in the first half of 1980 due to the huge financial assistance given by the 
Central Bank to the banks, which temporarily alleviated the situation for borrowers, the 
amount of assets in default rose further, reaching US$ 225 million; that is, 2.25% of the 
total loans allocated to firms in the Buenos Aires area in the second half of 1980, an 
eight-fold increase34.  
 
Although these figures represent only a small proportion of the amount of loans granted 
by the banking system, this marked increase in the number of companies facing 
financial difficulties is a clear symptom of the growing fragility of the business sector. In 
effect, the spread of the problem of solvency in the real side of the economy was an 
issue of major concern for the economic authorities. In 1980, the Vice-president of the 
Central Bank, Alejandro Reynal declared “there are problems in firms such as, if an 
entrepreneur wants to pay back a loan, he is unable to do so. This is so because day 
by day he goes further into debt, as the company is not profitable enough to pay the 
high interest rates reigning in the market”35. He also stated: ”I just want to say that 
                                           
33 These figures were estimated based on the proportion of GDP generated in the Greater Buenos Aires 
area.  
34 Besides this financial assistance, the Central Bank ordered banks to set up a reserve against 
unforeseen risks of an amount equivalent to 20% of the payroll of the institution (Circular No. 1245). This 
was done to protect against non-performing loans. For more details of this financial assistance, see 
Chapter IV, Section 5. 
35 Author’s translation of the speech given at the ‘’First Conference on Industrial Modernisation’’ taken 
place in the Centro Cultural General San Martin. Newspaper report, La Razón, 21 Friday, Nov. 1980, p. 5 
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there are many companies at this moment which should have closed down a long time 
ago36. In the same vein, James Tybout affirmed: ‘‘bankruptcy began to occur with 
increasing frequency, non-performing bank loans multiplied and the portfolios of many 
leading (financial) institutions deteriorated rapidly’’37. Julio Dreizzen proved that, at the 
beginning of 1980, the level of corporate financial fragility rose sharply38. These 
statements and studies would suggest that the graph above shows only the ‘’tip of the 
iceberg’’ and that many more business units were in serious financial difficulties which, 
at the end of the day, would cause further problems for the financial institutions. This 
conjecture is supported by the figures given earlier in Section 2, which show the rapid 
increase in the leverage position of the non-financial private sector.  
 
For the sample of firms analysed earlier in Section VI.3, it has been proved that the 
main reasons for the deterioration in their financial health were the increase in the 
lending rates together with their high leverage position. If this holds true for the 
economy as a whole, one would expect to find a high positive correlation between the 
amount of assets under judicial supervision (‘concurso’) and the rise in the lending rate 
and in the level of leverage of the business sector. Formally, this can be expressed as: 
 
(3) assbkrt =  α1 + β1 lendrt  + β2 levert 
 
with: 
 
assbkr = assets under judicial supervision or in bankruptcy 
lendr = lending rate in real terms  
lever = leverage position of the private sector as a whole 
 
The econometric estimation of equation (3) is undertaken using the logarithms of these 
series, after seasonal adjustment.  
                                           
36 La Razón, 21 Friday, Nov. 1980, p. 5 
37 J. Tybout, Op. Cit., 1986, p. 391  
38 The index of corporate financial fragility calculated by Dreizzen is based on Minsky’s theory, which is 
defined as the ratio of debt service payments to self-generated funds (debt service = debt amortisation 
plus interest payments) and (self-generated funds = corporate profits, plus asset depreciation and interest, 
minus taxes). J. Dreizzen, Op. Cit., 1985, pp. 35-52 and H. P. Minsky "A theory of systematic fragility", in 
Financial Crises: Institutions and Markets, Altman y A. Sametz (eds.), 1967 
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Table VI.6 
Assets Under Judicial Supervision or in Bankruptcy, 1977-81  
 
Dependent Variable: assbkr 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1977:4 1981:4 
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 14.81518 0.658274 22.50608 0.0000
lendr 0.288808 0.078951 3.658062 0.0026
lever(-3) 3.010713 0.472561 6.371063 0.0000
 R-squared 0.769317        Mean dependent var. 10.94150
 Adjusted R-squared 0.736362        S.D. dependent var. 1.036290
 S.E. of regression 0.532090        Akaike info criterion 1.734779
 Sum squared residual 3.963683        Schwarz criterion 1.881816
 Log likelihood -11.74562        F-statistic 23.34461
 Durbin-Watson stat 2.264464        Prob.(F-statistic) 0.000035
Source: own estimation based on information taken from (1) T.J.T. Baliño, “The Argentine Banking Crisis 
of   1980”, IMF Working Paper, Nov. 1987; (2)  the matrix of assets and liabilities for Argentina calculated 
in Chapter IV; and (3) The Central Bank of Argentina , Boletín Estadístico, monthly issues (1977-81). 
Econometric software: E-Views 3.0, Quantitative Micro Software 1997. 
 
These figures show a sound econometric fitness: the independent variables selected 
(lending rate in real terms and corporate leverage) help to explain - to a large extent - 
the firms in default (adjusted R-squared= 0.74). The model equation is statistically 
significant and all the single coefficients have the expected ‘sign’ and are statistically 
significant (F- and t-statistics) and, with a 5% significance level, the regression 
satisfactorily passed the White’s test of normality and the autocorrelation tests of 
residuals (Lagrange Multiplier and Ljung-Box Q-statistic tests)39. From an economic 
perspective, it can be stated that 74% of the total change in the amount of assets in 
‘concurso’ (assbkr) is explained by the lending rate in real terms (lendr) and the level of 
leverage with a lag of three quarters [lever(-3)].   
 
This estimation corroborates the conjecture made above regarding the importance of 
the real lending rate and the leverage position in explaining the rise in the degree of 
                                           
39 These econometric results are presented in Appendix B to Chapter VI. 
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financial fragility of the non-financial private sector as a whole from mid-1979 on40. 
Based on this, it can be stated that the financial vulnerability of the business sector 
began to rise in the second half of 1979 and developed into mounting problems of 
solvency from then on. In mid-1980, when the financial intermediaries were struggling 
to survive the liquidity crisis which ensued with the liquidations of the Banco de 
Intercambio Regional (BIR), Banco Internacional and Banco de Los Andes, the 
increased financial fragility of the business sector meant a reduction in the overall 
quality of bank credits. In effect, the sharp decline in the ‘net worth’ of the non-financial 
private sector - the main collateral for loans - brought about a general increase in the 
risk of insolvency of bank borrowers and consequently, a widespread reduction in the 
probability of loan repayment41. As a result, by late 1980, the stability of the financial 
system as a whole had been compromised. This was recognised by the Treasury 
Secretary Juan Alemann who admitted that if all the banks wrote off their bad debts 
several of them would be forced to close their doors42. This position is shared by José 
Luis Machinea who stressed that a large number of borrowers were unable to redeem 
their obligations with banks43. This means that many debtors were trapped in a stock-
flow disequilibrium, in which their capacity to generate the income required to pay off 
the accumulated debt was insufficient44.  
 
The worsening of the debt repayment capacity of bank borrowers had important 
negative consequences for the entire economy. First of all, the decline in corporate ‘net 
worth’ encouraged many firms to try to improve their economic position by assuming 
                                           
40 As defined in Chapter IV, Section 5, vulnerability or financial fragility refers to a position of weakness for 
absorbing negative shocks as a result of the high-risk exposure taken by the economic agent.  
41 Ben Bernanke puts forward the idea of the progressive erosion in ‘borrowers’ net worth’ (collateral) 
relative to their debt burdens as the central argument of the pervasiveness of the Great Depression in the 
economic recovery of the United States of America. He stated that the monetary explanation of the Debt 
Crisis of 1930 given by Friedman and Schwartz based on a monetary contraction seems insufficient to 
explain the fall in output. B. Bernanke, Op. Cit., June 1983, 73, pp.257-76.  
42 Newspaper interview, Clarín, Thursday 4, December 1980, p.10  
43 This confession was made by Machinea in a personal interview with the author. José Luis Machinea 
was Minister of Economy (1999-2000); President of the Central Bank (1985-89) and a member of the staff 
of the Central Bank during the period of the financial liberalisation reform (1977-81). 
44 This stock-flow disequilibrium affecting the borrower-lender relationship internally is similar to the 
national stock-flow disequilibrium of the country as a whole with foreign creditors explained in Chapter III, 
Section 4. 
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greater levels of risk. This was so because highly indebted companies with liquidity and 
solvency problems did not have any other way of financing their activities but to 
continue borrowing and even more so, if they had less of their own capital (net worth) 
to lose45. The most representative of these were the debtors of those banks which had 
behaved speculatively by taking excessive risk such as, the Banco de Intercambio 
Regional and Banco de Los Andes or by lending to sister companies such as the 
Banco Internacional46. In the words of Alejandro Reynal ‘’many firms decided to gamble 
against the continuance of the economic programme, and in spite of the fact that 
borrowing was an expensive option, did so to cover losses, to survive, to hold on’’47. 
The same was pointed out by Domingo Cavallo and Humberto Petrei ‘‘why do firms 
rely more on debt financing even though it is very costly in real terms ?. When the 
entrepreneurs are asked this question, their usual answer is that losses have to be 
financed and debt financing is the only available alternative’’48.  
 
As suggested in these statements, the increase in the lending rate encouraged some 
borrowers to change their attitude towards risk, making them less trustworthy (adverse 
selection); while others, decided to undertake ‘more profitable’ and hence, riskier 
projects (incentive effects). This situation gave an extra stimulus to borrowers to 
misrepresent and/or to camouflage the projects’ results or the performance of their 
firms, pretending to their creditors that they were financially sound (moral hazard). This, 
in turn, helps to explain the additional costs (explicit or implicit) that the intermediaries 
had to bear in order to audit or verify the truth of the performance and the ‘net worth’ of 
the firm and to liquidate assets if borrowers went bankrupt (transaction costs). An extra 
stimulus to behave irresponsibly was the belief that if the situation became a 
generalised problem of insolvency the government would be forced to step in to avert 
                                           
45 As analysed in Chapter IV, Section IV.5, this is a typical case of moral hazard in which one agent 
changes their risk position when he has less to lose.  
46 These cases of excessive risk taking and speculative behaviour in the financial system are discussed in 
depth in Chapter V, Section 6. This study is complemented with the analysis of the failures in supervision 
and banking regulations made in Chapter IV, Section 4.5 
47 Loc. Cit. La Razón, 21 Friday, Nov. 1980, p. 5 
48 D. F. Cavallo and A. H. Petrei, Op. Cit., April 1891, pp.177.  
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an economic collapse. These four factors - the increase in the riskness of borrowers 
and projects, the tendency on the part of bank debtors to conceal the results of their 
actions and the historical role of governments as the lender of last resort - had a 
negative impact on the loan-risk distribution of banks. In other words, the risk faced by 
the financial agents increased.  
 
It should be stressed that the riskier behaviour of borrowers was possible because the 
financial intermediaries also began to take greater risks in loan allocation. In effect, as 
explained in Chapter IV, Section VI.5, from the second quarter of 1980 on, the financial 
agents started to face the same problem of moral hazard as their clients: the decline in 
the banks’ capital (net worth) together with the need to obtain funds to deal with the 
liquidity crisis generated by the deposit run, prompted the banks to assume higher 
levels of risk in portfolio allocation. This suggests that the structure of incentives in the 
economy - the rules of the game - was changing adversely due to the actions of both 
borrowers (business sector) and lenders (banks). In this regard, it is reasonable to 
assume that the capacity of the financial agents regarding risk assessment in the 
allocation and monitoring of funds had suffered a severe weakening by the second half 
1980. This is so because the main intangible asset of the financial agents, the ‘state of 
affairs’ of their borrowers was undergoing a marked change and as a result, their 
information about which projects were likely to be profitable enough to enable the 
borrower to repay the loans, and who the most trustworthy borrowers were, was less 
reliable49. 
 
This change in the borrower-lender relationship had two consequences for the financial 
system: one, the efficiency of the process of financial intermediation was adversely 
affected and; two, the fears of the general public that the banking system was not to be 
trusted were deepened by the increasingly difficult situation of bank borrowers, who 
were facing rising lending rates, growing foreign competition and economic recession. 
                                           
49 A similar approach can be found in B. Bernanke and M. Gertler, Op. Cit., March 1989, 79, 1, pp.14-31;  
C. Calomaris and R. G. Hubbard “Firm Heterogeneity, Internal Finance and Credit Rationing”, The 
Economic Journal, March 1990, 100, 90-104; and M. Gertler Op. Cit., 1992, 59, pp. 455-472.  
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With more and more bad debts and the spectre of further deposit withdrawals, there 
was a real possibility that the entire banking system would collapse.  
 
By mid-1980, the government had begun to realise how serious the situation was and 
applied an extensive plan to bail out insolvent banks and firms: between November 
1980 and December 1981, the Central Bank granted loans amounting to US$ 6,500 
million (4.5% of GDP), equivalent to 12% of the stock of total credits and 15% of 
lending given to the private sector. This was followed in 1982 by a rescue plan for firms 
which had borrowed abroad. In a period in which the peso was being devalued, the 
government guaranteed the future nominal exchange rate at which these debts would 
be repaid - a process known as ‘nationalisation’ of private foreign debt. It is estimated 
that this plan covered around 70% of the total private foreign debt, approximately US$ 
9,600 million50. Another debt-relief measure applied in the same year was the setting of 
nominal interest rates which were negative in real terms (-4.8% per month on average, 
that is -75.5% per annum), the result of which was a massive redistribution of wealth 
from depositors to lenders in the banking system: it is estimated that the borrower 
subsidy amounted to 13.5% of GDP in the period 1982-83, equivalent to 23% of the 
stock of lending given to the private sector51. Despite all these efforts, over the period 
1980-81, economic activity experienced an unprecedented fall with a decline of 12% of 
GDP and 20.4% in industrial output. This marked the beginning of the longest period of 
economic stagnation in modern Argentine history.  
 
 
                                           
50 For more details, see R. Frenkel, J. Fanelli and J. Sommer, “El Proceso de Endeudamiento Externo 
Argentino”, Documento CEDES, No. 2, 1988, p. 13 
51 The subsidy obtained by the bank borrowers was estimated by Tomás Baliño, Op. Cit., 1987, p. 61. 
Its proportion in terms of the stock of credits given to the private sector is author’s calculation based on 
data taken from the financial matrix of assets and liabilities for Argentina (Appendix B to Chapter IV).  
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VI.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The macro- and micro- economic studies undertaken in this Chapter prove that the 
non-financial private sector was experiencing generalised problems of solvency in the 
years 1980-81 and that these problems stemmed primarily from financial factors both 
endogenous and exogenous to the firms - a high corporate leverage position combined 
with an increased lending rate. The hypothesis advanced in Chapter V has thus been 
confirmed: in a scenario of economic uncertainty, the decision made by banks to raise 
lending rates in order to deal with their immediate problems of liquidity ended up 
creating problems of solvency first for bank borrowers and, ultimately, for the banks 
themselves.  
 
The liberalisation of the financial system in 1977 gave rise to a rapid expansion in the 
supply of bank loans (credit boom), generating a period of economic prosperity which 
lasted until the first half of 1979. During this time, the business sector made large 
profits due to the combination of high ‘return on assets’ and negative real lending rates, 
which increased the level of ‘corporate net worth’. In turn, the stronger balance sheet 
position of borrowers had a positive effect on both the quantity and quality of the 
collateral offered to banks. As a result, the financial agents were encouraged to 
continue lending, which helped to sustain a high level of activity. At the same time, the 
business sector continued raising its levels of indebtedness in order to take advantage 
of the positive leverage effect resulting from the negative real interest rates.   
 
However, in the second half of 1979, the economy went into recession and the banks 
began to raise lending rates in real terms, which caused a marked decline in the 
indices of liquidity and solvency of bank borrowers. This had serious consequences for 
the business sector in that their capacity to repay outstanding debt obligations was 
reduced which, in turn, increased the probability of distress borrowing, further 
deteriorating the quality of bank loans. Moreover, the weakening in the balance sheet 
position of the firms together with the rising lending rates exacerbated the problems 
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caused by asymmetric information (‘hidden information’ and ‘hidden action’) between 
borrowers and lenders. As a result the bank borrowers began to change their attitude 
towards risk, making them less trustworthy (adverse selection); while others, decided to 
undertake ‘more profitable’ and hence, riskier projects (incentive effects). By the end of 
1980, the capacity of the financial system to acquire accurate information had been 
greatly reduced, affecting its overall efficiency in loan allocation. However, at that time, 
the most important problem for the financial intermediaries, resulting from the 
deterioration in the financial health of their borrowers, was a spreading problem of non-
performing loans. Although the government attempted a massive bailout of the financial 
system and business sector, it was too little, too late. The level of activity plummeted 
and the Argentine economy went into the longest period of recession in its modern 
history.   
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VII.   GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this dissertation is that the failure of the financial 
liberalisation was due to both a fundamental flaw in the neo-classical theory of financial 
markets and the macro-economic background against which this experiment was put 
into practice. With regard to the former, for the neo-classical theorists, financial markets 
were like any other market, and the liberalisation of the market forces was regarded as 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for an efficient operation of financial institutions.  
At that time, the seriousness of the effects of asymmetric information was not generally 
recognised and, therefore, little attention was paid in the Argentine financial reform of 
mid-1977 to the importance of regulating the amount of risk assumed by the financial 
intermediaries. The lack of appropriate regulation and supervision encouraged cases of 
excessive risk taking, speculative behaviour and corruption within the banking system, 
which had deleterious effects on the efficiency of resource allocation. At the same time, 
with large fiscal and foreign deficits, the informational problems present in financial 
markets were exacerbated in the case of Argentina by persistent high inflation, which 
further diminished the capacity of agents to make accurate predictions about market 
prices in real terms, including the interest and foreign exchange rates. The quality of 
loan allocation was also adversely affected by the abundance of deposits after the 
financial de-regulation, which generated a credit boom. This led the banks to relax their 
standards for screening and selecting projects and borrowers so as to speed up the 
process of lending. All these factors caused deterioration in the quality-features of the 
macro-financial structure, which brought about a steady rise in the levels of the 
country’s financial fragility until March 1980, when the banking system finally collapsed. 
 
The findings presented in this study also confirm that the failure of the financial 
experiment of the late 1970s was the primary cause of the longest period of economic 
stagnation in the history of Argentina. In contrast to the predictions of the neo-classical 
theorists, the financial liberalisation did not result in an increase, but rather in a 
decrease in the rate of national savings. This decline occurred in a period in which the 
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level of investment remained constant and the gap was financed by external funds 
(foreign savings). The consequence of this was a sharp increase in the level of the 
country’s foreign indebtedness. What is more, these obligations were accrued while 
Argentina was experiencing an across-the-board process of de-industrialisation which, 
ultimately, seriously diminished its capacity to repay what it had borrowed. As a result, 
for the first time ever, a large stock-flow disadjustment emerged in the economy in the 
early 1980s. Furthermore, the interest rate de-regulation and the increased competition 
within the banking system did not result in greater efficiency in capital allocation. Clear 
evidence of this is the very high lending rates and financial spread in real terms which 
prevailed in the financial markets after mid-1979. It has been shown that the high 
financial costs plus the growing overvaluation of the peso during the period 1979-81 
contributed greatly to the erosion of the economic bases of many bank borrowers, 
which, ultimately, caused the financial crisis of 1980-81. These two consequences of 
the financial liberalisation reform - the collapse of the banking system and the structural 
disadjustment between the stock of foreign debt and the country’s capacity to repay it - 
are at the root of the economic downturn and the long period of stagnation which 
followed.  
 
Theoretical Considerations and Policy Lessons  
 
There are a number of specific policy implications which have been raised throughout 
this dissertation and which can be summarised as follows: 
 
Financial Liberalisation Reform: initial macro-economic conditions.  
History matters for the success of an experiment in freeing a financial system. As in the 
case of Argentina, if the banking system has been operating for many years under the 
direct control of the Central Bank (interest rate ceilings, nationalisation or centralisation of 
deposits), it is most likely that after the reform - and for some period of time - the financial 
agents will have neither the expertise nor the information for a sound loan allocation. 
When there is a high level of financial repression, therefore, the de-regulation must be 
introduced step by step in order to allow the financial institutions time to adapt to the 
new rules of the game. This means that the non-written rules generally adopted by the 
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economic agents in each country, including the social conventions, customs, norms of 
behaviour and codes of conduct should be taken into account in the design, degree 
and speed at which the financial system will be liberalised. Stability of prices is also a 
basic pre-condition for a successful de-regulation of the banking system. None of these 
pre-requisites were met when the financial liberalisation was launched in Argentina.  
 
Institutional Framework: banking regulation and supervision. 
A successful de-regulation of the financial system will not be attained by relying only on 
the effectiveness of ‘market discipline’, as both the theory of information economics 
and practical experience of banking crises have proved. The monetary authority must 
limit the amount of risk assumed by the financial intermediaries and make sure that the 
financial institutions are managed properly by means of an appropriate policy of 
prudential regulation and supervision. Besides the compliance with capital adequacy 
and other legal requirements, the new financial operators should be evaluated for their 
knowledge, experience, reputation and honesty. That is to say, prudential regulation 
should ensure that financial agents are ‘fit and proper’. Financial policy should impose 
limits on the amount of liquidity, interest rate, exchange rate and credit risk that banks 
may assume by restricting lending to sister-firms, foreign exchange exposure, maturity 
and interest rate mismatches. To avoid excessive loan-default risks, the policy should 
take notice of the speed at which the financial intermediaries expand their portfolios. It 
is essential to correct practices and procedures largely biased towards monitoring 
quantitative rules associated with money supply rather than the quality of the banks’ asset 
allocation. The policy of preventing banks from taking risky actions based exclusively 
on requirements of capital adequacy is mistaken due to the high leverage position of 
these institutions. As most of a bank’s assets are other people’s money, the economic 
incentives generally pay for misbehaviour on the part of the banks. Competent bank 
supervision is also needed to assess the quality of management and the adequacy of 
policies, procedures and systems which are used to evaluate, limit and report on risk. 
As well as being short of information on the allocation of banks’ portfolios, the problem 
of the Central Bank may also lie in the lack of experience and, in all probability, ability 
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to supervise a swiftly liberalised banking system. Supervisory practices must focus on 
preventing individual bank failures from becoming systemic problems, as occurred in 
Argentina in the early 1980s.  
 
Policy Co-ordination: macro- and micro-economic interactions. 
The connection between macro-economic policies and micro-economic structures runs 
both ways: on the one hand, the overall macro-economic performance is the result of 
the actions of micro-economic units and; on the other hand, macro-economic policies 
have micro-economic consequences. That is to say, what happens at the macro-
economic level has an effect on - and is affected by - the actions and reactions of the 
economic structures at the micro-economic level. This means that in the process of 
financial de-regulation, besides the appropriate banking regulation and supervision, the 
macro-economic policies (monetary, fiscal, financial and exchange rate) should be co-
ordinated to control the evolution (size and speed) of the banking credits, something 
which did not occur in Argentina. When there is excessive liquidity (credit boom), it is 
most likely that the standards of banks for screening and selecting projects and 
borrowers will be relaxed in an attempt to speed up the process of bank lending. This 
will result in increased lending to high-risk borrowers and a distortion of asset prices, 
which will have a negative effect on the overall quality of resource allocation in the 
economy, with two inter-related effects: on the one hand, the level of the country’s 
financial fragility will increase as the risk distribution of the entire banking system is 
negatively affected and; on the other hand, with a lack of - or highly deficient - banking 
regulation and supervision, the probability that some financial agents will assume 
excessive levels of risk and engage in speculative behaviour increases, which will further 
weaken the macro-financial structure.  
 
Financial Structure and Economic Activity: real and financial interactions. 
What happens in the financial structure is affected by - and can have an effect on - the 
evolution and prospects of the real side of the economy. The country’s financial 
structure mirrors the health of the whole economy. Usually, a major financial disruption 
in which a large proportion of the financial system is at risk is a symptom that the 
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country is suffering from important macro-economic disequilibria such as deficits in the 
public and foreign sectors, which leads to misalignments in key relative prices. As can 
be learnt from the Argentine experience (1977-81), when the real lending rate is very 
low compared with the return on physical assets, there will be a propensity to accrue 
excessive levels of debt on the part of bank borrowers (over-indebtedness). Likewise, 
when the lending rate is very high in real terms, the financial costs will erode the 
economic bases of bank borrowers, affecting the solvency of the banks themselves. 
Therefore, in order to build a sound financial structure, it is vital to avoid a large 
disadjustment for a lengthy period of time between the lending rate charged by banks 
and the return on physical assets obtained in the real sector by bank borrowers. The 
necessary formula to achieve this goal is to design a set of consistent macro-economic 
policies (monetary, fiscal, financial and exchange rate), which prevent large imbalances 
in both the real and financial sectors.  
 
Informational Problems in Banks: inflation and asymmetric information. 
Banks are particularly subject to market failures arising from asymmetric information. 
The promise that a credit will be repaid in the future may not be wholly sincere, as the 
applicant for a loan may ‘hide information’ (adverse selection) and the borrower may 
‘hide action’ (moral hazard) from the bank. Bad loan allocation and their externality-
effects are at the root of the market failures caused by asymmetric information. These 
problems of information are exacerbated in a scenario of high and persistent inflation 
with a great volatility in relative and absolute prices. Indeed, since price changes affect 
the real value of nominal variables such as wages, prices, return on assets, stock of 
money and net worth, lack of certainty about the level of inflation erodes the 
informational base for both business planning and credit appraisal. Although one can 
manage prices in nominal terms, what really matters in any economic assessment are 
the real values. Therefore, in an inflationary context, the productive efficiency of 
debtors and creditors no longer depends only on their business competence but also 
on the accuracy of their predictions of inflation. In short, problems of asymmetric 
information make financial markets special; and inflation causes special problems of 
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economic information. For this reason, a financial liberalisation reform should not be 
implemented in a scenario of high and unstable inflation like that of Argentina during 
the period 1977-81. 
 
Bank Soundness and Macro-economic Stability. 
The relationship between the banking system and the macro-economy requires special 
attention for two main reasons: first, a well-functioning banking system is important for the 
effectiveness of macro-economic policies; and second, weaknesses which emerge in the 
banking system, if ignored, could pose a threat to the macro-economic stability. The 
banking system is the main conduit through which monetary policy is transmitted: the 
expansion and contraction of monetary aggregates and movements in the interest rates. 
Thereby, the quality of this channel of monetary transmission (banking system) is vital for 
the effectiveness of any monetary policy in the management of key variables such as the 
levels of activity, prices and foreign exchange. The experience of Argentina has shown 
that an unsound bank may change its incentive structure by raising the lending rate 
charged to its borrowers and by offering higher interest rates to attract deposits from 
competitors, in an attempt to alleviate its problems of liquidity and profitability. What is 
more, it is extremely likely that an unsound bank will continue lending to unprofitable firms 
and to insolvent debtors to prevent defaults that would in turn result in open insolvency for 
the bank. In this situation, a widening of the financial spreads is often employed to cover 
the cost of non-performing loans. When this perverse functioning of banks is widespread 
and the movements in interest rates no longer reflect the supply and demand conditions in 
financial markets, the effectiveness of monetary policy declines and the allocation of 
resources in the economy becomes inefficient. The economic consequences will be even 
worse if the weakening of banks is perceived by individuals, which may trigger a deposit 
run and cause a financial crisis, as happened in Argentina at the beginning of the 1980s. 
All this suggests that a fundamental goal of any economic plan should be to maintain a 
sound banking system. The findings of this dissertation may be useful for those 
countries considering the liberalisation of their domestic financial systems to achieve 
this objective.  
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Chronology of Key Political and Economic Events, 1945-75  
 
 
 
1945   Argentina enters World War II on the side of the Allies and is admitted as a founding 
member of United Nations. Perón arrested then freed after major popular protest by the 
working class, those known as the ‘Descamizados’. 
1946 Perón wins elections for the presidency, promising workers higher wages and social 
security. His wife, Eva Duarte ('Evita'), is put in charge of labour relations in the new 
government. Industrialisation by import substitution model (ISI) established. Banking 
system nationalised. Growing government intervention in market prices. 
1949 A new National Constitution is approved, strengthening the power of the president. The 
Peronist Party is formed 
1951  Perón is re-elected president with a huge majority (67% of vote).  
1952  Eva Duarte, Perón's wife dies. Perón's support among the army, church and middle 
classes begins to decline.  
1955 June An attempted coup by the Argentine navy is crushed as the army remains loyal to Peron.  
1955 Sept. Coup by all three branches of the armed forces succeeds after three days of fighting, 
during which thousands are killed (Revolución Libertadora). Perón resigns and goes into 
exile in Paraguay, and later in Spain. The federal constitution of 1853 is restored and 
Personist Party banned. 
1955 Gen. Pedro Eugenio Aramburu becomes president. Price control lifted and banking 
system de-regulated. IAPI is abolished. Argentina joins IMF and. 
1958 Arturo Frondizi (Radical Party) becomes president and applies anti-inflationary plan 
agreed with IMF. ISI continues with emphasis on heavy industry (steel, chemicals, petro-
chemicals) and motor-vehicles. Investment in infrastructure. New law gives equal 
treatment to local and foreign investment. Free capital movement (Desarrolismo).    
1962 Arturo Frondizi deposed by military coup. 
1963 Arturo Illia (Radical Party) is elected president. Attempt to re-activate the economy 
fostering private and public consumption. Contracts with foreign oil companies rescinded.   
1966 Military rule is imposed again with a coup led by Gen. Juan Carlos Onganía. Primary 
goal, control inflation and close the fiscal gap.  
1970  Growing labour and political unrest leads military to oust Onganía. Gen. Roberto 
Levingston takes office. Gives new impulse to ISI returning to Desarrollismo.  
1971   Gen. Alejandro A. Lanusse comes to power and under pressure from political parties 
announces presidential elections for March 1973. Peron declares intention to return to 
Argentina. 
1973 The Peronist party led by Cámpora wins elections. Violence breaks out between left-and-
right-wind factions within Peronism. Argentina is wracked by terrorist violence. Perón 
becomes president in September. María Estela Martínez (Isabelita), Perón’s third wife, is 
made vice-president amid social tension and violence. Social Pact with growing 
government intervention. Expansionist monetary and fiscal policies. Central Bank takes 
control of deposits in banks and credit allocation.    
1974 Peron dies in July. His wife (Isabelita), succeeds him in an increasingly divided nation. 
Terrorism from right and left escalates. Strikes, demonstrations, high and growing 
inflation. 
 1976 Isabelita deposed by the armed forces. Gen. Jorge Videla assumes the presidency. 
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Chronology of the Institutional and Economic Reforms, 1976-81  
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
 
March 1976 Military coup against President Maria Estela Martinez de Perón (Isabelita). The junta of 
commanders-in-chief designate General Jorge Rafael Videla as President. José Alfredo 
Martinez de Hoz is designated Economic Minister. 
October 1980 The junta designate General Roberto Eduardo Viola as President Elect to take charge in 
March 1981. 
March 1981 President Viola appoints Lorenzo Sigaut as Minister of Economy. 
December 1981 The junta fire General Viola and appoint General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri as 
                             President. 
 
COMMERCIAL POLICY REFORMS 
Note:  (BCRA) means the Central Bank of Argentina. (Banco Central de la República Argentina. 
 
April 1976 Economic Minister Martínez de Hoz announces a program of promotion of foreign trade 
oriented, towards eliminating quantitative and financial restrictions to eliminate 'water' in 
nominal tariffs. 
January 1977 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 674 authorises cash payments no later than 180 days for imports 
of some foodstuffs. Circular R.C. no. 678 authorises cash payments no later than 180 
days for current imports: 100% of the FOB value for transactions up to US $25,000 and 
75% for transactions in excess of US $25,000. 
March 1977  BCRA Circular R.C. no. 685 authorises cash payments of 100% of the value of current 
imports immediately after presenting the shipping invoice. 
May 1977 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 693 introduces modifications to the system of financial promotion 
of exports; the Central Bank can discount hills of exchange in foreign currencies at 
preannounced interest rates. 
July 1977  BCRA Circular R.C. no. 701 authorises cash payments for imports of capital goods in 
excess of US$ 50,00 when the importer provides its own foreign exchange. 
March 1978 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 727 regulates the servicing of loans in foreign currencies related 
to financing of exports. Payments cannot exceed 180 days, and the amortisation is 
simultaneous with the reception of foreign currencies. 
April 1978 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 733 regulates the financing of imports. Loans obtained through 
financial institutions should not exceed 180 days. 
June 1978 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 760 modifies the financing schedule of imports of capital goods 
eliminating the restrictions on purchases of less than US $5,000,000. 
                            BCRA Circular R.C. no. 809 eliminates the requirement of pesos deposits for any 
                            Operation related to financing foreign trade. 
December 1976 The economic minister announces his intention to further push the opening of the 
economy by proposing a program of tariff reform consisting of a schedule of gradual tariff 
reductions for five years. The average tariff is to fall from 34% in 1980 to 16% in 1986. 
and export taxes are to fall from 16% in 1980 to 0% in 1986. Non-tariff restrictions, which 
averaged 24% in 1980, remain unaltered. 
June 1979 Resolution no. 6 of the Secretary of Commerce accelerates the tariff reductions.  
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EXCHANGE RATES AND FINANCIAL REFORMS 
 
April 1976 Economic Minister Martinez de Hoz announces a programme to reduce the prevailing 
multiple exchange rate system to a system with only two exchange rates: commercial 
rate for trade operations and a financial rate for financial transactions. Both exchange 
rates nominally fixed by the Central Bank with periodic adjustments. 
May 1976 According to Law No. 21308 beneficiaries of loans in the financial system must pay an 
8.5% tax per semester. This law is a preliminary attempt to gradually correct the negative 
real interest rates prevailing in the system. 
July 1976 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 642 states that new loans without exchange rate insurance can 
be negotiated at the exchange rate prevailing in the free financial market for foreign 
exchange. Loans with a maturity of less than 180 days are not allowed. 
January 1977 Law no. 21495 essentially repeals Law no. 20520, which nationalised bank deposits. 
Law no, 21526 regulates the activities of financial institutions under a system of 
fractional reserve requirements, and extends the Central Bank guarantee of deposits 
to all authorised institution. 
February 1977 Law no. 21572 introduces the interest equalisation account. 
                          BCRA Circular R.C. no. 716, authorises without any restriction foreign exchange 
                          transactions in values lower or equal to US $5,000. 
January 1978 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 761 authorises without restriction foreign exchange 
transactions up    to US $10,000. 
Sept. 1978 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 778 authorises without restriction foreign exchange 
transactions up to US $20,000. 
October 1978 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 790 authorises operations in gold coins in bureaus of 
exchange. 
Dec. 1978 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 807 announces a daily exchange rate for the US dollar from 
December 21, 1978 to August 31, 1979. 
April 1979 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 832, announces a daily exchange rate from September I. 
1979, to December 31, 1979. 
October 1979 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 853 announces a 2.8% devaluation for January 1980; 
furthermore,    in the months following January the peso devaluation would he equal to 
the previous month's devaluation less 0.2%. 
April 1980 BCRA Circular R.P. no. 1050 authorises a new method of indexation based on an 
average of interest rate on deposits. 
April 1980 BCRA Circular R.P. no. 1051 regulates the rediscount system and increases the 
official guaranty on deposits. 
Sept. 1980 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 907 announces a 1% devaluation for October and 1% for the 
following months. 
Dec. 1980 BCRA Circular R.C. no. 916 establishes the following regulation limits: pesos per 
U.S. dollar:         Date    Buy      Sell 
  21/12/1980 1.989 1.996 
  30/01/1981 2.009 2.036 
  27/02/1981 2.029 2.077 
  03/01/1981 2.049 2.118 
INCOME POLICY REFORMS 
 
April 1976 Prices gradually liberated and nominal wages adjusted periodically (Law No. 21307). 
March 1977 The Minister of Economy announces a price truce and the secretary of commerce 
dictates Resolution 189, establishing price controls for 120 days. 
                            Relevant wages and prices mostly market determined between July 1977 and  
                            December 1981. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (% of GDP) 
 
   SECTORS     
Apr.-76 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD  ASSETS 
1.mon -3.93 -2.94 6.87    0.00 6.87
2.res -12.43 12.43      0.00 12.43
3.ccbg 0.23    -0.23  0.00 0.23
4.dgbc -0.10    0.10  0.00 0.10
5.red 10.73 -10.73      0.00 10.73
6.sad   -4.20 1.48 2.71  0.00 4.20
7.tip   -1.59 1.59  0.00 1.59
8.cred   9.05 -6.66 -2.39  0.00 9.05
9.bon 4.43 0.14 0.89 -5.46  0.00 5.46
10.jnv 1.31 -0.46    -0.85 0.00 0.85
11.jdep   0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
12.jcred  0.89 -0.89 0.00  0.00 0.89
13.jbon  0.01 -7.82 7.81 0.00 7.82
totass 16.70 22.07 10.84 2.81 7.81   60.22
totliab -16.46 -19.45 -7.55 -15.90 -0.85   -60.22
nfw 0.24 2.62 3.28 -13.10 6.96 0.00 0.00
jtotass 1.31 0.91 0.00 0.00 7.81   10.02
jtotliab 0.00 -0.46 -0.89 -7.82 -0.85   -10.02
jnfw 1.31 0.45 -0.89 -7.82 6.96 0.00  
Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
     SECTORS       
Jul-77 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD  ASSETS 
1.mon -5.80 -2.50 8.30  0.00 8.30
2.res -0.07 0.07   0.00 0.07
3.ccbg 1.60   -1.60  0.00 1.60
4.dgbc -0.61   0.61  0.00 0.61
5.red 0.84 -0.84   0.00 0.84
6.sad   -6.79 2.27 4.52  0.00 6.79
7.tip  -10.15 10.15  0.00 10.15
8.cred   19.38 -16.25 -3.13  0.00 19.38
9.bon 3.92 0.88 1.31 -6.11  0.00 6.11
10.jnv 5.79 -1.24  -4.55 0.00 4.55
11.jdep   0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
12.jcred  1.56 -1.56 0.00  0.00 1.56
13.jbon  0.01 -10.09 10.08 0.00 10.09
totass 12.14 20.65 22.03 5.13 10.08   70.04
totliab -6.48 -20.28 -17.80 -20.92 -4.55   -70.04
nfw 5.66 0.38 4.22 -15.80 5.53 0.00 0.00
jtotass 5.79 1.56 0.00 0.00 10.08   17.44
jtotliab 0.00 -1.24 -1.56 -10.09 -4.55   -17.44
jnfw 5.79 0.32 -1.56 -10.09 5.53 0.00 
Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (% of GDP) 
 
     SECTORS       
Dic-78 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -6.28 -1.83 8.10    0.00 8.10
2.res -4.15 4.15      0.00 4.15
3.ccbg 2.52    -2.52  0.00 2.52
4.dgbc -0.06    0.06  0.00 0.06
5.red 0.92 -0.92      0.00 0.92
6.sad    -6.03 1.89 4.14  0.00 6.03
7.tip   -15.22 15.22    0.00 15.22
8.cred    22.69 -17.78 -4.91  0.00 22.69
9.bon 1.49 1.31 2.50 -5.30  0.00 5.30
10.jnv 6.10 -2.28    -3.83 0.00 6.10
11.jdep    -0.14 0.14 0.00  0.00 0.14
12.jcred   1.99 -1.99 0.00  0.00 1.99
13.jbon   0.60 -12.68 12.08 0.00 12.68
Totass 11.02 30.74 27.85 4.21 12.08  85.91
Totliab -10.49 -26.41 -19.77 -25.41 -3.83  -85.91
Nfw 0.53 4.33 8.08 -21.20 8.26 0.00  
Jtotass 6.10 2.59 0.14 0.00 12.08  20.92
Jtotliab 0.00 -2.42 -1.99 -12.68 -3.83  -20.92
jnfw 6.10 0.17 -1.85 -12.68 8.26 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
     SECTORS       
Mar-80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5.78 -2.49 8.27    0.00 8.27
2.res -1.35 1.35      0.00 1.35
3.ccbg 1.58    -1.58  0.00 1.58
4.dgbc -0.04    0.04  0.00 0.04
5.red 0.46 -0.46      0.00 0.46
6.sad    -6.16 1.78 4.39  0.00 6.16
7.tip   -21.92 21.92    0.00 21.92
8.cred    35.30 -28.78 -6.52  0.00 35.30
9.bon 0.54 1.87 2.54 -4.95  0.00 4.95
10.jnv 4.88 -4.09    -0.79 0.00 4.88
11.jdep    -0.30 0.30 0.00  0.00 0.30
12.jcred   4.17 -4.17 0.00  0.00 4.17
13.jbon   0.54 -19.38 18.84 0.00 19.38
totass 7.46 43.21 34.80 4.42 18.84  108.74
totliab -7.16 -35.42 -32.94 -32.43 -0.79  -108.74
nfw 0.30 7.79 1.86 -28.00 18.06 0.00  
jtotass 4.88 4.70 0.30 0.00 18.84  28.73
jtotliab 0.00 -4.39 -4.17 -19.38 -0.79  -28.73
jnfw 4.88 0.31 -3.87 -19.38 18.06 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (% of GDP) 
 
     SECTORS       
Abr-80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5.85 -2.28 8.13    0.00 8.13
2.res -1.34 1.34      0.00 1.34
3.ccbg 1.27    -1.27  0.00 1.27
4.dgbc -0.08    0.08  0.00 0.08
5.red 2.64 -2.64      0.00 2.64
6.sad    -6.34 1.86 4.48  0.00 6.34
7.tip   -20.53 20.53    0.00 20.53
8.cred    35.57 -28.37 -7.20  0.00 35.57
9.bon 0.51 2.58 2.89 -5.98  0.00 5.98
10.jnv 3.83 -3.94    0.11 0.00 3.83
11.jdep    -0.31 0.31 0.00  0.00 0.31
12.jcred   4.08 -4.08 0.00  0.00 4.08
13.jbon   0.61 -19.97 19.36 0.00 19.97
totass 8.24 44.18 33.73 4.55 19.36  110.07
totliab -7.27 -36.05 -32.44 -34.42 0.11  -110.07
nfw 0.97 8.14 1.29 -29.87 19.47 0.00  
jtotass 3.83 4.69 0.31 0.00 19.36  28.19
jtotliab 0.00 -4.26 -4.08 -19.97 0.11  -28.19
jnfw 3.83 0.43 -3.77 -19.97 19.47 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
     SECTORS       
May-80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5.74 -2.11 7.85    0.00 7.85
2.res -1.69 1.69      0.00 1.69
3.ccbg 1.19    -1.19  0.00 1.19
4.dgbc -0.09    0.09  0.00 0.09
5.red 3.41 -3.41      0.00 3.41
6.sad    -6.73 2.05 4.68  0.00 6.73
7.tip   -19.61 19.61    0.00 19.61
8.cred    33.53 -26.93 -6.60  0.00 33.53
9.bon 0.48 2.02 2.78 -5.28  0.00 5.28
10.jnv 2.78 -3.80    1.01 0.00 2.78
11.jdep    -0.33 0.33 0.00  0.00 0.33
12.jcred   3.93 -3.93 0.00  0.00 3.93
13.jbon   0.59 -20.57 19.98 0.00 20.57
totass 7.86 41.77 32.61 4.77 19.98  106.99
totliab -7.52 -35.99 -30.86 -33.64 1.01  -106.99
nfw 0.35 5.77 1.75 -28.86 21.00 0.00  
jtotass 2.78 4.52 0.33 0.00 19.98  27.62
jtotliab 0.00 -4.13 -3.93 -20.57 1.01  -27.62
jnfw 2.78 0.40 -3.60 -20.57 21.00 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (% of GDP) 
 
     SECTORS       
Jun-80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5.95 -2.23 8.18    0.00 8.18
2.res -1.22 1.22      0.00 1.22
3.ccbg 1.51    -1.51  0.00 1.51
4.dgbc -0.01    0.01  0.00 0.01
5.red 3.35 -3.35      0.00 3.35
6.sad    -6.72 1.98 4.74  0.00 6.72
7.tip   -19.35 19.35    0.00 19.35
8.cred    33.57 -27.24 -6.33  0.00 33.57
9.bon 0.45 2.24 2.19 -4.88  0.00 4.88
10.jnv 3.27 -3.80    0.54 0.00 3.27
11.jdep    -0.38 0.38 0.00  0.00 0.38
12.jcred   3.95 -3.95 0.00  0.00 3.95
13.jbon   0.57 -21.20 20.63 0.00 21.20
Totass 8.57 41.54 32.08 4.75 20.63  107.57
Totliab -7.17 -35.83 -31.19 -33.91 0.54  -107.57
Nfw 1.40 5.71 0.89 -29.16 21.16 0.00  
Jtotass 3.27 4.52 0.38 0.00 20.63  28.80
Jtotliab 0.00 -4.19 -3.95 -21.20 0.54  -28.80
Jnfw 3.27 0.34 -3.57 -21.20 21.16 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina 
 
 
     SECTORS       
Jul-80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5.70 -1.63 7.33    0.00 7.33
2.res -2.65 2.65      0.00 2.65
3.ccbg 2.22    -2.22  0.00 2.22
4.dgbc -0.05    0.05  0.00 0.05
5.red 3.48 -3.48      0.00 3.48
6.sad    -6.57 1.84 4.73  0.00 6.57
7.tip   -20.35 20.35    0.00 20.35
8.cred    32.47 -26.65 -5.82  0.00 32.47
9.bon 0.42 1.46 2.33 -4.21  0.00 4.21
10.jnv 3.15 -4.05    0.90 0.00 3.15
11.jdep    -0.36 0.36 0.00  0.00 0.36
12.jcred   4.08 -4.08 0.00  0.00 4.08
13.jbon   0.46 -21.84 21.38 0.00 21.84
totass 9.27 41.12 32.21 4.78 21.38  108.76
totliab -8.40 -36.44 -30.74 -34.08 0.90  -108.76
nfw 0.86 4.69 1.47 -29.31 22.28 0.00  
jtotass 3.15 4.54 0.36 0.00 21.38  29.43
jtotliab 0.00 -4.41 -4.08 -21.84 0.90  -29.43
jnfw 3.15 0.13 -3.73 -21.84 22.28 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (% of GDP) 
 
     SECTORS       
Ago-80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5.47 -1.98 7.45    0.00 7.45
2.res -1.51 1.51      0.00 1.51
3.ccbg 1.28    -1.28  0.00 1.28
4.dgbc -0.06    0.06  0.00 0.06
5.red 3.15 -3.15      0.00 3.15
6.sad    -6.75 1.96 4.79  0.00 6.75
7.tip   -20.90 20.90    0.00 20.90
8.cred    33.91 -27.25 -6.66  0.00 33.91
9.bon 0.40 2.69 2.35 -5.44  0.00 5.44
10.jnv 2.93 -4.25    1.32 0.00 2.93
11.jdep    -0.38 0.38 0.00  0.00 0.38
12.jcred   4.62 -4.16 -0.46  0.00 4.62
13.jbon   0.39 -22.51 22.12 0.00 22.51
totass 7.77 43.12 33.04 4.86 22.12  110.90
totliab -7.03 -37.42 -31.41 -36.35 1.32  -110.90
nfw 0.73 5.69 1.63 -31.50 23.44 0.00  
jtotass 2.93 5.01 0.38 0.00 22.12  30.44
jtotliab 0.00 -4.63 -4.16 -22.97 1.32  -30.44
jnfw 2.93 0.38 -3.78 -22.97 23.44 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
 
     SECTORS       
Sep-80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5.68 -1.95 7.63    0.00 7.63
2.res -1.50 1.50      0.00 1.50
3.ccbg 2.27    -2.27  0.00 2.27
4.dgbc -0.04    0.04  0.00 0.04
5.red 3.06 -3.06      0.00 3.06
6.sad    -6.92 2.02 4.90  0.00 6.92
7.tip   -20.86 20.86    0.00 20.86
8.cred    33.98 -28.03 -5.95  0.00 33.98
9.bon 0.39 2.00 2.20 -4.58  0.00 4.58
10.jnv 2.14 -4.02    1.88 0.00 2.14
11.jdep    -0.51 0.51 0.00  0.00 0.51
12.jcred   4.56 -4.12 -0.44  0.00 4.56
13.jbon   0.38 -23.19 22.81 0.00 23.19
totass 7.85 42.42 33.22 4.94 22.81  111.24
totliab -7.22 -37.31 -32.15 -36.44 1.88  -111.24
nfw 0.63 5.11 1.07 -31.50 24.68 0.00  
jtotass 2.14 4.94 0.51 0.00 22.81  30.40
jtotliab 0.00 -4.53 -4.12 -23.63 1.88  -30.40
jnfw 2.14 0.41 -3.61 -23.63 24.68 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (% of GDP) 
 
     SECTORS       
Oct-80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5.18 -1.99 7.16    0.00 7.16
2.res -1.64 1.64      0.00 1.64
3.ccbg 2.39    -2.39  0.00 2.39
4.dgbc -0.04    0.04  0.00 0.04
5.red 2.83 -2.83      0.00 2.83
6.sad    -6.70 1.94 4.76  0.00 6.70
7.tip   -19.63 19.63    0.00 19.63
8.cred    32.06 -26.86 -5.20  0.00 32.06
9.bon 0.68 1.28 2.11 -4.08  0.00 4.08
10.jnv 1.51 -3.62    2.11 0.00 1.51
11.jdep    -0.55 0.55 0.00  0.00 0.55
12.jcred   4.27 -3.94 -0.33  0.00 4.27
13.jbon   0.42 -23.89 23.47 0.00 23.89
Totass 7.42 39.66 31.40 4.80 23.47  106.76
Totliab -6.85 -35.32 -30.80 -35.89 2.11  -106.76
Nfw 0.57 4.34 0.60 -31.09 25.58 0.00  
Jtotass 1.51 4.69 0.55 0.00 23.47  30.23
Jtotliab 0.00 -4.17 -3.94 -24.23 2.11  -30.23
Jnfw 1.51 0.52 -3.39 -24.23 25.58 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
 
     SECTORS       
Nov-80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5.49 -1.83 7.32    0.00 7.32
2.res -1.05 1.05      0.00 1.05
3.ccbg 2.51    -2.51  0.00 2.51
4.dgbc -0.12    0.12  0.00 0.12
5.red 3.16 -3.16      0.00 3.16
6.sad    -6.92 2.05 4.87  0.00 6.92
7.tip   -19.51 19.51    0.00 19.51
8.cred    32.65 -27.30 -5.35  0.00 32.65
9.bon 0.66 1.25 2.27 -4.18  0.00 4.18
10.jnv 0.93 -3.54    2.61 0.00 0.93
11.jdep    -0.58 0.58 0.00  0.00 0.58
12.jcred   4.20 -3.78 -0.42  0.00 4.20
13.jbon   0.52 -24.62 24.10 0.00 24.62
totass 7.25 39.68 31.72 4.99 24.10  107.74
totliab -6.67 -35.53 -31.08 -37.07 2.61  -107.74
nfw 0.59 4.14 0.64 -32.08 26.71 0.00  
jtotass 0.93 4.72 0.58 0.00 24.10  30.32
jtotliab 0.00 -4.12 -3.78 -25.04 2.61  -30.32
jnfw 0.93 0.60 -3.20 -25.04 26.71 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (% of GDP) 
 
     SECTORS       
Dic-80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -6.70 -2.18 8.88    0.00 8.88
2.res -1.12 1.12      0.00 1.12
3.ccbg 2.34    -2.34  0.00 2.34
4.dgbc -0.01    0.01  0.00 0.01
5.red 3.86 -3.86      0.00 3.86
6.sad    -6.69 2.07 4.62  0.00 6.69
7.tip   -19.73 19.73    0.00 19.73
8.cred    33.07 -27.98 -5.09  0.00 33.07
9.bon 1.57 0.83 2.00 -4.40  0.00 4.40
10.jnv 0.62 -3.53    2.91 0.00 0.62
11.jdep    -0.64 0.64 0.00  0.00 0.64
12.jcred   4.34 -3.89 -0.45  0.00 4.34
13.jbon   0.52 -25.36 24.84 0.00 25.36
totass 8.39 39.89 33.32 4.63 24.84  111.08
totliab -7.83 -36.64 -31.88 -37.64 2.91  -111.08
nfw 0.57 3.25 1.45 -33.01 27.75 0.00  
jtotass 0.62 4.86 0.64 0.00 24.84  30.97
jtotliab 0.00 -4.17 -3.89 -25.81 2.91  -30.97
jnfw 0.62 0.69 -3.25 -25.81 27.75 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
     SECTORS       
Ene-81 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -6.62 -1.95 8.56    0.00 8.56
2.res -1.19 1.19      0.00 1.19
3.ccbg 2.30    -2.30  0.00 2.30
4.dgbc -0.08    0.08  0.00 0.08
5.red 4.48 -4.48      0.00 4.48
6.sad    -7.94 2.35 5.59  0.00 7.94
7.tip   -21.73 21.73    0.00 21.73
8.cred    36.09 -29.63 -6.46  0.00 36.09
9.bon 1.75 1.01 2.60 -5.36  0.00 5.36
10.jnv 0.03 -3.71    3.69 0.00 0.03
11.jdep    -0.78 0.56 0.23  0.00 0.78
12.jcred   5.17 -4.33 -0.84  0.00 5.17
13.jbon   0.57 -25.95 25.38 0.00 25.95
totass 8.55 44.02 35.80 5.89 25.38  119.65
totliab -7.88 -40.58 -33.97 -40.90 3.69  -119.65
nfw 0.67 3.44 1.83 -35.00 29.07 0.00  
jtotass 0.03 5.73 0.56 0.23 25.38  31.92
jtotliab 0.00 -4.50 -4.33 -26.78 3.69  -31.92
jnfw 0.03 1.24 -3.77 -26.56 29.07 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (% of GDP) 
 
     SECTORS       
Feb-81 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -6.38 -1.32 7.70    0.00 7.70
2.res -1.88 1.88      0.00 1.88
3.ccbg 2.47    -2.47  0.00 2.47
4.dgbc -0.08    0.08  0.00 0.08
5.red 4.94 -4.94      0.00 4.94
6.sad    -8.03 2.14 5.88  0.00 8.03
7.tip   -21.70 21.70    0.00 21.70
8.cred    34.83 -29.32 -5.51  0.00 34.83
9.bon 2.63 1.22 1.43 -5.29  0.00 5.29
10.jnv -0.96 -3.82    4.77 0.00 -0.96
11.jdep    -0.87 0.70 0.16  0.00 0.87
12.jcred   5.49 -4.57 -0.93  0.00 5.49
13.jbon   0.42 -26.54 26.12 0.00 26.54
totass 9.08 43.84 33.69 6.12 26.12  118.85
totliab -8.33 -40.68 -33.88 -40.73 4.77  -118.85
nfw 0.75 3.17 -0.20 -34.61 30.89 0.00  
jtotass -0.96 5.92 0.70 0.16 26.12  31.94
jtotliab 0.00 -4.68 -4.57 -27.47 4.77  -31.94
jnfw -0.96 1.23 -3.86 -27.30 30.89 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
     SECTORS       
Mar-81 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5.59 -1.15 6.73    0.00 6.73
2.res -1.17 1.17      0.00 1.17
3.ccbg 1.64    -1.64  0.00 1.64
4.dgbc -0.01    0.01  0.00 0.01
5.red 4.89 -4.89      0.00 4.89
6.sad    -7.63 2.04 5.59  0.00 7.63
7.tip   -21.36 21.36    0.00 21.36
8.cred    34.32 -28.65 -5.67  0.00 34.32
9.bon 3.80 0.53 1.50 -5.84  0.00 5.84
10.jnv -1.61 -3.56    5.17 0.00 -1.61
11.jdep    -0.79 0.70 0.10  0.00 0.79
12.jcred   5.28 -4.31 -0.97  0.00 5.28
13.jbon   1.17 -27.15 25.98 0.00 27.15
totass 8.72 42.47 32.33 5.70 25.98  115.20
totliab -6.77 -39.38 -32.96 -41.26 5.17  -115.20
nfw 1.95 3.09 -0.63 -35.56 31.15 0.00  
jtotass -1.61 6.45 0.70 0.10 25.98  31.61
Jtotliab 0.00 -4.36 -4.31 -28.12 5.17  -31.61
Jnfw -1.61 2.09 -3.61 -28.02 31.15 0.00  
              Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina ( of pesos of 1995) 
 
                                            SECTORS       
Abr-76 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -5,522 -4,121 9,643    0.00 9,643
2.res -17,448 17,448     0.00 17,448
3.ccbg 323   -323   0.00 323
4.dgbc -137   137   0.00 137
5.red 15,059 -15,059     0.00 15,059
6.sad    -5,889 2,084 3,805   0.00 5,889
7.tip   -2,236 2,236    0.00 2,236
8.cred    12,702 -9,349 -3,354   0.00 12,702
9.bon 6,219 200 1,250 -7,669   0.00 7,669
10.jnv 1,838 -642   -1,196 0.00 1,838
11.jdep    0 0 0   0.00 0
12.jcred   1,253 -1,253 0   0.00 1,253
13.jbon   18  -8,388 8,370 0.00 8,388
totass 23,439 31,621 15,212 3,942 8,370   82,584
totliab -23,107 -27,947 -10,602 -19,734 -1,196   -82,584
Nfw 332 3,675 4,611 -15,792 7,174 0.00  
jtotass 1,838 1,271 0 0 8,370   11,479
jtotliab 0 -642 -1,253 -8,388 -1,196   -11,479
Jnfw 1,838 629 -1,253 -8,388 7,174 0.00  
             Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
                                            SECTORS     
May-77 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD  ASSETS 
1.mon -8,528 -4,603 13,131  0.00 13,131
2.res -34,779 34,779  0.00 34,779
3.ccbg 1,485 -1,485  0.00 1,485
4.dgbc -277 277  0.00 277
5.red 27,996 -27,996  0.00 27,996
6.sad   -3,899 3,899  0.00 3,899
7.tip  -11,912 11,912  0.00 11,912
8.cred   25,673 -21,525 -4,148  0.00 25,673
9.bon 5,253 1,160 2,479 -8,892  0.00 8,892
10.jnv 8,261 -1,349 -6,912 0.00 8,261
11.jdep   0 0 0  0.00 0
12.jcred  2,255 -2,255 0  0.00 2,255
13.jbon  14 -10,488 10,474 0.00 10,488
totass 42,995 63,883 31,420 277 10,474  149,049
totliab -43,584 -49,759 -23,780 -25,014 -6,912  -149,049
Nfw -589 14,124 7,640 -24,737 3,562 0.00 
jtotass 8,261 2,270 0 0 10,474  21,005
jtotliab 0 -1,349 -2,255 -10,488 -6,912  -21,005
Jnfw 8,261 920 -2,255 -10,488 3,562 0.00 
             Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (millions of pesos of 1995) 
 
                                            SECTORS       
Jul-77 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -8,938 -3,853 12,791     0.00 12,791
2.res -110 110       0.00 110
3.ccbg 2,461     -2,461   0.00 2,461
4.dgbc -935     935   0.00 935
5.red 1,292 -1,292       0.00 1,292
6.sad    -10,462 3,494 6,967   0.00 10,462
7.tip   -15,649 15,649     0.00 15,649
8.cred    29,863 -25,044 -4,819   0.00 29,863
9.bon 6,035 1,361 2,020 -9,416   0.00 9,416
10.jnv 8,925 -1,910     -7,015 0.00 8,925
11.jdep    0 0 0   0.00 0
12.jcred   2,398 -2,398 0   0.00 2,398
13.jbon   12   -10,821 10,809 0.00 10,821
Totass 18,713 33,744 33,953 7,903 10,809   105,122
Totliab -9,984 -33,165 -27,442 -27,516 -7,015   -105,122
Nfw 8,729 579 6,512 -19,613 3,794 0.00   
Jtotass 8,925 2,410 0 0 10,809   22,144
Jtotliab 0 -1,910 -2,398 -10,821 -7,015   -22,144
Jnfw 8,925 500 -2,398 -10,821 3,794 0.00   
             Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
                                            SECTORS       
Dic-78 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD  ASSETS 
1.mon -9,425 -2,743 12,168    0.00 12,168
2.res -6,233 6,233     0.00 6,233
3.ccbg 3,778   -3,778   0.00 3,778
4.dgbc -95   95   0.00 95
5.red 1,376 -1,376     0.00 1,376
6.sad    -9,057 2,832 6,225   0.00 9,057
7.tip   -22,858 22,858    0.00 22,858
8.cred    34,076 -26,704 -7,372   0.00 34,076
9.bon 2,232 1,972 3,754 -7,958   0.00 7,958
10.jnv 9,166 -3,420   -5,746 0.00 3,420
11.jdep    -209 209 0   0.00 209
12.jcred   2,991 -2,991 0   0.00 2,991
13.jbon   898  -13,600 12,702 0.00 13,600
totass 16,552 46,171 41,822 6,319 6,956   117,820
totliab -15,753 -39,663 -29,696 -32,708 0   -117,820
nfw 799 6,507 12,127 -26,389 6,956 0.00  
jtotass 9,166 3,889 209 0 6,956   20,220
jtotliab 0 -3,629 -2,991 -13,600 0   -20,220
jnfw 9,166 260 -2,782 -13,600 6,956 0.00  
             Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (millions of pesos of 1995) 
 
                                            SECTORS       
Mar-80 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD  ASSETS 
1.mon -8,651 -3,731 12,381     0.00 12,381
2.res -2,016 2,016       0.00 2,016
3.ccbg 2,367     -2,367   0.00 2,367
4.dgbc -55     55   0.00 55
5.red 682 -682       0.00 682
6.sad    -9,229 2,658 6,571   0.00 9,229
7.tip   -32,827 32,827     0.00 32,827
8.cred    52,854 -43,092 -9,762   0.00 52,854
9.bon 814 2,796 3,797 -7,407   0.00 7,407
10.jnv 7,304 -6,129     -1,176 0.00 6,129
11.jdep    -449 449 0   0.00 449
12.jcred   6,241 -6,241 0   0.00 6,241
13.jbon   804   -20,783 19,979 0.00 20,783
totass 11,167 64,710 52,113 6,626 18,803   153,420
totliab -10,722 -53,046 -49,333 -40,319 0   -153,420
nfw 445 11,664 2,780 -33,693 18,803 0.00   
jtotass 7,304 7,045 449 0 18,803   33,602
jtotliab 0 -6,578 -6,241 -20,783 0   -33,602
jnfw 7,304 467 -5,792 -20,783 18,803 0.00   
             Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
                                            SECTORS       
Mar-81 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF ADDING TOTAL 
ASSETS BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD   ASSETS 
1.mon -8,318 -1,706 10,024    0.00 10,024
2.res -1,739 1,739     0.00 1,739
3.ccbg 2,436   -2,436   0.00 2,436
4.dgbc -16   16   0.00 16
5.red 7,276 -7,276     0.00 7,276
6.sad    -11,351 3,032 8,320   0.00 11,351
7.tip   -31,793 31,793    0.00 31,793
8.cred    51,081 -42,647 -8,434   0.00 51,081
9.bon 5,661 796 2,233 -8,690   0.00 8,690
10.jnv -2,392 -5,301   7,693 0.00 5,301
11.jdep    -1,183 1,035 148   0.00 1,183
12.jcred   7,857 -6,415 -1,442   0.00 7,857
13.jbon   1,742  -29,113 27,372 0.00 29,113
totass 12,980 63,214 48,117 8,484 35,065   167,859
totliab -10,073 -58,609 -49,062 -50,115 0   -167,859
nfw 2,906 4,605 -945 -41,631 35,065 0.00  
jtotass -2,392 9,599 1,035 148 35,065   43,455
jtotliab 0 -6,484 -6,415 -30,556 0   -43,455
jnfw -2,392 3,115 -5,379 -30,408 35,065 0.00  
             Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina 
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Matrix of Flows of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (millions of pesos of 1995) 
 
     SECTORS      
Apr.76 - Mar.81 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF TOTAL 
  BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD ASSETS 
1.mon 2,796 -2,415 381     381 
2.res -15,709 -15,709       -15,709 
3.ccbg 2,112     2,112   2,112 
4.dgbc -120     -120   -120 
5.red -7,783 -7,783       -7,783 
6.sad    5,462 948 4,514   5,462 
7.tip   29,557 29,557     29,557 
8.cred    38,379 33,299 5,080   38,379 
9.bon -558 595 983 1,021   1,021 
10.jnv -4,230 -4,659     -8,889 -8,889 
11.jdep    1,183 1,035 148   1,183 
12.jcred   6,604 5,162 1,442   6,604 
13.jbon   1,724   20,726 19,002 20,726 
Totass -10,459 26,934 32,905 4,541 19,002 72,923 
Totliab -13,033 26,004 38,460 30,381 -8,889 72,923 
Nfw 2,574 930 -5,556 -25,839 27,891 0.00 
Jtotass -4,230 3,669 1,035 148 19,002 19,624 
Jtotliab 0 1,183 5,162 22,168 -8,889 19,624 
Jnfw -4,230 2,486 -4,127 -22,020 27,891 0.00 
Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 
     SECTORS      
Apr.76 - May.77 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF TOTAL 
  BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD ASSETS 
1.mon 3,006 482 3,488     3,488
2.res 17,332 17,332       17,332
3.ccbg 1,162     1,162   1,162
4.dgbc 140     140   140
5.red 12,937 12,937       12,937
6.sad    -1,991 1,815 -3,805   -1,991
7.tip   9,676 9,676 1,956   9,676
8.cred    12,971 12,176 795   12,971
9.bon -966 960 1,230 1,223   1,223
10.jnv 6,424 -707   5,716 5,716 5,716
11.jdep    0 0 0   0
12.jcred   1,002 1,002 0   1,002
13.jbon   -4   2,100 2,104 2,100
Totass 19,557 31,554 16,208 -3,665 2,104 65,758
Totliab 20,477 21,105 13,179 5,280 5,716 65,758
Nfw -921 10,449 3,030 -8,945 -3,613 0.00
Jtotass 6,424 292 0 0 2,104 8,819
Jtotliab 0 0 1,002 2,100 5,716 8,819
Jnfw 6,424 292 -1,002 -2,100 -3,613 0.00
Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Flows of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (millions of pesos of 1995) 
 
     SECTORS      
May.77- Jul.77 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF TOTAL 
  BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD ASSETS 
1.mon 411 -750 -340     -340
2.res -34,669 -34,669       -34,669
3.ccbg 976     976   976
4.dgbc 659     659   659
5.red -26,704 -26,704       -26,704
6.sad    6,563 -404 6,967   6,563
7.tip   3,737 3,737     3,737
8.cred    4,189 3,519 670   4,189
9.bon 783 201 -460 524   524
10.jnv 664 -561     103 103
11.jdep    0 0 0   0
12.jcred   142 142 0   142
13.jbon   -2   333 335 333
totass -24,282 -30,699 2,533 7,626 335 -44,488
totliab -33,600 -17,155 3,661 2,502 103 -44,488
nfw 9,318 -13,545 -1,129 5,124 232 0.00
jtotass 664 -420 0 0 335 578
jtotliab 0 0 142 333 103 578
jnfw 664 -420 -142 -333 232 0.00
Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
     SECTORS      
Jul.77 - Dec.78 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF TOTAL 
  BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD ASSETS 
1.mon 487 -1,110 -623     -623
2.res 6,123 6,123       6,123
3.ccbg 1,318     1,318   1,318
4.dgbc -841     -841   -841
5.red 84 84       84
6.sad    -1,405 -662 -743   -1,405
7.tip   7,210 7,210     7,210
8.cred    4,213 1,660 2,553   4,213
9.bon -3,803 610 1,734 -1,458   -1,458
10.jnv 241 -1,510     -1,269 -1,269
11.jdep    209 209 0   209
12.jcred   594 594 0   594
13.jbon   886   2,779 1,893 2,779
totass -2,161 10,917 7,869 -1,584 1,893 16,935
totliab 5,769 4,988 2,254 5,192 -1,269 16,935
nfw -7,930 5,928 5,615 -6,776 3,162 0.00
jtotass 241 -30 209 0 1,893 2,313
jtotliab 0 209 594 2,779 -1,269 2,313
jnfw 241 -239 -384 -2,779 3,162 0.00
Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Flows of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (millions of pesos of 1995) 
 
     SECTORS      
Dec.78- Mar.81 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF TOTAL 
  BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD ASSETS 
1.mon -1,107 -1,037 -2,144     -2,144
2.res -4,495 -4,495       -4,495
3.ccbg -1,343     -1,343   -1,343
4.dgbc -78     -78   -78
5.red 5,900 5,900       5,900
6.sad    2,294 199 2,095   2,294
7.tip   8,934 8,934     8,934
8.cred    17,005 15,943 1,062   17,005
9.bon 3,428 -1,176 -1,521 732   732
10.jnv -11,558 -1,881     -13,440 -13,440
11.jdep    974 826 148   974
12.jcred   4,866 3,424 1,442   4,866
13.jbon   844   15,513 14,670 15,513
totass -3,573 15,162 6,295 2,164 14,670 34,718
totliab -5,680 17,065 19,366 17,406 -13,440 34,718
nfw 2,107 -1,903 -13,072 -15,242 28,109 0.00
jtotass -11,558 3,828 826 148 14,670 7,913
jtotliab 0 974 3,424 16,956 -13,440 7,913
jnfw -11,558 2,854 -2,597 -16,808 28,109 0.00
Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
     SECTORS      
Jul.77 - Mar. 80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF TOTAL 
  BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD ASSETS 
1.mon -288 -122 -410    -410
2.res 1,905 1,905     1,905
3.ccbg -93   -93   -93
4.dgbc -880   -880   -880
5.red -610 -610     -610
6.sad   -1,233 -836 -397   -1,233
7.tip  17,179 17,179    17,179
8.cred   22,991 18,048 4,943   22,991
9.bon -5,222 1,434 1,778 -2,009   -2,009
10.jnv -1,621 -4,219   -5,839 -5,839
11.jdep   449 449 0   449
12.jcred  3,843 3,843 0   3,843
13.jbon  792  9,962 9,170 9,962
totass -7,546 26,747 18,160 -1,277 9,170 45,255
totliab 738 15,663 21,891 12,802 -5,839 45,255
nfw -8,284 11,085 -3,732 -14,079 15,010 0.00
jtotass -1,621 416 449 0 9,170 8,415
jtotliab 0 449 3,843 9,962 -5,839 8,415
jnfw -1,621 -33 -3,394 -9,962 15,010 0.00
Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Matrix of Flows of Assets and Liabilities of Argentina (millions of pesos of 1995) 
 
     SECTORS      
 Mar. 80 - Jul. 80 CENTRAL  FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF TOTAL 
  BANK  SECTOR  SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD ASSETS 
1.mon 408 -1,135 -727     -727
2.res 2,199 2,199       2,199
3.ccbg 1,161     1,161   1,161
4.dgbc 26     26   26
5.red 4,843 4,843       4,843
6.sad    1,211 272 938   1,211
7.tip   -497 -497     -497
8.cred    -1,262 -740 -522   -1,262
9.bon -151 -480 -93 -725   -725
10.jnv -2,298 -313     -2,610 -2,610
11.jdep    116 116 0   116
12.jcred   248 248 0   248
13.jbon   -73   -2,640 2,713 -2,640
totass 3,556 319 -929 964 2,713 1,342
totliab 2,632 4,537 -492 -2,726 -2,610 1,342
nfw 923 -4,218 -438 3,690 5,323 5,280.44
jtotass -2,298 -138 116 0 2,713 394
jtotliab 0 116 248 -2,640 -2,610 -4,887
jnfw -2,298 -254 -132 2,640 5,323 5,280.44
Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
     SECTORS      
Jul.77 - Mar. 81 CENTRAL FINANCIAL PRIVATE GOVERN. REST OF TOTAL 
  BANK SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR THE WORLD ASSETS 
1.mon -620 -2,147 -2,767    -2,767
2.res 1,628 1,628     1,628
3.ccbg -25   -25   -25
4.dgbc -919   -919   -919
5.red 5,984 5,984 18,293    5,984
6.sad   890 -463 1,352   890
7.tip  16,144 16,144    16,144
8.cred   21,218 17,603 3,615   21,218
9.bon -374 -565 213 -726   -726
10.jnv -11,318 -3,391   -14,708 -14,708
11.jdep   1,183 1,035 148   1,183
12.jcred  5,459 4,017 1,442   5,459
13.jbon  1,729  18,293 16,563 18,293
totass -5,733 26,079 14,164 581 16,563 51,653
totliab 89 22,054 21,620 22,598 -14,708 51,653
nfw -5,823 4,025 -7,457 -22,018 31,272 0.00
jtotass -11,318 3,798 1,035 148 16,563 10,226
jtotliab 0 1,183 4,017 19,735 -14,708 10,226
jnfw -11,318 2,615 -2,982 -19,587 31,272 0.00
Source: own construction based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina. 
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Determinants of the Rate of Financial Spread, 1977-81 
 
Month Spread Gross Fcial. Minimum Free Deposit 
  Yield Reserve Cost Reserves Composition
Jun-77 1.2101 - 0.5781 0.2905 - 
Jul-77 0.4945 0.2846 0.3443 0.1412 -0.2755 
Aug-77 0.7856 0.4553 0.4991 0.1281 -0.2969 
Sep-77 1.0534 0.6112 0.7708 0.0655 -0.3942 
Oct-77 2.6262 1.2311 1.8748 0.1822 -0.6620 
Nov-77 2.9650 1.3853 1.9242 0.2320 -0.5765 
Dec-77 2.6765 1.3077 1.7355 0.1805 -0.5473 
Jan-78 2.7244 1.2129 1.6759 0.3100 -0.4744 
Feb-78 2.5823 1.3339 1.3421 0.1654 -0.2591 
Mar-78 2.0403 1.1925 0.8454 0.0910 -0.0886 
Apr-78 1.4861 0.8461 0.6906 0.0908 -0.1415 
May-78 1.1833 0.7612 0.4452 0.0589 -0.0820 
Jun-78 1.5886 0.9193 0.7779 0.0719 -0.1804 
Jul-78 1.0461 0.7661 0.2722 0.0282 -0.0204 
Aug-78 0.9556 0.6368 0.2853 0.0658 -0.0322 
Sep-78 1.0340 0.7454 0.2943 0.0137 -0.0194 
Oct-78 0.8661 0.6476 0.2512 0.0378 -0.0705 
Nov-78 0.7994 0.5495 0.3160 0.0585 -0.1246 
Dec-78 0.8158 0.6320 0.2097 0.0474 -0.0733 
Jan-79 0.7157 0.5323 0.0878 0.1164 -0.0209 
Feb-79 0.6445 0.5130 0.2421 0.0534 -0.1641 
Mar-79 0.6260 0.5311 0.1160 0.0342 -0.0553 
Apr-79 0.5978 0.5101 0.1791 0.0211 -0.1125 
May-79 0.5880 0.4819 0.0605 0.0660 -0.0203 
Jun-79 0.5501 0.4625 0.1812 0.0345 -0.1282 
Jul-79 0.5762 0.4860 0.1401 0.0467 -0.0966 
Aug-79 0.5929 0.5383 0.0811 0.0221 -0.0485 
Sep-79 0.6017 0.5271 0.1555 0.0223 -0.1032 
Oct-79 0.6858 0.5974 0.0542 0.0439 -0.0098 
Nov-79 0.7104 0.6209 0.0589 0.0320 -0.0013 
Dec-79 0.8054 0.6947 0.0788 0.0476 -0.0157 
Jan-80 0.8158 0.7064 0.0788 0.0518 -0.0212 
Feb-80 0.7547 0.6966 0.0822 0.0374 -0.0614 
Mar-80 0.6821 0.6553 0.0403 0.0348 -0.0483 
Apr-80 0.6844 0.6857 0.0565 0.0119 -0.0696 
May-80 0.7972 0.7845 0.0783 0.0199 -0.0855 
Jun-80 0.9401 0.9203 0.1737 0.0545 -0.2084 
Jul-80 0.8972 0.8973 0.1324 0.0196 -0.1522 
Aug-80 0.8966 0.8164 0.0049 0.0416 0.0337 
Sep-80 1.0996 1.0242 0.0970 0.0265 -0.0481 
Oct-80 0.8365 0.8254 0.0826 0.0208 -0.0922 
Nov-80 0.7401 0.7656 0.0882 0.0215 -0.1352 
Dec-80 0.8093 0.8079 0.1129 0.0673 -0.1788 
Jan-81 0.9008 0.8787 0.0760 0.0684 -0.1224 
Feb-81 1.5606 1.5354 0.2650 0.0551 -0.2949 
Mar-81 2.6832 2.5436 0.3760 0.0159 -0.2523 
Source: based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina, Boletín Estadístico, BCRA several monthly 
issues, 1977-81.  
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Determinants of the Cost of Banking Reserves, 1977-81 
 
Month Legal Reserve Rate of Excess Margin Excess Demand Dep./ 
 Requirement Charge Compensation From the CRM Reserves Total Deposit 
Jun-77 45.00 6.05 6.05 8.00 4.20 37.00 
Jul-77 45.00 6.35 6.35 8.00 2.11 37.00 
Aug-77 45.00 7.00 7.00 8.00 1.69 35.30 
Sep-77 45.00 7.30 7.30 8.00 0.78 33.00 
Oct-77 45.00 7.75 7.65 8.00 1.66 32.40 
Nov-77 45.00 9.00 8.80 8.00 1.93 31.20 
Dec-77 44.00 9.30 9.10 8.00 1.51 30.00 
Jan-78 44.00 9.30 9.10 8.00 2.62 28.90 
Feb-78 44.00 7.75 7.75 7.00 1.65 27.10 
Mar-78 44.00 7.20 7.20 7.00 1.07 25.90 
Apr-78 43.00 6.60 6.60 7.00 1.18 25.90 
May-78 43.00 7.05 7.05 7.00 0.78 26.60 
Jun-78 43.00 6.93 6.93 7.00 0.88 27.10 
Jul-78 42.00 7.32 7.32 7.00 0.38 26.70 
Aug-78 41.00 7.04 7.04 6.00 0.91 24.40 
Sep-78 39.00 6.54 6.54 6.00 0.20 22.50 
Oct-78 31.00 6.51 6.51 6.00 0.55 22.90 
Nov-78 33.00 6.55 6.55 6.00 0.83 23.80 
Dec-78 29.00 7.09 7.09 6.00 0.65 24.30 
Jan-79 27.00 7.24 7.24 7.00 1.65 25.90 
Feb-79 27.00 6.10 6.10 7.00 0.81 25.20 
Mar-79 27.00 6.57 6.57 7.00 0.52 23.70 
Apr-79 27.00 6.35 6.35 7.00 0.32 23.40 
May-79 27.00 6.90 6.90 7.00 0.99 23.40 
Jun-79 27.00 6.54 6.54 7.00 0.51 23.40 
Jul-79 26.00 7.03 7.03 7.00 0.66 23.00 
Aug-79 25.00 7.59 7.59 7.00 0.30 21.70 
Sep-79 24.00 7.33 7.33 7.00 0.30 19.80 
Oct-79 22.50 7.64 7.64 7.00 0.60 19.20 
Nov-79 21.00 6.68 6.68 7.00 0.49 18.60 
Dec-79 16.50 6.27 6.27 7.00 0.75 18.90 
Jan-80 15.00 6.09 6.09 7.00 0.83 19.40 
Feb-80 13.00 5.33 5.33 9.00 0.66 18.60 
Mar-80 11.50 5.19 5.19 12.00 0.66 18.70 
Apr-80 11.00 4.66 4.66 12.00 0.24 19.30 
May-80 11.00 4.62 4.62 12.00 0.39 19.40 
Jun-80 12.00 4.83 4.83 12.00 0.91 19.80 
Jul-80 13.00 5.91 5.91 12.00 0.30 19.40 
Aug-80 13.00 5.91 5.91 12.00 0.74 17.80 
Sep-80 11.50 4.60 4.60 12.00 0.51 18.00 
Oct-80 11.00 4.41 4.41 14.00 0.42 18.40 
Nov-80 10.00 4.46 4.46 14.00 0.42 18.40 
Dec-80 10.00 5.07 5.07 14.00 1.14 18.10 
Jan-81 10.00 5.76 5.76 16.00 1.11 16.90 
Feb-81 10.00 5.42 5.42 16.00 0.72 15.60 
Mar-81 12.00 7.58 7.58 20.00 0.16 13.90 
Source: based on data of the Central Bank of Argentina, Boletín Estadístico, BCRA several monthly 
issues, 1977-81.  
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Estimations of the Supply and Demand Functions:  
Markets of Deposits and Credits, 1977-81 
 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFHPLTOTDEP 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1977:08 1981:12 
Included observations: 53 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IPC 1.16080323026 0.243410591892 4.76891010059 1.70057086e-05
NDRATEEST 1.57225752114 0.421015511065 3.73444084557 0.00049075909
DIFHPLPBI(-2) 0.30108156060 0.136937915396 2.19867200208 0.03265314059
C -0.21380911507 0.032412611757 -6.59647907032 2.7993869e-08
R-squared 0.65452948815     Mean dependent var 0.00755961303
Adjusted R-squared 0.63337823232     S.D. dependent var 0.05860377550
S.E. of regression 0.03548417558     Akaike info criterion -3.76698809962
Sum squared resid 0.06169720911     Schwarz criterion -3.61828682311
Log likelihood 103.825184639     F-statistic 30.9451832793
Durbin-Watson stat 0.95202002042     Prob(F-statistic) 2.2754042e-11
 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFHPLTOTDEP 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1979:08 1981:12 
Included observations: 29 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IPC 1.6416966845 0.43226704514 3.7978761114 0.00083104859
NDRATEEST 1.2945881447 0.55628955433 2.3271839901 0.02834922144
DIFHPLPBI(-2) 0.4874067912 0.21860012358 2.2296729847 0.03498642575
C -0.2182963622 0.04282790373 -5.0970592345 2.8999264e-05
R-squared 0.7463279345     Mean dependent var -0.01299733061
Adjusted R-squared 0.7158872867     S.D. dependent var 0.06816885932
S.E. of regression 0.0363355184     Akaike info criterion -3.66460003107
Sum squared resid 0.0330067474     Schwarz criterion -3.47600750281
Log likelihood 57.136700455     F-statistic 24.5174786779
Durbin-Watson stat 0.9229423799     Prob(F-statistic) 1.2848318e-07
 
Dependent Variable: DIFHPLPTOTDEP 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1977:08 1981:12 
Included observations: 53 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
NDRATEEST -2.82573994422 1.4428778842 -1.95840547155 0.05577286071
NLETRATE 2.10080040409 1.7838318924 1.17768967665 0.24449562381
NFORATE 9.42531231068 3.6835166596 2.55878096442 0.01357807494
R-squared 0.15319836534     Mean dependent var 0.00639816545
Adjusted R-squared 0.11932629995     S.D. dependent var 0.09523950563
S.E. of regression 0.08937676800     Akaike info criterion -1.93697335343
Sum squared resid 0.39941033299     Schwarz criterion -1.82544739606
Log likelihood 54.3297938658     F-statistic 4.52285278726
Durbin-Watson stat 0.62989431655     Prob(F-statistic) 0.01565100364
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Estimations of the Supply and Demand Functions:  
Markets of Deposits and Credits, 1977-81 
 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFHPLPTOTDEP 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1979:08 1981:12 
Included observations: 29 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
NDRATEEST -1.39722102795 1.62415785388 -0.860274156615 0.39750150560
NLETRATE 1.10012241102 1.81145623165 0.607313823979 0.54891043973
NFORATE 4.73178921563 6.23777678509 0.758569820411 0.45493193062
R-squared 0.76643207384     Mean dependent var 0.01392335120
Adjusted R-squared 0.65823032047     S.D. dependent var 0.08041479252
S.E. of regression 0.08233117330     Akaike info criterion -2.05843667324
Sum squared resid 0.17623897455     Schwarz criterion -1.91699227703
Log likelihood 32.8473317619     F-statistic 0.35584339296
Durbin-Watson stat 0.49198312512     Prob(F-statistic) 0.70394130038
 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFHPLTOTLOAN 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1977:08 1981:12 
Included observations: 53 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IPCOM 1.0306470654 0.4608269010 2.2365167116 0.02980889682
NLENDRATE -0.7429279222 0.4002306413 -1.8562494859 0.06931550680
DIFHPLPBI(-1) 1.5335169513 0.3154636639 4.8611524141 1.1984708e-05
R-squared 0.3854438124     Mean dependent var 0.00326048376
Adjusted R-squared 0.3608615649     S.D. dependent var 0.10803752806
S.E. of regression 0.0863718270     Akaike info criterion -2.00537182616
Sum squared resid 0.3730046250     Schwarz criterion -1.89384586879
Log likelihood 56.142353394     F-statistic 15.6797629051
Durbin-Watson stat 0.4429692439     Prob(F-statistic) 5.1765437e-06
 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFHPLTOTLOAN 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1979:08 1981:12 
Included observations: 29 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IPCOM 1.13403364626 0.803394001268 1.4115535397 0.169937390949
NLENDRATE -0.80925662662 0.630206877918 -1.2841126540 0.210427859071
DIFHPLPBI(-1) 1.55935339332 0.463689228274 3.3629277934 0.002398563179
R-squared 0.28619581576     Mean dependent var -0.02990186982
Adjusted R-squared 0.23128780153     S.D. dependent var 0.11103886467
S.E. of regression 0.09735469467     Akaike info criterion -1.72321438759
Sum squared resid 0.24642635019     Schwarz criterion -1.58176999138
Log likelihood 27.9866086223     F-statistic 5.21227766092
Durbin-Watson stat 0.41412799295     Prob(F-statistic) 0.01248901429
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Estimations of the Supply and Demand Functions:  
Markets of Deposits and Credits, 1977-81 
 
 
Total Deposit of the Aggregate Financial System 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFHPLTOTDEP 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1977:08 1980:02 
Included observations: 31 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IPC 1.21338242045 0.310854669341 3.90337524292 0.000571161560
NDRATEEST 1.71508933971 0.826396861204 2.07538220464 0.047603850246
DIFHPLPBI(-2) 0.32598244025 0.192976591075 1.68923307456 0.102692043629
C -0.23910879874 0.068763407698 -3.47726802307 0.001731724029
R-squared 0.53895630827     Mean dependent var 0.013750039368
Adjusted R-squared 0.48772923142     S.D. dependent var 0.052776103196
S.E. of regression 0.03777348958     Akaike info criterion -3.594504334612
Sum squared resid 0.03852458591     Schwarz criterion -3.409473727572
Log likelihood 59.7148171863     F-statistic 10.52092645821
Durbin-Watson stat 1.04698818308     Prob(F-statistic) 9.28959183e-05
 
 
 
 
 
Total Deposit of the Banco Internacional 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFHPLTOTDEPBINT 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1977:08 1980:02 
Included observations: 31 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IPC -1.12942645001 0.73251951532 -1.54183803487 0.13475304745
NDRATEEST 2.80261584647 1.94737891349 1.43917335607 0.16159474473
DIFHPLPBI(-2) 1.87572382709 0.45474343127 4.12479586972 0.00031788421
C -0.14854749819 0.16203886589 -0.91673992762 0.36739526521
R-squared 0.40555408386     Mean dependent var 0.00987331379
Adjusted R-squared 0.33950453763     S.D. dependent var 0.10952518425
S.E. of regression 0.08901207223     Akaike info criterion -1.88017537298
Sum squared resid 0.21392502316     Schwarz criterion -1.69514476595
Log likelihood 33.1427182811     F-statistic 6.14014943284
Durbin-Watson stat 1.11381038901     Prob(F-statistic) 0.00253788550
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Estimations of the Supply and Demand Functions:  
Markets of Deposits and Credits, 1977-81 
 
 
Total Deposit of the Banco de Intercambio Regional 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFHPLTOTDEPBIR 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1977:08 1980:02 
Included observations: 31 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IPC -0.55359777994 0.99428882405 -0.55677763498 0.58226552398
NDRATEEST 3.01857615171 2.64328396633 1.14197951872 0.26348928509
DIFHPLPBI(-2) 4.08249097314 0.61724814433 6.61401903042 4.2686691e-07
C -0.20342285027 0.21994421998 -0.92488381958 0.36321935434
R-squared 0.61840158662     Mean dependent var 0.02502372676
Adjusted R-squared 0.57600176291     S.D. dependent var 0.18554969500
S.E. of regression 0.12082095668     Akaike info criterion -1.26909987441
Sum squared resid 0.39413799651     Schwarz criterion -1.08406926737
Log likelihood 23.6710480532     F-statistic 14.5850037225
Durbin-Watson stat 0.57337463996     Prob(F-statistic) 7.6858698e-06
 
 
 
 
 
Total Deposit of the Banco de Los Andes 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFHPLTDEPBANDES 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1977:08 1980:03 
Included observations: 32 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IPC -1.18642090349 1.55210931027 -0.76439262088 0.45102758171
NDRATEEST 3.22746632248 3.85012670576 0.83827535277 0.40897537674
DIFHPLPBI(-2) -6.52488973843 0.94627213266 -6.89536288012 1.70653351e-07
C -0.20278572676 0.31333688647 -0.64718115078 0.52278561060
R-squared 0.646632477057     Mean dependent var -0.01919004119
Adjusted R-squared 0.608771671027     S.D. dependent var 0.30160992212
S.E. of regression 0.188651722793     Akaike info criterion -0.38135979341
Sum squared resid 0.996505230359     Schwarz criterion -0.19814280556
Log likelihood 10.10175669461     F-statistic 17.0792052486
Durbin-Watson stat 0.710295707099     Prob(F-statistic) 1.6791787e-06
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Breakdown of the Return on Equity and on Assets 
 
In general, the economic result of one company (gain/ loss) is made up of the 
difference between the revenues generated by its assets and the expenditures 
generated by its liabilities1. Formally,  
 
(1) Bt  =  (σ At – r L t) – t (σ At – r Lt) with: Bt = corporate profit or loss  
(2) Bt  =  (1- t)  (σ At – r Lt)    At = total stock of assets  
Lt = total stock of liabilities 
σ  = rate of return on assets 
r  = rate of financial cost on liabilities 
t  = rate of income tax 
 
Dividing expression (1) by the stock of corporate equity (NWt); and substituting the stock 
of assets for its equivalent: the sum of total liabilities and the firm’s ‘net worth’ [At = Lt + 
NWt]; the profit (loss) made by the firm can be re-written as:   
 
(2) τ  = (1- t) {σ + (σ - r)} (L/NW)      with: τ = return on equity   
nwt = stock of corporate net worth 
 
And, by eliminating the tax effect, the expression is as follows:  
 
(3) τ  =  σ + (σ - r) (L/NW) 
 
Equation (3) shows the ‘return on equity’ of the company (τ) as a function of the following 
variables: (a) the ratio total debt to the stock of ‘net worth’ - corporate leverage (L/NW); (b) 
the profit (loss) of the firm as a proportion of the stock of assets (σ); and (c) the financial 
cost paid on the firm’s liability (r). These three cases are analysed below.   
 
 
                                                 
1 The connection and interaction between stock (e.g. corporate structure) and flow variables (e.g. business 
performance) is developed in detail in Chapter II, Section 3  
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a. Rate of Profit as a Function of the Level of Leverage 
The ‘return on equity’ of the firm as a function of its level of leverage {τ = ƒ (L/NW)}; for 
different values of (σ) and (r) is depicted in Graph VI.3.  
 
Return on Equity and Corporate Leverage 
 
 
 
L / NW 
τ 
( σ - r ) > 0
( σ - r ) = 0
( σ - r ) < 0
 
 
Case (σ > r) positive leverage: the ‘return on assets’ is higher than the financial cost paid 
on debts. Consequently, the company would increase its rate of profit (τ) by raising its 
level of indebtedness and thus, the level of leverage (L/NW). 
Case (σ = r) neutral leverage: the ‘return on assets’ is equal to the interest rate. It means 
that the composition of the financial structure of the firm does not affect its rate of ‘return 
on equity’.  
Case (σ < r) negative leverage: the financial cost of debts is greater than the ‘return on 
assets’. It means that the level of indebtedness negatively affects the economic result of 
the firm and consequently, a reduction in the ‘debt-net worth’ ratio would improve the 
‘return on equity’.  
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b. Rate of Profit as a Function of the Return on Asset  
In order to facilitate the graphical representation of the function {τ = ƒ (σ)}, equation (3) 
can be re-expressed as follows:  
 
(4)  τ  = (1 + l) σ - r l    with: l = (L/NW) 
 
 
Return on Equity and Return on Assets 
 
l ol 1l 2
A
45º
τ
σσ 1
τ 1
 
 
In equation (4), when the leverage is zero (l = 0); the ‘return on assets’ equals the ‘return 
on equity’. It is represented by the locus at 45° in the graph above. The line (l¹) depicts 
the relationship between (τ) and (σ) when the level of indebtedness and the rate paid on 
debts are both positive. In the point (A), the ‘return on equity’ (τ) equals the ‘return on 
assets’ (σ) and the financial cost paid per unit of debt (r)2. Above the point (A), an increase 
in the level of leverage causes an increase in the rate of profit. Vice-versa when points are 
below (A).  
 
                                                 
2 Formally, this is a result derived from equation (4) when (τ = σ)  
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The effect on the rate of profit (τ) of a change in the return on assets (σ) is obtained by 
taking the total difference of equation (4) {d τ = (1 + l ) d σ}. This shows that an increase in 
the return on assets by one unit [d σ] causes an expansion of (1+ l) units in the ‘return on 
equity’ [d τ]. It should be stressed that the factor (1+ l) = {1+ (L/NW)} indicates the 
multiplier effect caused by the return on assets on the return on corporate equity. 
Accordingly, the higher the level of leverage, the higher will be the sensitivity of the ‘return 
on equity’ to changes in the return on assets of the firm.  
 
c. Rate of Profit as a Function of the Financial Cost  
The rate of profit as a function of the financial cost paid on debts {τ = ƒ (r)} is obtained 
from equation (4). Whenever the interest rate is positive in real terms, any change in this 
rate will have an inverse effect on the ‘return on equity’. On the contrary, with a negative 
real rate of interest, the company receives a subsidy equivalent to this financial cost times 
the amount of debt. In this case, an increase in the level of indebtedness will be beneficial 
for the firm, provided that there is a positive leverage (σ > r). 
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CHAPTER VI: APPENDIX B 
 
Estimation of the Net Financial Wealth of the Business Sector, 1977-82 
 
Equation (1) nfwpt =  α11 + β11 ind-outputt -  4  + β12 credpt  + β13 spreadt + β14 nfwpt -1 
Jarque-Bera Test for normality   0.464562 
Probability     0.792723 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 1.460964     Probability 0.259716
Obs*R-squared 3.520054     Probability 0.172040
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/29/05   Time: 19:17 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 2268.684 7210.571 0.314633 0.7569
ind-output(-4) -17842.26 32354.40 -0.551463 0.5885
Credp 0.045071 0.073090 0.616656 0.5456
Spread 3979.800 8234.107 0.483331 0.6350
nfwp(-1) 0.114776 0.119640 0.959346 0.3508
RESID(-1) -0.372140 0.289738 -1.284401 0.2162
RESID(-2) -0.400498 0.283352 -1.413427 0.1756
R-squared 0.146669     Mean dependent var 2.92E-12
Adjusted R-squared -0.154507     S.D. dependent var 2270.037
S.E. of regression 2439.109     Akaike info criterion 18.67515
Sum squared resid 1.01E+08     Schwarz criterion 19.01874
Log likelihood -217.1018     F-statistic 0.486988
Durbin-Watson stat 1.799926     Prob(F-statistic) 0.809074
 Source: own estimation based on the econometric results of equation (1) 
 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 4.771580     Probability 0.004543
Obs*R-squared 17.22960     Probability 0.027805
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/29/05   Time: 19:22 
Sample: 1977:1 1982:4 
Included observations: 24 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 2.08E+08 1.27E+08 1.631547 0.1236
ind-output(-4) -1.83E+09 1.09E+09 -1.675365 0.1146
Ind-output(-4)^2 3.90E+09 2.35E+09 1.662984 0.1171
credp 916.2526 1484.693 0.617132 0.5464
credp^2 -0.014188 0.023071 -0.614949 0.5478
spread -91917336 76849699 -1.196066 0.2502
spread^2 5.45E+08 2.60E+08 2.094842 0.0536
nfwp(-1) -106.1188 215.0668 -0.493422 0.6289
nfwp(-1)^2 -0.025054 0.026972 -0.928904 0.3676
R-squared 0.717900     Mean dependent var 4938357.
Adjusted R-squared 0.567447     S.D. dependent var 6789387.
S.E. of regresión 4465297.     Akaike info criterion 33.74157
Sum squared resid 2.99E+14     Schwarz criterion 34.18334
Log likelihood -395.8988     F-statistic 4.771580
Durbin-Watson stat 2.144499     Prob(F-statistic) 0.004543
Source: own estimation based on the econometric results of equation (1) 
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Estimation of the Net Worth of the Business Sector, 1977-82 
 
Equation (2) nwpt  =  α21 + β21 ind-outputt - 4  + β22 spreadt + β23 nwpt -1 
 
 
Jarque-Bera Test for normality   0.542457 
Probability     0.762442 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 0.476723     Probability 0.628433
Obs*R-squared 1.207310     Probability 0.546809
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/29/05   Time: 18:58 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -9510.539 16181.04 -0.587758 0.5640
ind-output(-4) -9789.959 35662.73 -0.274515 0.7868
credp 177.7061 8597.730 0.020669 0.9837
spread 0.089632 0.144662 0.619596 0.5433
nfwp(-1) -0.237235 0.303896 -0.780648 0.4452
RESID(-1) -0.215827 0.289831 -0.744666 0.4661
R-squared 0.050305     Mean dependent var 1.73E-11
Adjusted R-squared -0.213500     S.D. dependent var 2460.825
S.E. of regression 2710.820     Akaike info criterion 18.86021
Sum squared resid 1.32E+08     Schwarz criterion 19.15472
Log likelihood -220.3225     F-statistic 0.190689
Durbin-Watson stat 1.856843     Prob(F-statistic) 0.962257
Source: own estimation based on the econometric results of equation (2) 
 
 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 4.868081     Probability 0.004581
Obs*R-squared 15.17045     Probability 0.018972
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/29/05   Time: 19:04 
Sample: 1977:1 1982:4 
Included observations: 24 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 4.74E+08 4.17E+08 1.137550 0.2711
ind-output(-4) -3.09E+09 1.38E+09 -2.237680 0.0389
Ind-output(-4)^2 6.66E+09 2.94E+09 2.265027 0.0369
credp -9547529. 85773667 -0.111311 0.9127
credp^2 3.07E+08 3.03E+08 1.013068 0.3252
spread -1977.831 6812.514 -0.290323 0.7751
spread^2 0.008446 0.026486 0.318884 0.7537
R-squared 0.632102     Mean dependent var 5803342.
Adjusted R-squared 0.502256     S.D. dependent var 7893227.
S.E. of regression 5568749.     Akaike info criterion 34.14173
Sum squared resid 5.27E+14     Schwarz criterion 34.48533
Log likelihood -402.7008     F-statistic 4.868081
Durbin-Watson stat 1.949761     Prob(F-statistic) 0.004581
Source: own estimation based on the econometric results of equation (2) 
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Estimation of Assets under Judicial Supervision (‘concurso’), 1977-81 
 
Equation (3)   assbkrt =  α1 + β1 lendrt  + β2 levert   
 
 
Jarque-Bera Test for normality   1.218046 
Probability     0.543882 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 0.478343     Probability 0.631137
Obs*R-squared 1.255234     Probability 0.533863
  
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/29/05   Time: 19:40 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.146031 0.707280 0.206468 0.8399
lendr 0.011930 0.092052 0.129603 0.8990
lever(-3) 0.100062 0.510126 0.196151 0.8478
RESID(-1) -0.300741 0.313085 -0.960573 0.3557
RESID(-2) -0.165976 0.352451 -0.470918 0.6461
R-squared 0.073837     Mean dependent var -4.24E-16
Adjusted R-squared -0.234884     S.D. dependent var 0.497725
S.E. of regression 0.553099     Akaike info criterion 1.893367
Sum squared resid 3.671016     Schwarz criterion 2.138430
Log likelihood -11.09362     F-statistic 0.239172
Durbin-Watson stat 1.800992     Prob(F-statistic) 0.910746
Source: own estimation based on the econometric results of equation (3) 
 
 
 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 0.118308     Probability 0.973384
Obs*R-squared 0.644978     Probability 0.957937
     
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/29/05   Time: 19:42 
Sample: 1977:4 1981:4 
Included observations: 17 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.707040 1.787235 0.395605 0.6993
lever(-3) 0.690126 2.684783 0.257051 0.8015
lever(-3)^2 0.245499 0.984687 0.249317 0.8073
lendr 0.036276 0.059958 0.605032 0.5564
lendr^2 -0.011932 0.023666 -0.504183 0.6233
R-squared 0.037940     Mean dependent var 0.233158
Adjusted R-squared -0.282747     S.D. dependent var 0.258235
S.E. of regression 0.292473     Akaike info criterion 0.619038
Sum squared resid 1.026484     Schwarz criterion 0.864101
Log likelihood -0.261823     F-statistic 0.118308
Durbin-Watson stat 2.508576     Prob(F-statistic) 0.973384
Source: own estimation based on the econometric results of equation (3) 
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